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Reviewed work(s):

Source: *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997-1998), pp. 74-100

Published by: [The MIT Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539358>

Accessed: 03/04/2012 11:18

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Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy

Philip H. Gordon

In early February 1996, after the United States had engineered a peace agreement for former Yugoslavia that the Europeans had failed to bring about after four years of intervention, a senior U.S. official concluded out loud what many other observers had already begun to think: "Unless the United States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really gets done."¹ Only a few days later, after a successful U.S. diplomatic intervention to prevent a conflict between Greece and Turkey over an Aegean island, that same official commented that Europeans were "literally sleeping through the night" as President Bill Clinton mediated the dispute on the phone.² Five years after the European Union (EU) had signed a treaty announcing the creation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the perception had begun to emerge—not only among Americans but among many Europeans as well—that the EU's efforts had failed, and that the United States was more than ever the diplomatic and military leader of the Western world.³

Comparing the EU's foreign and security policy to that of the United States is, of course, unfair. The CFSP project is far more limited than the creation of

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This article was first presented as part of a Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Europe and Transatlantic Relations in the 1990s. A different version of the paper, focusing more on European Union institutional issues and less on security than this article, will be published in Andrew Moravcsik, ed., *The Prospects for European Integration: Deepening, Diversity, Democratization* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Council on Foreign Relations, forthcoming 1998). I would like to thank Rosa Alonso, Amaya Bloch-Lainé, Fraser Cameron, John Chipman, Charles Grant, Charles Kupchan, Andrew Moravcsik, John Roper, Gideon Rose, and the participants in the Council Study Group for their comments and suggestions; responsibility for the arguments is of course mine alone.

1. Then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke, cited in William Drozdiak, "Europe's Dallying Amid Crises Scares Its Critics," *International Herald Tribune*, February 8, 1996.

2. Cited in Lionel Barber and Bruce Clark, "US Polices Aegean 'While EU Sleeps,'" *Financial Times*, February 9, 1996.

3. This also seems to be the view of U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen, who has said that Bosnia "was principally a European problem to be solved. The Europeans did not move. It pointed out that the Europeans do not act in the absence of American leadership." Remarks reported by Barbara Starr, "Cohen Establishing His Doctrine as Clinton and Congress Look On," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, February 5, 1997, p. 19.

a political-military capability like that of the United States; CFSP mechanisms and procedures have been in place for only a short time; and the obstacles to foreign policy cooperation among longstanding sovereign states with their own histories, perspectives, interests, and bureaucracies are obvious. Yet the comparison—and the disparaging remarks from abroad—do serve to highlight just how far the European Union is from possessing the sort of unity, credibility, and military power necessary to be an influential actor in global diplomatic and security affairs. Those who had hoped in 1991 that the EU's CFSP would be worthy of such a name—and there were plenty of them at the time—have been largely disappointed.⁴

Whether or not the European Union is able to develop into a unified and effective foreign and security policy actor is important, not only for those Europeans seeking to enhance their own influence on the world stage but for the structure of world politics itself. An EU of nearly 400 million people and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of more than \$8 trillion that was able to unite its diplomatic and military potential could easily challenge the United States' current status as "lone superpower"; exert influence over the Middle East peace process and security in the Persian Gulf; gain increased economic and commercial leverage from its international security policy; begin to play more of a role in Asian diplomacy and security; and, perhaps most important, create a new balance within a NATO alliance that is currently dominated by the United States. An EU that remains weak and fragmented in foreign policy, however, will continue to be the subordinate partner that it is today—dependent on U.S. leadership within the Atlantic Alliance, a relatively minor diplomatic actor in the wider world, and unable to deal with security crises even on its own periphery.

For decades, and in particular since the 1991 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), the EU has been trying to enhance its ability to act diplomatically and militarily abroad. This article examines the recent record of the EU's efforts to do so and prospects for doing so in the future. My argument is that contrary to the ambitious rhetoric of EU officials and treaties, the analyses (or hopes) of a number of scholars, and some theories of European integration, the prospects for a unified and effective EU foreign and security policy are

4. The most famous example of exaggerated aspirations for an autonomous European foreign policy were the comments by the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos that the EU's intervention in Yugoslavia was "the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States." See Joel Haveman, "EC Urges End to Yugoslav Violence, Threatens Aid Cut," *Los Angeles Times*, June 29, 1991, p. A11.

poor, and likely to remain so. For reasons explained below, the European Union is highly effective in determining and implementing common external aid and trade policies, but it is not a very unified or credible diplomatic actor, is poorly equipped to deal quickly and effectively with external crises, and has a vastly underdeveloped military force projection capability given its size and economic strength. As I demonstrate by examining theories of European integration and the record of CFSP so far, this situation is unlikely to change significantly even over the longer term. So long as the United States is willing to remain engaged in European security and in NATO, and unless some unforeseen and overwhelming common external challenge were to emerge, the EU is likely to remain a fragmented and incomplete international actor, dependent on the United States for diplomatic leadership and military support.

The next section of this article looks at alternative theories for thinking about European integration and examines the conditions under which foreign and security policy integration would be likely. Those conditions have not yet been met. The following section considers the record of CFSP since its creation in 1991 and argues that—even after efforts to improve it in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty—its achievements have not been much more significant than those of the informal European Political Cooperation (EPC) that preceded it. The fourth section considers European attempts to develop a military capability, either through the EU's fledgling defense arm, the Western European Union (WEU), or as an "identity" within NATO, and argues that neither of these efforts comes close to freeing Europe from its military dependence on the United States. In the final section I ask if the longer-term prospects for an effective and unified European foreign and security policy are better than the prospects for the shorter term, and show that—barring unforeseen and unlikely circumstances such as the rise of a new common threat or a U.S. disengagement from Europe—they probably are not.

Theories of European Integration and CFSP

To assess the prospects for integration in the area of foreign and security policy, it is useful to reflect on past patterns of European integration, and on the theories that best explain the conditions under which integration proceeds in different functional areas. It is always possible that the coming years will see a sharp departure from previous patterns of European integration, but this is unlikely; in the absence of compelling reasons to believe that these past patterns will not hold, the best way to know what to expect in the future is to try to understand what has happened in the past, and why.

In the theoretical literature on the European Union, there are two broadly competing explanations, which might be called “functionalist” and “intergovernmentalist,” of how and why the process of integration proceeds.⁵ The first set of theories—“functionalist” or “neofunctionalist”—emphasizes the process by which power is gradually transferred to a “new center” as integration in some areas makes it more necessary in others; institutions, once set up, push to expand their power; leaders and people call for integration in new domains as they see its success in others; and transnational elites and interest groups tend to “socialize” and develop common views and interests. Ultimately, as power is transferred to the new, central institutions, people come to transfer their expectations and loyalty to the new bodies. Such functionalist theories dominated explanations of European integration during the 1960s, as the then-European Economic Community was first moving forward, but largely went out of fashion during the 1970s as European integration stalled.⁶

The second set of theories—“intergovernmentalist”—emphasizes national interests, bargaining, lowest-common-denominator deals, and the unwillingness of states (or at least large states) to compromise their core national interests. The intergovernmental paradigm has been predominant since the 1980s, when the limits of functionalism became clear and alternative explanations for the European Community’s unexpected revival in the mid-1980s were required. Although the success of the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) and the decision at Maastricht in 1991 to proceed with monetary union stimulated renewed scholarly interest in new versions of the old functionalist theories, the dominant explanation of the Community’s 1980s revival emphasized the importance of states.⁷

Functionalism and intergovernmentalism are not only competing descriptions of integration processes; they carry policy implications as well, particu-

5. Here “integration” is defined as either the delegation of sovereignty to new central institutions or the sharing, or “pooling,” of sovereignty in common institutions.

