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ČASOPIS ZA NAUKU O JEZIKU I KNJIŽEVNOSTI
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SADRŽAJ / TABLE OF CONTENTS

Studije književnosti i kulture / Literary and Cultural Studies ***The Discourse of Power in Anglo-American Literature***

Introduction

Aleksandra Nikčević-Batričević and Marija Krivokapić7

The Discourse of Power in Western Philosophy and Literary Theory:
An Introduction

Raad Kareem Abd-Aun11

Maintenance of Power – Louis Althusser’s Ideological and
Repressive State Apparatuses

Tomislav Kuna27

The Power of Tears: Margery Kempe and Female Empowerment
in the Middle Ages

Anđelka Raguž41

Hard Men and Soft Women: The Gendering Power of the Virtual

Boris Berić.....53

When Worlds Collide: Tradition and Pragmatism in *King Lear* and *Richard II*

Denis Kuzmanović61

When Equality is Just not Enough: The Interplay of Love and Power
in Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice* and Brontë’s *Jane Eyre*

Branko Marjanović81

The Discourse of Power in Popular Fiction: A Case Study of Charlaine
Harris’ *Dead Until Dark*

Biljana Oklopčić97

Name as a Powerful Means of Forming Identity in Jhumpa Lahiri’s
The Namesake

Sanja Čukić.....113

The Balkan Higher-Education Express
Marija Krivokapić and Petar Penda 125

UPUTSTVO AUTORIMA.....133

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTORS135

***Studije književnosti i kulture /
Literary and Cultural Studies***

INTRODUCTION

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This cluster of papers is a product of the XI International Conference on Anglo-American Literary Studies that took place at the University of Montenegro in September 2015. The objective of the conference was to discuss the challenging issue of the discourse of power in literature, literary theory, and in society at large.

Although our research is focused on the examples from Anglo-American literature, it assumes a multidisciplinary approach that looks into etymology, philosophy, economy, history, sociology, culture, and education too. There are numerous definitions of power, as we will see later. However, as the word originates from the Anglo-French “poueir,” “poer,” a derivation from the Vulgar Latin “potēre,” which replaced Latin “posse,” meaning “to be able,” “have power,” it is also closely related to “potent,” coming from the Medieval Latin “potentia.” Therefore, apart from physical and political power, there are other forms and expressions of power, such as the power of creativity, of love, of beauty, of literature, of knowledge, of discourse, of now, etc., which the papers that follow discuss.

Raad Kareem Abd-Aun from the University of Babylon authors the paper titled “The Discourse of Power in Western Philosophy and Literary Theory: An Introduction.” He argues that although the western philosophers, thinkers, and literary theorists vary in their understanding of the concept and discourse of power, they all seem to agree that whenever power is held by an individual or an entity, it is bound to be abused or used to abuse others no matter how good the intentions, or noble the cause. There is always someone/some entity to take power in his/its hands to control another/others for ends other than those of the others. Kareem Abd-Aun asks if the other/s will be good if power does not exist, or if it is not exercised? Or, would they wield that power themselves? This paper also gives a historical overview of the leading philosophical meditation of the concept, from Plato to contemporary feminists.

Tomislav Kuna’s paper “Maintenance of Power – Louis Althusser’s Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses,” opens with an analysis of Niccoló Machiavelli’s work on political and social philosophy, *The Prince* (1532), which minutely describes the ways in which one *gains* power. It also gives sound advice on ways in which that power is *maintained*. Building on that discussion Kuna considers Louis Althusser’s notion of Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses (ISA and RSA). The ISA include ways in which a party in power (or a

dictator) supplies the masses (proles) with desirable information through: the mass media (TV, radio, Internet, technology, newspapers, magazines, etc.), art (literature, painting, music, etc.), religion, social conventions, and within the nucleus of the family itself. The RSA include the military and the police. These are the necessary keepers of the law, instituted and controlled by the leading few. Comparing the totalitarian and democratic ways of ruling (gaining and maintaining power), this paper brings us closer to understanding how this process operates and supports it with examples from literature, mainly dystopian fiction, which deals chiefly with such issues.

“The Power of Tears: Margery Kempe and Female Empowerment in the Middle Ages,” by Anđelka Raguž, looks into *The Tears of Compunction, Compassion and Contrition shed by Margery Kempe* and discusses how a medieval English mystic from Lynn firmly sets Margery onto the path of medieval spirituality. Her mystical experience has attracted controversy since the discovery of the full manuscript of her fifteenth-century autobiography, *The Book of Margery Kempe*, published in 1934. As her book illustrates, Margery was no less controversial in her own time, with many considering her not a mystic but a madwoman. Although scholars acknowledge the historical value of the *Book* as a document on medieval life and forms of worship, they cannot reach a consensus on Margery and the validity of her mystical experience, which started with a lengthy episode of postpartum psychosis after the birth of her first child. Margery’s sudden recovery from the illness is attributed to a vision of Christ, and her conversion from sinner to saint begins. Margery’s mystical experience is characterised by her “dalliances” with Christ, by her tears, which first occur in her mid-thirties, and by her crying, which begins on Mount Calvary when Margery is around forty. As Margery gets older, the cries intensify both in content and frequency. The tears of compunction, compassion and contrition are, according to religious doctrine, a gift from the Holy Spirit. They are also every woman’s weapon. The paper analyzes the way in which Margery’s tears empower her in a male-dominated society which preferred to keep spiritual women behind closed doors. Margery’s refusal to be confined to a convent led to her active participation in religious life and subsequently to problems with authorities, both ecclesiastical and secular, and with society at large.

In his research titled “Hard Men and Soft Women: The Gendering Power of the Virtual,” Boris Berić, from the University of Osijek in Croatia, reminds that John Milton has frequently been accused of multiple sexism in *Paradise Lost*. However, Berić asserts, when Milton’s Satan contemplates the gender of hard men and soft women, he actually leans on a long standing tradition in philosophy, theology, and medical science, from Aristotle and Galen to Isidore of Seville and Milton’s own time. This gendering tradition had close ties with the virtual, which has been misunderstood as “fake,” “illusion” and “unreal” in more recent times. In its original form, the virtual had dialectical ties with the actual

and it meant power, the power that operates in the manner of Moebius strip. So, to be more virtual did not mean to be more “unreal,” “disembodied” or “dehumanized,” but to be empowered with the potential of becoming a male. Derived from *virtus* and *vir*, the virtual was even an etymologically gendering power. The lack of this power deprived some fetuses of being fully actualized as men, so they became women or, rather, failed men.

Denis Kuzmanović, from the University of Mostar, participates in this selection with his paper “When Worlds Collide: Tradition and Pragmatism in *King Lear* and *Richard II*.” Kuzmanović assumes that these two Shakespeare’s plays have differences, which would initially make their grouping under a common theme vague. The theme would be the vicissitudes of power and inability of these monarchs to adapt to the times. Certain differences are fairly obvious, he notices: the first is a tragedy, whereas the second is a history play; the first is set in Britain’s pre-Christian, pagan past while the second is placed in the fourteenth century; Lear gives away his kingdom voluntarily as an old man, while Richard is deposed fairly young; Lear has three daughters while Richard has no heirs, etc. However, there is a similarity in each king’s downfall, which stems from the conflicting natures of two worlds, i.e. viewpoints: that of tradition and cosmologically determined roles and norms which everyone is supposed to follow, and that of pragmatism, ambition and disregard for customs, concludes Kuzmanović.

One more scholar focuses on Shakespeare with a comparative approach. In his paper “When Equality is Just not Enough: The Interplay of Love and Power in Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice* and Brontë’s *Jane Eyre*,” Branko Marjanović discusses that in both works the heroines are exquisite persons who are prepared to go against tradition and willing to accept it, but on their own terms. They do not stop when they achieve equality, as the concept is usually understood in feminist circles, because, as the philosopher John Rawls points out, equality is often very far from justice. They demand full self-realization and the sense of power which they can choose to exercise or not. In the end, both Jane and Portia are not carried away by their newly gained power, but distribute it according to Rawlsian principles of fairness to those who, despite the initial equality of chances, have not been fortunate or able to overcome the personal, financial or societal obstacles in their path. Marjanović tries to explore various visions of power and equality and the ways in which the acquisition thereof, or failure to do so, influences the lives of people both on a personal and societal level.

Biljana Oklopčić, from the University of Osijek, discusses the discourse of power in popular fiction with “A Case Study of Charlaine Harris’s *Dead Until Dark*.” She examines how terms *power as domination* and *power as capacity* can be applied to reading popular fiction, in particular to a cross-genre hybrid such as Harris’s *Dead Until Dark* (2001). The term *power as domination* refers to

“coercive” power or “power over,” which in popular fiction, as Oklopčić argues, works through its form and fandom/readership. The principles of coercive power in Harris’s novel are visible in its cross-genre hybridity (mystery-horror-romance), which attracts different types of fans/readers who, in its multi-generic definition, find their own type of empowerment. The term *power as capacity* connotes “coactive” power or “power with” as well as “power to.” Oklopčić concludes by considering some consequences of her argument: it shows that the discourse of power in popular fiction operates through both its form (power as domination) and content (power as capacity).

Sanja Čukić, from Union University, Belgrade, considers name as a powerful means of forming identity in Jhumpa Lahiri’s *The Namesake*. She explains that as an outstanding writer of short stories, Lahiri has explored various issues concerning immigrants of an Indian background and their lives in America, pointing out their sense of isolation and alienation living far away from their homeland. In the same respect, Lahiri’s first novel *The Namesake* deals with the similar themes, showing what being a stranger in a foreign land means.

In “The Balkan Higher-Education Express” Marija Krivokapić and Petar Penda talk about the conditions of the the Former Yugoslav countries’ higher education which has lost its vigour and rigour with the reforms in the last ten years. Instead of adapting the system to the new political and economic situation, our university decision-makers literally implanted the existing western models thus creating a non-productive and mediocre situation. While requirements for tenure track position equal those at the most prestigious universities, funding for research (and teaching too) is desperate. Humanities, especially, are judged useless and literary studies are marginalized as an ineffectual expression of subjectivity. While mapping the Balkan higher-education state of affairs in contrast to its vision, Krivokapić and Penda especially highlight the unenviable “post-Theory” condition of literary studies.

THE DISCOURSE OF POWER IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION

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Abstract: This paper deals with the discourse of power in the works of a number of Western philosophers and thinkers. The paper opens with Plato and his discussions of the notion in a number of his works. The Italian Renaissance thinker Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince* is then discussed. The discussion then moves to Hegel's section "Lordship and Bondage" of his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. Nietzsche's use of the concept of power is presented mainly in light of his *Will to Power*. The discussion moves on to discuss four literary thinkers, Fanon, Said, Bhabha, and Spivak. Their analyses of the concept of power is important for an understanding of postcolonial theory. The last literary critic dealt with is the feminist critic Judith Butler. The concept of power is discussed in relation to feminist theory. It is hoped that this brief review will offer an understanding of how this concept runs through the writings of these philosophers and thinkers who meet and/or diverge in their understanding of it.

Key words: power, discourse, philosophy, literary theory.

Before we begin to discuss the discourse of power, we must answer some fundamental questions: what is power? The Oxford Dictionary defines power as "the ability or capacity to do something or act in a particular way" (OxfordDictionaries.com, s.v. "power"). The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines it as "the ability or right to control people or things" (Merriam-Webster.com, s.v. "power"). While the Encyclopædia Britannica Online has no entry for power per se, it discusses power under "authority" which it defines as "the exercise of legitimate influence by one social actor over another" (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. "authority").

It is interesting that the three references do not agree on a definition of power, let alone that one of the three skips it altogether. The Oxford Dictionary simply says that it is an "ability" or a "capacity" to do, act, or accomplish things. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary is more American in that it is aggressive: it defines power as a "right" to "control people." The Encyclopedia Britannica adds legitimacy to authority/power, consistent with Britain being a monarchy.

In his *Republic*, Plato discusses two notions: ideal political philosophy and practical political philosophy. His discussion is problematic as to which is best, the former or the latter. In the former, philosopher-kings rule over a city-state on account of their relatively perfect comprehension of justice and its

demands. Their knowledge of justice confers an unequalled authority of judgment on them in political affairs. In addition, their right to rule is readily acknowledged by the ruled (Brooks 70).

In his practical political philosophy, Plato comes to see the great difficulty of making such judgments, as statecraft is not the pure science he thought it was at first. Instead, the best possible ruler – rather than the ideal ruler – must receive a philosophical education, but such an education cannot hope simply to determine political decisions within the neat confines of ideal justice, but to judge within the contingent world of earthly possibilities (Brooks 70).

Plato ultimately favours his practical political philosophy as the best manner of bringing about the best possible city-state, rather than the idyllic city-state. In addition, he is clear that the ideal city-state is an ideal that cannot be realized and sustainable well before we reach later dialogues, principally the *Laws*, as Thom Brooks argues (Brooks 70).

In the *Laws*, the ultimate sovereignty is supposed to rest with the law rather than with any particular group of citizens, there is much less emphasis on the need for philosophical training than in the *Republic*, and all citizens, not just a select few, are expected to take some part in government. The *Republic* is bitterly hostile to democracy but the constitution of the *Laws* has some decidedly democratic features (Stalley, 13).

In the *Laws*, Plato says that since it is impossible to provide any institutional guarantee that the ruler will be wise, two different, but compatible, strategies appear to be available to those who hold politics to be a matter of knowledge. The first is political education: if those likely to gain power are given an appropriate training there is a chance that the state will be wisely governed. The second strategy is to adopt constitutional forms that encourage wise decisions or, at least, help to prevent foolish ones. This can be done in a variety of ways. If the area of discretion granted to rulers is tightly circumscribed by law, they may be prevented from doing some of the most dreadful things; it may also be possible to ensure that political decisions are taken only after prolonged discussion in which all points of view can be heard; and the requirement that candidates for election have appropriate experience or education may help to bar the most unsuitable characters from holding office. So, although the *Laws* does not advocate the direct rule of a philosopher king, it can be seen as an interpretation at the practical level of the same underlying ideals (Stalley 15).

Plato claims:

Where the law is itself ruled over and lacks sovereign authority, I see destruction at hand for such a place. But where it is despot over the

rulers and the rulers are slaves of the law, there I foresee safety and all the good things which the gods have given to cities. (Plato 715d)

Giving absolute *power* to the law ensures that no one misuses any power, whether personal, communal, or legal. This view is indeed still idealistic.

Plato's *Republic's* closest rival is Niccolo Machiavelli's *The Prince*. Although the *Republic* discusses politics in the context of things above politics, and politics turns out to have a limited and subordinate place, Machiavelli discusses politics in relation to things outside politics as well, but his conclusion is very different (Mansfield vii).

