

9

RECRUITMENT

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One classic function of political parties concerns their gatekeeping role in nominating candidates for office at all levels of government. Political recruitment is not just a matter of nominating elected representatives at local, regional, national, and subnational levels, the core focus of this chapter, but also of filling a wide range of patronage appointments to public office. This is exemplified by party nominations to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations in Britain, the thousands of positions in various government branches and federal agencies allocated by the patronage of the incoming American president, and the depth of patron–client relations in Brazil. The process of recruitment to elected and appointed office is widely regarded as one of the most important residual functions for parties, with potential consequences for the degree of intra-party conflict, the composition of parliaments and governments, and the accountability of elected members.¹

The opening section considers ‘Who is eligible?’ by outlining an analytical model of candidate selection, identifying the key steps in this process, and considering the ‘certification’ stage of recruitment. The second section considers ‘Who nominates?’ The core issue surrounds identifying the location and scope of decision-making by different party agencies and organizational bodies, and whether many established democracies have gradually decentralized the nomination process by shifting power from a small group of local party activists toward the grassroots membership. The third section examines ‘Who is nominated?’, in particular, whether parties have adapted in recent

decades to pressures to diversify the candidacy pool and the composition of parliamentary elites, through the use of positive action strategies designed to include more women and ethnic minorities, and whether these strategies have succeeded. The final section considers the consequences of recruitment, particularly how party nomination processes interact with the electoral system in generating the chain of democratic accountability linking citizens and elected representatives.

WHO IS ELIGIBLE?

The schematic model illustrated in Figure 9.1 identifies the main factors influencing the candidate recruitment process. This model suggests that three successive stages operate in this process: *certification*, involving electoral law, party rules, and informal social norms defining the criteria for eligible candidacy; *nomination*, involving the supply of eligibles seeking office and the demand from selectors when deciding who is nominated; and *election*, the final step determining which nominees win legislative office. Each of these stages can be seen as a progressive game of ‘musical chairs’: many are eligible, few are nominated, and even fewer succeed.

The certification process, defining who is eligible to pursue candidacies for elected office, is shaped by a number of factors. The most comprehensive and detailed analysis of the formal legal requirements for candidacy has been carried out based on constitutional documents and




Figure 9.1 Model of the candidate selection process

electoral laws in 63 democracies by Massicotte, Blais and Yoshinaka.² Some legal restrictions on eligibility prove fairly universal and uncontroversial, such as age and citizenship requirements, while others are more exceptional, such as educational or literacy qualification. The main legal regulations include those relating to age, citizenship, residence, incompatibilities, monetary deposits, and the need to gather supporting signatures.

The minimum age for candidates is sometimes the same as that established to qualify for the voting franchise, but slightly higher age requirements are also used for legislative bodies, on the basis that a certain level of maturity and experience is desirable for public leaders. All the countries under comparison demanded citizenship for presidential elections and almost all followed similar requirements for legislative office. The more restrictive systems require citizenship by birth, for example in Brazil and the Philippines, although others allow naturalized citizens also to run for office. The majority of democracies do not impose any local district residency requirements for nomination, so that candidates can fight any seat, on the grounds that it is desirable that elected members should represent national as well as local interests. But nine countries, including Chile, Panama, and Taiwan, impose some conditions of residency in the electoral district, to prevent 'carpet-baggers' with weak constituency ties or knowledge of the local area. The main category of incompatibility concerns holding public office, such as civil servants, judges, and holders of elected office at other local or regional levels, since these are thought to create a conflict of interest. There are also legal restrictions associated with holding a criminal record, convicted felons, and bankrupts. But many democracies also require a financial deposit designed to screen out frivolous candidacies, with most refundable depending upon winning a minimum share of the vote. Another less common screening device includes requiring a certain number of signatures to be collected. In short, all countries impose some minimal legal restrictions on who is qualified to run for legislative office but most are not very stringent, and the majority of citizens would qualify according to these conditions.

In addition to the legal requirements, other certification requirements are set by parties through their internal rules, constitutions, and by-laws. Most commonly these stipulate that party membership is required for a specified period prior to candidacy, to ensure party

loyalty and familiarity with party policies. Some are more restrictive. For example, in earlier decades eligible nominees had to meet a range of criteria in the Belgian Socialist party: '(1) have been a member at least five years prior to the primary; (2) have made annual minimum purchases from the Socialist co-op; (3) have been a regular subscriber to the party's newspaper; (4) have sent his children to state rather than Catholic schools; and (5) have his wife and children enrolled in the appropriate women's and youth organizations'.³ The certification process is also influenced more generally by the informal social norms and cultural values in each country shaping perceptions of appropriate nominees, such as what sort of experience and background is most suitable for legislative careers. For example, people are more likely to consider running for parliament if they have professional legal training, experience of policy-oriented think-tanks, or careers in journalism and local government, all occupational channels providing skills and experiences valuable for higher office, reflecting the current typical composition of legislative elites. Although informal eligibility perceptions are most difficult to establish with any systematic evidence, they probably shape who comes forward, and who is deterred, from pursuit of a legislative career.

Independent candidates who meet the certification requirements are entitled to stand for elected office without any party backing. Independents can succeed in countries with exceptionally weak party organizations and with some single-member districts; for example, non-partisans have formed at times about one-quarter of the Ukrainian parliament and one-sixth of the Russian Duma. In a few countries such as Uganda party labels are legally banned and members are either elected from single-member districts or from special interest groups such as trade unions, the army, and young people. But in most democracies independents usually have a minimal realistic chance of electoral success at national level without the official endorsement, financial assistance, and organizational resources that parties provide. The US House of Representatives, for example, currently contains only one independent (Bernie Sanders, Vermont). As discussed below, political parties play the central role in nominating legislative candidates and they also shape the recruitment 'supply' of potential candidates by providing social networks, training, civic skills, and organizational experiences that are valuable in the pursuit of elected office.

Once nominated, as discussed in the conclusion, the role of the electoral system becomes critical in determining the final stage of entry into parliament. The electoral success of candidates is also shaped by non-partisan gatekeepers, including the type of coverage, publicity and endorsement provided by the news media, the financial backing of any donor organizations, and campaign support such as volunteers and office facilities provided by affiliated trade union, business, professional and community groups. These forms of support are particularly important in contexts where parties provide weak organizational structures and minimal institutional resources, exemplified by primary elections in the United States.

WHO NOMINATES?

Despite the acknowledged importance of the candidate nomination process, and although there are many descriptive case studies of the candidate recruitment process within specific parties, and some documentation of the formal party rules, relatively little is known about the structure and dynamics of the process in practice, or how and why this varies among parties and countries.⁴ For those interested primarily in the internal life of parties as organizations, the nomination process is regarded as the dependent variable which serves as a prism for understanding the distribution of intra-party power among different organs and factions.⁵ In Schattschneider's words: 'The nominating process has become the crucial process of the party. He who can make the nominations is the owner of the party.'⁶ In a few countries certain aspects of the nomination process are governed by law; for example, in Germany and Finland there are broad requirements for parties to adopt democratic processes in candidate selection. In most, however, parties are entitled to decide their own processes and internal regulations. The key question is 'who decides?' The key dimensions of internal party democracy here are: (i) the degree of *centralization*, namely how far nominations are either determined mainly by the national party leadership or devolved downward to regional, district or local bodies; (ii) the breadth of *participation*, a related but distinct matter concerning whether just a few selectors pick candidates or whether many people are involved in this process; and (iii) the *scope* of decision-making, concerning whether there is a choice of one, a few, or multiple contenders vying for nomination.

In centralized organizations, exemplified by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, PASOK in Greece, or the Christian Democrats in the Netherlands, party leaders have considerable powers of patronage, enabling them to place 'their' chosen candidates into electorally favorable districts, seats, ridings, or constituencies, or in high-ranked positions on party lists. Most European parties, however, have greater internal democracy, so that although national leaders can sometimes exercise a veto, the key decisions determining who is nominated are made by officials, delegates, and activists at regional or local levels. In the most decentralized processes, nomination decisions in each local area rest in the hands of all grassroots party members who cast votes in closed primaries, or even the mass public in open primaries.

The locus of decision-making has been studied most commonly by classifying the legal regulations, party constitutions; and formal party rules which govern selection; for example, studies have developed typologies based on the Western European data set collected by Katz and Mair.⁷ Based on this source, a recent comparison of nomination rules in Western Europe by Lars Bille classified the final level of decision-making regarding candidate selection into six categories ranging from the most centralized (national organs control completely) to the most localized (using ballots among all party members). As shown in Table 9.1, the most common process (in eight out of ten European parties) is one where subnational party organs either decide subject to leadership approval, or else they control the process completely.

Much of the debate in the literature has sought to determine whether parties have been actively democratizing the selection process, transferring decisions downwards from local office-holders and local activists to ordinary grassroots party members, and, if so, what consequences this process might have for the balance of power within the party. Table 9.1 compares the level of decision-making in the nomination process according to the formal rules in 1960 and 1989.⁸ Bille concluded on this basis that most parties had experienced little change in the levels of decision-making in the candidate selection process during this era. Nevertheless some democratization had occurred involving a modest shift from decision-making by local officials and activists within subnational bodies down towards the engagement of all party members through the use of individual membership ballots, often by post.

Table 9.1 *The degree of centralization of the nomination process*

	1960		1989	
	No.	%	No.	%
National leadership controls completely	2	4	3	4
National leadership nominates from list provided by subnational organs	5	9	10	14
Subnational organs nominate from list provided by national leadership	3	5	1	1
Subnational organs nominate subject to approval by national leadership	22	39	23	32
Subnational organs control completely	25	44	34	48
Ballot applied to all party members	9	16	16	23
<i>Total</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>71</i>	<i>100%</i>

Note: The 'final' level of decision-making in party nomination processes for candidacies for the lower house of the national legislature in 11 Western European countries.

Source: summarized from Table 1 in Lars Bille (2001) 'Democratizing a democratic procedure: Myth or reality? Candidate selection in Western European parties, 1960–1990; *Party Politics*, 7: 363–80.