6. For a concise explanation and discussion of the literature on functionalism, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 473–482. The EEC, European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom—the “European Communities” (EC)—formally became the “European Union” with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. I use “Union” except when referring to a specific historical point.

7. The SEA strengthened community institutions and launched the “1992” program for completing the EC’s single economic market. For the renewed interest in functionalism—but also the emphasis on states and governments—see Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 1–40; and Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act,” in Keohane and Hoffmann, *The New European Community*, pp. 41–84.

larly where institution building is concerned. Confidence in functionalist explanations for integration leads to the belief that the setting up of institutions itself should be a goal, because those institutions will be used, confidence in them will grow, their legitimacy will become established, and the ideology and momentum of integration will be maintained. In response to the intergovernmentalists' view that institutions cannot work unless common goals are shared, functionalists have faith that the institutions themselves can have an effect on the perception of common goals. Intergovernmentalists thus tend to take a "pragmatic" view of what is possible and seek to keep institution building within those limits, whereas functionalists believe that the European integration process is about *changing* what is possible, and *stretching* those limits. This debate about "vision" and momentum on one hand, and "pragmatism" on the other, has often marked the difference between French and British views about the European integration process.⁸

Which set of theories explains more? Despite the recent preference for intergovernmental approaches (which, as argued below, are more relevant to CFSP), it must be admitted that functionalism still has a certain logic, and that functionalist pressures do exist, even if they are not always strong enough to provoke deeper integration. Functionalism has been badly served by the ultimate expectation of a "transfer of loyalties" to a new center, which has not happened, but the lack of which should not discredit the explanatory power of the theory. The process has hardly been rapid or complete, but it does appear, as functionalists expected, that the formation of a customs union led to pressures for a completed single market; that the creation of a single market resulted in increased pressure for monetary union; that monetary union and other forms of integration have led to calls for further democratization of the Union; and that the common interests and perspectives resulting from all this integration increases pressure for a common foreign and security policy to represent and pursue the interests of the Union. All along, EU elites and institutions have pushed to expand their power, and the perceived successes in some areas (like the single market and common commercial policy) and perceived failures in others (like monetary and foreign policy) have led to calls

8. French leaders (including Jean Monnet, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, François Mitterrand, and Jacques Delors) have often explicitly supported the setting up of institutions—like the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Monetary System, or the Eurocorps—on the grounds that their very existence would propel the process of integration forward and keep the notion of "Europe" alive, whereas British leaders have tended to oppose institutions—including all of the above—unless their immediate utility could be demonstrated.

for integration in new domains. These pressures have not always resulted in further integration, but it is worth noting that they exist.⁹

It is also clear from the past forty years, however, that the member states of the European Union have proven eminently capable of resisting the pressures and incentives of integration as well as the lobbying of institutions and interest groups, and that integration moves forward only when member states have sufficiently similar perceived interests (government-preference convergence) that the potential gains of integration (through increased scale and the absence of interstate friction) are greater than the costs of lost sovereignty. As a general rule, only when it is in the mutual interests of the large states of the Union are common arrangements set up, and only when it is in those states' interest are those arrangements abided by in times of difficulty. In the mid-1960s, for example, the French government concluded that it was not in its interest to allow the strengthening of the European Commission or the increased use of majority voting; it therefore instigated the "Luxembourg Compromise," a de facto national veto on legislation that nearly all member states found useful in the following decades.¹⁰ In the early 1970s, despite the pressures for and setting up of an instrument to coordinate monetary policy (the "snake") and calls for a full monetary union, the oil crisis and the Middle East war of 1973 drove apart EC economic policies and forced the dismantling of the monetary arrangements. European integration moved forward again in the 1980s with the SEA, but only, as Andrew Moravcsik has shown, because the preferences and perceived interests of the main EC governments converged at that time and on that issue, and integration proceeded in such a way as to meet the minimum requirements of the major EC states.¹¹ In the early 1990s, just as scholars had begun once again to pay close attention to regional integration theory, diverging national interests of the main EC states led some of them to abandon their revived attempts to harmonize monetary policy and exchange rates (the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System), and voters in

9. On the pressures toward integration and the process of "spillover," see Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 243, 283–317; and Keohane and Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," in Keohane and Hoffmann, *The New European Community*, pp. 18–22.

10. For details, see William Nicoll, "The Luxembourg Compromise," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1984), pp. 35–43.

11. See Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act." See also David R. Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences," in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., *Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 23–74.

France and Denmark showed in referenda that the popularity of even limited integration was not widespread. The fledgling CFSP showed its limits as soon as it was announced when member states were divided over how to deal with the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

The conclusion from even this brief sketch of the apparent processes of and prerequisites for European integration thus seems clear, and it is relevant to any assessment of the prospects for further integration in the area of foreign and security policy. The conclusion is that states only share their sovereignty, let alone *surrender* sovereignty to a new institution, when the following conditions hold.

1. The perceived gains of common action through the advantages of scale outweigh the potential costs of lost sovereignty or national prestige.¹²
2. Government preferences or perceived national interests have converged sufficiently so that the first condition holds (because lost sovereignty is likely to matter less when EC member governments have similar interests and ideologies).
3. Particular interests of large states remain protected either through the application of strict limits or conditions to the terms of integration or through the "opting-out" of the state with the particular interests.

These conditions have held in the area of commercial policy, where the gains of scale in internal free trade and through a common external bargaining position outweighed the costs of giving up national commercial policies (condition 1), and the particular interest of French agriculture was protected (condition 3). They have held for the completion of the internal market where the abandonment of the national veto was seen as necessary to pass important single-market legislation (condition 1); and since by the mid-1980s all EC governments had accepted the virtues of economic liberalism and deregulation, the risks of sacrificed sovereignty were perceived as small, even by the British government at the time (condition 2). And more recently, all three conditions played important roles in the area of monetary policy: the perceived

12. The advantages of scale include (1) the added leverage that comes from a unified bargaining position; (2) the benefits that derive from avoiding EU states pursuing *competing* interests; and (3) the possibility of using Community prestige, means, institutions, and financing, which can enhance leverage and possibly facilitate more efficient implementation, for the pursuit of certain objectives. For a discussion of why common action might enhance leverage, see Roy H. Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 3, 154.

gains of unity were greater than the lost sovereignty cost of all the governments that agreed to participate (condition 1); the first condition held because all those governments had come to accept the virtues of independent central banks and anti-inflationary currency policies (condition 2); and Germany protected its particular interest in a stable currency by requiring strict criteria for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), and Britain and Denmark reserved the right not to participate, because for them, the first condition did not apply (condition 3). A similar analysis could be done of the agreement to allow open borders among the signatories of the Schengen accords as well as of the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty (on working conditions), but not yet for foreign and security policy, for which the states still perceive the costs of integration to be greater than the potential benefits.