For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power. Rather, authority and power are essentially coequal: whoever has power has the right to command; but goodness does not ensure power and the good person has no more authority by virtue of being good. Thus, in direct opposition to a moralistic theory of politics, Machiavelli says that the only real concern of the political ruler is the acquisition and maintenance of power. In this sense, Machiavelli presents a trenchant criticism of the concept of authority by arguing that the notion of legitimate rights of ruling adds nothing to the actual possession of power. Goodness and right are not sufficient to win and maintain political office (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Niccolò Machiavelli").

Machiavelli's political theory represents a concerted effort to exclude issues of authority and legitimacy from consideration in the discussion of political decision-making and political judgment. In other words, the legitimacy of law rests entirely upon the threat of coercive force; authority is impossible for Machiavelli as a right apart from the power to enforce it (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Niccolò Machiavelli"). This power is maintained through the army at the prince's disposal.

A strong military organization is the indispensable pillar. Only if it exists, citizens can hope "without fear that his patrimony will be taken from him; he knows not merely that they are born free and not slaves but that by means of their abilities they can become prominent men" (Machiavelli 332). This statement links the individual freedom of not being a slave and the external freedom of the community, the Free State, and to participating in the shaping of the political actions of this community, i.e. the potential to play an active and effective role in political life. However, Machiavelli points out that free citizens are generally reluctant to serve the common good and prefer to pursue their own immediate advantage. That is where the law and political institutions step in to overcome this dilemma. He says that "it is said that hunger and poverty make men industrious, and the laws make them good" (Machiavelli 201). Power is needed if the prince is to make his people good.

Hegel adopts a more radical view of power. He defines power as the capacity that natural and social things and processes have to become what they are (Zambrana 13). In his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, and in his famous master-slave dialectic, Hegel says that in order for the master to achieve his existence he must exercise his power, a brute power, over the slave who must relinquish all of his power in order to achieve his existence (Hegel 111).

Hegel opens the section entitled "Lordship and Bondage" saying that "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, in that and by the fact that it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (Hegel, 111). Thus, the self needs to be acknowledged by another, recognized by him, in order to feel its existence in the world as an independent being. This self must gain the recognition of others if it is "to prove its independence, it must gain the recognition of others, which it regards only as living beings. It can gain its independence only if it has control over the world, and it has such control only if it can make these beings obey its commands" (Beiser 186).

If the self is to gain recognition of others, it must enter a life-and-death struggle with those others. For, if the self demands obedience from the others, the other also demands obedience from the self. The self cannot establish its independence unless it defends itself against the other and prevents him from dominating it (Beiser 187), or in Hegel's words,

each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part; is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its own life. Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case (Hegel 113-114).

However, if the self is to gain recognition through this struggle, it cannot kill its adversary. Killing it means that it has no one to recognize it, hence the victor must grant the defeated life (Beiser 188). By backing away from the threat of death and preferring life, and not caring for prestige, the defeated becomes like an animal and submits to the winner, hence he turns into a slave or a bondsman (Kain 47). Frederick Neuhouser confirms this saying that "precisely because he was unable to renounce his attachment to life, the bondsman emerged from the struggle unto death as the lord's servant" (51). However, the master or lord not only grants the slave or bondsman life; he also grants him recognition as a definite object that it cannot consume so that the recognition the master or lord needs is not undermined (Beiser, 188, 189).

Labour transforms the slave. As Philip J. Kain argues, the master originally won the combat through his control of nature manifested in his

control of weapons and tools of war and through his control of natural desires, namely, his fear of death. The slave does not control neither nature nor natural desires as the master does. Thus, he ended up subordinate to the master. Labour, Kain continues, is not subservient to the natural because it works on it, transforms and controls it. The slave transforms nature to suit his purposes and desires. Moreover, labour requires that desire be restrained or checked, that it waits till the end of the labour process. Thus the slave or bondsman transcends and controls natural desires making them subordinate to self-consciousness (48): "Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing" (Hegel 118).

Hegel states that labour negates the slave's or bondsman's fear of death which caused his enslavement (Neuhouser 52): "It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, *qua* worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence" (Hegel 118). The slave or bondsman by working on and transforming the objects of the world for the master or lord learns to master the world. The slave or bondsman attains the negating orientation to the objective world that goes beyond the more primitive for-self orientation of the lord whose negations essentially are tied to the satisfaction of immediate desire (Redding 108). It is thus the bondsman who "[t]hrough his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it" (Hegel 117). In other words, the slave is driven to the point at which he has nothing further to lose and then he is free, he is the master of everything (Rauch and Sherman 99).

At first sight, Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of "the will to power" is somewhat close to Hegel's concept of power. In *The Will to Power*, Section 776, he says that the will to power appears "among the oppressed, among slaves of all kinds, as will to 'freedom'" (407). As such, it is very close to the slave's attempts to break free from bondage to the master. However, Nietzsche continues in the same section saying that "among a stronger kind of man, getting ready for power, as will to overpower; if it is at first unsuccessful, then it limits itself to the will to 'justice,'" i.e. to the same *measure of rights* as the ruling type possesses" (407).

With those who are stronger, those who are not slaves in Hegelian terms, it entails strife, and then a claim for justice. The notion of struggle is not an accidental feature of will to power, that is, under certain conditions, the will to power experiences struggle as an essential feature (Burnham 342). For those who are already in possession of power, the will to power is manifested as "'love of mankind,' of 'the people,' of the gospel, of truth, God; as sympathy; 'self-sacrifice,' etc." (Nietzsche 407). Thus, the will to power constitutes its "object" for itself, and also takes up an attitude towards that object, through value. This "attitude" could be a striving for power over, or defence from, or feelings of resentment, veneration, pity or shame, etc. (Burnham, 343).

Yet of all his influences, it is from Machiavelli that Nietzsche acquires the idea of a radical separation of morals from politics. The two thinkers share a distinctively tragic view of life that serves as a foundation of a particularly skeptical attitude towards modernity (von Vacano 74, 75).

Nietzsche, in his Notebook 10 of Autumn 1887, says: "In the end the Christian prince, too, practises the politics of Machiavelli: assuming, that is, he doesn't practise bad politics" (197, in von Vacano 96). Here, Nietzsche is even more explicit in wholeheartedly embracing Machiavellian politics as the true, accurate, and proper way to engage in the practice of politics. Nietzsche agrees with the Machiavellian estimation that to be effective in political life one must disengage from everyday morality. It is particularly Christian morality that is the antipodal view of the Machiavellian insight, for it claims to possess a clear-cut definition of right and wrong, a doctrine of sin, and a theory of punishment to be meted out not by a worldly magistrate but by a divine ruler. For Nietzsche, as for Machiavelli, authority and its concomitants standards of right and wrong, good and bad, are born from earthly processes of power (von Vacano 96).

Rulers and politicians who claim to act out of Christian motivations, Nietzsche tell us, in reality simply follow Machiavelli's tenets for acquiring, maintaining and utilizing power; if they are effective rulers and politicians. For Nietzsche a political man who does not understand and act on such tenets is an inept one. Christian morality is merely a facade that belies the desire for power. But what is the theory of power that explains what really motivates the ruler? This is what Machiavelli and Nietzsche posit as an alternative to the ethical, Christian view that politics should be about achieving justice. What they argue is that there is an aesthetic motivation in the political man. For Machiavelli the notion of *virtu* is the key concept, while for Nietzsche it is will to power. These notions are related to each other through their sense of aesthetic practice (von Vacano 96).

Frantz Fanon opens his book *Black Skin, White Masks* with a question: "What does the black man want?" He answers this question, saying that "[t]he black man wants to be white" (4). This is the result of the black man's feeling of inferiority. It is the power the underprivileged wants in order not to perish in Nietzschean terms. "If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process: – primarily, economic; – subsequently, the internalization – or, better, the epidermalization – of this inferiority" (Fanon 4). This is caused by the black man coming into contact with the white world. According to Ziauddin Sardar, this contact causes him to go

through an experience of sensitization. His ego collapses. His self-esteem evaporates. He ceases to be a self-motivated person. The entire purpose of his behavior is to emulate the white man, to become like him, and thus hope [sic] to be accepted as a man. It is the dynamic of

inferiority that concerns Fanon; and which ultimately he wishes to eliminate. (Fanon xiii)

Fanon says that “alterity for the black man is not the black but the white man” (72). It is clear that the Other, the colonizer, is treating both the Negro and the Arab as his inferior and is making this inferiority take root within their psyche whether they like it or not, and as Fanon reasserts: “When the Negro makes contact with the white world, a certain sensitizing action takes place. [...] The goal of his behavior will be The Other (in the guise of the white man), for The Other alone can give him worth [and] self-esteem” (119).

In the section entitled “The Negro and Hegel,” Fanon discusses Hegel’s lord/bondsman dialectic in comparison to the relationship between the negro and the white man as he saw and lived it. Although Fanon picks up where Hegel left off (Villet 5), stating that “man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another man in order to be recognized by him,” (168) it is unfortunate that the former, despite the accuracy of his diagnosis of the dilemma of the modern Negro, fails to see Hegel’s colonialist stand which “reflects Hegel’s ideas on the conflict that existed between the French (master) and German (slave) cultures in the early nineteenth century in his native Prussia” (Villet 2).

Ziauddin Sardar argues that Fanon writes from the perspective of a colonial subject. He is a subject with a direct experience of racism who has developed a natural and intense hatred of racism. Fanon’s book, *Sardar* continues, emerged from a life and death struggle, individual and collective, concerned with the survival of both body and soul. This struggle is concerned as much with freedom from colonialism as with liberation from the suffocating embrace of Europe. For Fanon, it is nothing less than an attempt to survive, to breathe the air of liberty and regain the power he was denied being a colonial subject (x, xii).

Orientalism is a term popularized by Edward Said’s book of the same name in which he “examines the process the ‘Orient’ was, and continues to be, constructed in European thinking” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 153), or as Said defines the term, “a way of coming with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience” (Said 1). In his book, Said discusses orientalism as the corporate institution for dealing with the orient (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 153): “dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient” (Said 3). The significance of orientalism is that, as a mode of knowing the other, it is a supreme example of the construction of the other, a form of authority. It is not an inert fact of nature, but a phenomenon constructed by generations of intellectuals, artists, commentators, writers,

politicians, and constructed by the naturalizing of a wide range of orientalist assumptions and stereotypes. The relationship between the occident and the orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony. Consequently, orientalist discourse, for Said, is more valuable as a sign of the power exerted by the West over the orient than a true discourse about the orient (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 153).

Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia say that in *Orientalism* Said takes “the unfinished project of Frantz Fanon [and] moves from a politics of blame to a politics of liberation” (53). Said notes in the “Afterword” to his book *Orientalism* that his book rather than stressing “the Orient versus Occident opposition” (335), *Orientalism* is an attempt to stress “the actualities of what was later to be called multiculturalism, rather than xenophobia and aggressive, race oriented nationalism” (335). He seeks liberation, just as Fanon did, not only of the colonized, but also of the colonizer. Said undertakes a conceptual re-reading of Fanon in order to carry forward Fanon’s project of liberation (Ahluwalia 42).

The Indian critic Homi K. Bhabha says that “mimicry emerges as one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge” (85). Bhabha’s theory of colonial mimicry, which he develops through his reading of Fanon’s work, claims that it is precisely through the figures of “irony, mimicry, and repetition” (85) that the discourse of colonial imperialism exercises its authority. Bhabha makes it clear that the ever-present possibility of slippage from mimicry into mockery immediately discredits colonialism’s authorized versions of otherness and profoundly undermines the colonizer’s elusive self-image to point where “the great tradition of European humanism seems capable only of ironizing itself” (87). As the narcissistic demand for possessions and authority may evolve into paranoid fear of the colonized as the colonizer’s frustrated wish “I want him to love me,” turns into opposite, “I hate him,” and then through projection into “he hates me” (96-97, 99-100), the division within colonialist narratives of domination become more visible. Not even the colonial production of the divided other (black skin, white masks) leaves the colonizer’s authority completely intact.

In occupying two places at once [...] the depersonalized, dislocated subject can become an incalculable object, quite literally, difficult to place. The demand of authority cannot unify its messages nor simply identify its subjects. (Bhabha, Forward to the 1986 edition of *Black Skin, White Masks*, xxxiv)

Ambivalence is another key concept in Bhabha’s writings. Ambivalence is a term developed in psychoanalysis to describe a continual fluctuation between wanting one thing and wanting its opposite (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 10). It also refers to a simultaneous attraction toward and repulsion from

an object, person, or action (Young 153). Bhabha adapted it into colonial discourse theory, and as such, it describes the complex mix of attraction and repulsion that characterizes the relationship between colonizer and colonized. The relationship is ambivalent because the colonized subject is never simply and completely opposed to the colonizer, because ambivalence suggests that complicity and resistance exist in fluctuating relation within the colonial subject (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 10).

Most important in Bhabha's writing, however, is that ambivalence disrupts the clear-cut authority of colonial domination, because it disturbs the relationship between colonizer and colonized. Ambivalence, is therefore an unwelcome aspect of colonial discourse for the colonizer. The problem for colonial discourse is that it wants to produce compliant subjects who reproduce the assumptions of this discourse, habits, and values, that is, "mimic" the colonizer (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 10), which leads to the second concept, mimicry. Mimicry describes the ambivalent relationship between colonizer and colonized. When colonial discourse encourages the colonized to "mimic" the colonizer, by adopting the colonizer's cultural habits, assumptions, institutions and values, the result is never a simple reproduction of those traits. Rather, the result is a "blurred copy" of the colonizer that can be quite threatening. This is because mimicry is never very far from mockery, since it can appear to parody whatever it mimics. Mimicry, therefore, locates a crack in the certainty of colonial dominance, an uncertainty in its control of the behaviour of the colonized (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 124-125), and threatens the colonizer's power by investing the colonized with a 'blurred copy' of that power.

Bhabha acknowledges the vital influence of Said in initiating his own project, although he seeks to revise and extend aspects of *Orientalism*, which he describes as the book that "inaugurated the postcolonial field" ("Postcolonial Criticism," 456), by attempting a reappraisal of Said's account of both the colonizer and colonized's agency and identity, which he perceives as presented in terms which are too monolithically powerful and unitary (Moore-Gilbert 456, 457). Bhabha's reconsiderations of colonial and postcolonial agency and identity also involve him in a sustained dialogue with Fanon, "the most innovative thinker in the field of postcolonial studies prior to Said" (Moore-Gilbert 457). Bhabha's dissatisfaction with his mentors regarding agency and identity leads him to reappraise these aspects from a psychoanalytic aspect via Lacan which accounts for his manipulation of ambivalence. Bart Moore-Gilbert stresses that Bhabha's interest in Fanon lies in the application of Lacanian theory to the analysis of colonial relations in Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (458).