Other studies also report that political parties have democratized their candidate selection processes during the post-war period, thereby widening participation among the selectorate.⁹ During recent decades these changes are evident in the British Labour party, the ÖVP and SPÖ in Austria, the CDU and SPD in Germany, and by Fine Gael in Ireland. The main reason for this trend, commentators suggest, is an attempt to attract new members, or at least to staunch membership losses, by offering engagement in the candidate nomination process as a selective benefit. Nevertheless Scarrow, Webb and Farrell point out that despite these patterns, there have not been parallel moves to weaken or even eliminate the vetoes over this process held by central party elites, ensuring that the leadership retains the ability to exclude unwanted nominees.¹⁰ Why should the location of nomination decision-making vary from one party to another? Krister Lundell sought to explain the degree of centralization of nomination decision-making in parties in 21 established democracies.¹¹ The study concluded that the nomination process was usually more decentralized in smaller parties (defined by their share of the vote), in far right and far left parties, and among parties within the Nordic region compared with Mediterranean Europe. Many other common assumptions about the primary drivers in this process did not prove important, however, including the territorial organization of parties, their age and the mean district magnitude.

Yet the attempt to determine the 'main' location of decision-making in the nomination process typically encounters a number of limitations, so we need to be cautious about these conclusions. As with any study of written constitutions, there are often significant differences

between the *de jure* and *de facto* decision-making bodies, especially in poorly institutionalized parties where democratic rulebooks and procedures exist on paper but are widely flouted in practice. The nomination process often involves a complex sequence of steps from the initial decision to consider running for office through a winnowing process with veto points that operates at multiple national, regional, local, or factional levels until the formal nomination or adoption meeting. In the British Conservative party, for example, there are a series of at least eight distinct stages from the submission of the formal application form to Central Office, an interview with party officials, a 'weekend' selection board, entry into the national list of approved candidates, application to particular constituencies, the short-listing and interview process by local constituency parties, and the final nomination meeting among party members. Some steps may prove to be mere rubber-stamp formalities. Others may involve competition among hundreds of applicants, uncertain outcomes, and heated internal battles, especially for 'safe' party seats where the incumbent is retiring.¹² Classifications of the degree of centralization or participation which attempt to reduce all this complicated multi-stage process with multiple actors into a single 'final decision' or 'cut-off' point may prove arbitrary and unreliable.¹³

Moreover, just like the studies of community power in the 1960s, any focus on 'who nominates' inevitably neglects the prior question of what Bacharatz and Baratz termed 'non-decisions', for example if certain groups such as ethnic minorities are discouraged by the formal or informal rules of the game and never even come forward to pursue elected office.¹⁴ The focus on 'who nominates' also neglects the

logically prior question 'what choices are available?'. Even with the same formal rules, some contexts present selectors with a wide range of choices among multiple contenders facing selectors, while in others, such as where an incumbent is automatically returned, there is none. For example, if we compare the way the presidential primary process worked in the United States during the 2004 contest, Democrats involved in the Iowa caucus and the subsequent New Hampshire primary in mid-to-late January faced a broad range of contenders, and caucus and primary participants played a decisive role in winning this field down. Once the Democratic race had been decided in favor of John Kerry in mid-March, however, subsequent primaries were merely a ritual endorsement of the outcome. In the Republican camp, President Bush faced no challengers so there was no contest. Therefore although grassroots Democrats and Republicans had the formal power to become engaged in the search for their presidential nominee through state caucuses and primary elections, in practice the real power of participants was determined by the electoral timetable. In the broader context, the range of choices facing selectors varies substantially in legislative seats where there is already an unchallenged incumbent, one or two rivals, or a multiple set of contenders. Any analysis of decision-making processes according to the formal rules ideally needs to be supplemented by a labor-intensive program mixing participant observation, qualitative interviews, and/or survey-based studies of the informal social norms among eligible candidates and party selectors that determine the outcome of this process. Detailed multi-method case studies remain relatively uncommon and, moreover, it becomes difficult to generalize across parties within and between nations on this basis¹⁵.

We can conclude that the evidence suggests that a slight democratization of the nomination process has occurred within European parties, with the circle of decision-making widened slightly from local activists and office-holders downward to grassroots party members using ballots. Nevertheless, although the potential number of participants has increased slightly, at the same time the choice of nominees has been more greatly constrained by the adoption of rules designed to generate more inclusive legislatures. The most important of these concerns positive action strategies for women which have been implemented through reserved seats, statutory gender quotas and voluntary gender quotas. How do these affect both the process and the outcome?

WHO IS NOMINATED?

Rather than focusing upon the internal life of parties, other scholars of legislative elites, gender and racial politics are often more interested primarily in understanding the *outcome* of the nomination process. In this perspective, these processes are regarded as the independent variable which, in turn, can throw light upon who enters legislative elites and what consequences this has for the broader political system. The nomination process is the central mechanism for electing delegates to parliament and for holding them accountable. This perspective emphasizes that the type of candidate nominated by parties has the capacity to influence the quality of the members of the legislature, and ultimately the composition of government as well. For example, it is likely to have consequences for the legislative, policy-making, and scrutiny capacity of parliaments if parties decide to select professional lawyers or local constituency activists, minor celebrities or ambitious political entrepreneurs, seasoned party officials or inexperienced opportunists. The sociological study of political elites has long been concerned to document the composition of parliaments, the gradual transformation of legislative elites in terms of their occupational class, age, education, gender, and ethnic background, and the consequences for representative democracy that flow from these patterns¹⁶. Building upon this older tradition, in recent decades an extensive body of literature has sought to understand the barriers facing women and ethnic minority candidates, and which structural reforms prove most effective in widening opportunities for underrepresented groups.

During the last decade many policy initiatives have attempted to increase the number of women in elected and appointed office. As shown in Figure 9.2, the most common strategies fall into three main categories.

The issue of the basic *electoral system* has moved up the agenda in many established democracies, as exemplified by major electoral reforms introduced during the last decade in New Zealand, Italy, and Britain. The establishment of the basic electoral system is also obviously a critical issue that needs to be determined in transitional and consolidating democracies, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. This issue affects the nomination process since it is now widely understood that more women usually are elected under proportional than majoritarian electoral systems. This thesis has been




Figure 9.2 Gender equality strategies

confirmed in a series of studies since the mid-1980s, based on research comparing both established democracies and also a broader range of developing societies worldwide¹⁷. Within proportional electoral systems, district magnitude has commonly been regarded as a particularly important factor, with more women usually elected from large multimember constituencies. A worldwide comparison of the proportion of women in parliament confirms how women are far more successful under proportional representation (PR) list systems. As a simple rule, women proved almost twice as likely to be elected under proportional than under majoritarian electoral systems¹⁸. Accordingly where women are mobilized around the debates about electoral reform they have often fought to achieve PR systems.

Equal opportunity policies are designed to provide a level playing field so that women can pursue political careers on the same basis as men. Common examples include programs of financial aid to assist with electoral expenses, candidate training in the skills of communication, public speaking, networking, campaigning, and news management, and the provision of crèches and childcare facilities within legislative assemblies. Equal opportunity strategies can be gender-neutral in design, for example opportunities for training can be offered to both female and male parliamentary candidates, and childcare can be used by both parents, although their effects may be beneficial primarily to women. Equal opportunity policies are valuable in the long term, especially when used in conjunction with other strategies, but, by themselves, they often prove to have little impact in boosting women's representation.

Positive action strategies, by contrast, are explicitly designed to benefit women as a temporary stage until such time as gender parity is achieved in legislative and elected bodies. Positive action includes three main strategies:

- the use of *reserved seats* for women established in electoral law;
- *statutory gender quotas* controlling the composition of candidate lists for all parties in each country;
- *voluntary gender quotas* used in the regulations and rules governing the candidate selection procedures within particular parties.

Positive action has become increasingly popular in recent decades, as one of the most effective policy options for achieving short-term

change, although the use of these policies remains a matter of controversy within and outside of the women's movement.

By electoral law, some countries have stipulated a certain number of reserved seats that are only open to women or ethnic minority candidates. This policy has been adopted to boost women's representation under majoritarian electoral systems in developing nations in Africa and South Asia, particularly those with a Muslim culture (see Table 9.2). Reserved seats have been used for the lower house in Morocco (elected from a national list of 30 women members out of 325 representatives), Bangladesh (30/300), Pakistan (60/357), Botswana (2 women appointed by the president out of 44 members), Taiwan (elected), Lesotho (3 women appointed out of 80 seats), and Tanzania (37 women out of 274 members, distributed according to parties' share of seats in the House of Representatives)¹⁹. This mechanism guarantees a minimum number of women in elected office, although some have argued that it may be a way to appease, and ultimately sideline, women. Being elected does not necessarily mean that women are given substantive decision-making power, especially given the weakness of many of these legislative bodies. An important distinction needs to be drawn between those filled by direct election and those filled by appointment. Where women have an electoral base they can be more independent of the party leadership and they gain legitimacy derived from the democratic process. In India, for example, reserved seats have also been used at local level with considerable success. One-third of the seats on local municipal elections are reserved for directly elected women, empowering thousands of women²⁰. By contrast, where appointed by the president or another body, if lacking an independent electoral or organizational base, women may be marginalized from any real decision-making responsibility, and their appointment can reinforce control of parliament by the majority party. In Uganda, for example, 53 parliamentary seats out of 292 are reserved for women (18%), who are indirectly elected, along with seats set aside for representatives drawn from groups such as the army, youth, the disabled, and trade unions, despite a ban on opposition parties standing for election.²¹ Reserved seats based on regional, linguistic, ethnic, or religious ethnopolitical cleavages have also been used, for example for the Maoris in New Zealand, although their effects depend upon the size and spatial concentration of minority populations.

Table 9.2 *Reserved seats for women used by the lower house of parliament worldwide*

	Election	Selection method	Total number of MPs in the lower house	Number of seats reserved for women	% of seats reserved for women
Appointed by another body					
Tanzania	2000	Appointed	295	48	16.2
Zimbabwe	2000	Appointed	274	37	13.5
Botswana	1999	Appointed	44	2	4.5
Jordan	2003	Appointed	120	6	5.5
Lesotho	1998	Appointed	80	3	3.8
Bangladesh	2001	Appointed	300	30	10.0
Uganda	2001	Appointed	292	56	19.1
Direct election					
Pakistan	2002	FPTP ^a	357	60	16.8
Sudan	2000	FPTP ^a	360	35	9.7
Morocco	2002	FPTP ^a	325	30	9.2
Taiwan	1996	Combined-independent (SNTV and closed PR list) ^b	334	Varies	Varies
Djibouti	2003	Party Block ^c	65	7	10.7

Notes: Reserved seats in the lower house of the national parliament are defined as those seats that by law can only be filled by women, either by appointment, indirect election, or direct election.

^aFPTP First-past-the-post (with single-member districts and plurality election).