It is also worth noting what the past record says when integration does *not* happen: it does not happen simply because states want to keep up the momentum toward functional integration. Institutions are important in forming common perceptions, and there is certainly a bias toward EU cooperation and political solidarity whenever possible. But the record suggests that states take only cosmetic steps toward integration when their perceived interests are not served by accepting real integration. European states may well one day accept an integrated foreign policy simply for the sake of creating a true union, but that would be breaking with a pattern of functional cooperation that has evolved over decades.

From the preceding analysis, it appears clear that the prerequisite for the development of foreign and security policy integration is a convergence of the perceived interests of the main member states, at least to the point where they either (1) no longer fear that the common policy would diverge significantly from their national policy; or (2) are compelled by the development of an important common interest to believe that a common policy is worth sacrificing national autonomy. States will only take the difficult and self-denying decision to share their foreign policy sovereignty if the gains of common action are seen to be so great that sacrificing sovereignty is worth it, or if their interests converge to the point that little loss of sovereignty is entailed.

I argue below that these conditions have not held in the past, do not currently hold, and are not likely to hold in the future. In foreign and security policy, the perceived benefits of institutionalized cooperation seem so low that governments still feel they can indulge cultural, historical, or domestic political imperatives. Before showing why, however, it is necessary to make clear just what is understood here by common foreign and security policy, because the

discussion of CFSP is often plagued by ambiguity and confusion about just what is being discussed. Indeed, many apparent “disagreements” about CFSP—both prescriptive and descriptive—are not really disagreements at all, but simply reflections of a failure to agree on terms and state them clearly.

The first ambiguity with CFSP is that it potentially covers a wide range of different things, from long-term economic aid to crisis reaction and potential military interventions. Thus if one analyst has in mind the EU’s long-term approach to sub-Saharan Africa or Ukraine, and another is thinking about the Gulf War or the Yugoslav crisis, it is not surprising that they can come to very different conclusions about how successful CFSP has been, what its prospects are, and how best to fix it.¹³ As noted earlier, the EU is in fact highly effective at using trade and foreign aid in support of its long-term economic interests, but it is less good at crisis reaction or diplomatic and military intervention. I define “foreign and security policy” broadly, and focus on the diplomatic and security aspects more than the economic ones, for these are the areas the CFSP was designed to improve.

The second potential ambiguity is about what “strengthening the CFSP”—a goal of all the member states of the EU—really means. “Progress toward CFSP” could conceivably be defined according to how integrated it is (as opposed to intergovernmental), how global it is (as opposed to regional), how military it is (as opposed to civilian), how well articulated it is (as opposed to poorly explained), or how well it can deal with immediate crises (as opposed to pursuing long-term goals). There is no “right” or “wrong” definition of progress, but it is important to be clear just which definition one has in mind. Along any of these axes, I believe the notion of “making progress” toward CFSP must involve the creation of institutional, legal, or political mechanisms to promote and implement common perspectives or actions. For the word “cooperation” to have meaning, it must to some degree entail getting states to do what they otherwise would not have done, either through mechanisms to promote convergence of views (through common analysis and consultation),

13. See, for example, Philip Zelikow’s sharp critique of CFSP, based on the (unstated) assumption that it is primarily about military crisis response (like the Gulf and Bosnia wars, the two cases he considers). The critique is trenchant if crisis response is the issue at hand; if long-term foreign orientation is the issue, the critique misses the mark. And contrast this with the view of Eberhard Rhein of the European Commission, who in listing the means available to a state for foreign policy—treaty policy, economic cooperation, and diplomatic measures—does not even mention military force. Not surprisingly, Rhein’s judgment of CFSP is more positive than Zelikow’s. See Philip Zelikow, “The Masque of Institutions,” *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 9–10; and Eberhard Rhein, “Besser als ihr Ruf: die EU Aussenpolitik,” *Internationale Politik* (Summer 1996), p. 55.

through deals in the expectation of mutual gain, or, most significantly, through binding decision-making institutions. Simply happening to agree on the same policy—say, to support democracy in South Africa—is very important, but it does not require a common foreign and security policy to bring it about.¹⁴

Finally, CFSP can be ambiguous because any normative judgment of it depends on the perspective of the judge. Depending on the level of analysis—the EU itself, one or another EU member state, outside actors such as the United States, or world order in general—CFSP will have different merits and drawbacks. Foreign policy integration might, for example, be in the interest of the EU as an organization, or of small member states with little independence to lose, but it might not be in the interest of other states, or of outside actors. Rather than assert categorically that CFSP is or is not a good thing, it is important to keep in mind the different ways integration would affect the various actors in the process, and the way in which these differences could affect the outcome of negotiations. Different actors will make different assessments of whether CFSP would be in their interest, and opposing views will not necessarily be “wrong.”

The Record of CFSP

The CFSP created in the 1991 Treaty on European Union is but the latest in a long series of attempts over the past forty years to coordinate the foreign policies of the members of the European Community. The first successful attempt to do so—after the failed European Defense Community (EDC) of the early 1950s and the unsuccessful Fouchet Plans of the early 1960s—was “European Political Cooperation,” conceived at the EC’s Hague summit of 1969, which came into being in 1970.¹⁵ EPC was a network of European foreign

14. It might be worth noting that when the EU uses the word “common” in other functional areas (“common agricultural policy,” “common currency,” “common fisheries policy,” etc.), it normally refers to policies that are under the authority of EU institutions (such as the European Commission and Parliament or a European Central Bank), which go beyond simple intergovernmental coordination and genuinely imply joint implementation and binding central decisions. The reason the United States (or any other state) has a true “CFSP” is not because its “member states” have the same interests and always agree on what to do, but because it has legitimate, centralized institutions with the authority to take binding decisions.

15. The EDC was a French plan devised in 1950 to create an integrated European army. It was rejected by France’s own National Assembly in 1954. The Fouchet Plans, named after French President Charles de Gaulle’s adviser Christian Fouchet, were de Gaulle’s attempts to create a European political-military grouping distinct from the United States. The French National Assembly rejected the EDC largely because it was too integrated and too Atlanticist, and the Fouchet Plans were rejected by the Belgians and Dutch in 1962 because they were not integrated and not

ministers, political directors, and other diplomats who sought to meet regularly to exchange information and to coordinate their foreign policies as much as possible.¹⁶ It had no formal status in the EC treaties and was entirely intergovernmental. EPC was a recognition by European leaders that in the absence of a more integrated approach, regular meetings and discussions about foreign policy were better than nothing.