One of the obvious links between the Indian critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Bhabha is that each, according to Moore-Gilbert, substantially develops the project of bringing Western theory to bear on colonial and postcolonial issues, and of bringing the latter to bear on the former, a project

initiated by Said (451), whose *Orientalism* Spivak describes as “the source book in our discipline” (Spivak 56). To remedy the imbalance Spivak notices in *Orientalism*, where Said focuses on the colonizer and pays less attention to the colonized, she pays consistent attention throughout her career to the less privileged sectors of the colonized people (Moore-Gilbert, 452).

In “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, Spivak discusses whether the subalterns can speak for themselves, or whether they are condemned only to be known, represented, and spoken for in a distorted fashion by others, particularly by those who exploit them (Moore-Gilbert 452). “Can the Subaltern Speak?” begins with an analysis of the silencing of the contemporary subaltern by Western intellectuals who seek to champion those who are most oppressed by neocolonialism. Then, she links these aspects of contemporary Western theory to the colonial history of the construction of subject-positions for the colonized. Spivak discusses the debates surrounding the prohibition of *sati* (the immolation of Hindu widows) in early nineteenth century India. At the heart of the competition to represent the colonized female’s “best interests” between “progressive” colonialist males and “traditionalists” indigenous men who defend the custom as a symbol of the integrity of the Indian (Hindu) cultural identity is the ascription of voice, which represents free will and agency, to the Indian woman. In British colonial discourse, this voice supposedly cried out for liberation, thus legitimatizing the colonial mission, from this tradition, while according to the native male, the voice allegedly expressed the subaltern woman’s attachment to tradition by assenting voluntarily to become *sati*. In both accounts the voice of the female subaltern is in fact ventriloquized (Moore-Gilbert 451-452). Consequently, Spivak asserts, “One never encounters the testimony of the women’s voice-consciousness” (Spivak 93).

Spivak discusses the same topic in another essay, “The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives.” The British deposed the Raja of Sirmur, Karma Prakash, and the Rani, his wife, was established as a guardian of the minor king Fatteh Prakash, her son. Spivak argues that because the Rani is the king’s wife and a weaker vessel that she appears briefly in the archives of the East India Company. The reason is that she is needed so Sirmur, held under a child guarded by a woman, would be annexed to secure the East India Company trade routes and frontiers. Spivak continues saying that a title and a vaguely sketched first name (spelled once Gulani, another Gulari) will suffice for the king’s wife because of the specific purpose she is made to serve. She does not have any power to make decisions as such power was given to a British officer who resides in her palace. After that, Spivak argues, the Rani disappears from the archives. She emerges only when she is needed in the space of imperial production (265-267, 270).

Spivak introduces in this article the concept of “othering.” The term describes “the process by which imperial discourse creates its ‘others’”

(Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 171). She gives an example from a letter by Captain Geoffrey Birch, who served in India, to Charles Metcalfe, the Resident at Delhi, in 1815. Birch was travelling across India engaging himself in “consolidating the self of Europe [...] He is worlding *their own world*, [...] by obliging them to domesticate the alien as Master” (Spivak 253). He writes explaining the reasons behind taking the journey:

to acquaint the people who they are subject to, for I suspected they were not properly informed of it and seem only to have heard of our existence from conquering the Goorkah and from having seen a few Europeans passing through the country. (Spivak 254)

Birch clearly sees himself as a representative image replacing rumour of the existence of the British imperialist by fact of sight and utterance. He reinscribes himself as master, while the native sinks as subject (Spivak 253-254). Thus, othering the natives, making them others, while he becomes their Other, which is an exercise of power over the less privileged.

Feminists theorists believe that power is “understood in terms of an oppressive or unjust power-over relationship,” which clearly echoes Nietzsche (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Feminist Perspectives on Power”). For Feminists, it is not merely power, it is power-over, domination or control of the masculine over the feminine, or, to borrow a term from postcolonial theory, the oppression of the masculine of the female other. Judith Butler says: “Feminist critique ought also to understand how the category of ‘women,’ the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought” (Butler 4). But, will the male relinquish his tight grip of his power over the other sex?

Feminists are inclined to conceptualise power in terms of patriarchy, so that even the most disenfranchised man was seen to have more access to power and the privileges of our culture than any woman (Pilcher and Whelehan 116). Judith Butler – in studies like *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* and *Bodies That Matter: the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* – reconceptualises Platonic notions of agency, identity, intentionality, and “the subject” in light of a wide-ranging theory of “performativity” (Keegan 93). The concept of performativity is introduced in the first chapter of *Gender Trouble* when Butler states that “gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed” (34). She then quotes the claim Nietzsche makes in *On the Genealogy of Morals* that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, acting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction imposed on the doing – the doing itself is everything,” (13) before adding her own gendered corollary to his formulation: “There is no gender identity behind the

expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results" (34).

Towards the beginning of *Gender Trouble*, Butler states that "within the inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be performative, that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be" (34). Gender is an act that brings into being what it names: in this context, a "masculine" man or a "feminine" woman. Gender identities are constructed and constituted by language, which means that there is no gender identity that precedes language. If you like, it is not that an identity "does" discourse or language, but the other way around – language and discourse "do" gender. There is no "I" outside language since identity is a signifying practice, and culturally intelligible subjects are the effects rather than the causes of discourses that conceal their workings (Butler 145). It is in this sense that gender identity is performative (Salih 64).

In Butler's analyses, one is not born but rather one becomes a subject and the way one does so is by submitting to power. The subject is the effect of a prior power (1997: 14-15), and yet power is also the condition of the subject without which it could not exist as an agent. The subject does not wield power, and the agency it possesses is the effect of subordination: in other words, the subject requires power in order to be a subject, and without power there would be no potential for either subject-status or agency. The subject emerges as the effect of a prior power that it also exceeds, but power also "acts on" a subject that appears to (but does not) precede power (1997: 14-15).

The philosophers, thinkers, and literary theorists discussed above vary in their understanding of the concept and discourse of power. They all seem to agree that whenever power is held by an individual or an entity, it is bound to be abused or used to abuse others no matter how good the intentions or noble the cause. There is always someone/some entity to take power in his/its hands to control another/others for ends other than those of the others. But will the other/s be good if power does not exist, or is not exercised? Or, if they wield that power themselves? The answer is obvious.

Note: It is hoped that this short review will offer a preliminary understanding on the concept and discourse of power in the writings of the selected philosophers and thinkers. This review is far from comprehensive as limitations of time and space dictated the exclusion of many writers and works. The only hope is that in missing so much, the work is not too deficient to be useful. I would like to thank my colleague Mrs. Lina Muhsin for her review of an early draft of the paper.

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LE DISCOURS DU POUVOIR EN PHILOSOPHIE OCCIDENTALE ET LA THÉORIE LITTÉRAIRE UNE INTRODUCTION

Cet article traite du discours du pouvoir dans les œuvres d'un certain nombre de philosophes et penseurs occidentaux. Le document ouvre avec Platon et ses discussions de la notion dans un certain nombre de ses œuvres. Le prince du penseur Renaissance italienne Niccolò Machiavelli est ensuite discuté. La discussion se déplace ensuite à la section «La Seigneurie et Bondage» de Hegel de la *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*. L'utilisation de Nietzsche de la notion de puissance est principalement présentée à la lumière de sa volonté de puissance. La discussion se déplace pour discuter de quatre penseurs littéraires, Fanon, Saïd, Bhabha et Spivak. Leurs analyses de la notion de pouvoir est important pour la compréhension de la théorie postcoloniale. La dernière critique littéraire

traitée est la critique féministe Judith Butler. Le concept de pouvoir est discutée en relation avec la théorie féministe. On espère que cette brève revue offrira une compréhension de la façon dont ce concept fonctionne à travers les écrits de ces philosophes et des penseurs qui se réunissent et / ou divergent dans leur compréhension de celui-ci.

Mots clés: puissance; discours; philosophie; la théorie littéraire.

MAINTENANCE OF POWER – LOUIS ALTHYSSE'S IDEOLOGICAL AND REPRESSIVE STATE APPARATUSES

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Abstract: Niccoló Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1532), a great work on political and social philosophy, very minutely describes the ways in which one *gains* power. It also gives sound advice on ways in which that power is *maintained*. Building on that discussion we will consider *Louis Althusser's* notion of Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses (ISA and RSA). The ISA's include ways in which a Party in power (or a Dictator) supplies the masses (Proles) with desirable information through: the mass media (TV, Radio, Internet, Technology, Newspapers, Magazines, etc), Art (Literature, Painting, Music, etc), Religion, Social Conventions and within the nucleus of the Family itself. The RSA's include the Military and the Police. These are the necessary keepers of the Law, instituted and controlled by the leading few. Comparing the Totalitarian and Democratic ways of ruling (gaining and maintaining power), this paper will bring us closer to understanding how this process operates and support it with examples from literature, mainly dystopian fiction which deals chiefly with such issues.

Key words: Machiavelli, Althusser, ISA, RSA, Power, dystopian fiction, Democracy, Totalitarianism.

“There is no liberty, save wisdom and self-control.
Liberty is within – not without. It is each man's own affair.”
When the Sleeper Wakes (1910)
H.G. Wells

The chronicles of power trace their lineage back to the early history of man. Its numerous forms and intoxicating effect on the human mind is what makes power so widespread within human societies and undeniably impossible to eradicate. Even among the animal kingdom the survival of the fittest, the most powerful, is the defining factor that distinguishes the strong from the weak, the leaders of the pack from the rest.

By definition, a person in power is “a person who exercises control, influence, or authority” (“Ideology,” *Oxford*). This control and authority is exerted over people or societies in the hope of gaining certain rights, profit or political advantage. From the beginning of human history it was exerted by sheer force, the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA in the further text) a term coined by Louis Althusser. The RSA consists of the Government (or a single Ruler

in the case of a principality), the Administration, the Army, the Militia, the Police (both public and secret), the Court system and the Prisons. From early human societies in the form of clans, tribes to the first villages and states – all were kept in check and in *fear* of the ones in control of the RSA. It is only with the establishment of advanced civilizations that Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA in the further text) start to be implemented and take dominion as the most effective way of instituting a certain mind frame in the ones “destined” to be the cogs in the large wheel that runs a State like a well-oiled machine.¹

Concentrating our discussion on political power and State control over the population, we can shortly discuss Niccoló Machiavelli’s novel *The Prince* (1532). This work is important for two main reasons. First, it deals mostly with principalities (a single person holding the reigns of executive and legislative power in a certain State or region) which will allow us to discuss its characteristics and continue on to the modern, democratic/capitalist, State orientation in the second part of this paper and largely discussed in Althusser’s work. Secondly, *The Prince* stands even today as one of the most simple and effective portrayals of the “game of thrones” and all its minute dangers, oscillations and rewards. It is almost a practical guide on the Art of Rule through power and fear.

Accepting the fact that the great majority of human beings *need* guidance, especially if living in a society comprised of many individuals, where labour is divided among the population. It also needs to be acknowledged that certain people thus need to *take charge*, take the responsibility of being the “guardians” of the population. The inherit problem arises at this critical juncture. This acquisition of power by the individual corrupts the mind almost immediately. Like an addictive opiate it brings to the surface the essential cravings and deepest desires of the individual. Machiavelli talks of rulers of infamous cruelty, ruling only by fear and intimidation. Roman times were full of power-drunk Kings, Caesars and Emperors that became notorious for their hedonistic indulgences, who believed themselves to be demigods. History is a rich depository of such rulers and dictators, even up to the modern times and to this very day.

The Prince, if boiled down to bare essentials, teaches the Ruler to be three things: cunning as a fox, dangerous like a wolf and forceful like a lion. Being cunning is nothing that needs elaborating. Tip-toeing in dense political minefields where only one misstep can be fatal is the daily consideration of a ruler holding great power. Some dangers can be avoided by instituting fear into

¹ It is important to note that the RSA functions mostly by repression (physical and non-physical), while including ideology only secondarily, yet, there is no purely repressive *or* ideological apparatus. To take a simple example, the police could not function without a certain ideological cohesion that will ensure replenishment of their numbers and a certain set of values (Althusser 145).

one's political adversaries, which is why Machiavelli cautions his Patron (Lorenzo de Medici in his case) to be dangerous like a wolf with the ones who oppose him (using his RSA) and never hesitate, like a lion. Being always prepared, conscious of one's surroundings and avoiding to be hated by the people at all costs are the prerequisites for any serious Ruler.

The most interesting thing about *The Prince* is that it gives the reader an insight into the minutiae of the Art of Rule. The reins of power are sought by many and, as Machiavelli points out at the beginning of his book, there are many cunning ways to climb up the social ladder and become a Prince. The book also very clearly explains that the best way the Ruler can institute a certain ideology upon the masses is by using *public opinion*. If one is beloved by the masses, it is the only security one needs. This point at least, studying political history, never actually changes.

Advancing the definition of Karl Marx, Althusser defines ideology as a system of ideas and representations which dominate the mind or a social group (159). Before going into a detailed conversation about the forms of ideology, we need to establish some boundaries that ideology seems to pose. Althusser distinguishes the *concept* of ideology, which has *no history*, a figurative representation of the imaginary relationships that surround us in our everyday lives, from the minute *forms* of ideology, which have a very physical existence.

The concept that ideology has no history is the same as Sigmund Freud's conclusion that the human unconscious also has no history. Both are *eternal*. Plato's philosophy can also be correlated, to some extent, to the eternal ideology. His world of eternal Ideas is something that human beings and our very souls have to ponder on and piece together to form some sort of imperfect representation of the real, physical world and the relations of existence in motions within it. Every person has his or her own single, limited viewpoint. From this perspective, the world seems incoherent, complicated and sometimes inexplicable. This is why certain explanations given to us in the form of political doctrine, historical teachings in the education system, religious doctrines – all try to soothe our minds and explain our part in the Universe. Frank Herbert writes in *Dune* (1965): "Deep in the human unconscious is a pervasive need for a logical universe that makes sense. But the real universe is always one step beyond logic" (604).