^bThe combined-independent electoral system uses both single non-transferable vote and PR party list in parallel. This policy is currently being considered for elections in Afghanistan and Iraq.

^cThe party block electoral system uses plurality elections in multimember districts.

Sources: The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (www.eisa.org.za); *Elections around the World* (www.electionworld.org); International IDEA (www.IDEA.int); Pippa Norris (2004) *Electoral Engineering* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Legal gender quotas

Positive action strategies also include gender quotas applied by law to all political parties, specifying that women must constitute a minimal proportion of parliamentary candidates or elected representatives within each party. Quotas represent an instrument that introduces specific formal selection criteria, in the form of minimal or maximal thresholds for a given group, into selections procedures, whether for elected or appointed office in the public sphere or for personnel recruitment in the private sector, such as for trade union office. There is an important distinction drawn between *statutory* gender quotas introduced by law, and thereby applying to all parties within a country, and *voluntary* gender quotas implemented by internal regulations and rule books within each party. Quotas can be specified for women and men, or for other relevant selection criteria, such as ethnicity, language, social

sector, or religion. Statutory gender quota laws have been applied to elections in Belgium, France, and Italy, to many nations in Latin America (see Table 9.3), as well as to appointments to public bodies and consultative committees in many countries such as Finland and Norway.²²

As shown by the last column in Table 9.3, in some countries and in some elections, legal gender quotas appear to have worked far more effectively than in other cases. Hence the substantial rise in women in parliament found in Argentina, the modest growth in Peru and Belgium, but minimal progress evident in France, Mexico, or Brazil. Why is this? The effective implementation of legal gender quotas depends upon multiple factors, including most importantly how the statutory mechanisms are put into practice, the level of the gender quota specified by law, whether the rules for party lists regulate the rank order of female and male candidates, whether party lists are open or

Table 9.3 *Statutory gender quotas in use worldwide*

Country	Date of law	Gender quota %	Legislative Body	Electoral system	List open or closed	% Women MPs before law (i)	% Women MPs after law (ii)	Change(i)-(ii)
Argentina	1991	30	Lower house	Proportional	Closed	6	27	+21
Armenia	1999	5	Lower house	Combined	Closed		3.1	
Belgium	1994	33	Lower house	Proportional	Open	18	23	+5
Bolivia	1997	30	Lower house	Combined	Closed	11	12	+1
Bolivia	1997	30	Senate	Combined	Closed	4	4	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	2001	33	Lower house	Proportional	Open		14.3	
Brazil	1997	30	Lower house	Proportional	Open	7	6	-1
Costa Rica	1997	40	Unicameral	Proportional	Closed	14	19	+5
Dominican Republic	1997	25	Lower house	Proportional	Closed	12	16	+4
Ecuador	1997	20	Unicameral	Combined	Open	4	15	+11
France	1999	50	Lower house	Majoritarian	-	11	12	+1
Indonesia	2003	30	Lower house	Proportional	Open	9	N/A	N/A
Korea, North	-	20	Lower house	Majoritarian	-		20.1	
Macedonia	2001	30	Lower house	Combined	Closed		17.5	
Mexico	1996	30	Senate	Combined	Closed	15	16	+1
Mexico	1996	30	Lower house	Combined	Closed	17	16	-1
Nepal	1990	5	Lower house	Majoritarian	-		5.9	
Panama	1997	30	Unicameral	Combined	Closed	8	10	+2
Paraguay	1996	20	Senate	Proportional	Closed	11	18	+7
Paraguay	1996	20	Lower house	Proportional	Closed	3	3	0
Peru	1997	30	Unicameral	Proportional	Open	11	18	+7
Philippines	1995	20	Lower house	Combined	Closed		17.8	
Serbia	2002	30	Lower house	Proportional	Open	7.5	N/A	N/A
Venezuela	1998	30	Lower house	Combined	Closed	6	13	+7
Venezuela	1998	30	Senate	Combined	Closed	8	9	+2
Average		30				10	14	+4

Note: Legal gender quotas for the lower house of national parliaments are defined as laws which specify that each party must include a minimum proportion of women on party lists of candidates. Change is estimated based on the percentage of women MPs in the parliamentary election held immediately before and after implementation of the gender quota law.

Sources: Mala Htun (2001) 'Electoral rules, parties, and the election of women in Latin America,' paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco; Mala Htun and Mark Jones (2002) 'Engendering the Right to Participate in Decision-making: Electoral quotas and women's leadership in Latin America', in Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux (eds), *Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America* (London: Palgrave); International IDEA, *Global Database of Quotas for Women* (www.idea.int).

closed, and also the penalties associated with any failure to comply with the law. Positive action policies alter the balance of incentives for the party selectorate. Where these laws are implemented, then selectors need to weigh the potential penalties and benefits if they do or do not comply. Selectors may still prefer the default option of nominating a male candidate under certain circumstances, for example if the laws are designed as symbolic window-dressing more than as *de facto* regulations; if the regulation specifies that a certain proportion of women have to be selected for party lists but fails to specify their rank order so that female candidates cluster in unwinnable positions at the bottom of the list; or if the sanctions for non-compliance are weak or non-existent. As in many attempts to alter the incentive structure, the devil lies in the details, so apparently similar legislative policies turn out to have different consequences in different nations.

In *Belgium* the Electoral Act of 24 May 1994 specified that no more than two-thirds of the candidates on any party electoral list may be of the same sex. The minimum representation requirement is thus exactly the same for men and women. It applies to the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, and also to regional, community, provincial and municipal councils, as well as elections to the European Parliament. If this requirement is not respected, the list candidacies that would otherwise have been held by women have to be left blank or the whole list is declared invalid.²³ The Act was first fully enforced in the 1999 European elections that saw the proportion of Belgian women MEPs rise from 18.5% to 23.3%. However, the power of incumbency means that it will take many successive elections under the new rules before women become a third or more of Belgian parliamentarians.

In 1999 *France* passed the parity law, a constitutional amendment requiring parties to include 50% representation of women in their party lists for election, with financial penalties attached for failure to do so. The gender parity law passed in June 2000 specified that for elections to the National Assembly between 48% and 52% of all candidates presented nation-wide by any given political party must be women. If this percentage is higher or lower, the state will cut its financial contribution. The results of the first elections held in March 2001 under the new rules indicate a substantial impact at municipal level, almost doubling the number of women in local office from 25% to 47%. Nevertheless in the first elections to the French National Assembly held under the parity rules,

in June 2002, the proportion of elected women rose by only 1.4 percentage points, from 10.9% to 12.3%. Only eight more women entered the Assembly, dashing the hopes of the reformers. The main reasons were that the parity law failed to specify the selection of women for particular types of single-member seats, so that women nominees could be concentrated in unwinnable constituencies. Moreover, the major parties decided to favor incumbents and largely ignored the financial penalty of reduced party funding associated with imbalanced party lists.²⁴ The sanction is a reduction in the public funding received for each party's campaign on a sliding scale of 5% for a gender difference of 10% on party lists of candidates, 30% for a difference of 60%, and a maximum 50% for a difference of 100%. Hence an all-male list would still get half the public funding. Despite the parity law, the proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies means that France is ranked 61st worldwide after reform, compared with 59th before parity was introduced.

Another parallel European case concerns *Italy*, where a quota system was introduced in 1993 into the legislation governing municipal, provincial, and national elections²⁵. These laws asserted that a minimum of 30% of both sexes had to be present in electoral lists. In 1995, however, the Italian Constitutional Tribunal repealed these regulations, considering that they were contrary to the principle of equality. Some parties have introduced voluntary gender quotas into their party rules, set at 50% for Verdi, 40% for DS, 40% for the PRC, and 20% for the PPI. Yet in the 2001 election women accounted for only 9.8% of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, ranking Italy 77th worldwide. In *Armenia*, the 1999 Electoral Code states that the voting lists of the parties involved in the proportional parliamentary electoral system should contain not less than 5% female candidates, but the low level and poor implementation meant that women in the June 1999 elections were only 3.1% of the national parliament.

During the early 1990s, with the expansion of democracy, the popularity of statutory gender quotas spread rapidly in Latin America. The first and most effective law (the Ley de Cupos) was passed in *Argentina* in 1991, introducing an obligatory quota system for all parties contesting national elections to the Chamber of Deputies – ‘lists must have, as a minimum, 30% of women candidates and in proportions with possibilities of being elected. Any list not complying with these requisites shall not be approved’. Most importantly, the law stipulates that women must be ranked throughout party lists, not

consigned to the end where they face no realistic chance of election. Party lists failing to comply with the law are rejected. If a rejected list is not corrected so as to bring it into compliance with the law, the party in question cannot compete in that district's congressional election. The provincial branches of the political parties create the closed party lists from which the Argentine deputies are elected, although at times the national party intervenes to impose a list. Following the implementation of the law, in the 1993 Chamber election, 21.3% (27 of 127) of the deputies elected were women, compared to only 4.6% (6 of 130) in the election of 1991. A decade after passage, the proportion of women in the Chamber of Deputies had risen to 30.7% (79 out of 257), ranking Argentina ninth from the top worldwide in the representation of women. In total 11, Latin American countries have now adopted national laws establishing a minimum percentage for women's participation as candidates in national elections and a twelfth – *Colombia* – had approved a quota of 30% for women in senior positions in the executive branch²⁶. Although their impact has been varied, in these countries a comparison of the elections held immediately before and after passage of these laws suggests that legislative quotas generated on average an eight percentage point gain in women's election to congress. Variation in the effectiveness of the quotas can be explained by whether the PR list is open or closed (with the latter most effective), the existence of placement mandates (requiring parties to rank women candidates in high positions on closed party lists), district magnitude (the higher the number of candidates in a district, the more likely quotas are to work), and good-faith party compliance.

Statutory gender quotas have also been applied to local, municipal, and regional contests. In *South Africa* the Municipal Structures Act states that political parties must seek to ensure that women comprise 50% of lists submitted for election at the local level. Following the municipal elections in 2000, 28.2% of local councilors were women. In the *Namibian* local authority elections in 1992 and 1998, the law required political parties to include at least 30% women on their party candidate lists.

The comparison of legal gender quotas suggests grounds for caution for those who hope that these strategies will automatically produce an immediate short-term rise in women legislators. The French case, in particular, illustrates the way the detailed aspects of how such quotas are implemented, and the sanctions for

non-compliance, can generate very different results even for municipal and national elections within the same country. The variations in the results across Latin America confirm these observations.