The 1987 Single European Act gave EPC a place in the EC treaties for the first time. It gave the European Commission a role in the "political and economic aspects of security" and called on EC governments not to block, wherever possible, "the formation of a consensus" (Article 30.1). Even with these strengthened provisions, EPC played a limited role in European foreign policymaking in the late 1980s. Its outcomes were mostly declaratory, always based on consensus, and usually focused on relatively peripheral or uncontroversial issues (such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Horn of Africa, and the Iran-Iraq War) rather than core issues (such as dealing with the Soviet Union, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, or defense). At times EPC even seemed to get in the way of rapid EC foreign policy decision making, for example when European leaders took weeks before even making a statement on the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or when they failed to find anything at all to say about the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983.¹⁷ One of the most successful areas for EPC was its role in coordinating European policy toward the Middle East, beginning with the Euro-Arab dialogue of the late 1970s and culminating with the June 1980 Venice Declaration on the Arab-Israeli peace process.¹⁸ Even in this area, however, although EC policies were fairly well coordinated, they were primarily declaratory and had little actual effect. When the Middle East peace process finally got off the ground in

Atlanticist enough. This intra-European debate over integration and Atlanticism was one of the main reasons for the inability to agree on foreign policy cooperation for so long, and it still divides Europeans today.

16. For an excellent study of EPC written by an "insider," see Simon J. Nutall, *European Political Co-operation* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1992).

17. See Délégation de l'Assemblée Nationale pour les Communautés Européennes, Pierre Lelouche, rapporteur, *L'Europe et sa sécurité: bilan et avenir de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l'Union Européenne* (Paris: Assemblée Nationale, May 31, 1994), p. 14.

18. The Venice Declaration distinguished EU policy from U.S. policy by emphasizing the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and calling for the Palestine Liberation Organization to have a role in the peace process. See Conseil Européen, "Déclaration du 17^e Conseil Européen sur le dialogue euro-arabe, et la situation au Proche-Orient," Venice, June 12–13, 1980; and Christin Marschall, "The European Community and the Arab World, 1972–1991: From Economics to Politics," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 56–80.

October 1991 after the Gulf War, its official sponsors were the United States and the moribund Soviet Union, and the EC played hardly any role at all.

EPC was not without purpose or effect, and European diplomats noted over the years that regular contacts led to better understanding of one another's positions and facilitated a common approach.¹⁹ EPC also helped harmonize EC member state positions on a range of issues in regions like Latin America and Asia, where local actors were unable to play one EC state off against another, because all members were following the same line. But if a habit of seeking common positions existed, it was limited; and a common foreign and security policy did not result, which became sorely evident in Europe's responses to the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis. EC member states had national constituencies and interests, and EPC did not. Nor did the Community have the institutional means to impose a common position or back up its diplomacy with military force. As the 1990s began, European foreign policies were still nationally made, with EPC playing little more than a consultative function.

CFSP was a response to EPC's perceived inadequacy in the face of the momentous change that took place in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War and German unification, France became convinced that the EC's foreign policy process had to be strengthened, if only to "tie in" a now fully sovereign Germany; and Germany, long a strong proponent of all aspects of European integration, readily agreed.²⁰ The result was the 1990–91 European Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on political union, which was added to the IGC on monetary union already scheduled for that year, and which concluded at the Maastricht summit of December 1991.

The Maastricht Treaty created a new, three-pillar structure for the European Union, with the European Community as the first pillar, the CFSP as the second, and Home and Justice Affairs as the third. Only the first pillar would be governed by the integrated community institutions (the European Commission, Parliament, and Court of Justice), while the other two—thus CFSP—would remain almost exclusively intergovernmental. This was a disappointment for those states that supported foreign policy integration within the

19. See Christopher Hill, "European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model, or Flop?" in Reinhardt Rummel, ed., *The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 33.

20. On the developments leading up to the CFSP agreement at the Maastricht summit of December 1991, see Mathais Jopp, *The Strategic Implications of European Integration*, Adelphi Paper No. 290 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1994), pp. 6–12; and James B. Steinberg, "An Ever Closer Union": *European Integration and Its Implications for the Future of U.S.-European Relations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), pp. 50–60.

European Community, but it reflected the unwillingness of a number of member states (not only Britain, but also others including France) to abandon their right of foreign policy initiative to the Commission.

Like many previous steps on the road to European integration, the CFSP created at Maastricht reflected a lowest-common-denominator compromise among the competing visions and interests of the EC's member states. In this case, the compromise was between one group of states, led by France and Germany, that sought significantly to strengthen the existing EPC and to give it more of an integrated and binding character, and another group, led by the United Kingdom, that was more cautious about giving up its national foreign policy prerogatives and sought to avoid any possible threat to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. CFSP made no significant progress toward the adoption of majority voting in foreign policy; and although it claimed to deal with "all aspects related to the security of the union" and for the first time referred to "the eventual framing of a common defense policy" (Title V, Article J.4), it took no practical steps toward the realization of this goal and gave no defense role at all to the integrated institutions.

The result of the Maastricht negotiations on CFSP is thus a good demonstration of the theory of European integration described earlier: that integration is accepted only when the perceived gains of scale clearly outweigh the costs of lost sovereignty, at least for the large member states. EC leaders came together at Maastricht to negotiate a common foreign and security policy in the wake of momentous international change, but despite the ostensible French and German enthusiasm for the project (and their mutual goal of an ever closer Europe), they agreed only on limited institutional change, not a qualitative leap forward. The prerequisites for integration had not been met.

At their 1996–97 intergovernmental conference (concluded in Amsterdam in June 1997), foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty partly to reassess and strengthen CFSP, EU member states considered a wide range of institutional proposals for improving foreign policy cooperation. The consensus among observers and officials alike was that CFSP had not been effective, and some member states went into the IGC determined to make bold moves in the foreign policy area. Spurred on by the admitted failure in Bosnia, the need to find some functional area in which to pursue integration lest momentum be slowed, and ongoing uncertainty about the American role in Europe, many EU leaders thought foreign policy might be the most promising area for further EU integration, especially as the monetary union project appeared to be in trouble.

Yet, not surprisingly if one accepts the analysis offered here, the outcome of the IGC was extremely limited, plagued by some of the same divisions among

member states and unwillingness to give up sovereignty that had been present at Maastricht and before. The changes made were limited to the setting up of a foreign policy planning and analysis unit at the EU Council of Ministers; the appointment as High Representative for foreign policy of an EU bureaucrat (the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers), rather than a prominent politician, as some member states wanted; and closer cooperation—but no merger—between the EU and its defense arm, the WEU. Majority voting, it was agreed, would be used only in the “implementation” phases of foreign policy, whereas the strategic choices would still have to be agreed unanimously.²¹

How effective has the CFSP been under the provisions developed since it was first negotiated in 1991? Even the most enthusiastic supporters of a CFSP would accept the EU Commission's own assessment that “the aim of a substantial improvement has not been achieved.”²² The EU has, it is true, established more than twenty-five so-called common positions, including those on economic relations with Libya, Sudan, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia; on general policy objectives or a common approach toward Ukraine, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and East Timor; and on functional subjects such as blinding lasers, the biological and chemical weapons convention, and the colocation of diplomatic missions. It has made an unprecedented number of joint declarations on foreign policy (roughly two per week), and taken more than three dozen “joint actions,” including supervising elections in South Africa and Russia; delivering aid to the Palestinian authority; organizing humanitarian aid in Bosnia and administering the Bosnian city of Mostar; supporting the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and negotiating and implementing the Stability Pact (or Balladur Plan) to ensure stability in Central Europe.²³

21. The treaty does allow for a form of “constructive abstention,” whereby a state could abstain from a vote, allowing the decision to go ahead but without having to implement it. For the specifics of what was agreed at Amsterdam, see Intergovernmental Conference, Amsterdam European Council, *An Effective and Coherent External Policy*, chapter 12, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy,” available from the European Union website.