This is almost an existentialist question, which brings us back to the epigraph of this paper – is true liberty within or did Ostrog from Wells' novel give up any attempt of fighting the system? Winston Smith from Orwell's *1984* (1948) did give up like the Savage from Huxley's *Brave New World* (1931). There are many examples of individual resistance towards an oppressive system in dystopian fiction. True liberty could very well be a certain peace of mind and a level of self-control that enables the individual to see the society for what it

really is.² Yet, most consider such resistance useless and simply let themselves be controlled and manipulated. They become *subjects*. To give an example of this surrender, here is an excerpt from Margaret Atwood's novel *The Handmaid's Tale*:

I know this can't be right but I think it anyway. Everything they taught at the Red Centre, everything I've resisted, comes flooding in. I don't want pain. I don't want to be a dancer, my feet in the air, my head a faceless oblong of white cloth. I don't want to be a doll hung up on the Wall, I don't want to be a wingless angel. I want to keep on living, in any form. I resign my body freely, to the uses of others. They can do what they like with me. I am object. I feel, for the first time, their true power (Atwood 298)

Speaking of this position in the "great scheme of things," we need to establish the origin for the yearning of such Truth. We can say that religious ideology, ethical ideology, political ideology, legal ideology, etc., are examples of *world outlooks* chosen by us, because in our minds they describe best our own position and attitudes that define the current state of affairs. An archaeologist will very easily see the same method in progress in the present day and age as it did in the myriad of "primitive societies" in our very short evolution as a species. A person feels an inner yearning for the Truth and seeks to satisfy it. This is the starting point on the road to inner liberty and self-control discussed above. To take a simple example, religion gives a person answers through doctrine but also through prayer; giving each "believer" a sense that God speaks *directly* to him or her, making that person truly *matter*. Althusser plays with this notion of "calling" to a person:

Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a *subject*. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was 'really' addressed to him, and that 'it was *really him* who was hailed' (and not someone else). Experience shows that the practical telecommunication of hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed always recognizes that it is really him who is being hailed. And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely

2 Hesse took this notion as one of the major themes in *Siddhartha* (1922) and especially *Steppenwolf* (1927): "Solitude is independence. It had been my wish and with the years I had attained it. It was cold. Oh, cold enough! But it was also still, wonderfully still and vast like the cold stillness of space in which the stars revolve" (Hesse 46).

by ‘guilt feelings,’ despite the large numbers who ‘have something on their consciences.’ (Althusser 175)

The “hail” needs to be understood in a much broader sense, naturally. The daily news bulletins, the religious teachings from the pulpit, political doctrines in manifestoes, Union slogans, billboard commercials, radio voices talking into the ether, newspapers on coffee tables and carried across streets by the wind, books on dusty shelves and magazines sold over counters to innuendo spat over cheap drinks in pubs across the globe – The Truth of Ideology is spreading and there is no escape from it. Its *power* is undeniable and it speaks to *us*!

We have mentioned that ideology has no history, but in that case how can its *parts* have history and physical existence? First we need to use Althusser’s division of the ISA and determine which apparatuses *were* and which *are* dominant today.

Family ISA – our paternal, maternal, conjugal and fraternal relationships are rooted very deep and by these associations we are exposed to many different opinions and world attitudes. They strengthen certain common viewpoints because we feel protected in being one of many people who have our respect and share the same feelings. Family ISA is the starting point in every person’s ideological acceptance process.

Education ISA is the second stage in the process. It is comprised of a complex system of (private, secondary and tertiary) public and private schools. Althusser’s firm belief was that the Education System, joined secondarily with the Family ISA, holds the dominant position in instituting ideology among young people still not ordered in the State hierarchy according to their individual abilities. He explains:

But besides these techniques and knowledges, and in learning them, children at school also learn the ‘rules’ of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is ‘destined’ for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination. (Althusser 133)

In other words, the schools (like churches, courts, army, etc.) teach the “know-how” that ensures the *subjection* to the existing ideology. Starting with children at infant-school age, the most innocent and gullible stage, the system puts them between the Family ISA and the Education system which “drums into them” (Althusser 156) a certain amount of know-how wrapped in the colours of the ruling ideology (language study, literature, history, etc.) or the very ideology

in its purer form: ethics, philosophy, etc. From a certain point in the education process the young workforce is projected into the Workplace, which is our next ISA. Only to add, those who continue on to achieve higher education are more likely to fill position of greater ambition: White-collar workers, executives or educators,³ renewing the cycle of Educational ISA.⁴

To use Wells' dystopian vision once more, here is his bleak portrayal of education in the distant future: instead of receiving a formal education, children are hypnotized and brought into a trance state in which they stay for several weeks until the teachers dictate material they will remember and reproduce when necessity calls for it. Such visions are perhaps far-fetched but sometimes this style attracts more of the reader's attention and concern than the conventional warning: "Little Children of the labouring classes, as soon as they were of sufficient age to be hypnotized, were thus converted into beautifully punctual and trustworthy machine minders, and released forthwith from the long, long thoughts of youth" (Wells 130).

Workplace ISA comes after the education system. In Althusser's work also known as the Trade-Union⁵ ISA, the Workplace is a strong psychological marker for every person in which the occupation over time becomes the person and the person becomes the occupation. This "dedication" comes from the sense of entrapment and becomes simply a routine. Rarely, some individuals try to make a difference (perhaps someone like Ernest Everhard, the main protagonist of Jack London's novel *The Iron Heel*) but the results are commonly too sparse to make a larger impact on the system itself.

Legal ISA, or the Justice system, is comprised of a certain set of Laws, the Police who enforce those Laws, the Government that bring new Laws, the Courts that judge if the Law has indeed been broken and the Prison system that punishes the behaviour contrary to those Laws. This System on the one hand ensures civilized societies but also protects vital interests of the ruling class and retains the rules under which the economic and political systems hold dominion over the State and the people. The Legal system is a *gateway* ISA between the ideological and the repressive in equal measure.

Most ISA make room for the subjects to "rebel," to a certain degree. People are allowed to protest, hold demonstrations, sign petitions and do similar activities that would satisfy their need to voice their grievances when

³ Althusser begs pardon from teachers who, under "dreadful conditions" attempt to teach against the ideology and teach constructive criticism and clear thought. He adds these people are "a kind of hero" (Althusser 158)

⁴ From this education system one can argue comes a fairly large number of people who go on to find their own way, and yet they are the ones who will support the State Ideological Apparatus going into various professions ranging from the clergy, military, political administration, professional politics, private capitalists and exploiters, etc.

⁵ This used to be merchant and banker's guilds.

they think their rights have been violated. In some cases (!) the people will achieve a small victory and gain something, but on the whole, these are minor ripples on the vast ocean of ideology and state governance.

This perhaps is one of the key facts about ideology and the modern way of governing. People are not enslaved or caught in the nets of ideology by any deliberate intent or evil plan, but rather people come of their own cognition, they *ask* to be part of the machine or as Althusser points out, they are *always-already* subjects (Family ISA). And once the person becomes a part of the apparatus, there is no point in blaming “the system” and they can only live in the hope of changing it someday, which is highly unlikely.

Religious ISA is comprised of different Churches centred on the belief in an omnipresent and all-powerful Being; the Church ISA saw its period of utter domination during the Greek, Roman and Byzantine Periods culminating in the Middle Ages when the Church in Europe encompassed most of the Education and Family ISA as well. It was a time when a small number of cynical men dominated and exploited the poor under false representations of the world that enslaved the minds of the masses, dominating their imaginations and “world outlooks” as we noted earlier (Althusser 13).

The most remarkable thing about Belief is that it is very personal and self-guiding. Every person has certain ideas and explanations of Belief. This is very convenient for the ruling ideology because it means that if one does not agree with a certain part of religious doctrine; he or she will reinterpret it on a personal level and continue to be a part of the ISA.⁶ Althusser explains it thus: “...a subject endowed with a consciousness in which he freely forms or recognizes ideas in which he believes” (Althusser 167). The Belief does not even have to be centred on a Supreme Being; it can simply be a firm belief in the rule of Law, in pure and honest Justice and one man’s Duty to behave with compassion and empathy. An interesting example of Belief comes from James Joyce’s novel *Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man* (1916) where Dedalus went from strict religious brainwashing and a firm Belief in the fires of Hell to a complete engrossment with artistic Beauty as the most sublime form in Life.

Dystopian fiction plays with the concept of religion in many ways trying to place it in a post-apocalyptic or possible futuristic world. In the first sequel to Dick’s *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968), K.W. Jeter used genetic and memory implants to condition the human clones for servitude to their makers. One of the implants used was to give the clones a religious background: “The memory implant they gave her was Roman Catholic, wasn’t it?” He nodded. “Heavy Latin. Tridentine. The old stuff.” “One of my uncle’s clever little ideas. He wanted her to have some deep notion of guilt and redemption – so he could

⁶ World Christian Encyclopaedia (David A. Barrett, Oxford University Press, 1982) estimates that the number of Christian denominations alone range from 21.000 to staggering 33.000.

control her more easily, I imagine" (Jeter 99). Dedalus received his religious background through education, Rachel (the Replicant) through implants, but the *guilt* is basically the same.

In *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* we find two interesting contradictory religious views. The first religion is called Mercerism. People use Empathy Boxes that are linked to TV-sets. These boxes link the user to a collective consciousness (with other users) based on the suffering of Wilbur Mercer. The idea for this religion is taken from the Greek myth of Sisyphus, and it tells the story of a man who takes an endless walk up a mountain. People throw stones at him and he is in a lot of pain. The users feel his pain and share it.

Buster Friendly, on the other hand, is a television character who reveals Mercerism as a sham. J.R. Isidore also concludes: "but Mercer, he reflected, isn't a human being; he evidently is an archetypal entity from the stars, superimposed on our culture by a cosmic template" (Dick 55). His show is broadcast almost non-stop and it represents the second religion. Androids do not like Mercerism because they lack empathy, but they support Buster because they can join in his kind of consumerist spirituality. Mercerism, besides having an obvious Christian background, plays with the notion of the collective consciousness, which is very interesting in a Jungian sense, in connection to ideology. Namely, rarely an individual accepts being a part of any ideology, bearing certain negative connotations, but is nevertheless guided by the same. Jungian collective unconscious is similar; it acts as a force of the multitude, guiding our choices, moral sensitivity, understanding of good and evil, right and wrong, lie and truth.

Political ISA, made up of an assortment of political fractions (most notably "left wing," "right wing" and "centre") which preach individual interests of nationalities, groups and minorities in the hope of gaining power to control a region or country. Since all ideology is political and politics deals exclusively in ideology we need not go deeper into this issue here but rather continue on to our final and perhaps the most important two ISA's in the 21st century, Cultural and Communications ISA.

Communications ISA, or the Mass Media, that include the Press, the Radio, the Television and especially the *Internet*, have not only overtaken the Education system and Religion as the *dominant* ISA in the 21st century, but also incorporated them acting as a *medium* of their renewed development. Mass Media also exhibits a strong inclination towards rapid growth. Althusser's writings pointed out Education as the dominant ISA but almost half a century later the combination of the *Cultural* and Communications ISA reach a much larger number of people. Tablets, smart phones, unlimited Internet access, I-watches, superfast computers, holo-projections – all testify to the tsunami of electronic devices that have taken a very large portion of our time, energy and resources. Social media make us more accessible but at the same time less and

less unique.⁷ By following these trends, people lead alternative, cyber-lives. As Rubashov put it in Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (1940), our "I" becomes a "grammatical fiction" (Koestler 72).

Culture as well seems to have taken a turn for the worse. By lowering the bar in criticism of art, anyone is able to create "good" art.⁸ As a consequence, even great art is then drowned in a sea of rubbish. The art in Cultural ISA consists of: literature, painting, sculpture, theatre, street art/performances but most notably – sports and music. Culture ISA has the basic function of preoccupying the public mind and push it as farther away from the key issues that shape the world those same people occupy as possible. Culture ISA is symbiotically tied to the Mass Media, through which they are largely presented or popularized.

The Mass Media (especially Internet), are not just tied to Culture ISA. Political propaganda, religious indoctrination, personal opinions (social media, chat rooms), on-line news channels, educational programmes, civil-rights movements, capitalist marketing, on-line shopping and a host of others are present on the World Wide Web. Its rate of growth, yearly innovations and increasing availability only suggest the Internet will become an utter *necessity*, alongside electricity, water or shelter.⁹ Its power is growing and the limits of this power are not yet known.

What we do know so far is that the Internet, by and large, has a numbing effect. The zombie-like masses of Proles preoccupy their spare time with trivial matters, playing games and scrolling social media which have become nothing less than *religious* experiences. This need to leave a cyber crumb trail of everyday events is only a form of self-affirmation for people lacking confidence or true social contact. Every tweet or status can be seen as a small prayer, and if liked by enough people, the person feels a sort of catharsis, acceptance of sorts. H.G. Wells wrote a description of Pleasure Cities in his novel *When the Sleeper Wakes* of an actual, physical place where people go and indulge themselves. Something similar can be found today, only on-line:

and to the eastward, towards the port, the trading quarters, the huge public markets, the theaters, houses of resort, betting palaces, miles of billiard saloons, baseball and football circuses, wild beast rings and the

⁷ Erich Fromm explains this phenomenon: "The idea that we are all created equal suggests that all people have the same fundamental right to be treated as ends unto themselves, and not as tools or machines. Instead of making sure every person develops his own unique sense of individuality, today's society is making us more like everyone else, losing our 'market value,' which is the most ironic part. The modern man is truly indifferent to his own value" (72).

⁸ Famously, even elephants are recognized "artists," for further information see the 1998 "Asian Elephant Art and Conservation Project."

⁹ The author personally met two homeless men with cell phones and internet access.

innumerable temples of the Christian and quasi-Christian sects, the Mahomedans, Buddhists, Gnostics, Spook Worshippers, the Incubus Worshippers, the Furniture Worshippers, and so forth (Wells 102).¹⁰

In printed literature, things also have changed. In the past authors like Zamyatin, Eliot, Orwell, etc., had trouble publishing their novels mostly due to an unfavourable political environment. In today's electronic world, even the most profane, provocative and trashy work can find its target audience. Perhaps the ones in power realized that it would be much easier to swamp the people with so much bad cultural material that any decent work would largely go unappreciated. The blades of censorship, like any knife, become blunt over time.

To circle back to the discussion on power, we need to establish a hierarchical structure of society in order to find a place for the RSA and ISA.


Regardless of the type of government (socialism, communism, capitalism, etc.), the State needs to produce certain goods and services in order to make profit and meet the demand of the open market. This is the *Infrastructure* of a society. The *Superstructure* we discussed in the eight ideological apparatuses that govern the society from "above." The infrastructure mainly consists of the working class, like George Orwell's Proles from "1984" or the Numbers from Yevgeny Zamyatin's "We." The Proles are able to control the superstructure of society only in times of great revolutions and revolts. Such times do come, but rarely and only if the ideological apparatus fails in its main task. Yet, even such attempts are of no avail because one form of government will simply be replaced by another, and the cycle continues. Examples from history abound, we can only be reminded of the French Revolution (1789-1799; the abolition of the French monarchy and establishment of a secular and democratic republic that very quickly lead to an authoritarian and militaristic rule by Napoleon), the Russian Revolution (dismantlement of Tsarist autocracy led to civil war, establishment of the Soviet Union and eventually to a totalitarian state led by Stalin), rise of the Nazi Movement in Germany pre WWII, etc. Any strong shift in State Power led to civil wars, mass killings and general turmoil. Why? The simple answer presents itself – lust for *power*. This phenomenon is unquestionably one of the most "human" features we possess, alongside artistic expression, complex languages, varied sexual behaviour, agriculture and the tendency towards violence.