Voluntary gender quotas in party rules

Most commonly, however, voluntary gender quotas have been introduced within specific parties, particularly those of the left, rather than being implemented by electoral law²⁷. Rules, constitutions, and internal regulations determined within each party are distinct from electoral statutes enforceable by the courts. Parties in Scandinavia, Western Europe, and Latin America often have used voluntary gender quotas, and Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe employed them in the past. It is difficult to provide systematic and comprehensive analysis of party rules worldwide, but in spring 2003 International IDEA's *Global Database of Quotas for Women* estimated that 181 parties in 58 countries used gender quotas for electoral candidates for national parliaments²⁸. The effects of these measures can be analyzed by focusing on their use within the European Union, since this allows us to compare a range of representative democracies at similar levels of socioeconomic development. Table 9.4 compares the use of gender quotas for the candidate selection process in national elections in the 15 EU member states. By 2000, among 76 relevant European parties (with at least ten members in the lower house), almost half (35 parties) used gender quotas, and two dozen of these had achieved levels of female representation in the lower house of parliament over 24%²⁹. Among the European parties using gender quotas, on average one-third (33%) of their elected representatives were women. By contrast, in the European parties without gender quotas, only 18% of their members of parliament were women. Of course it might be misleading to assume any simple 'cause' and 'effect' at work here, since parties more sympathetic towards women in public office are also more likely to introduce gender quotas. European parties of the left commonly introduced voluntary gender quotas during the 1980s, including Social Democratic, Labour, Communist, Socialist and Green parties, before the practice eventually spread to other parties. Nevertheless the 'before'

Table 9.4 *Voluntary gender quotas in party rules, used in the EU-15, 1996–2000*

	Party	Country	Election year	Total number of party MPs	% Women	Gender quota
1.	VIHR	Finland	1999	11	81.8	✓
2.	PDS	Germany	1998	36	58.3	✓
3.	B90/Grüne	Germany	1998	47	57.4	✓
4.	Centerpartiet	Sweden	1998	18	55.6	✗
5.	GroenLinks	Netherlands	1998	11	54.5	✓
6.	Miljöpartiet de Grona	Sweden	1998	16	50.0	✓
7.	Social Democrats	Sweden	1998	131	49.6	✓
8.	PvdA	Netherlands	1998	45	48.9	✓
9.	Ecolo	Belgium	1999	11	45.5	✓
10.	SDP	Finland	1999	51	43.1	✓
11.	D'66	Netherlands	1998	14	42.9	✗
12.	Vänsterpartiet	Sweden	1998	43	41.9	✓
13.	Christian Democrats	Sweden	1998	42	40.5	✓
14.	SKL	Finland	1999	10	40.0	✓
15.	Socialistisk Folkeparti	Denmark	1998	13	38.5	✗
16.	Venstre Liberale Parti	Denmark	1998	42	38.1	✗
17.	KOK	Finland	1999	46	37.0	✓
18.	Social Democrats	Denmark	1998	63	36.5	✗
19.	SPÖ	Austria	1999	65	35.5	✓
20.	Folkpartiet Liberelna	Sweden	1998	17	35.3	✓
21.	Social Democrats	Germany	1998	298	35.2	✓
22.	IU	Spain	1996	21	33.3	✓
23.	KF	Denmark	1998	16	31.3	✗
24.	Christian Democrats	Netherlands	1998	29	31.0	✓
25.	Dansk Folkeparti	Denmark	1998	13	30.8	✗
26.	Moderata Samlings	Sweden	1998	82	30.5	✗
27.	VAS	Finland	1999	20	30.0	✓
28.	PCP	Portugal	1999	17	29.4	✗
29.	ÖVP	Austria	1999	52	28.4	✓
30.	PSOE	Spain	1996	141	27.7	✓
31.	KESK	Finland	1999	48	27.1	✗
32.	VVD	Netherlands	1998	39	25.6	✓
33.	SFP/RKP	Finland	1999	12	25.0	✓
34.	Rifond. Comunista	Italy	1996	32	25.0	✓
35.	C.I.U	Spain	1996	16	25.0	?
36.	Labour	UK	1997	418	24.2	✓
37.	POSL/LSAP	Luxembourg	1999	13	23.1	✓
38.	PRL-FDF	Belgium	1999	18	22.2	✗
39.	FDP	Germany	1998	43	20.9	✗
40.	Socialist Party	Portugal	1999	115	20.0	✓
41.	PD	Luxembourg	1999	15	20.0	✗
42.	CDU	Germany	1998	200	19.5	✓
43.	PDS	Italy	1996	156	19.2	✗
44.	CVP	Belgium	1999	22	18.2	✓
45.	KKE	Greece	2000	11	18.2	?
46.	VLD	Belgium	1999	23	17.4	✗
47.	FPÖ	Austria	1999	52	17.3	✗
48.	Partie Socialiste	France	1997	251	16.7	✓
49.	PCS/CSV	Luxembourg	1999	19	15.8	✓
50.	Popular Party	Spain	1996	156	14.1	?
51.	PSD	Portugal	1999	81	13.6	✗
52.	CSU	Germany	1998	45	13.3	✗
53.	Labour	Ireland	1997	17	11.8	✓

(Continued)

Table 9.4 (Continued)

	Party	Country	Election year	Total number of party MPs	% Women	Gender quota
54.	PCF	France	1997	36	11.1	✓
55.	Fine Gael	Ireland	1997	54	11.1	?
56.	PASOK	Greece	2000	158	10.8	✓
57.	Socialist Party	Belgium	1999	19	10.5	×
58.	Fianna Fáil	Ireland	1997	77	10.4	?
59.	Lega Nord	Italy	1996	59	10.2	×
60.	PSC	Belgium	1999	10	10.0	×
61.	Verdi (Greens)	Italy	1996	21	9.5	×
62.	Forza Italia	Italy	1996	123	8.1	×
63.	New Democrats	Greece	2000	125	8.0	✓
64.	Conservative	UK	1997	165	7.9	×
65.	P-S-P-U-P	Italy	1996	67	7.5	×
66.	CDS-PP	Portugal	1999	15	6.7	?
67.	Vlaams Blok	Belgium	1999	15	6.7	×
68.	Liberal Democrats	UK	1997	45	6.5	×
69.	RCV	France	1997	33	6.1	?
70.	UDF	France	1997	113	5.3	×
71.	Alleanza Nazionale	Italy	1996	93	4.3	×
72.	Lista Dini	Italy	1996	25	4.0	×
73.	RPR	France	1997	140	3.6	×
74.	CCD-CDU	Italy	1996	30	3.3	×
75.	UUP	UK	1997	10	0.0	×
76.	SP	Belgium	1999	14	0.0	×

Notes: Voluntary gender quotas are defined as internal party rules, regulations, or constitutions specifying that the party should include a minimum proportion of women as candidates for elected office. The table only includes relevant parties (i.e. those with at least ten seats in the lower house of the national parliament). The data, derived originally from the Council of Europe database, has some important limitations. It should be noted that the definition and meaning of 'quota' can differ among parties, and some may use this only for internal organizational posts rather than for candidate nomination. Parties without a formal quota may instead apply a 'gender target', adhered to more or less rigidly in candidate selection. Parties in **bold** are in countries using majoritarian electoral systems.

- ✓ Gender quota is currently used by this party for parliamentary nominations.
- ×
- Gender quota is not currently used by this party for parliamentary nominations.
- ?
- Information on gender quotas is not available from this source.

Source: Pippa Norris (2004) *Electoral Engineering* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

and 'after' test, exemplified by cases such as their deployment by parties in Scandinavia, in Germany, and in the British Labour party, suggests that the effect of voluntary gender quotas within parties also varies substantially.

Many of the parties ranking at or near the top of the proportion of women MPs in Table 9.4 are in Scandinavia. The Norwegian Labor Party was the first in this region to implement a 40% gender quota for all elections in 1983, although this did not specify the location of women candidates within their lists. Other Norwegian parties followed suit, including the Social Left, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats³⁰. This was followed by Denmark

where the Social Democratic Party introduced a 50% quota for elections in 1988³¹. Because the rank position of candidates on the party list is critical to their success in being elected, in 1994 the Swedish Social Democratic Party introduced the principle of including a woman as every second name on the list – the 'zipper' or 'zebra' principle. In Sweden, since the general election in 1994, the largest political party, the Social Democrats, and later the Greens and the Christian Democrats, have systematically alternated women's and men's names in their lists of the constituency candidates for parliamentary, local, regional, and the EU Parliament elections. If we compare the Swedish parties

ranked high in Table 9.4, it is apparent that gender quotas are used by some such as the Social Democrats and the Vänsterpartiet, although not all the credit should go to the use of positive action, as other Swedish parties including the Centerpartiet, also have a substantial number of female members of parliament despite not using any gender quotas.

Elsewhere in Western Europe, as shown in Table 9.4, formal practices vary among countries and parties. In Germany, for example, three of the five major political parties have a 40–50% quota system in their party rules. In 1980, when the Greens turned from a social movement into a political party, they instilled gender balance by including a strict 50% quota combined with a zipper system in their statutes. Except for the very top positions in government, the Greens have been more or less able to meet their requirements. In 1988 the Social Democrats followed suit by stipulating in party rules that in all internal party elections at least one third of candidates must be female. Since 1994, 40% of all party positions must be held by women. For election lists, parliamentary mandates, and public office a transition period with lower percentages was agreed. It started with one-quarter in 1988, required one-third in 1994, and reached 40% in 1998. The SPD met the targets within the party but fell slightly short for seats in parliaments and in governments. In 1996 the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) introduced the so-called 'quorum' requiring 30% female representation in both party functions and election lists, but so far these targets have not been met. After German unification the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, former East German Communist party) introduced a strict 50% quota in combination with a zipper system. In many elections the PDS has outperformed its own targets. Currently only the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU, the Bavarian sister party of the CDU) and the Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) refuse to introduce voluntary gender quotas.

It is often easier to implement positive action in proportional elections using party lists, but these strategies can also be used under majoritarian rules. In Britain, the Labour party first agreed the principle of quotas to promote women's representation in internal party positions in the late 1980s.³² In 1988 a minimalist measure was agreed for candidate selection for Westminster, so that if a local branch proposed a woman, at least one woman should be included on the constituency shortlist. In 1993, following an electoral defeat where the party

failed to attract sufficient support amongst women voters, it was decided that more radical measures were necessary. Consequently the Labour party's annual conference agreed that in half the seats where Labour MPs were retiring, and in half the Party's key target marginal seats, local party members would be required to select their parliamentary candidate from an all-women shortlist. Other seats would be open to both women and men. Although this policy was subsequently dropped under legal challenge, it still proved highly effective, contributing to a doubling of the number of women in the UK House of Commons between 1992 and 1997³³. Despite abandoning the original policy, low levels of incumbency turnover maintained most of these gains in the subsequent general election in 2001. For the first elections to the new Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Greater London Assembly, Labour adopted a 'twinning' policy. The system 'twinning' neighboring seats, taking into account their 'winnability', so that each pair would select one man and one woman. This opportunity was uniquely available, given that there were no incumbent members. Under this system, local party selectors in the two constituencies would come together to pick candidates, and each would have two votes – one for a woman and one for a man.