22. See European Commission, *Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Commission Report for the Reflection Group* (Brussels: EC, May 1995), p. 63. A recent French analysis has also admitted that CFSP “has not been able to play a determining role.” See “Quelle identité politique extérieure?” in Institut Français des Relations Internationales, *Ramsès: 1996* (Paris: Dunod, 1996), p. 320.

23. On the common positions and joint actions, see European Commission, “List of Joint Actions Adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993–September 1996),” and “List of Common Positions Adopted by the Council since the Entry into Force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993–September 1996),” *European Dialogue* (Brussels: European Commission, 1997), pp. 18–20; and Barbara-Christine Ryba, “La politique étrangère et de sécurité commune: Mode d'emploi et bilan d'une année d'application,” *Revue du marché commun de l'union européenne*, No. 384 (January 1995), pp. 15–35.

But CFSP has been absent from other, more important (or more controversial) aspects of European foreign and security policy. Intelligence collection and analysis is still a national responsibility, and common EU representation in international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council is not even considered, although the Amsterdam Treaty does call for "coordinated action in international organizations" (Article J.9). In the Middle East, the EU has continued to seek a greater diplomatic role and in October 1996 appointed its own special representative there; but analysts agree that Europe's diplomatic role remains extremely limited relative to its economic presence in and assistance to the region, and that EU member states cannot agree on how the EU should interact with the United States in the peace process.²⁴ Even those states supposedly most enthusiastic about developing a united EU capacity for action, such as France, have been unwilling to abandon their own freedom of maneuver in areas of national importance. The unilateral French intervention in Rwanda in June 1994, the decision later that year to conduct a final series of nuclear tests (condemned at the United Nations by eleven of the sixteen EU member states), and the immediate dispatch of the French foreign minister to Lebanon in the April 1996 crisis in the Middle East are just some of the recent examples of CFSP's inability either to constrain continued national foreign policy behavior or to offer an acceptable alternative to it. Greece's 1994–95 economic embargo of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, Britain's isolated support for U.S. air strikes on Iraq in September 1996, and France and Germany's unwillingness to agree to an April 1997 EU resolution critical of China's human rights record (lest it imperil their economic contracts with Beijing) were all further examples of cases in which certain EU states had distinct perceived national interests and pursued national foreign and security policies to protect those interests. Most recently, Italy's April 1997 decision to organize a peace enforcement mission to Albania outside the context of either the EU or WEU, because of a lack of consensus or ability to compel joint action in those organizations, demonstrated the enduring limits of CFSP.

Close consultations among member states have been pursued through the CFSP, and the general bias toward "systematic cooperation among member states," although difficult to measure, does seem to exist. But in the areas that

24. See Rosemary Hollis, "Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997), pp. 15–29; IISS, "Europe and the Middle East Peace Process," *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (December 1996); and Kenneth Stein, "Transatlantische Partnerschaft im Nahen Osten?" *Internationale Politik* (9/1996), pp. 33–39.

the Maastricht Treaty was supposed to strengthen—the areas in which the EU was not already competent through its effective first pillar—CFSP has been ineffective. Judged by any of the possible criteria for “progress” discussed earlier—degree of unity of member states, ability to act globally, ability to intervene militarily, crisis reaction, or even presentation of policy—CFSP has not been significantly better than EPC. Unless and until EU member states agree that there is more to be gained than lost from more successful binding institutional integration, these weaknesses are unlikely to disappear.

The EU as a Military Actor

Creating a truly effective common European foreign and security policy would mean endowing the EU with the military power to back up its diplomatic and economic initiatives. It is precisely in this area, however, that the EU has been most lacking, and where prospects for further integration are most doubtful. Whereas some member states, most notably France, have long sought to give Europe a more independent strategic capability, others—led by Britain—have always resisted doing anything that might seem to threaten either NATO’s primary role in the defense and military field or close relations with the United States. Even France, which from the 1960s to the 1980s urged its European partners to join it in the creation of an independent European military capability, was always reluctant to embed this capability in the EU lest its own national independence be constrained.²⁵ As a result, and despite repeated demonstrations that European foreign policy cooperation unsupported by military strength could not reach its full potential (a consequential example was the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein refused even to meet an EU delegation), an integrated or effective EU military policy remained an elusive goal.²⁶

25. See Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

26. Saddam Hussein refused to meet the “Troika” of current, past, and upcoming holders of the rotating EU presidency (who are supposed to represent the Union’s foreign policy), and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz only agreed to do so if they came to Baghdad. The Soviets gave the EU little more respect, failing to tell the Troika about their own peace offer when the EU leaders were in Moscow. This episode was a demonstration not only of the EU’s lack of credibility in a military crisis, but also of the shortcomings of the way EU foreign policy was represented, because the Troika at that time happened to consist of Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg—not exactly Europe’s major military powers. On the EU and the Gulf crisis, see Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, eds., *Western Europe and the Gulf* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1992), p. 131.

At the December 1991 Maastricht summit, despite the sense of urgency created by the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia three months before, EU leaders could not agree on the extent to which defense and military policy should be brought into the Union; even France, despite its support for European strategic autonomy, was still reluctant to take steps that would constrain its military sovereignty. The compromise reached was to declare that the WEU was both the “European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance” and the “defense arm of the EU,” and, as noted earlier, to create a nonbinding linkage between the EU and WEU. At the Amsterdam summit of June 1997, designed in part to improve the functioning of these mechanisms, France and Germany (with support from Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Greece) put forward a proposal calling for a specific timetable for the gradual merger of the EU and WEU.²⁷ This project was once again stopped by Britain and the neutral states, determined to keep defense and military affairs out of the EU. All that could be agreed instead was an unspecified commitment to “enhance cooperation” between the two organizations, that EU members that are not members of the WEU could participate in some WEU activities, and that an EU-WEU merger could take place “should the European Council so decide.” In other words, the right of member states to continue to block a WEU-EU merger has been preserved.²⁸

In the absence of a consensus to turn the EU itself into a defense organization, European efforts to enhance military cooperation have revolved around the strengthening of an independent WEU. Although in existence since 1948, the WEU has always been subordinate to NATO (created the following year) as Western Europe’s primary defense organization, and only over the past decade has it played any operational role. The WEU’s first military operation ever, in 1988, was the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. Since then it has participated in a naval blockade of Iraq during the 1990–91 Gulf War, helped enforce sanctions on Yugoslavia along the Danube River and in the Adriatic Sea, and provided a police force for the Bosnian city of Mostar from 1994 to 1996. These were all very limited operations, however, and were arguably undertaken more as a way of giving the WEU some sort of a role—in the name of European “identity”—than because the WEU was best equipped for the job.²⁹

27. See the proposal outlined by French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette and his Italian counterpart Lamberto Dini in “Innovare pour progresser,” *Le Monde*, March 25, 1997.