¹⁰ Bold mine. The emphasis made due to the uncanny similarity with Roman culture, where gambling, prostitution, animal fights/sports and entertainment of all sorts were common practice. They also had temples to all religions: not individual buildings like today's churches, synagogues, monasteries, mosques, etc.

Up until the twenty-first century, the only change that seems to have occurred is the progressive sophistication of the ways in which ideology and repression are being instituted. The subtlety and planning of Ideological state apparatuses prove that future leaders will make us subjects using technology rather than weaponry, a shift we mentioned in our discussion on the Mass Media ISA.

We can turn back to the structure of society. In duplicating the conditions of production, Althusser names three processes needed to reinstitute the conditions required to fuel the further functioning of the Infrastructure: Means of Production, Productive Forces and the Existing Relations of Production.

Means of Production are raw materials, fixed installations, buildings, factories, offices, machines and all material objects needed to ensure production of needed goods. If some are worn out, they need to be repaired or replaced to ensure continuation. The Productive Forces naturally mean the Labour Force, workers, but also their wages. With wages, the circular flow of capital, like the spinning wheel, moves the economy forward.¹¹ With decent wages, the workers reproduce their own living conditions and thus exist. The reproduction of labour not only requires the reproduction of physical living conditions but also the ideological concept, the submission as a Subject that colours people's Belief system. The Existing Relations of Production are for the most part controlled by the Ideological Superstructure. Its Legal and Political ISA insures the existing economic and monetary relations to endure and continue the exploitation of the system.¹² As the dominant economic system, capitalism uses the ISA to




¹¹ This is a very simple explanation that gives us insight into the inevitable doom of capitalism. By accumulation of wealth in a small number of pockets, the flow of capital is reduced, unemployment drastically increases and a meltdown is only a matter of time. The global economic crisis (recession) in recent years is only the precursor of very difficult times in the global economy that lies ahead.

¹² Exploitation is by no means an over-exaggeration since the only goals of any system are the accumulation of wealth and securing the material and ideological reins of power which secure the exploitation in the long run. Most religious doctrines are in fact in direct conflict with the capitalistic ideology. It is almost inconceivable that the world can still function with such contradictions in our Economic/Political, Religious and Science beliefs. There are many who define themselves as Christians, respect scientific discoveries (that include human evolution over millions of years) and support the capitalistic market economy. The contradictions are staggering. Jack London's "Iron Heel" talks about how the attitude and doctrines of the Church changes with time: "Times have changed since Christ's day. A rich man today who gives all he has to the poor is crazy. There is no discussion. Society has spoken" (London 111).

ensure its continuous function. While the Proles are occupied with prayer and “turning the other cheek” (Religious ISA), sports and art (Cultural ISA), Chauvinism, Liberalism, Nationalism, Moralism (Communications ISA/Political ISA), etc., the eyes are turned away from the true problems of society.

The final problem surfaces concerning the *origin* of ideas and free thoughts of Individuals. The pool of knowledge a person is able to acquire gathers its waters from available books, writings, living people who teach knowledge and personal experience of the world (Locke’s *a posteriori* knowledge). But if the Education ISA, Family ISA and the general public largely work *for* the reigning ideology, the pool of knowledge can only produce ideas that help the system gain even more ground. But, perhaps this is the natural state of things when people come together to form a society. The collective consciousness is indeed as present as Jung would have us believe our collective *unconscious* is. Joseph Conrad seems to agree:

Few men realize that their life, the very essence of their character, their capabilities and their audacities, are only the expression of their belief in the safety of their surroundings. The courage, the composure, the confidence; the emotions and principles; every great and every insignificant thought belongs not to the individual but to the *crowd*: to the crowd that believes blindly in the irresistible force of its institutions and of its morals, in the power of its police and of its opinion. (Conrad 2006)



Thus, the ISA is the *source* of most ideas, and even if a person manages to think “outside the box,” the impact a handful can achieve is negligible. The river of ideology is too strong, and one person is not able to build a dam.

We can conclude this discussion on the maintenance of power through the RSA and ISA with one simple sentence – *True power lies in ideology*. Ideology controls the power of the State and the repressive apparatus attached

to it. Also, Althusser points out that the “Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the *stake*, but also the *site* of class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle” (Althusser 148). The true battle for power is waged in the *minds* of the people, in our very world outlooks. Without hegemony with ideology, there is no prolonged rule, as Machiavelli likewise noted in his *Prince*. In this frame of mind, knowledge also, is power.

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MACHTERHALTUNG – LOUIS ALTHUSSER'S IDEOLOGISCHE UND REPRESSIVE STAATSAPPARATE

Niccolo Machiavellis *Der Prinz* (1532) ist ein grosses Werk über politische Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie, welches auf minuziöse Art und Weise beschreibt, wie jemand zur Macht gelangt. Es gibt außerdem gute Ratschläge, wie man Macht erhalten kann. Auf dieser Diskussion aufbauend werden Louis Althusser's Idee ideologischer und repressiver Staatsapparate (ISA und RSA) betrachtet. Die ISA berücksichtigen Strategien, wie eine Partei (oder ein Diktator) an der Macht die Massen (das Plebs) mithilfe folgender Mittel mit erwünschten Informationen beliefert: Massenmedien (TV, Radio, Internet, Technologie, Zeitungen, Zeitschriften, usw.), Kunst (Literatur, Malerei, Musik, usw.), Religion, soziale Konventionen und sogar innerhalb des Familien-Nucleus selbst. Die RSA berücksichtigen das Militär und die Polizei. Dies sind die notwendigen Gesetzeshüter, die von der herrschenden Minderheit eingesetzt und kontrolliert werden. Während die totalitäre und demokratische Herrschaftsweise (das Gelangen an die Macht und das Beibehalten derselben) verglichen werden, wird dieser Artikel den Prozess erläutern und dem Leser näherbringen und an Beispielen aus der Literatur – größtenteils aus der dystopischen Literatur, die sich hauptsächlich mit derartigen Themen beschäftigt – veranschaulichen.

Schlüsselwörter: Machiavelli, Althusser, ISA, RSA, Macht, dystopische Fiktion, Demokratie, Totalitarismus.

THE POWER OF TEARS: MARGERY KEMPE AND FEMALE EMPOWERMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES

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UDC 821.111'04.09 Kempe M.

Abstract: The Gift of Tears granted to Margery Kempe, a medieval English mystic from Lynn, firmly set Margery onto the path of medieval spirituality. Her mystical experience has attracted controversy since the discovery of the full manuscript of her fifteenth-century autobiography, *The Book of Margery Kempe*, in 1934. As her book illustrates, Margery was no less controversial in her own time, with many considering her not a mystic but a madwoman. Although scholars acknowledge the historical value of the *Book* as a document on medieval life and forms of worship, they cannot reach a consensus on Margery and the validity of her mystical experience, which started with a lengthy episode of postpartum psychosis after the birth of her first child. Margery's sudden recovery from the illness is attributed to a vision of Christ, and her conversion from sinner to saint begins. Margery's mystical experience is characterised by her "dalliances" with Christ, by her tears, which first occur in her mid-thirties, and by her crying, which begins on Mount Calvary when Margery is around forty. As Margery gets older, the cries intensify both in content and frequency. The Gift of Tears is, according to religious doctrine, a gift from the Holy Spirit. Tears are also a woman's weapon.

The focus of this paper is to analyse the way in which Margery's tears empower her in a male-dominated society which preferred to keep spiritual women behind closed doors. Margery's refusal to be confined to a convent led to her active participation in religious life and subsequently to problems with authorities, both ecclesiastical and secular, and with society at large.

Key Words: Margery Kempe, mystic, tears, spirituality, visions

Tears are commonly seen as a sign of weakness and are usually dismissed as being feminine and weak. Shakespeare, on the other hand, gives tears power when King Lear characterises "water drops" or tears as "women's weapons" (Shakespeare 2.4.270-1). Recent studies into the effect of women's tears on men tend to support King Lear's designation. According to scientists at the Weizmann Institute in Israel, the tears collected from female volunteers watching sad movies contain a chemical signal which reduces arousal and testosterone levels in men. Robert Provine from the University of Maryland believes that these "results are consistent with previous suggestions that crying could reduce aggression. Testosterone may be linked to hostility, and lowering aggression could be evolutionarily adaptive" (Weaver). What these and other studies suggest is that tears, and women's tears in particular, may be an

evolutionary form of protection. This hypothesis may find confirmation in the case of Margery Kempe, the medieval mystic from Norfolk, England.

A similar conclusion may also have been reached by Margery Kempe's contemporaries in late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century Bishop's Lynn, who believed her weeping to be her way of evading the consequences of her unconventional behaviour and hence her weapon of choice for the purposes of manipulation. Brought before both secular and church tribunals several times on charges of heresy, Margery's tears partially contributed to her clearing her name and illustrating that she was no heretic, thus granting her protection from the clergymen who found that her whole character and actions defied what they believed a holy woman should be. Not only do Margery's tears protect her, but they also empower her, enabling her to live the life she *chooses* in a time when wives were expected to raise children, maintain the home, spin and card and be obedient to their husbands.

Margery Kempe lived in Bishop's Lynn at the turn of the fifteenth century. Her mystic path is presented in *The Book of Margery Kempe*, which is considered to be the first autobiography in the English language. Margery begins the account of her life at the age of twenty, when she suffered a lengthy case of postpartum psychosis following the birth of her first child. Margery was miraculously cured through a vision of Jesus Christ. She went on to have thirteen more children, taking a vow of chastity around the age of forty. In her thirties, Margery was granted the Gift of Tears, which she shed for her sins and the sins of humanity for the greater part of her life. Margery was also, according to her account, given other Gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as the Fire of Love burning within her for sixteen years; sweet sounds and melodies which occurred daily for the period of twenty-five years and would cancel out all other noises when she was in devout prayer. She also saw "many white things flying about her," (Kempe 64) which, she was told by the Lord, were angels, and the sudden occurrence of sweet smells. Whereas the fire, the smells, the sounds and angels were only experienced by her, her tears were the only gift publically manifested. The nature of her tears, however, changed when she was in Jerusalem on pilgrimage: they intensified into a violent, fit-like crying that became her trademark.

Margery's tears are not the tears of a woman watching sad movies but Tears of Compunction, Compassion and Devotion. Also known in devotional texts as The Gift of Tears, it is believed to be a Gift of the Holy Spirit and mention of the Gift can frequently be found in saints' vitae. The Gift is not, however, only granted to female saints and mystics, but also to male saints, such as Saint Francis of Assisi, who, when asked why he was walking around and weeping uncontrollably, answered: "I ought to go thus weeping and wailing without shame through the whole world for the passion of my Lord" (qtd in Atkinson 139).

The most extensive devotional text discussing the nature and function of tears is Saint John Climacus' *The Ladder of Divine Ascent*. Kallistos Ware, in his Introduction to *The Ladder of Divine Ascent*, summarises Climacus' classification of tears into three levels. The first or lowest level, "contranatural tears," may stem from "vainglory, from licentiousness." Such tears are "tears of frustration, anger, jealousy or self-pity"; in short, "an expression of our fallen self, and as such they are sinful and injurious" (Ware 25). The second level consists of "natural tears" which are "the result of spontaneous human feelings" which "may have an effect for good, as with the healing and purifying tears that we shed for the departed" (Ware 25). Natural tears are generally a response to emotional and physical suffering, whether experienced by oneself or by others, and are evoked through grief, pain or compassion. These tears have the ability to heal. The third and highest level of tears are "supranatural" or spiritual tears which can only be conferred by God as a Gift of Grace, and this is the level to which the Gift of Tears that mystics experience belongs. As opposed to natural tears which heal the individual, supranatural tears have the ability to also heal others. They incorporate tears of compunction, which is deep sorrow for one's own sins and for the sins of mankind; tears of compassion for the suffering of others, and the tears of devotion which are an expression of one's love and devotion to God and his Son, Jesus Christ. Ware observes that it may be difficult at times to distinguish between natural and supranatural tears, for "it is possible for natural tears to develop, gradually and almost unnoticed, into spiritual tears, without the point of transition being clearly evident to the one who weeps" (25). "Climacus believes, nevertheless, that a distinction needs to be made, and that it is only to the supranatural or spiritual tears that the title 'gift of tears' can be applied" (Ware 25).

Just as Climacus recognises the difficulty in determining the level of tears, Margery Kempe's contemporaries had the same difficulty with respect to the nature of her tears. Her neighbours found it difficult to reconcile the converted Margery with the younger woman they knew. As Margery herself testifies in her *Book*, she was exceedingly proud before her conversion, desiring to be worshipped by others because of her prominent origins.¹³ Even after her first vision of Jesus Christ, which led to her miraculous recovery from the lengthy bout of postpartum psychosis, she believed that Jesus had chosen her especially and that she should be worshipped by others as a result. It is only after two enterprises fail miserably, namely a brewery and a mill, that she interprets her business failures as divine punishment for her pride. Any tears shed by the younger Margery could only be, according to Climacus'

¹³ Margery was exceedingly proud of her father, John Brunham, who was "sometime mayor of the town N., and since then he was the alderman of the high Guild of the Trinity in N." (8)

classification, contranatural tears out of anger, frustration and jealousy brought on by her vainglory.

The nature of her tears changes dramatically after she hears a “melodious sound so sweet and delectable that she thought she had been in paradise” (Kempe 10) in bed one night. This is the first time that she cries and weeps uncontrollably for her fallen state. The melody “caused this creature when she afterwards heard any mirth or melody to shed very plentiful and abundant tears of high devotion, with great sobbings and sighings for the bliss of heaven, not fearing the shames and contempt of this wretched world” (Kempe 10).

These tears represent the turning point of Margery’s life. Instead of raising the children she had borne until this stage, she completely gives herself over to her devotion. She does bodily penance, goes to confession daily, sometimes several times; she holds vigils, stating that she gets up in the middle of the night to go to church and pray, returning home at midday or in the afternoon (Kempe 11). She also starts continually thinking of and talking about God and heaven, which irritates her fellow townspeople, who cannot credit her conversion and her refusal to dwell on earthly things as she did before (Kempe 10). Furthermore, she vehemently desires chastity: “for paying the debt of matrimony was so abominable to her that she would rather, she thought, have eaten and drunk the ooze and muck in the gutter than consent to intercourse, except out of obedience” (Kempe 10).