Gender quotas are by no means limited to established democracies. In South Africa, for example, in 1994 the African National Congress introduced a 33.3% gender quota, while in Mozambique in 1999 the Frelimo Party introduced a 30% quota on electoral lists. This policy has been particularly common among parties of the left, and Socialist International Women lists 57 socialist parties using gender quotas in April 2002, ranging from 20% to 50%, including the Israeli Meretz (40%), the Mali Adema-Pasj (30%), the Nicaraguan FSLN (30%), and the Turkish CHP (25%)³⁴. Gathering systematic and reliable data on the use of such strategies worldwide is difficult, but a global review of practices by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1993 found that 22 parties employed gender quotas for legislative elections, while 51 parties used them for elections to internal party posts³⁵. By contrast, in the first democratic elections following the fall of the Berlin Wall, parties within Central and Eastern Europe often moved in the opposite direction, abandoning gender quotas for parliament and local government that were regarded as part of the old Communist state³⁶, although occasionally later reinstating this practice, as in the case of the Czech SDP (25%), the Bosnian SDP (30%) and the Lithuanian SDP (30%).




Figure 9.3 The interaction of selection rules and ballot structures

WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY?

What are the consequences of party recruitment processes for power and decision-making within political parties, for the inclusiveness of legislative bodies, and for the chain of accountability in representative democracies? Underlying studies of both the process and the outcome of candidate nomination are a set of broader normative values about how recruitment should work ideally in any representative democracy³⁷. Most commonly, evaluations of the process are framed against the standards of internal party democracy, as well as in terms of its procedural ‘fairness’, ‘simplicity’, and/or ‘transparency’. The outcome is usually judged by the inclusiveness of all major social sectors in the electorate, and also by the ways in which the process is thought to influence the role of elected members.

Figure 9.3 illustrates schematically how the chain of accountability linking citizens and elected representatives is thought to work. The vertical axis distinguishes the location of the decisions about candidate nomination, whether centralized among the party leadership or alternatively devolved downwards to grass-roots level in each area. Ballot structures can be classified into the following categories based

on the choices facing electors when they enter the voting booth:

- **Candidate ballots.** In single-member districts, citizens in each constituency cast a single ballot for an individual candidate. The candidate winning either a plurality or majority of votes in each district is elected. Through casting a ballot, electors indirectly express support for parties, but they have to vote directly for a particular candidate. In this context, politicians have a strong incentive to offer particularistic benefits, exemplified by casework helping individual constituents and by the delivery of local services (‘pork’), designed to strengthen their personal support within local communities. This inducement is particularly powerful in marginal seats where a handful of additional votes may make all the difference between victory and defeat.
- **Preference ballots.** In open-list multimember districts electors cast a ballot for a party, but they can express their preference for a particular candidate or candidates within a party list. Where citizens exercise a preference vote, this strengthens the chances that particular candidates from the list will be elected and therefore changes their rank. Under these rules, politicians have a moderately strong incentive to offer particularistic benefits, to stand out from rivals within their own

party. In most nations the choice of exercising one or more preferential votes is optional, and the practical effect of preference ballots is contingent upon how many citizens choose to 'vote the party ticket' without expressing a preferential vote. If most people decide to vote for the party list, then the effects are similar to party ballots, whereas if most choose to exercise a preferential vote for an individual on the list, then the effects are similar to candidate ballots.

Preference ballots are employed in party list PR used in 27 electoral systems worldwide, including Belgium and the Czech Republic, as well as in single transferable vote elections in Ireland. This ballot is also used in plurality and majoritarian electoral systems, such as in the single non-transferable vote that has been used in the Republic of Korea, Japan and Taiwan³⁸. The majoritarian block vote, used in Bermuda, the Philippines and Mauritius, also allows citizens to vote for individual candidates in multimember districts with party lists of candidates. There are some variants to these rules. In Finland, people must vote for individual candidates, and the number of votes won by candidates determines their party's share of seats. The *panachage* system used in Luxembourg and Switzerland gives each elector as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and electors can distribute them either within or across different party lists.

- **Dual ballots.** In 'combined' (or 'mixed') electoral systems voters can cast separate ballots in both single-member and multimember districts, as exemplified by elections in Italy, Germany and New Zealand. This category can be divided into either combined-independent (where the votes in both types of seats determine the results independently of each other) or combined-proportional (where the share of the vote cast for the party list determines the final allocation of seats). Where combined systems operate, most use closed-list multimember districts, so that citizens can cast a ballot for a candidate in their single-member districts as well as for a party in their multimember districts. The effects of dual ballot elections depend upon what proportion of seats are allocated through single-member or multimember districts: where most seats are single-member then the effects will be closer to candidate ballots, and where most are multimember then the effects will be closer to party ballots.
- **Party ballots.** In closed-list multimember districts, citizens cast a single ballot for a

party. Each party ranks the order of the candidates to be elected within their list, based on the decisions of the party selectorate, and the public cannot express a preference for any particular candidate within each list. Closed-list multimember districts, where voters can only 'vote the ticket' rather than supporting a particular candidate, are expected to encourage politicians to offer programmatic benefits, focused on the collective record and program of their party, and to strengthen cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties.

This system is used in party list PR in 35 electoral systems worldwide, such as Norway and Romania. It also operates in the party block vote system, where electors can cast a ballot for the party list, and the party with a simple plurality of votes in each district is duly elected, as in Singapore, Ecuador and Senegal.

While there are many reasons to believe that the ballot structure is important for the chain of accountability from legislators to voters and parties, nevertheless it is only one factor at work here. A related arrangement is the mean district magnitude (referring to the number of seats per district). Extremely large multimember districts are likely to weaken the incentive to cultivate a personal vote in preference ballot elections, as it will be difficult for any individual candidate to stand out from the throng; alternatively, they may encourage candidates to develop local bailiwicks, effectively dividing the large district into personal 'subdistricts'. Moderate or small multimember districts, on the other hand, are expected to have the opposite tendency, for example where four or five candidates are rivals in STV seats in Ireland.

The nomination process within parties is therefore expected to interact with the electoral system, determining the final stage of recruitment. Members are expected to be most accountable to both local parties and local citizens in systems where the powers of nomination rest in the hands of the local party selectorate, such as grassroots members in each seat, and where the electoral system uses candidate ballots, typified by single-member districts. Such a context is thought to encourage members to focus on delivering particularistic benefits to their district, exemplified by constituency casework and the provision of pork. By contrast, a combination of centralized party selection and the use of party ballots is thought to generate cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties, with members focused on the

provision of collective programmatic benefits³⁹. Rather than a 'one size fits all' approach, the most suitable nomination processes therefore depend upon their interaction with the ballot structures, and whether it is thought to be more important in any political system to prioritize local accountability or cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties.

There are also certain non-congruent cases. Although it is often assumed that party nomination rules will tend to reflect the structure of the electoral system, in fact, as Lundell observed, the degree of centralization of the candidate nomination process is quite complex and diverse among parties, depending upon their structure and organization⁴⁰. In mass-branch parties with a tradition of internal democracy, for example many Scandinavian parties, we have already seen that candidate selection decisions are localized even within party ballot elections. At the same time, the party leadership can play an important role in internal party decisions about nominations, for example vetoing unacceptable nominees, even in candidate ballot elections⁴¹. In non-congruent cases, it remains to be seen whether elected representatives regard themselves as more accountable to the party selectorate or to the electorate.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall the evidence therefore suggests that grassroots members in many European parties have gradually been given greater opportunities to nominate candidates. At the same time selectors are operating within a more constrained scope of decision-making, due to the simultaneous adoption of rules implementing positive action strategies. A wider number of members are therefore able to engage in selection decisions, but they face a more restricted range of choices. We can conclude that the recruitment process to elected office may appear to be one of the more hidden and technical aspects of party politics, but this process has many consequences for the division of power within party organizations, the barriers and opportunities facing women and ethnic minority candidates, and also for the accountability of elected representatives.

NOTES

1. For reviews of the earlier literature on this topic see Moshe M. Czubnowski (1975) 'Political recruitment', in Fred Greenstein and Nelson

W. Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 2: Micropolitical Theory* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley); Donald R. Matthews (1985) 'Legislative recruitment and legislative careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson and Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), *Handbook of Legislative Research* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson (1979) *Comparing Legislatures* (Boston: Little, Brown); Austin Ranney (1981) 'Candidate selection', in David Butler, Howard Penniman and Austin Ranney (eds), *Democracy at the Polls* (Washington, DC: AEI). Comparative studies can be found in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds) (1988) *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective* (London: Sage) and Pippa Norris (ed.) (1998) *Passages to Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

2. Louis Massicotte, André Blais and Antoine Yoshinaka (2004) *Establishing the Rules of the Game* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), Chapter 2. See also details of the legal qualifications to become a candidate in legislative elections provided by the Election Process Information Collection (EPIC) project (<http://epic.at.org/EPIC/multi>).
3. Quoted from Jeffrey Obler in Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. Hazan (2001) 'Candidate selection methods – An analytical framework', *Party Politics*, 7: 297–322.
4. See Czubnowski, 'Political recruitment'.
5. Angelo Panebianco (1988) *Political Parties: Organisation and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Richard S. Katz (2001) 'The problem of candidate selection and models of party democracy', *Party Politics*, 7: 277–96.
6. E.E. Schattschneider (1942) *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p. 101.
7. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (1992) *Party Organisations: A Data Handbook on Party Organisations in Western Democracies, 1960–90* (London: Sage).
8. Lars Bille (2001) 'Democratizing a democratic procedure: Myth or reality? Candidate selection in Western European parties, 1960–1990', *Party Politics*, 7: 363–80.
9. See Rahat and Hazan, 'Candidate selection methods'; Reuven Y. Hazan (2002) 'Candidate selection', in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Neimi and Pippa Norris (eds), *Comparing Democracies 2* (London: Sage). For similar conclusions, see also Susan Scarrow, Paul Webb and David M. Farrell (2000) 'From social integration to electoral contestation', in Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds), *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); J. Hopkin

10

CANDIDATE SELECTION: METHODS AND CONSEQUENCES

*Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat**

Whatever the electoral formula used in elections, candidate selection is one of the first things that political parties must do before they take place. Those who are eventually elected to office will be the successful candidates that the parties previously selected, and they are the ones who will determine much of how the party looks and what it does. That is, the results of the candidate selection process will affect the party a long time after the election itself is over.