28. See Intergovernmental Conference, Amsterdam European Council, *An Effective and Coherent External Policy*.

29. Indeed, in some cases, such as the enforcement of the Yugoslav arms embargo in the Adriatic during 1992–93, the WEU’s efforts to stake out a role for itself actually diminished the efficiency of the operation by causing confusion between the WEU and NATO as to their respective roles,

Over the past decade, and particularly since the Gulf and Yugoslavia wars, European leaders have attempted to give the WEU more of an operational capability and role. At their June 19, 1992, meeting in the Petersberg castle outside Bonn, WEU leaders agreed to strengthen the WEU's operational role, in accordance with the decisions taken at Maastricht the year before to develop the WEU into the defense component of the EU. The Petersberg Declaration listed possible operations (now commonly referred to as "Petersberg tasks") that would include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and combat tasks in crisis management.³⁰ Since Maastricht, the WEU has taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate. It has moved its headquarters to an impressive new site in Brussels; set up a Defense Planning Cell of more than forty officers; developed a catalogue of military units answerable to the WEU; set up a satellite interpretation center in Torrejon, Spain (where it is already training staff and receiving data from the Helios I satellite); arranged for the regular meeting of armed forces chiefs of staff and other military officers; developed a political-military decision-making process; initiated a comprehensive military exercise policy; set up its own Institute for Security Studies in Paris; and established a situation center (capable of twenty-four-hours per day operation) to better monitor and deal with crisis situations.³¹ Even though its role is still limited, and although it is still separate from the EU, the WEU has more actual military and organizational capability than it ever had in the past.

In addition to strengthening the WEU and bringing it closer to the EU, European leaders have also sought to enhance their military leverage and

until the enforcement operations were combined in November 1993. The fault here was not all the WEU's, of course, because it was actually first to declare its mission in the Adriatic, with NATO following on immediately afterward. Interviews with WEU officials. Also see Jopp, *The Strategic Implications of European Integration*, pp. 30–31; and Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 19–42. On "identity" as a primary WEU mission, see Philip H. Gordon, "Does Western European Union Have a Role?" in Anne Deighton, ed., *Western European Union, 1954–1997: Defence, Security, Integration* (Oxford, U.K.: St. Antony's College, 1997), pp. 103–117. Some of the following section draws on and updates my chapter in the Deighton book.

30. Participation in such missions would still be voluntary, but now there was an explicit agreement that the WEU would plan for, and possibly undertake, missions that went well beyond its original common defense commitment. See the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992; and the discussion in Assembly of Western European Union, Sir Russell Johnson, rapporteur, *Western European Union: Information Report* (Brussels: March 14, 1995), pp. 33–36.

31. See Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, "WEU Operational Development," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 15 (Spring 1997), pp. 70–74; and Assembly of Western European Union, *Western European Union*, pp. 47–55. On the satellite Center, see Assembly of Western European Union, *WEU and Helios 2* (Brussels, WEU: May 14, 1996).

capability by pursuing the creation of a distinct European role—a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)—within NATO. Announced as a goal at NATO's November 1991 summit in Rome, the pursuit of an ESDI was given further impetus by the January 1994 agreement at NATO's Brussels summit to create "combined joint task forces" (CJTFs), flexible new command structures that would allow for "coalitions of the willing"—potentially all-European ones—to undertake potential military actions without the participation of the rest of the Atlantic Alliance.³² Prospects for an ESDI within NATO seemed particularly promising after late 1995, when France announced its intention to pursue a European strategic role from within NATO rather than outside it, a goal welcomed by a Clinton administration allegedly favorable to giving the Europeans a greater role within the Alliance.³³

At its June 3, 1996, ministerial meeting in Berlin, NATO agreed—after more than two years of debate—on the basic principles of CJTF.³⁴ Most important where ESDI was concerned, the Alliance explicitly accepted the possibility of creating CJTFs led by the WEU, in which the WEU would command a military mission but would be able to draw on NATO and even American assets, without necessarily the participation of U.S. troops. The Berlin decision was hailed by Europeans and Americans alike (and described by the media) as one that would allow Europe to take on more responsibility for its own security, and one that promised a much more important future for the WEU.³⁵ While the WEU-led CJTF innovation is indeed useful, however, as are the changes taking place within the WEU, there are numerous reasons to believe that Europe's ability to back its diplomacy with force will remain limited, and that the enhanced role for the WEU pronounced after the Berlin meeting will be hypothetical rather than real.

First, it is necessary to remember that for all the recent efforts to strengthen the WEU's operational role, Europeans are still militarily dependent on NATO

32. See Charles Barry, "Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 81–97. Also see various contributions in Philip H. Gordon, ed., *NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

33. On France's decision to pursue ESDI within NATO rather than independently, see Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 58–80.

34. See the Final Communiqué of the June 3, 1996, North Atlantic Council Berlin Ministerial Meeting.

35. See, for example, "NATO Acquires a European Identity," *The Economist*, June 8, 1996, pp. 43–44; Bruce Clark, "US Agrees to Give Europe More Say in NATO Operations," *Financial Times*, June 4, 1996; and Rick Atkinson, "NATO Gives Members Response Flexibility," *Washington Post*, June 4, 1996.

and the United States for all but small and nearby military operations. European countries have large and capable armed forces (nearly 2 million men and women under arms for the members of the WEU), and without doubt the economic potential to develop robust capabilities for intelligence, force projection, and high-technology combat.³⁶ At present, however, most of this force remains devoted to and organized for territorial defense, with Britain and France the only two WEU members possessing the capability for even medium-scale (10,000 soldiers) or sustained deployments abroad (the type of mission most likely for the WEU). As the Gulf War, conflict in former Yugoslavia, and even interventions such as Rwanda made clear, only the United States has the types of military forces necessary to conduct operations that involve getting large numbers of combat-ready troops to a distant location in a short amount of time.³⁷

There is no sign, moreover, that Europeans are prepared to do very much about their military dependence on the United States. European military budgets have been falling rapidly for more than six years and are likely to be cut even further in an effort to meet the deficit criteria for European monetary union. Whereas the United States, whose military budgets are also falling, still spends \$266 billion—3.6 percent of its GDP—on defense annually, the members of the WEU spend only \$173 billion, or 2.3 percent of their GDP.³⁸ It is true that some countries, most important France, are reorganizing their armed forces to be better able to project forces and participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions abroad. The professionalization of the French forces, and plans to build up an intervention force of up to 60,000 troops, are important and relevant contributions to Europe's military capabilities.³⁹ But even while France talks of building up European military capabilities, it is cutting defense spending by FFr 100 billion (\$20 billion) over the coming six

36. Full WEU member troop-strength, not including reserves, is 1.79 million. The total for all of NATO's European members, including Turkey, is 2.46 million. See IISS, *The Military Balance 1997-98* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 46-73.