Despite her desire to be chaste in her thirties, and her clear communication to her husband that “I may not deny you my body, but the love my heart and my affection is drawn from all earthly creatures and set only in God,” (Kempe 10) neither Margery’s tears nor supplications appear to have given Margery the protection she desired from her husband’s advances: “He would have his will, and she obeyed with great weeping and sorrowing because she might not live chaste” (Kempe 10). She does, nevertheless, constantly propose that they both take a vow of chastity because she knows that they had “displeased God by their inordinate love” (Kempe 10). Her husband does not reject the proposal outright, believing that “it was good to do so, but he might not yet; he should when God would” (Kempe 10). Margery states that he continued to “use her as he had done before; he would not spare,” (Kempe 10-11) which in modern days would be termed marital rape.

Margery does obtain consent from her husband for her vow of chastity “three or four years” (Kempe 11) after their discussion, during which time she did her “duty” and bore several more children. The vow itself was preceded by the Kempes living chastely for eight weeks. Margery enquires of her husband why he had not “meddled with her eight weeks before, since she lay with him every night in his bed” (Kempe 19). Her husband’s response that “he was so made afraid when he would have touched her that he dared do no more”

(Kempe 19) suggests that his condition for consenting to the vow of chastity “when God would” (Kempe 10) has been met. One of the reasons that he was still reluctant to grant Margery’s desire is expressed in the text by the alteration to the nature of sexual intercourse within a marriage before a vow of chastity and after. John Kempe claims that he may “use [her] without deadly sin and then [after the vow of chastity] might I not so” (Kempe 19). Although Margery in Chapter 11 does not give prominence to her tears as a presence during these eight weeks, her earlier account of doing her “duty” with plenteous tears and deep sorrow still apply. Furthermore, her subsequent prayers to discover God’s will with respect to her desire for chastity were conducted with “great abundance of tears” for “sorrow I have had to be chaste in my body to you all these three years” (Kempe 19).

Margery’s desire to take a vow of chastity later on in life is not unique: there are many documented cases from medieval times onwards of women, usually widows, who take vows of chastity and withdraw from this world into convents. Margery, however, is no widow nor does she entertain any thought of entering a “house of stone,” but continues to live and work in the world. In addition, she is commanded by Jesus to wear white, which is a colour reserved for the pure and which causes her additional scorn and tribulation.

Margery does, nevertheless, like her townspeople, have her own doubts with respect to her tears. She is concerned about their origin and the origin of the visions and “dalliances,” or conversations, she has with Jesus Christ and other divine personages. This concern has her wandering around England upon Jesus Christ’s commands, visiting clergymen and those who have the gift of discerning between divine and demonic spirits, such as Saint Julian of Norwich. All those to whom she talks and shows her revelations assure her that her tears cannot be of demonic origin for the Gift of Tears comes from the Holy Spirit and is one of the ways the devil is rendered helpless. Julian of Norwich explains the power of the tears as a torment to the devil:

No evil spirit may give these tokens, for St Jerome says that tears torment the devil more than do the pains of hell. God and the devil are always at odds, and they shall never dwell together in one place, and the devil has no power in a man’s soul. (Kempe 32)

Jesus Christ also assures Margery that the tears are his graces and gifts to his own chosen souls (Kempe 150). Despite these assurances, Margery never appears to be quite sure. What her tears do, however, is disrupt the worship of others, annoying parishioners and the odd priest, rendering Margery a public nuisance.

If her constant weeping were not sufficiently disruptive, it is later compounded with violent crying or roaring which Margery experiences for the

first time whilst on pilgrimage to Jerusalem. On Mount Calvary, Margery vividly sees or witnesses the Passion of Christ, which results in a violent reaction:

she fell down so that she might not stand or kneel but wallowed and twisted with her body spreading her arms abroad, and cried with a loud voice as though her heart should have burst asunder for in the city of her soul she saw verily and freshly how our Lord was crucified. Before her face she heard and saw in her ghostly sight the mourning of our Lady, of Saint John and Mary Magdalene, and of many others who loved our Lord. And she had so great compassion and so great pain to see our Lord's pain that she might not keep herself from crying and roaring though she should have died from it. (Kempe 50)

The intensity of this type of crying makes her physically weak and would occur "if she heard of our Lord's Passion" (Kempe 50), and would occur sometimes at the sight of a crucifix, at the sight of a wounded man or beast, at the sight of cruelty towards man or beast, all of which would immediately recall to her our Lord's pain and passion. The crying would, however, occur wherever she was, if alone or with others, and most significantly could not be controlled. Margery states that the crying would occur whenever God would send it; there was no pattern to it, yet when it did come, it was "never without passing great sweetness of devotion and high contemplation" (Kempe 51). Her contemporaries had their own opinions on her crying: some believed she was possessed, ill, drunk. Others offered solutions to the problem, like sending her to sea in a bottomless boat (Kempe 51).

Just as her tears divided opinion amongst the population, so too did they divide the clergymen. Some clerics gave her support and love, guidance and instruction; others did not know what to do with her and banished her from their parishes. Others, still, were outright hostile. A Preaching Friar who came to Lynn denied her access to the church during his masses for years, despite being informed by other clerics of the divine nature of Margery's tears and crying:

he would not believe that it was a gift of God. But he said, if she might not withstand it when it came, he believed it was a heart disease or some other sickness, and, if she would be so known, he said, he would have compassion on her and steer the people to pray for her, and under this condition he would have patience with her and suffer her to cry enough, if she should say that it was a natural sickness. (Kempe 111)

Under the influence of the Preaching Friar, Margery's second scribe was also sceptical of the nature of her tears, yet when he read the biography of Marie D'Oignies, he was convinced of the divine origins of the tears. Marie's

confessor, Jacques de Vitry, tells in Chapter 17 of Marie's tears just before a Good Friday, when she was asked by the ministering priest to refrain from crying and pray in silence. Unable to do so, Marie slipped out of the church and hid herself, imploring "the Lord that he show this priest that it is not in man's power to restrain the intensity of tears when the waters flow with the vehemence of the blowing spirit"¹⁴ (Kempe 221). Marie's request was granted when, during the celebration of Mass, the same priest was overcome with so many tears, and as he tried to repress their intensity, "by that much more was he drenched with his tears and the book and the altar cloths were dripping as well" (Kempe 221). Fully aware of the opinions of others with respect to her crying, Margery, like Marie, does attempt to refrain from crying as much as possible, albeit unsuccessfully, achieving the opposite effect: waxing blueish-gray as lead and crying even more loudly (Kempe 51).

Her weeping and crying out loud are a form of protection for Margery, precisely because nobody can prove that her tears are not a gift from God. They do draw attention to her, but Margery's general behaviour and defiance of conventions create tremendous problems for her in a time which was dangerous for anybody who was different. In Margery's lifetime the hunt for heretics, or Lollards as they were known in England, was in full swing. For a woman, who comes from the parish of St Margaret's, Bishop's Lynn, whose parish priest, William Sawtrey, was the first Lollard to be burned at the stake in 1401 (Atkinson 103-4), Margery's public behaviour appears to smack of heresy and rebellion.

Indeed, cracking down on heresy, particularly that propagated by followers of John Wycliffe, was a priority for the Church and State in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century, to which the enactment of *De haeretico comburendo* in 1401 attests. Identifying Lollards was a different thing altogether. According to Clarissa W. Atkinson, the initial concerns of Wycliffe and his followers were more in line with "religious disposition and moral attitude" (Atkinson 104) than differences in doctrine. Besides demanding access to the Bible in the vernacular and protesting "against the greed, avarice, and wealth of the Church and its upper clergy" (Atkinson 104), Lollards generally spoke against "transubstantiation, clerical celibacy, Friday fasts, images, pilgrimage, special prayers for the dead, and the belief that confession to a priest was necessary for salvation" (Atkinson 104-5). These practices were singled out first and foremost because they lacked "scriptural origin," and as such were "regarded as human fabrications, excuses for priests to make money from the Christian people they were called to serve" (Atkinson 104-105).

¹⁴ *The Life of Marie d'Oignies by Jacques de Vitry*, trans. Margot H. King (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Peregrina Publishing Co., 1986). In: Kempe, Margery. *The Book of Margery Kempe*. (218-222)

Margery has no issues with many of the above-mentioned “human fabrications.” She spends years fasting until Jesus and Our Lady command her to resume eating meat to keep up her strength for the tears and Grace that He will send her. She is commanded to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem and to Rome, which was generally done to reduce the amount of time a soul would suffer in purgatory, even though she had been told repeatedly by Jesus Christ in their dalliances that she does not need to make the trip; her sins have already been forgiven. Yet to her merit, she still desires to undertake the long and dangerous voyage to visit the places that Jesus walked and suffered. She is called to pray and weep for the dying, ironically by those who slandered her, with the knowledge that her tears can and will benefit the souls of the fatally ill. She is also called upon to pray and weep for the souls of the departed to reduce their penance in purgatory. She confesses regularly to priests and is “houseled” or partakes of Communion, although she also confesses many times to Jesus himself and Saint John, whom the former sends to hear her confession in Rome when she is left without a confessor.

Not only does she have no issues with the “human fabrications,” but she was also found to be completely orthodox in her convictions. Every time she was summoned before the Church authorities, she was interrogated with respect to the Articles of the Faith and was not found lacking. The Archbishop of York found her orthodox and upon her request granted her a letter with his seal as a record that “neither error nor heresy” can be proven against Margery (Kempe 99). Her orthodoxy was further confirmed in the letter of record she obtains from the Archbishop of Canterbury¹⁵ stating that she has been interrogated and is no heretic (Kempe 101). Despite passing these interrogations with the Holy Spirit’s assistance, Margery is still a *persona non grata* in many cases, with many leaders of the Church, unable to fathom the origins of her tears and as such unwilling to condemn her lest she truly is a mystic, expressing the desire she leave their jurisdiction and not return.

Yet, Margery does not approach these interrogations with *sang froid*. Tears play an important role in her defence. Margery best describes the fear she feels during such interrogations when she is summoned before the Archbishop of York the first time. When the Archbishop leaves her standing alone,

¹⁵ On the point of letters and seals, Margery’s account is confusing. It would appear that she was granted two letters. In Chapter 52, Margery recalls being summoned by the Archbishop of York and being interrogated by him. She reappears before the same Archbishop in Chapter 54 after being arrested by the secular authorities. He greets her with “What, woman, are you come again? I would fain be delivered of you” (97). Before parting, she requests a record of orthodoxy from him, which is granted. Yet, her return to Bishop’s Lynn is postponed because she has to go to London to see the “Archbishop of Canterbury for his letter and his seal.” She needs this letter because when she was before “the Archbishop of York, he would give no credence to my words inasmuch as I had not my lord’s letter and seal of Canterbury. And so I promised him that I should not come into Bishop’s Lynn till I had my lord’s letter and the seal of Canterbury” (101), which she duly obtains.

she made her prayers to our Lord God almighty to help her and succor her against all her enemies, ghostly and bodily, a long while, and her flesh trembled and quaked wonderfully so that she was fain to put her hands under her clothes so that it should not be espied. (Kempe 91)

While her accusers and audience were filing into the room, Margery was praying so hard and so long “that she melted all into tears. And at the last she cried therewithal” (Kempe 92) to the amazement of all who were present as they had “not heard such crying before” (Kempe 92). The knowledge, or “cunning,” (Kempe 100) Margery needs to answer her interrogators is granted to her by the Holy Ghost. Indeed, her knowledge is such that some men of law Margery met on her travels noted that “We have gone to school many years, and yet are we not sufficient to answer as you do” (Kempe 100).

The greater peril Margery faces, however, comes from the secular authorities, notably from the Mayor of Leicester and the Duke of Bedford, who considered Margery to be “the greatest Lollard in all this country” (Kempe 95) and one who should burn at the stake. One yeoman even implied that there was a price on her head, claiming that he would get a hundred pounds for bringing her in (Kempe 95). The charges brought before Margery included bearing letters for the heretics about the country; lying about going on pilgrimage anywhere; disproving all men of the holy church and that her tears are not sincere but that she may weep and have contrition when she wishes, among other things (Kempe 97).

Whereas Margery denies all of the charges against her, she does not deny speaking up against individual clergymen whose impiety besmirches the holy church. She particularly takes offence and criticises those who curse and blaspheme, even openly telling the Archbishop of York to his face that he is a “wicked man” (Kempe 92). She also boldly tells other clerics what their sins are and that they should amend themselves if they wish to attain the kingdom of Heaven. Such criticism was also generally levelled at clergymen by Lollards.

Another aspect of her behaviour which could be considered consistent with Lollardy is her constant speaking of God and quoting from the Gospel, exhibiting knowledge that was generally reserved for the literate upper-classes and clergy. Indeed, a man quoting the Gospel would be in the same peril; a woman doing so is unheard of. Furthermore, she speaks, or as the Archbishop of York’s clerk defines it, “preaches” (Kempe 93) wherever she goes, much to the annoyance of travelling companions, who abandoned her several times on her pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Rome. Her companions, even though on a holy pilgrimage, like modern tourists, wished to see the sights and enjoy themselves and not be subject to Margery’s constant “preaching.” Margery, however, completely rejects the Archbishop’s characterisation of her activities as preaching. She does not preach as she “go[es] in no pulpit” (Kempe 93); she

communicates about God, which she believes the Scriptures give her leave to do. Margery's knowledge of the Scriptures is suspicious particularly as she claims she is illiterate. All her knowledge of the Gospel is granted to her through the Holy Spirit and/or obtained from priests reading the Bible and devotional texts to her.

Nevertheless, the true danger represented by Margery, and voiced several times by men, is the possibility that other wives may choose to follow her example: the Mayor of Leicester accuses her of desiring "to take away our wives from us, and lead them with you" (Kempe 85). Not only does Margery reject her large family – husband and children, but she also rejects the conventions of the church in refusing to be "closed in a house of stone" and devote her life to God in a convent. She will live the way she chooses, which is a life devoted to worshipping God through the manhood of Jesus Christ, to the praise of God, earning her pardon and path to heaven at the cost of all earthly ties.

Margery's choice of lifestyle does have its drawbacks – one being the scorn and derision of the majority with which she comes into contact. Her tears are generally understood by her contemporaries as the false tears of a sinner or madwoman. Yet Margery takes all of the mockery and humiliation with joy: everything she experiences is nothing compared to that experienced by Jesus Christ, and the older Margery even gives thanks to those who mock and attempt to discredit her.