Candidate selection is, according to Ranney (1981: 75), the 'process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates'. Candidate selection is, therefore, not the same as legislative recruitment; the latter is more comprehensive and actually includes the former. Legislative recruitment involves such aspects of the political system as the legal, electoral and party frameworks (Norris, 1996, 1997, see also Chapter 9 this volume). Candidate selection may, indeed, be described as a 'key stage' in the recruitment process (Gallagher, 1988a: 2), or even as 'the most important stage' (Czudnowski, 1975: 219).

Candidate selection takes place almost entirely *within* particular parties. There are very few countries – e.g., Germany, Finland and Norway – where the legal system specifies criteria for candidate selection. Only in the United States does the legal system extensively regulate the process of candidate selection. In most countries, the parties themselves are allowed to determine the rules of the game

for their selection of candidates. Candidate selection should, therefore, be seen as a particular and important aspect of legislative recruitment that takes place *inside* the party arena and is predominantly *extralegal*.

The following sections in this chapter elaborate why it is important for students of party politics to understand the mechanisms and dynamics of candidate selection; what the main factors are that delineate candidate selection methods; and how different candidate selection methods have significant consequences for central aspects of democracy, such as participation, representation, competition, and responsiveness.

WHY STUDY CANDIDATE SELECTION?

Until recently, candidate selection received relatively little attention. This dearth of scholarly literature has raised a formidable obstacle in the path of researchers who wish to undertake cross-national analyses of the subject. A few pioneering ventures, however, did take place, with initial attempts to produce a theory or a framework for analysis, but they remain few and far between (Duverger, 1959; Czudnowski, 1975; Epstein, 1980; Ranney, 1981; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Hazan and Pennings, 2001; Narud *et al.*, 2002). This is partially due to the objective difficulties and obstacles one encounters in any attempt to conduct research on candidate selection – namely, the lack and inaccessibility of empirical data. It is not by chance that Gallagher and Marsh's (1988) work on




Figure 10.1 Party selectorates (updated from Rahat and Hazan, 2001)

candidate selection calls it the ‘secret garden’ of politics. However, the more recent research into this subfield, particularly in the last decade, eschews many of the earlier assumptions, penetrates new grounds of empirical research, and shows that candidate selection has wide-ranging and significant implications for political parties, party members, leaders, and democratic governance.

Beyond being a significant stage in the recruitment process (Norris, this volume), candidate selection is also an important arena for internal party power struggles. Schattschneider’s (1942: 64) argument concerning this issue is worth citing in full:

Unless the party makes authoritative and effective nominations, it cannot stay in business, for dual or multiple party candidacies mean certain defeat. As far as elections are concerned, the united front of the party, the party concentration of numbers, can be brought about only by a binding nomination. The nominating process thus has become the crucial process of the party. The nature of the nominating process determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party. This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party.

Ranney (1981: 103) endorses this statement.

It is therefore not surprising that the most vital and hotly contested factional disputes in any party are the struggles that take place over the choice of its candidates; for what is at stake in such a struggle, as the opposing sides well know, is nothing less than control of the core of what the party stands for and does.

Gallagher (1988a: 3) takes it a step further, stating that ‘the contest over candidate selection is generally even more intense than the struggle over the party manifesto’. Indeed, after an election, what largely remains as the functioning core of almost any party is its office-holders – its successful candidates.

Thus, the importance of candidate selection methods for understanding party politics can be explained by a combination of the three elements elaborated above: First, candidate selection

reflects and defines the character of a party and its internal power struggle. Second, it is relatively easy for parties to alter their candidate selection methods. Third, a change in candidate selection methods will affect party politics.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING CANDIDATE SELECTION

In any analysis of candidate selection methods, the unit of analysis is a single party in a particular country at a specific time. Only in those cases where several parties in a particular country use similar methods (usually due to legal requirements), or where a single party uses a similar candidate selection method over time, can one begin to make generalizations about the candidate selection process.

The procedure for classifying candidate selection methods elaborated here is based on four criteria: the selectorate; candidacy; decentralization; and voting versus appointment (Rahat and Hazan, 2001).

Selectorate

The selectorate is the body that selects the candidates. It is, as Best and Cotta (2000: 11) argue, ‘an important intermediary actor in the process of recruitment’. The selectorate can be composed of one person or many people – up to the entire electorate of a given nation. On the inclusiveness to exclusiveness continuum, as presented in Figure 10.1, at one extreme the selectorate is the most inclusive, i.e., the entire electorate that has the right to vote in the general elections. At the other extreme, the selectorate – or rather the selector – is the most exclusive, i.e., a nominating entity of one leader.

Between these two extremes, the selectorate of each single party is classified according to its degree of inclusiveness. For example, American *non-partisan* primaries, in which every registered voter can vote for candidates from any party, are located near the inclusive end of



Figure 10.2 Candidacy (updated from Rahat and Hazan, 2001)

the continuum (Ranney, 1981). American *closed* primaries, on the other hand, which demand voters' registration according to their party affiliation before the day of the primaries, are located slightly away from the inclusive end. The exact location of American primaries will, therefore, depend on the restrictions that are defined by the different state laws (Kolodny and Katz, 1992).

The inclusive end of the continuum also includes examples from Iceland and Spain. According to Kristjánsson (1998), from 1971 on, several parties in Iceland adopted open primaries, where every citizen in a particular electoral district could participate. The Spanish Catalan Party opened its candidate selection to 'registered "sympathizers"' – non-members who can register as party supporters without paying any membership fee (Hopkin, 2001).

Party primaries, in which the selectors are party members, would be located closer to the middle of the selectorate continuum (Gallagher, 1988a). More and more Western democracies allot their party members a significant role in candidate selection (Bille, 2001). The purest type of party primary is where the party members' vote alone decides the composition and rank of the candidates. Less pure types allow the party members to select the party candidates from a short-list determined either by party agencies or by a nominating committee, and/or allow the party headquarters to veto certain candidates.

When the selectorate is an agency of the party, we find ourselves in the middle of the continuum. Inside the party, the relative size of each agency is a sign of its inclusiveness: conventions are usually larger than central committees, which in turn are usually larger than executive bodies, such as bureaus. As the size of the particular party agency gets smaller, we move further toward the exclusive pole of the continuum.

An extremely inclusive selectorate is, for example, a special nomination committee that is composed of a few leaders or their aficionados, and whose composition is ratified *en bloc*. The extreme end of the exclusive pole is defined by a selectorate comprised of a single individual. Israel's ultra-orthodox religious

parties serve as an example of such an extremely exclusive selectorate. In one party, a single rabbi was authorized to decide the composition and order of the party list (Rahat and Sher-Hadar, 1999).

Candidacy

Candidacy addresses the question of who can present himself or herself as the candidate of a particular party. Again we can posit an inclusiveness to exclusiveness continuum (Figure 10.2). At one end, the inclusive pole, every voter is eligible to stand as a party's candidate. Some US states are close to this pole. At the exclusive pole, we encounter a series of restrictive conditions. Consider Obler's (1974: 180) account of the requirements that applied to potential candidates in the Belgian Socialist Party.

While the exact requirements vary from one constituency to another, they generally stipulate that to be placed on the primary ballot aspirants must (1) have been a member of the Socialist party, trade union, co-operative and insurance association for at least five years prior to the primary; (2) have made annual minimum purchases from the Socialist co-op; (3) have been a regular subscriber to the party's newspaper; (4) have sent his children to state rather than Catholic schools; and (5) have his wife and children enrolled in the appropriate women's and youth organizations. These conditions, in effect, require that a candidate serve as a member of an activist subculture before he becomes eligible to run for Parliament. They involve a form of enforced socialization during which it is assumed (or hoped) that the aspirant will absorb the appropriate values and attitudes as well as a keen commitment to the party.

More common requirements are less demanding, such as a minimal length of membership prior to the presentation of candidacy and pledges of loyalty to the party. At times, parties will ignore their own candidacy regulations, largely due to electoral considerations. For example, even the exclusive Italian Communist Party included non-members as candidates (Wertman, 1988).




Figure 10.3 Centralization and decentralization (Rahat and Hazan, 2001)

Decentralization

A common error in studies that address candidate selection methods is that of considering decentralization and inclusiveness (and centralization and exclusiveness) as conceptually similar, or at least as describing the same dimension of candidate selection methods (Bowler *et al.*, 1999; Shugart, 2001). Analytically, though, they are different. Decentralization could mean only that control over candidate selection has passed from the national oligarchy to a local oligarchy. For example, if the selectorate is decentralized from a national party conference of several thousand participants to ten local committees each consisting of a few dozen activists and leaders, the overall selectorate has been decentralized, but has not become more inclusive – and has actually become more exclusive.

Party selection methods may be seen as decentralized in two senses (see Figure 10.3), which are parallel to the concepts Lijphart (1984) proposed when he dealt with the division of power in federal and unitary democratic regimes. Decentralization can be *territorial*, i.e., when local party selectorates nominate party candidates – such as a local leader, a party branch committee, or all party members or voters in an electoral district. Decentralization of the selection method can also be *functional*, i.e., ensuring representation for representatives of such groups as trade unions, women, or minorities.

Decentralization based on territorial mechanisms, in order to ensure regional and local representation, is rather straightforward. In many European cases, the selectorate at the district level plays the crucial role in candidate selection. The Norwegian case falls close to the territorial decentralization pole. National party agencies cannot veto a candidacy that is determined at the district level, and territorial representation is taken into account *inside* each district (Valen, 1988; Valen *et al.*, 2002).

More complex mechanisms are required for ensuring functional representation via decentralization. There are two mechanisms commonly used. The first is the reserved place mechanism, which guarantees a minimal number of positions on the list (or minimal number of safe seats in the case of single-member districts) for candidates belonging to a distinct sector or social group. This mechanism implies the decentralization of candidacy alone. Candidates who are eligible for reserved places compete for their place on the list against all of the candidates and are selected by the same selectorate, and the reserved representation mechanism is implemented only if the candidates do not attain the reserved position or a higher one. Establishing quotas for women, a practice adopted by many parties, is one example.