37. For a good analysis of European NATO members' logistical deficiencies, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 5-15.

38. For figures on defense spending and comparisons with earlier years, see IISS, *The Military Balance, 1997-98*, 293. See also Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham, "As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink," *Washington Post*, July 29, 1996, p. A1.

39. French defense reform plans are discussed in Jacques Isnard, "Le budget militaire sera réduit de 100 milliards de francs en cinq ans," *Le Monde*, February 24, 1996, pp. 6-9. Also see Stanley R. Sloan, "French Defense Policy: Gaullism Meets the Post-Cold War World," *Arms Control Today* (April 1997), pp. 3-8.

years, withdrawing its support for joint European projects critical to the WEU's autonomy like the Future Large Aircraft (a military transport plane) to be built by a European consortium, and sharply cutting its orders of transport and attack helicopters meant to be coproduced with Germany. German defense budgets are also under great pressure; and although Bonn will probably go along with (and help pay for) French plans to build a new series of optical and radar satellites, the scope for significant development in this area, as in others, is very limited.⁴⁰ Estimates vary of what it would take for Europe to create the military capability to conduct medium-scale "out-of-area" military operations without the United States, but the costs of doing so (including intelligence satellites, floating communications headquarters, mobile logistics, and transport craft) would be at least \$30 billion, a figure unlikely to be added to European defense budgets anytime soon.⁴¹

The new NATO arrangements, of course, are designed to help Europeans circumvent this capabilities constraint by making NATO and U.S. assets available to the WEU. Thus the WEU should not need its own independent assets, but can borrow NATO's. One must not forget, however, that NATO has very few assets of its own to lend the WEU. Most of the forces that make up the Alliance are nationally owned and nationally controlled—simply "earmarked" for NATO use if the national capital gives the go-ahead. The only assets actually owned by NATO itself are an air defense system; some command, control, and communications assets (which are mostly fixed, and therefore of little use for outside interventions); oil pipelines; a system of bunkers and shelters; and about three dozen airborne warning and control systems. What the Europeans would need to conduct anything but small-scale and nearby interventions are not NATO assets but American ones—long-range heavy transport aircraft, air-refueling capabilities, and satellite intelligence systems. The very capabilities the Europeans need but do not have, NATO, as such, does not "have" either.

40. Despite many past agreements, uncertainty remains as to whether the Germans will be able to go ahead with the satellite cooperation with France because of cuts in the defense budget. See Giovanni de Briganti, "Germans May Drop Helios," *Defense News*, June 24–30, 1996, pp. 1, 76.

41. According to a 1993 study done at the RAND corporation, equipping a European intervention force of around 50,000 troops would require extra equipment costing \$18–\$49 billion over twenty-five years (depending on the amount of capability deemed necessary) as well as satellite intelligence systems that would cost between \$9 billion and \$25 billion over the same period. See M.B. Berman and G.M. Carter, *The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993). Brookings Institution defense analyst Michael O'Hanlon calculates that it would cost around \$50 billion for NATO's European members to develop about one-half the strategic lift capability of the United States. See O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO," pp. 10–11.

Even the borrowing of strictly NATO assets depends on the agreement of all sixteen members of the Alliance, including (most important for the case of WEU-led CJTFs) the agreement of the United States. While one can easily imagine certain situations in which the United States might be glad to lend its support—when missions are small, with goals supported by Washington and little risk of escalation—the United States may in many cases be reluctant to authorize a WEU-led CJTF, and thereby turn over political control from the North Atlantic Council to the WEU Council, where it is not present. If U.S. assets are involved (as they would most likely be), or if there is any risk of the WEU (with or without U.S. assets) getting bogged down in an operation and requiring the United States to help get them out (as was nearly the case with European forces in Bosnia in 1994), it is difficult to imagine Washington authorizing a WEU-led CJTF.

Finally, even when U.S. support for WEU missions exists, the accompanying prerequisite for such missions to take place is that Europeans agree to do them, which is also far from guaranteed. Having focused their security policies on territorial defense for more than forty years, most Europeans have developed a culture of security dependence, and they seem reluctant to use force or undertake collective missions without the participation and leadership of the United States. An exclusively European intervention force in Bosnia, for example, has from the start of the conflict been consistently and vigorously ruled out by European leaders as too ambitious and too difficult without the United States.⁴² And there is no sign yet that the European attitude will change when the mandate of NATO's stabilization force expires in July 1998. European concerns about American "interference" in a WEU mission even if the United States was not participating in the mission are legitimate, but those concerns themselves are a reflection of a political-military imbalance within the Alliance. If U.S. participation in European security proves in coming years to be erratic and undependable, and if Washington consistently refuses to support WEU missions, perhaps the Europeans will respond by developing both the political will and the means to conduct such missions on their own. But such a development seems unlikely, and it is worth noting that even after the great tensions

42. The repeated theme of nearly all European leaders since NATO intervened militarily in Bosnia in late 1995 has been "in together (with the Americans), out together." When EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek suggested in early May 1996 that perhaps European troops could stay on in Bosnia without the United States, he was quickly repudiated by French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette. See Agence France-Presse, "EU Commissioner Slammed for Bosnia Comments," May 7, 1996.

over former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995, the European response has been more to ensure that European security remains in the hands of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole than to pursue their strategic independence from the United States.⁴³

The prospects for a coherent EU military policy—or even a functioning ESDI within NATO—seem uncertain at best. Many Europeans resent their military dependence on the United States and consequently regret their limited ability to influence developments in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and even southeastern Europe that results from this dependence. They do not, however, seem sufficiently resentful—or in agreement on what to do about it—to be willing to endow the EU with a genuine military capability of its own. Until either of these realities changes, the EU is unlikely to become a foreign policy actor able to back its diplomacy with force, or even significantly to influence transatlantic and regional security developments. If the Yugoslav crisis on Europe's periphery—combined with a U.S. policy that was erratic, uncertain, and domineering at the same time—was not enough to motivate the EU genuinely to adopt common security policies and military integration, what will?

Longer-Term Prospects: CFSP in the Coming Decades

If the conditions are not yet in place for a genuine integration of European foreign and security policies, will they ever be? Is the creation of an effective CFSP only a matter of time, or has foreign and security policy integration reached its limits? Going back to the theories with which this analysis began, is foreign and security policy just a “function” that is taking longer than some others to be pulled into the dynamic of European integration, or is there something particular about it that makes it less susceptible to the forces and processes that have led to integration in so many other areas?