Margery's tears are her trademark. They are an emotional response to experiencing God and are an accepted feature of affective piety, which urges the Christian to meditate on episodes from the Bible, focused on the life of Jesus Christ, particularly the Passion. Indeed, meditation and contemplation on the Passion of Jesus Christ, perhaps, to use a modern concept, the saddest movie ever, is in the majority of cases the catalyst for Margery's weeping and crying. Faced with hostile secular and church authorities, Margery's ability to shed tears through the Grace of God save her from certain death. The decisive factor in why Margery was not punished by the authorities is the simple inability of anyone, even today's readers, to know for certain if her tears were indeed God-given. The church authorities were faced with a dilemma: if she does have the Gift of Tears and they deny this, they will be damned. Likewise, if Margery's tears and her dalliances with Christ are the fabrications of a cunning manipulator, as her contemporaries believed, but the authorities believe this to be the Gift of Tears, they are likewise damned for believing in false representations. Either way, Margery's tears, be they genuinely divine or the manipulation of a cunning woman, protect her from the perils of a world which was changing significantly.

Margery Kempe defies categorisation: she is neither a good wife and mother nor the traditionally accepted prototype for a saint. Her inability to be categorised in a time when different was not just frowned upon but burnt at the

stake is the cause of many of her tribulations. The secular authorities want to burn her and the church authorities are at a loss what to do with her, mostly wishing to get rid of her and leave her case for somebody else to solve. Her neighbours are wary of her, preferring to label her as a madwoman and false hypocrite, rather than believe that God could favour a woman like Margery. Her husband allows her to live the life she wishes and is generally loyal, accompanying her on many journeys and granting permission for her to travel, yet when the kindling is being stacked, he is inconspicuous. Even modern readers, as Anthony Bale notes, are divided with respect to Margery: “she is being subjected to insulting and provocative comments made by strangers” (Bale 16). Margery would simply reply with a laugh: “I have great cause to laugh, for the more shame and despite I suffer, the merrier may I be in our Lord Jesus Christ” (Kempe 99).

Margery’s tears may lend credence to the recent theory that tears are an evolutionary form of protection. Those who witness her crying do lose their initial aggressive attitude, which one may presume would not be the case with a male in the same situation. If testosterone is linked to aggression, then the ability of Margery’s tears to mellow her adversaries may be viewed as support of the theory. Whether the tears are a Gift from God or not is irrelevant in the end because their effect is the same. Her tears empower her: they give her strength and enable her to live the life she chooses and allow her to face adversity in a very dangerous time. If her tears are, indeed, a divine gift then their power transcends this world. Thus, Margery’s tears are not only a weapon against worldly authorities, but against otherworldly adversaries and succour to all sinners in this world and the world hereafter.

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MOĆ SUZA: MARGERY KEMPE I OSNAŽIVANJE ŽENA U SREDNJEM VIJEKU

Dar suza koje je dobila Margery Kempe, engleska srednjovjekovna mističarka iz Lynn-a, jasno je odredio njezin duhovni put. Margeryino mistično iskustvo izaziva kontroverzu još od pronalaska njezina rukopisa, *Knjige o Margery Kempe*, 1934. godine. Margery, međutim, nije bila nimalo manje kontroverzna u svom vremenu s obzirom da ju je većina njezinih suvremenika smatrala luđakinjom, a ne mističarkom. Iako znanstvenici priznaju povijesnu vrijednost njene *Knjige* kao prikaza srednjovjekovnog života i oblika vjerskog štovanja, nisu suglasni oko Margery u smislu vjerodostojnosti njezina mističnog iskustva, koje je započelo nakon duge epizode postnatalne psihoze po rođenju prvog djeteta. Margeryino iznenadno ozdravljenje pripisuje se viziji Isusa Krista, čime počinje njezino preobraćenje iz grešnice u sveticu. Margeryino mistično iskustvo obilježeno je razgovorima s Isusom, suzama, koje su se pojavile prvi put u njenim tridesetim godinama, te plačem, koji počinje na Kalvariji kad joj je bilo četrdeset godina. Kako Margery stari, njezin plač postaje intenzivniji po sadržaju i učestalosti. Dar suza je, prema vjerskoj doktrini, Dar Duha Svetoga. Suze su i oružje svake žene.

Rad se bavi analizom načina na koji Margeryne suze djeluju na njezino osnaživanje u društvu u kojem dominiraju muškarci koji drže produhovljene žene iza zatvorenih vrata. Margery je odbila samostanski život i radije je aktivno sudjelovala u vjerskom životu što ju je dovelo do sukoba s vlastima, crkvenim i sekularnim, kao i s društvom općenito.

Ključne riječi: Margery Kempe, mističarka, suze, duhovnost, vizije.

HARD MEN AND SOFT WOMEN: THE GENDERING POWER OF THE VIRTUAL

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Abstract: John Milton has frequently been accused of multiple sexismisms in his *Paradise Lost*. However, when he, or rather Satan, contemplates the gender of hard men and soft women, he actually leans on a long standing tradition in philosophy, theology, and medical science, from Aristotle and Galen to Isidore of Seville and Milton's own time. This gendering tradition had close ties with the virtual, which has been misunderstood as "fake," "illusion," and "unreal" in more recent times. In its original form, the virtual had dialectical ties with the actual and it meant power, the power that operates in the manner of Moebius strip and, in the sphere of language, manifests itself in reading, interpretation, translation and derivation of words. So, to be more virtual did not mean to be more "unreal," "disembodied," or "dehumanized" but to be empowered with the potential of becoming a male. Derived from *virtus* and *vir*, the virtual was even an etymologically gendering power. The lack of this power deprived some fetuses of being fully actualized as men, so they became women or, rather, failed men.

Key Words: Gender, virtual power, Aristotle, Galen, Isidore of Seville, Milton.

John Milton has frequently been accused of multiple sexismisms in his *Paradise Lost*. According to Frederic Jameson, "the marks of Milton's sexism here and throughout [*Paradise Lost*] are too obvious and too embarrassing ... to document at any great length" (55). And, of course, such claims are not difficult to justify in spite of Milton's filtering of his remarks through the voices of a broad array of protagonists and antagonists. Even the fact that some of those sexist remarks emerge as compliments or figures of speech can hardly exonerate the poet. For instance, in admitting his only weakness as passion for Eve's irresistible charm and beauty, Adam paradoxically claims his superiority, not only in the mind but also in the outward appearance.

at least on her bestowed
Too much of ornament, in outward show
Elaborate, of inward less exact.
For well I understand in the prime end
Of nature her th' inferior, in the mind
And inward faculties, which most excel,
In outward also her resembling less

His image who made both (*PL*, 8. 537-44)

The only excuse Adam can get in this case is that, unlike Eve, he has not seen his own image in the water yet. Thus, the superiority of his outward appearance must be coming out of his male gender that he shares with his Creator and it is more of a political than esthetic category.

However, Eve is not any less paradoxical in the assessment of Adam's appearance after seeing her own image in the water: "Till I espied thee, fair indeed and tall, / Under a platan, yet methought less fair, / Less winning soft, less amiably mild, / Than that smooth wat'ry image" (*PL*, 4. 477-80). By asserting the inferiority of Adam's looks and character, the narcissistic Eve actually echoes Satan's denigrative observations of the female sex: "though both / Not equal, as their sex not equal seemed; / For contemplation he and valour formed, / For softness she and sweet attractive grace" (*PL*, 4. 295-8). Although the latter passage has been ranked as "the greatest politically incorrect passage in English poetry," (*The Complete Poetry*, Kindle Locations 12200-12201) all of them concur in the point of male gender superiority. The Miltonic Satan begins his observations with polarization of biological differences, but he uses those differences to impose gender inequalities. While the "compliments" he uses might appear benign, they cannot be taken lightly because of their derivational potential in suggesting further terms and paradigms of inequality.

It must be noted that Adam and Eve's self-discovery follows Thomas Aquinas' precept according to which "everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite" (76). It is actually an old epistemological method, found in Roman glosses as well as in the works of English poets such as Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde* (*The Riverside Chaucer*, 1. 637) or Milton's *Areopagitica* (*The Complete Poetry*, Kindle Location 38681), and in *Paradise Lost* it plays a significant part in the process of Adam and Eve's gendering. Thus, Adam gets to know himself through his likeness to the Creator and through his opposite, Eve. Actually, his closer resemblance of God makes him superior to Eve and turns her into his opposite. On the other hand, by looking at Adam Eve realizes that she is softer, and if Adam is "less soft," he must be hard. Consequently, if Adam is hard in the mind and the body then Eve must be soft both in the body and the mind. And eventually, it all boils down to the paradigm of power: Adam is an intelligent, powerful male and exact opposite of Eve, a weak female. Since, theologically speaking, we all virtually partake not only in the Original Sin but also in the nature of our original parents, it turns out that all men as "prime end of nature" are powerful and all women are weak.

It is interesting that Milton generally uses the term "soft" with positive connotations. Accordingly, "softness" is a significant attribute of the unfallen angels (*PL*, 1. 424-5); however, even their "soft" appeal is in subjection and obedience to God. Thus, no matter how appealing female "softness" might be

to Milton and men in general, it seems to represent the paradoxical power of weakness, the weakness that men desire in women. The admiration and respect shown for Eve's "softness" are actually the means of her subjection into the paradigm of powerful men and weak women.

Although Milton cannot be easily exonerated from sexism in *Paradise Lost*, the fact is that in his prose works he almost never uses the term "feminine" in pejorative sense (Hausknecht 22). So, Milton's Satanic verses do not exclusively represent his personal views; they seem to be a cultural construct, as much as Satan himself, of long historical standing, reflecting the gendering practices in philosophy, theology, linguistics, and medical science from antiquity and the Middle Ages to Milton's own time.

One of the greatest Christian encyclopedists and, quite significantly, the patron saint of the Internet, Isidore of Seville (560-636), epitomized the views of the ancients on powerful men and weak women in the following way:

A man (*vir*) is so called, because in him resides greater power (*vis*) than in a woman – hence also "strength" (*virtus*) received its name – or else because he deals with a woman by force (*vis*). But the word woman (*mulier*) comes from softness (*mollities*), as if *mollior* (cf. *mollior*, "softer"), after a letter has been cut and a letter changed, is now called *mulier*. These two are differentiated by the respective strength and weakness of their bodies. But strength is greater in a man, lesser in a woman, so that she will submit to the power of the man; evidently this is so lest, if women were to resist, lust should drive men to seek out something else or throw themselves upon the male sex. (*Etymologies*, 242)

Not only did Isidore believe "that the origin of words informs one about the pristine, uncorrupted, essential nature of their referants, about a reality beyond the corrupt senses," (Laqueur 55) but he also realized that "a word's etymology often has an indispensable usefulness for interpreting the word" (*Etymologies*, 55). Although aware of other terms for "woman", he does not find them "useful" for spreading the ideology of female inferiority and condoning the violence against women. Thus, the term *femina* is not "useful" because it simply denotes the biological differences: "The word 'woman' (*femina*) is derived from the parts of the thighs (*femur*, plural *femora* or *femina*) where the appearance of the sex distinguishes her from a man" (*Etymologies*, 242). Needless to say, Isidore's etymological musings are unreliable and ideologically tainted, so he continues in the same manner: "Others believe that through a Greek etymology *femina* is derived from 'fiery force,' because she desires more vehemently, for females are said to be more libidinous than males, both in human beings and in animals. Whence among the ancients excessive love was called feminine (*femineus*) love" (*Etymologies*, 242). However, in PIE, the term *femina* relates

more directly to nursing and breastfeeding than to excessive sexual desire (de Vaan 210).

Isidore chooses polarizing terms *vir* and *mulier* because they best differentiate “the respective strength and weakness” and thus become “useful” as gendering devices. Although he is aware of the ancient term for a woman, *vira*, he introduces it much later as a derivative of *vir* and, once again, in paradigms of subjection: “She who is nowadays called a woman (*femina*) in ancient times was called *vira*; just as ‘female slave’ (*serva*) was derived from ‘male slave’ (*servus*) and ‘female servant’ (*famula*) from ‘male servant’ (*famulus*), so also woman (*vira*) from man (*vir*)” (*Etymologies*, 242). Not only does Isidore superimpose the morphology of contemporary Latin on “ancient times”, but he also sets in motion the derivational mechanics of subjection according to which female nouns are always derivatives of male nouns just as Eve was a derivative of Adam: “Eve was called woman as soon as she was made from the side of her man” (*Etymologies*, 242).

However, these derivational practices seem to be equally misleading both in Latin and English. We do not know to which language in “ancient times” Isidore refers, but he seems to be unaware of the fact that Latin *vir* is derived from Proto-Indo-European **u̯irow* and that it has variants in other ancient, as well as in vernacular, languages, such as Sanskrit (*vira*) or Old English (*wer*). And Sanskrit seems to be of particular importance here because the term *vira* applies not only to the female but also to the male sex. Thus it can mean “wife” or “matron” and, with slight change in accent, “man,” “hero,” “brave man” or “husband.” In its adjective form *vira* means “powerful,” “brave,” “strong.” Therefore, in Sanskrit there is no indication of gendering derivation of one noun from another that would suggest which came first and, more importantly, the two sexes are not polarized into a paradigm of powerful men and weak women as in Isidore’s *Etymologies*.

The sense of Biblical primogeniture applicable to linguistics might be even more “obvious” in an English translation of Isidore’s work in the sense that “woman” was derived from “man” as soon as Eve was made from Adam’s side. However, the question which came first in this case, “man” or “woman”, is pointless because before there was a woman there was not a man but a wife. Namely, the term “woman” was derived from the term “wife” or “Weib” in German: the Old English term *wif* is a variant of OHG *wib* and MHG *wip*, meaning to “vibrate” or “tremble.” Interestingly, in Sanskrit the verb *vepati*, derived from *vip*, also means to “vibrate” or “shake.” The Old English compound *wifmann*, on the other hand, did not entail any derivation of woman from man because the terms *mann*, *man*, or *monn* did not differentiate man from woman but were used for “a human being of either sex” (Bosworth 668). The Old English terms used to differentiate the two sexes were *wif* for woman and *wer* for man. However, two curious things happened with the appearance of this

compound: once *wif* acquired the suffix *mann* it became a noun of male gender to represent the female sex and it also came to mean “female servant.” Subsequently, the Old English *wifmann* turned into Middle English *wifmon*, *wimman*, *wumman* or *womman*, and then “woman.” Although the “vibrator” origin of the term woman has been contested, it still seems to be the most plausible one (Partridge 3685-6).

Not only is Milton’s Adam the virtual prototype of a physically superior male, but he also excels in intelligence. The etymology of the term “man”, along with biblical ideology, might have shaped Milton’s view. Being a great classicist, Milton was probably aware of “the very attractive theory that *man* derives from the IE r[oot] of Skt *man-*, to think, Gr *menos*, mind, spirit, L *mens*, mind, E *mind*” (Partridge 1877). Although this theory has been challenged, it has not been completely discredited. Namely the Sanskrit term *manu*, does not only stand for being “intelligent” or “wise”; the noun form (*manu* or *manuś*) stands also for “man.” However, this term does not necessarily imply gendering because it has generic connotations and it also means “thinking creature” or “mankind.” In other words, it differentiates humans from other creatures rather than the man from the woman.