The second mechanism used to ensure functional representation is the sectarian or social group district, where the candidates and the

selectors are members of the same sector or social group. This mechanism decentralizes both candidacy and the selectorate. Belgium supplies us with examples of both of the functional representation mechanisms, which were used at the district level. In the Belgian Christian Social Party in 1961, the reserved place mechanism was used when it was decided that in some of the Brussels districts, Flemish and Francophone candidates would get every other seat on the party list. In 1965, separate intra-party subdistricts were actually established when Francophone and Flemish party members in these districts selected, separately, Francophone and Flemish candidates for parliament (Obler, 1974).

Voting versus appointment

It is usually the case that in smaller and more exclusive selectorates, candidates are appointed, while larger selectorates usually vote in order to choose their candidates. However, a voting system can, theoretically, be used in a selectorate of two or more people, and appointments can take place in bodies that include several dozens of people. When the selection process includes a procedure by which votes determine whether someone is named as the party's candidate in an election, and/or his or her position on the list, we are dealing with a *voting procedure*. It should be noted that while a voting procedure can be used by an appointment body of two people or more, it is not considered a voting system unless two conditions are filled: first, each candidacy must be determined exclusively by votes, and not, for example, by an agreed-upon list or an allocation that is ratified by a unanimous or majority vote; and second, the voting results must be presented officially to justify and legitimize the candidacy. When candidacy is determined without fulfilling these conditions, we refer to this as an *appointment system*. In a pure appointment system, candidates are appointed with no need for approval by any party agency except the nominating organ itself. In a pure voting system, all candidates are selected through a voting procedure, and no other selectorate can change the composition of the list.

Cases located between these extremes are called appointment-voting systems. Such is the *en bloc* ratification vote that was used in Belgium. In many constituencies, party members were asked either to vote for a 'model list' – a list of candidates determined by

a local party agency – or to express their preferences regarding the candidates. Only if more than 50% of party members did not ratify the model list were the other votes counted, and thus they did not carry much weight (Obler, 1974; de Winter, 1988). In Norway, appointments were more open to change in the ratification process. Lists that were recommended by a nominating committee were then ratified by a majority of a selected party agency, position by position (Valen, 1988).

Voting systems can be further distinguished on the basis of two elements. One is the position allocation formula, i.e., proportional representation (PR), semi-PR, semi-majoritarian, and majoritarian systems. The distinction among these four kinds of voting system is based on their potential level of proportionality. Proportional voting systems in this context will usually be personalized. For example, three of the four largest Irish parties in the 1980s – Fianna Fáil was the exception – used the single transferable vote (STV) system that was also used in general elections to determine the composition of their candidate lists. Semi-proportional systems are those in which the number of votes each selector has is *smaller* than the number of safe seats being contested. This is the intra-party version of a limited-vote electoral system. In a majoritarian system, the number of votes and safe seats/positions is *equal*. In many cases, every position is contested separately, making the system almost parallel to single-member district elections. Semi-majoritarian systems are defined as systems where the number of votes that each selector receives is *higher* than the number of safe seats contested. While such a system is majoritarian – as a majority block can be organized and can take over all of the safe positions¹ – it is 'semi' in the sense that incentives for organizing a plurality or majority bloc vote are weaker than in the pure majoritarian case.²

The second parameter distinguishes between single-round and multi-round selection methods. In the former, all safe positions are selected at one and the same time, whereas in the latter, the safe positions are filled gradually. The importance of this distinction lies in the opportunities to control and/or balance the composition of the lists that a gradual selection process gives the parties.

There is a connection between the voting system used in the final stage of the candidate selection process and the national electoral system. Where national elections are conducted in single-member districts, the voting system used in the candidate selection process

must be majoritarian, in order to produce a single candidate. For example, the exhaustive ballot was used by the British Conservative and Labour parties in the final stage of their selection process,³ while the Liberals used the majoritarian method of the alternative vote (Denver, 1988). On the other hand, when general elections take place in multi-member districts, the voting system does not need to be majoritarian. For example, in Ireland the exhaustive ballot was used by Fianna Fáil in order to determine its candidate list, position by position, while the next three largest parties used a one-round STV method.

There is also a connection between the selectorate size and the use of either single-round or gradual selection. In smaller selectorates, it is possible to adopt either method. However, when the selectorate is larger – especially in those cases where it includes all party members or the entire electorate – logistics makes the use of a single round almost a must.⁴

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CANDIDATE SELECTION METHODS

As elaborated above, the classification of candidate selection methods can be based on four major dimensions: selectorate; candidacy; decentralization; and voting versus appointment. The different methods used along these dimensions produce different political consequences. For example, when it comes to the decentralization dimension, territorial decentralization of the candidate selection method could lead to increased responsiveness of members of parliament to the demands and grievances of their (newly created) constituency (Hazan, 1999) – similar to an electoral system founded on small districts. On the voting dimension, parties that use more proportional voting methods, or parties that use appointment methods, could control intra-party conflicts by balancing representation better than parties that use centralized methods and majoritarian voting systems. Concerning candidacy rules, parties could influence the composition of the parliamentary party group by adopting term limits or setting additional criteria for incumbents. Conversely, parties could make the life of incumbents easier by adopting an almost automatic reselection procedure.

The selectorate, however, determines the most significant and far-reaching consequences (Scarrow, 2000; Best and Cotta, 2000). Therefore, this section focuses on the political

consequences of the *inclusiveness of the selectorate*. The impact of this foremost dimension will be assessed according to four important aspects of democracy: participation, representation, competition, and responsiveness.

Participation

When we talk about political participation, we must distinguish between the quantity of participants and the quality of their participation. It is obvious that in terms of quantity, the more inclusive selectorates are the more participatory ones. Indeed, political participation is at its lowest when a few party leaders, or their aficionados, produce the list of candidates. A selectorate that is composed of hundreds, or even thousands, of delegates (a party agency, such as a central committee or a convention) comes closer to the democratic ideal, especially since the party members usually select these delegates. A selectorate that includes tens, and even hundreds, of thousands of party members can be seen, from the quantitative perspective, as an open arena for political participation.

When looking beyond the numbers, in an attempt to analyze the quality of membership and its meaning, the picture becomes quite obscure. Citizens positively perceive the attempts of parties to enhance participation by adopting a more inclusive selectorate in their candidate selection processes. However, most of them do not even bother to join the parties in order to enjoy the now empowered benefits of membership. Numerous country studies, such as Britain (Webb, 2002), Germany (Scarrow, 2002), France (Knapp, 2002), the Scandinavian countries (Sundberg, 2002) and Ireland (Murphy and Farrell, 2002), show that parties try to meet the challenge of declining party membership by empowering party members, yet these efforts have failed to enlarge the number of party members significantly.

Furthermore, many of those who join the parties do not satisfy even the minimum expectations of party members – to be loyal party voters and to be affiliated with the party for more than a short period. Research on Israeli party primaries found that many of the new party members joined the party (or rather were recruited) with the sole purpose of supporting a certain candidate. Approximately one-third of those who joined the party were not even aware of the fact that they were party members. One-tenth were actually members of more than one party. Moreover, many party members voted for other parties in the general elections

(Rahat and Hazan, forthcoming). Studies of candidate selection in Canada show that most of those who joined the parties in order to participate in the candidate selection process were 'instant members'. These members joined the party solely in order to select a leader, or a candidate for parliament, and left the party as soon as the selection was over (Carty and Blake, 1999; Carty, 2002; Malloy, 2003). It appears that the parties, for their part, prefer to 'improve membership statistics' (Scarow, 1994: 46) as a demonstration of their public 'credibility', rather than to embark on a search for measures to improve the quality of membership alongside its expansion.

The rate of turnout in party primaries is another interesting indicator of the (lack of) quality of a more inclusive selectorate. Kuitunen (2002: 74–5, 77) reports that turnout in primaries in Finland ranged from 20% to 63%. De Winter (1988: 26) reports a decline in the participation by Belgian party members from 51% in 1958 to 25% in 1985. According to Rahat and Hazan (forthcoming), turnout in primaries in Israel during the 1990s ranged from 51% to 75%, while Gallagher (1988b: 246) reports that in the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) in 1975 it was 63%. These statistics indicate two things: first, turnout in the party primaries is lower than in the general elections; and second, on average, about one-half of the dues-paying, empowered party members do not bother to collect the 'merchandise' that they paid for, and do not participate in their party's candidate selection process.

A more inclusive policy is also likely to erode, in the long run, the loyal core of party activists. Enhanced, and equivalent, political participation in candidate selection damages the differential structure of rewards (or 'selective incentives') in parties when the privileges of long-time loyal activists are made equal to those of new, temporary and unfaithful registrants. This may be the actual aim of those who employ this policy (Katz, 2001), or may be an unintended consequence of it (Hazan, 2002).

Representation

Among the many notions of representation, two distinct concepts can be used to illustrate the influence of candidate selection. The first is the representation of *ideas*, as described by Pitkin (1976), which implies that the representatives reflect the political beliefs of their voters. The second is representation as *presence*, which relates to the descriptive characteristics

of the representatives – whether their identity is similar to those whom they represent or not (Phillips, 1995). Both kinds of representation are relevant to candidate selection because parties – in their attempt to address the electorate, and to control intra-party conflicts – are likely to try to balance their list of candidates in terms of both notions of representation.

Smaller, exclusive selectorates will be more capable of balancing representation in both senses. When selection can be controlled by a party oligarchy that appoints candidates – and to a lesser extent, when voting takes place in a party agency and can be coordinated – there are more chances that different ideological and social groups (women, minorities, etc.) within the party will be allocated safe positions on the party list, or safe constituency seats. The parties themselves, according to their behavior, appear to validate this claim. The process of democratization of the candidate selection methods in western Europe (Hazan and Pennings, 2001) took place parallel to the increase in the use of representation correction mechanisms (Caul, 1999). Parties increasingly tend to restrict the choices of their more inclusive selectorates in order to ensure representation as presence, particularly that of women (Norris, this volume).

Competition

The candidate selection process pits against each other numerous candidates who aspire to be among those few that will compete in safe seats, or in safe list positions, during an election. There are various ways to measure and compare the level of competition in candidate selection. For example, one can calculate the average number of candidates who compete per safe seat or list position; alternatively, in cases where voting takes place, one can analyze the spread of the votes among the competing candidates. Incumbency, or the level of turnover, could serve as an indicator for the level of competition. For example, higher turnover could signify higher levels of competition.