This article has argued that states pool or delegate their sovereignty in particular functional areas only if the perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. In the area of foreign policy, because the gains of common action are

43. During the Yugoslavia wars, the closest the United States came to driving the Europeans to consider a truly independent military capability was in November 1994, when Congress forced the administration to cease its implementation of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia, leading even some British officials to question whether they could still rely on the United States or whether the European defense option would have to be pursued. When U.S.-European cooperation improved during the course of 1995, however, the British and other Atlanticist Europeans were all too happy to stick with NATO. Interviews with British and German officials, 1994–95.

not always obvious and do not accrue evenly to all members of the group, this condition is likely to be met only when national interests or government preferences have converged to the point where the potential costs and risks of binding common action are low. The most critical question about the future of foreign and security policy integration, then, is whether this is happening. If EU members' interests are more similar in the coming decades than they are today, integration will be more likely; if they are not, integration is less likely. This is not the only variable in the long-term development of CFSP, but it is the most important one.

In favor of the view that European states' foreign interests will converge, it might be noted that they have been converging for the past forty years.⁴⁴ Some of the issues that most divided Europeans in the past—colonial relationships (and wars), memories of World War II, divergent economic philosophies, and different roles in the Cold War—have lost significance, and even ancient cultural differences, while still strong, have become less strong through the open communications, travel, and ideal of the European Union. The existence, in some cases for more than thirty years, of a common commercial policy, growing monetary coordination, joint industrial projects, and a single internal market have all made different European states' interests far more similar than they were in the 1950s and 1960s.

A certain "spillover process" resulting from integration in other domains is also likely to lead to a relative convergence of European interests. Open EU internal borders stemming from the Schengen accords, for example, make all states susceptible to the same immigration worries, and increase their stake in stabilizing the entire periphery of Europe, not just the regions near them. And monetary union, if it happens, will not only further harmonize European economic interests, but it will constrain states' ability to finance independent foreign policy adventures and perhaps contribute to the feeling of unity and commonality that a true CFSP requires.⁴⁵ All of these factors suggest that EU member states' interests will converge and that the pressures for CFSP will continue well into the future.

Whether they will lead to enough convergence of interests to make those states willing to accept foreign and security policy integration, however, is

44. For a good recent argument to this effect, see Charles Grant, *Strength in Numbers: Europe's Foreign and Defence Policy* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1996), pp. 19–20.

45. For an argument that monetary union will increase pressures for more common foreign and security policy, see Pierre Jacquet, "European Integration at a Crossroads," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 1996–97), p. 92.

another matter; indeed there are three good reasons to believe they will not. First, the end of the Cold War has taken away one of the most compelling forces behind the need for a common security policy. Without a common enemy and the simplicity of the two-bloc system of the Cold War, security interests are potentially more differentiated than in the past. The division of Europe and the Cold War harmonized EC foreign policy interests to an extent that is unlikely to be repeated.

Second, the expected enlargement of EU membership to as many as thirty countries will mean a significant expansion of the Union's geographical and cultural diversity. If a Community of six was unwilling to accept foreign policy integration during the Cold War (when there was a common threat), a Community of twelve was unwilling to do so at Maastricht (when the French and German leaders were devoted to the idea of European unity and concerns about the future U.S. role in Europe were great), and a Union of fifteen was unwilling to do so at Amsterdam (in the wake of the Bosnian war), it is legitimate to ask why they should be expected to accept integration sometime in the future when the Union's membership will be more than twice as large. Indeed, the European Union of the year 2020 will probably stretch from Portugal in the West to Estonia in the northeast, and from Sweden and Finland in the north to Bulgaria and Greece in the south. It will include a far greater diversity not only of material (economic and security) interests, but also of foreign policy traditions, relationships, cultures, and attitudes toward the use of force and intervention. It is true that foreign policy traditions and cultures change with time and political evolution, and that interaction within the Union will help lead to more common thinking about international affairs. But it is also true that these things change extremely slowly, and the diversity in the "strategic cultures" even of current members of the EU has hardly disappeared despite decades of interaction within the EC/EU.

It can be argued, of course, that the widening of the Union will *require* integration rather than prevent it, because EU institutions will not be able to function with twenty-five separate states having veto power.⁴⁶ There is certainly something to this argument, and the use of qualified majority voting is likely to be extended incrementally into every domain in which the states will accept it, which they will do when the benefits of unity seem worth this

46. As Alain Lamassoure, former French Minister for European Affairs, has put it, "doing things intergovernmentally with 30 members is like reinventing the CSCE or the League of Nations." *Agence Europe*, March 30, 1995, p. 3.

concession. But will widening to include new and diverse states provoke a willingness to integrate foreign and security policies to ensure the advantages of common action? Or will it provoke the opposite—large states insisting on maintaining their freedom of maneuver and refusing to submit to the will of a centralized institution, or a majority, that might not have the same interests? If there were an absolutely compelling need for integration—a new security threat in the absence of American protection, for example—integration would be the more likely response. Given that there is not such a need—even the performance of the EU in Bosnia, recognized as a failure, does not seem to have led to a willingness to integrate foreign policy at the recent IGC—integration is unlikely.

Third, the functionalist arguments for longer-term convergence—that forms of integration such as open borders and monetary union necessarily spreads to other areas—can easily be exaggerated. Open borders, it is true, theoretically make all states equally susceptible to regional instabilities, but in fact states remain unequally susceptible to such problems because of geography, history, language, and culture. Schengen or no Schengen, refugees from Central and Eastern Europe would mostly go to Germany—the biggest, richest, and closest country to them—and refugees from North Africa would mostly go to France, where they might have family or other contacts and would understand the language. Similarly, monetary union might enhance the internal economic cohesion of the Union and prevent intra-EU exchange rate problems, but it is hard to see how and why it would lead to the harmonization of foreign interests. If it did, these of course would only apply to those EU states participating in the monetary union—presumably not all members for a very long time—thus separating rather than harmonizing their interests. European industrial collaboration also cuts both ways: the desire to sell Airbus aircraft to China may well help unite the members of the Airbus consortium's foreign (and perhaps even security) policies toward that rising power, but it does not have the same effect on those EU states left out.

The interests of EU members, then, do not seem likely to converge to the point where true integration of foreign and security policies becomes probable. The desire to preserve the notion of an EU identity and more efficiently pursue those interests that are shared among Europeans will probably lead to even more interaction and discussion among member states, continued institutional tinkering, the spread of limited qualified majority voting to areas that do not involve the potential use of deadly force, and symbolic pronouncements about political solidarity. These developments should not be underestimated, and

any comparison of EU foreign policy solidarity today with the situation ten, twenty, or thirty years ago is a reminder of how far cooperation has usefully come. But the end of the Cold War, the widening of the Union, the continued differences in EU members' strategic culture, ambitions, values, and historical relationships, and the lack—even after forty years of integration—of a European identity sufficient to permit delegation of sovereignty to centralized institutions mean that EU foreign policy cooperation will probably remain limited, fragmented, and intergovernmental. Having eliminated wars and security competitions among West European states is an enormous achievement; eliminating distinctive national foreign and security policies and preferences will remain an elusive one. The United States' current status as the world's "lone superpower" may well be challenged in the twenty-first century, but not by the European Union.