While incumbency is an advantage in every kind of candidate selection method, as it is in every type of electoral system (Somit *et al.*, 1994), the differences in the inclusiveness of the selectorate are likely to create variations in the extent of this advantage. Smaller selectorates allow aspiring candidates a chance to be known and to personally contact their selectors. When the selectorate is inclusive, i.e., composed of party members at large, support cannot be based on personal affiliations and

incumbency is thus likely to offer a larger advantage. This is mainly because, as public officials, incumbents enjoy publicity and the ability to demonstrate responsiveness to the demands of the selectorate, interest groups, financial supporters, etc. The American experience supplies clear evidence of the advantage of incumbents in primaries (a very inclusive selectorate). Between 1978 and 1992, in only 47 cases out of 3166 (1.5%) were incumbents seeking re-election to the House of Representatives defeated in the primaries, and in only 13 cases out of 236 (5.5%) were incumbents seeking re-election to the Senate defeated in the primaries (Jackson, 1994). As Maisel and Stone (2001: 43) point out, 'It is clear that primary elections do not serve to stimulate more competition, and to the extent that competition is an essential ingredient of democracy, it is not clear they accomplish their intended purpose of enhancing U.S. democracy'.

If we accept the argument that party agencies are more competitive than primaries because of the shorter 'distance' between the candidates and selectors, then nomination committees (a very exclusive selectorate) can be expected to be even more competitive. This is because it is easier for each candidate to be in personal contact with each member of the committee than would be the case in a more inclusive selectorate. However, this prediction misses an important part of the picture. The nomination committee suffers – because of its small size and informal, non-transparent working procedures – from a lack of popular democratic legitimacy, i.e., a democratic deficit. The best strategy for the nomination committee to legitimize its decisions in the eyes of the party members, the party agencies and even the general public is to present a list that is largely composed of incumbents – i.e., a list that reflects the existing balance of power and will thus not encounter much antagonism. There will be changes, to demonstrate that something was changed and that the nomination committee is not a rubber stamp, but they will be minimal. The result is that party agencies, located in the middle of the inclusive–exclusive selectorate dimension, are likely to be the most competitive selectorates. The more exclusive selectorates, such as nominating committees, are likely to be the least competitive, while the most inclusive selectorates, such as primaries, are likely to be moderately competitive (Rahat and Hazan, 2005). More data and more empirical analysis are needed in order to validate and strengthen this assessment,

because to date there are few studies of competition in the candidate selection process outside the inclusive American arena.

Responsiveness

Since a central motivation, and constraint, for the behavior of members of parliament (the successful candidates) is their wish to be reselected, they will pay special attention to the grievances and demands of their selectorate. The composition of the selectorate is thus likely to influence the behavioral patterns of parliamentarians and of their parent organization, the political party. Bowler (2000), for example, argues that the best explanation for the collective action of legislators is the nomination procedures in general, and who nominates in particular.

One approach claims that there are negative relationships between inclusiveness and party cohesion because the role of non-party actors in candidate selection rises with an increase in the inclusiveness of the selectorate, and also their importance as an object of responsiveness. Legislators who were selected by small nominating committees owe their positions to the party leadership, and are therefore likely to be first and foremost party players. Legislators who were selected by party agencies are likely to be party players at most times, but nevertheless will be somewhat differentiated in their efforts to promote the demands and interests of the groups within the party that serve as their power base. Legislators who were selected in primaries need the help of non-party actors in order to reach their massive, fluid, and somewhat apathetic audience. In the more inclusive selectorates, candidates need political 'mediators' who can supply the resources needed to address the large number of party members: capital holders who can supply the necessary finances to address a huge selectorate; interest group leaders who command the votes of hundreds, and even thousands, of members; and the mass media. All of these mediators have narrower – and sometimes different – interests and perceptions than the party as a whole. Facing the plurality of pressures that characterize the more inclusive selectorates, the cohesion of the parties is likely to decrease, as parliamentarians behave more like individuals than team players.

Comparing the level of party cohesion in the US Congress to levels of party cohesion in other Western democracies illustrates this point: the

relatively low cohesion of US parties can be explained by their adherence to extremely inclusive candidate selection methods. Candidates select their party label with little to no say on the part of the party institutions. In most other cases, where cohesion is much higher, the parties as such have a say in candidate selection. First of all, party institutions often take part in candidate selection: filtering candidacies, validating their selection and sometimes playing the central role in their selection (Bille, 2001). Even when a growing number of parties allow their members a crucial role in candidate selection, membership, as such, is far more exclusive than in the USA (Epstein, 1980). As Gallagher (1988b: 271) argued, 'It may not matter much, in this sense [level of party cohesion], *which* party agency selects candidates, but it does matter that *some* party agency selects them'. Second, Western European parties still put some formal and informal limits on candidacy. Third, US parties have lost most of their control over candidate selection. The most they can do – and even in this they are limited – is to endorse a certain candidate competing in the party primaries for the use of the party label (Jewell and Morehouse, 2001). Another case in point is that of the democratization of candidate selection methods in Israel, Iceland, and Taiwan. In all three countries, the adoption of a more inclusive selectorate led to a decrease in party cohesion (Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Kristjánsson, 1998; Baum and Robinson, 1999).

A second approach, based on the logic of the cartel party model (Mair, 1994, 1997; Katz and Mair, 1995; Katz, 2001) and on the Canadian experience (Carty, 2004), claims that inclusive selectorates actually increase the power of party elites and help preserve party cohesion. An increase in nominal power at the base of the party is achieved at the expense of the middle-level activists, as they are the ones who might be able to coordinate an effective challenge to the autonomy of the party leaders. The rationale behind this approach is that the less intense (atomistic, unorganized, unstable) audience of party members is more likely to take cues from the highly visible party leadership. Empirical support for this approach comes from the Canadian case of inclusive selectorates and high party cohesion, and from other cases in which the opening up of candidate selection did not lead to a decrease in cohesion. However, as in the case of competition, the study of the impact of candidate selection methods on responsiveness, and in

particular on party cohesion, is still in an embryonic phase. More data and empirical analysis, such as Hix (2004), are needed to assess its ramifications comprehensively.

Intra-party democracy

The political consequences of the selectorate dimension in candidate selection reveal that more democracy in one dimension does not necessarily lead to more democracy in other dimensions. For example, parties that use small nomination committees can ensure representation, but are problematic in the participatory sense. On the other hand, parties that select their candidates through primaries enjoy high levels of participation, but can hardly balance representation. This indicates that in order to be considered truly 'more' democratic, parties should look for a candidate selection method that could optimally balance different democratic dimensions, such as participation, representation, competition, and responsiveness. It is the challenge of future research to clarify the relationship between these dimensions, based on the much needed empirical research, so that the study of candidate selection can supply a solid base for improved theoretical and political understanding of democracy in general and democracy within parties in particular.

CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The major challenge for the study of candidate selection methods is to bring it closer to the state that the study of electoral system was in approximately 40 years ago, when Rae's (1967) seminal work *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* was published. That is, we need cross-party and cross-national empirical studies of the political consequences of candidate selection methods.

Achieving this is by no means easy. Existing theoretical frameworks, particularly those concerning party politics, provide substantial propositions for the study of candidate selection. The lack of cross-national empirical studies is, nonetheless, the Achilles heel of any attempt to make further progress. The problem with a cross-national empirical study is that it requires familiarity with local politics and accessibility (in terms of language, as well as in other more basic terms) to intra-party data.

Candidate selection methods not only affect party politics, they can also reflect party politics. There is, therefore, a need to analyze candidate selection methods both as a dependent and as an independent variable. Prominent examples of treating candidate selection as a dependent variable, in the rather exceptional case of the United States, range from Key (1949) to Ware (2002). The possible links between candidate selection and such variables as the structure of government, the electoral system, the political culture, and the nature of the party were already suggested long ago (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988), but were only recently put to a cross-national empirical test (Lundell, 2004). There is a dire need for additional data, before any conclusive findings can be reached.

An additional path is the study of the politics of reform of candidate selection methods – why, when, and in what circumstances parties change (or preserve) their candidate selection methods. Several studies have suggested various explanations for such changes, for example, the democratization of candidate selection methods (Katz, 2001; Scarrow, 1999; Hazan and Pennings, 2001). Yet there remains a need for a more integrative look at the phenomenon, one that would account not only for overall trends but also for the differences among parties and among nations that may result from interactions at the inter- and intra-party levels.

Sailing the uncharted waters of candidate selection could help us better understand the nature of party membership, the kind of candidates selected, the dynamics exhibited within the party, the power and performance of the party in parliament, and our overall ability to evaluate party politics. Behind closed party doors, this ‘secret garden’ of politics is still largely unexplored.

NOTES

- * This chapter is largely based on published and unpublished research by the authors, *inter alia* Rahat and Hazan (2001, 2005, forthcoming), Hazan (2002), and Hazan and Rahat (2002a, 2002b, 2005).
- 1 The concept of *safe* positions on the candidate list, or safe seats when dealing with majoritarian systems, is used quite freely in the research literature. Here we define it according to the following criteria. Although the size of the party’s legislative representation is not known in

advance – intra-party selection is made before the general election – parties and politicians tend to relate to their party’s *actual* representation as the one that distinguishes ‘safe’ list positions from ‘unsafe’ positions. As for new parties that did not compete previously, and thus cannot relate to any existing size, we are forced to estimate according to their *projected* size, using opinion polls.

- 2 When the number of votes is equal to the list size (ratio = 1), a majority bloc can take over all of the safe list positions. When the ratio is lower – or ‘limited’ in electoral studies terminology – even in the case of bloc voting, more than one bloc can win ‘safe’ seats. When the ratio is higher than one, a bloc equal to the size of the legislative list can be formed. Such a bloc can try to manipulate the results by asking voters to vote for it and spread the rest of their votes among many different candidates, thereby wasting the surplus votes. However, to organize such a vote under competitive conditions requires very high levels of mutual political trust and excellent coordination – conditions that are rare – and even the attempt might create an effective counter-reaction by other blocs.
- 3 The exhaustive ballot is a selection method according to which a series of ballots takes place, with the bottom candidate being eliminated after each round, until a candidate wins an absolute majority of the vote.
- 4 The tools offered in this section can be easily used when analysing a simple, one-stage, uniform candidate selection method. Empirically, however, we often encounter complex candidate selection methods. For solutions to classification problems, see Rahat and Hazan (2001).

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