It must be noted that Isidore’s etymological musings were done in Latin, in his view one of the three sacred languages along with Hebrew and Greek (*Etymologies*, 191), and his work greatly contributed to making Latin a male polarized language of learning, the language “controlled by writing” (Ong 35). The alienation of Latin from the speaker into a foreign tongue was not at all bad, as Walter Ong has demonstrated; it furthered noetic processes. By being exclusively submitted to the written form Latin became a virtual language, and “virtual” in this case did not mean unreal but powerful. Paradoxically, in its “death” Latin became more powerful than it had been “alive.” It became a powerful hermeneutic tool for the creation of an ideology that would make men socially superior to women and that would justify violence against women as a necessity. Women simply had to be weaker in order to protect the male population from turning homosexual. Needless to say, ideology always presents what seems to be politically unacceptable or indefensible as necessary, and the Church used exactly the same argument to condone prostitution as the same kind of necessity later on in the Middle Ages.

In his “interpretations” of words and their derivations, Isidore monopolized and virtualized Latin as a powerful ideological tool by means of which all the attributes of power and strength were ascribed to men. Therefore, *virtus* did not only become the attribute of powerful men but also of their language. It is generally assumed that words have power, but the virtual power in words becomes evident in their derivations. Thus *virtus*, as derived from *vir*, turns later on in the Middle Ages into *virtualis*, out of which the contemporary term “virtual” has been derived. While the virtual has assumed the connotations

of “fake” and “unreal” in contemporary times, it must be noted that this usage is based on the wrong association of the virtual with the visual, with all its negative connotations and limitations. The virtual was derived from “power” and in scholastic philosophy it was not considered as an opposite of real but it was equated with potential and, as such, it was in a dialectical relationship with the actual. Thus the virtual should not be confused with actualized visual forms but it manifests itself in the dynamics of their transformations; it is a power that causes actualization in different forms, an impulse that Brian Massumi ingeniously compares to the analog: it is “the analog in a sense close to the technical meaning, as a continuously variable impulse or momentum that can cross from one qualitatively different medium into another. Like electricity into sound waves” (135).

In terms of language, the power of the virtual manifests itself in reading, interpretation, translation and derivation of words. As Pierre Lévy points out, “Reading and interpretation, from generation to generation, reestablish the fragile thread of memory, reactualizing dormant thoughts. Translation, from one language or discipline to another, enables disconnected thought spaces to communicate with one another” (109). Thus, the power of the virtual can be defined as the “turning” power. In this capacity, the term virtual seems to be related to the Proto-Indo-European root *vrt* and its broad spectrum of meanings: so in Sanskrit and some vernaculars it means to “turn,” “revolve,” “be transformed,” “change,” “become,” “live.” This root seems to be a dialectical opposite of *mrt*, the term that terminates the power of life. Because of this turning power some scholars compare the operations of the virtual to Moebius strip (Ryan 36), the belt that constantly flips over in the process of turning whereby the inside becomes the outside and vice versa.

Interestingly, this is exactly how the gendering dynamics, of becoming man or woman, were conceived to operate in medical science from Galen to Milton’s time. This long standing tradition adhered to the principle of one body/one flesh principle according to which all fetuses are initially the same but subsequently some of them actualize themselves as males and others as females. The process of male actualization operates in the manner of Moebius strip which turns the inside out and Galen describes it in the following way:

In fact, you could not find a single male part left over that had not simply changed its position; for the parts that are inside in woman are outside in man [...] Now just as mankind is the most perfect of all animals, so within mankind the man is more perfect than the woman, and the reason for his perfection is his excess of heat, for heat is Nature’s primary instrument. Hence, in those animals that have less of it, her workmanship is necessarily more imperfect, and so it is no wonder that the female is less perfect than the male by as much as she

is colder than he. In fact, just as the mole has imperfect eyes, though certainly not so imperfect as they are in those animals that do not have any trace of them at all, so too the woman is less perfect than the man in respect to the generative parts. For the parts were formed within her when she was still a fetus, but could not because of the defect in the heat emerge and project on the outside, and this, though making the animal itself that was being formed less perfect than one that is complete in all respects, provided no small advantage for the race; for there needs must be a female. Indeed, you ought not to think that our Creator would purposely make half the whole race imperfect, and, as it were, mutilated, unless there was to be some great advantage in such a mutilization. (629-30)

According to Galen, all fetuses initially possess the same sexual organs, but they do not have the same potential of actualizing themselves as males. And this potential is in the power of heat. Those that accumulate excessive heat puff out their reproductive parts; in other words, they project themselves into males. On the other hand, those without sufficient heat do not “project on the outside” and actualize themselves as females. They become “losers” or failed men. Needless to say, having losers is a biological necessity.

Obviously, the medical science of Galen’s time was not based on observation and experiment because that is not how men in general experience women. So the mutilation of women was not done by nature but rather by the authority of ancient authors and their philosophy. Galen’s “observations” are actually second-hand observations of Aristotle’s observations of animals, and it looks like both authors lacked experiment, or they repressed their knowledge of women for political reasons. In his *Politics*, Aristotle defines the female/male natures in political paradigms of slavery and subjection in the following way:

the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. (1990)

And this Aristotelian paradigm of superior males ruling inferior females has been virtualized, or revitalized, in Galen’s medical treatise on hot men and cold women, and again in Isidore’s etymological explorations of powerful men and weak women until it received the final touch in Milton’s *Paradise Lost* and subjected soft women to intelligent, valorous men. Paradoxically, this paradigm

does not exhibit the power of the males or the weakness of the females as much as the power of the virtual itself.

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WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: DIVINE RULE AND USURPATION IN *RICHARD II* AND *KING LEAR*

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Abstract: Ruminations on power run through many of Shakespeare's plays, but when it comes to the interplay of the divine right to rule and uprising, *Richard II* and *King Lear* seem especially pertinent. Initially, there are some obvious differences: the first is a history play (although it has some elements of tragedy as well) while the second is a tragedy; the first is set at the end of the fourteenth century while the second is placed in Britain's pre-Christian, pagan past; Richard is deposed fairly young while Lear gives away his kingdom voluntarily as an old man; Richard has no heirs while Lear has three daughters, etc. However, if we look at the two plays closely, there is a similarity in each king's downfall. It stems from the conflicting natures of two worlds, i.e. viewpoints: that of the divine rule of monarchs in a traditional and cosmologically determined order, and that of usurpation, pragmatism and disregard for customs (or basically, revolution). As representatives of the first one, both Richard and Lear are caught practically unawares in this divergence and exacerbate their ruin with improvidence (in not seeing the consequences of their political decisions) and hubris (in serving their vanity and dismissing wise counsel), making them woefully unprepared for the ambition and retaliation of their subjects. This axiomatic belief in the unassailability of monarchy was well known in Shakespeare's time and was promulgated by Henry VIII, his daughter Elizabeth I and her successor James I.

Key Words: pacifism, traditionalism, pragmatism, Richard II, King Lear, revolution, Shakespeare, Bacon, power

These kinds of flaws, faults and steps to remedy them are described in the famous prose work *The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral* by Shakespeare's contemporary Francis Bacon, which also highlights the interest of Renaissance audiences in these universal issues of power, rule, consequences and change. What Shakespeare implicitly criticizes in his plays, Bacon formulates in clear and logical prose. His essays attain a special significance because he had an important governmental position during the reign of James I, and was favourably looked upon by the king himself; in fact, he was considered to be somewhat of a mediator between the king and the parliament. He continued an established didactical tradition of the Renaissance concerning kings and rule, as there were many other popular publications with advice on how to handle and exercise power properly, like *Mirror for Magistrates* (a collection of poems on influential historical figures) and Holinshed's *Chronicles*; Roston explains the

importance of these works: "Moreover, such an undertaking particularly suited an age regarding human history as a source of ethical guidance" with the primary objective "of instructing future rulers in the responsibilities of their office" (86). *Gorboduc*, the first English drama in blank verse published in 1561, was also significant because of its political context as it deals with "a king's fatal error in judgement and the grim sequence of calamities which the responsibilities of kinship set in motion" (89). The play went beyond its influences from the morality and Senecan plays and would in many ways kick-start the Elizabethan drama, best exemplified in Marlowe and Shakespeare.

Shakespeare himself is primarily interested in fostering discussion of these topics, since he did not represent either side of the conflict as morally or even legally right, although kings bear more responsibility because they wield more power. He was well aware of the absolutes in his time, whether they were political, religious or economic and the often extreme behaviours accompanying them. History shows us that the royal absolutes especially were not everlasting and that the pendulum would often swing back, so to speak, usually through the forceful counter-reactions of commoners and nobles. Shakespeare's aversion and critique, especially of the divine right to rule, is evident in a lot of his plays, as Greenblatt notes:

What is striking is that his work, alert to every human fantasy and longing, is allergic to the absolutist strain so prevalent in his world, from the metaphysical to the mundane. His kings repeatedly discover the constraints within which they must function if they hope to survive. (3)

Even morality itself was usually not considered to be absolute by Shakespeare, as virtue did not always prevail and the characters were frequently portrayed as gray in this aspect; Greenblatt again: "Shakespeare's characters have a rich and compelling moral life, but that moral life is not autonomous. In each case it is intimately bound up with the particular and distinct community in which the character participates" (83). The complexity of dealing with monarchical injustice is presented in the ambiguity of the rebels themselves. An interesting question arises regarding these two plays if we consider the political circumstances in Shakespeare's time: why would he portray the intricacies of the divine right of kings both during Elizabeth and James' reign and why did he use a real historical background for the first, and mythical past for the second? We could say that the topics he presented are universal, regardless of the times surrounding them and that the critique was suitably more implicit in Lear's distant, mythological setting. Overall, both plays are powerful representations of the turmoil surrounding the characters involved and were in certain aspects relevant for contemporary times.

Richard II is considered to be written around 1595 and its sources include an anonymous (usually called Woodstock's) play detailing the events before 1397, *The Mirror for Magistrates* and the ubiquitous Holinshed's *Chronicles*. Aside from these sources, of great influence was Marlowe's 1592 play *Edward II*, also dealing with royal ineptitude and dire consequences, as Roston elaborates:

Edward II, as an exploration of monarchical power misused, a king's lack of wisdom in directing and controlling his realm, is ultimately a play about weakness. [...] Yet in its depiction of the political repercussions of such weakness it presents with telling effect the magnitude of regal responsibility and the chaos that can ensue to the kingdom as a result of mismanaged rule. (86)

The differences between the play and historical records can sometimes be very indicative of the themes Shakespeare wanted to emphasize. Richard II had five uncles, sons of his grandfather Edward III (of special importance were dukes of Gaunt and Gloucester, along with Richard's father, Edward the Black Prince). For example, Shakespeare simplifies the life and character of John of Gaunt, not including his adventurous and risky endeavours (such as his warring in Spain) and is presented as the king's loyal adviser. As for Richard, Shakespeare makes no mention of his more positive deeds, such as the adept handling of the Peasants' Revolt of 1381 when he was only 14 years old, or establishing temporary peace with Ireland and France in 1394 and 1396 respectively. Shakespeare follows the historical accounts regarding Richard's susceptibility to flatterers and the parliament's subsequent complaints, although he often emphasizes the king's melodramatic personality and rashness. Despite this, taking note of Richard's flashes of self-awareness and irony regarding his demise, he could be considered enough of a complex character to be relatively ambiguous. Probably for simplicity's sake, Shakespeare presents Richard's downfall as continuous, starting from 1397, whilst in reality it was more of a back and forth affair between him and the nobles (their temporary advantage during the Merciless Parliament of 1388 comes to mind) (Dawson, Yachnin 49). Historically, Richard's sins in the eyes of his noblemen are not as clear as Shakespeare presents them in the play, but they are likely grounded in his irresponsibility and absolutism, as Saccio clarifies:

Richard certainly held a theory of the kingly dignity and power more exalted than that of his predecessors. Shakespeare picks this up from Holinshed and has his Richard express a grandiose notion of monarchy, although it is couched of course in language and concepts developed by Elizabethan political theorists rather than in medieval terms. (23)

This royal absolutism is seen in his reckless handling of both domestic (strict financial measures, as he says: “farm our royal realm” [1.4.45]) and foreign affairs (his ill-timed Irish campaign). The key event providing the point of no return for the rebellion was likely his illegal seizing of Gaunt’s considerable wealth at the expense of his cousin Henry Bolingbroke. As for the usurper, his motives were somewhat guarded both historically and in the play, with the ostensible reason being the return of his property after his father’s death. However, some of the measures undertaken during his return to England involved executions of the king’s perceived flatterers which were, as Saccio puts it “acts of quasi-regal authority” (28). Henry’s usurpation was also suspect from the legal point of view, as he tried to devise several justifications for wresting the crown, from the dubious claim of familial descent, the alarming notion of the right of conquest, to the absolutist claim that he was compelled to take it by the grace of God (31). The issue of Richard’s abdication is also vague; one historical account has Richard voluntarily surrendering the crown to his cousin, but it was in fact believed that he “set his crown upon the floor and resigned it to God, a striking and characteristic last gesture” (32). Shakespeare simplified this convoluted transfer of power by creating an unhistorical and unrealistic depiction of Richard being compelled to publically read his misdeeds, something that was actually censored in some early editions of the play (32). Finally, Richard’s exact cause of death was also clouded in mystery, with reports of starvation or murder. Whatever the truth was, the remaining usurpers certainly could not allow him to live, him being such a potent symbol and a rallying point for future rebels to the current regime. Henry’s complicity in his cousin’s death is difficult to disbelieve, and Shakespeare presents it as indirect, or at least ambiguous.

King Richard in the play is certainly guilty of improvidence and hubris, and is pitted against the ambitious pragmatism of his nobles, especially Henry of Bolingbroke. It soon becomes clear that the king was involved in Duke of Gloucester’s murder, but even so, retaliation is forbidden, as John of Gaunt says, “His deputy anointed in His sight, / Hath caused his death: the which if wrongfully, / Let heaven revenge; for I may never lift / An angry arm against His minister” (1.2.38–41). Here we can see that traditional belief in king’s supremacy even more so than in *King Lear*: the monarch is no less than chosen and removed only by God and Gaunt as an old nobleman is bound by this creed. On the day of the duel between Henry and Mowbray, Richard stops it just before it gets underway by declaring that peace has been usurped by the hateful noise of arms “Which so roused up with boisterous untuned drums, / With harsh resounding trumpets’ dreadful bray” (1.3.134–35). This is one of many musical symbols in the play, where capable governing was compared to finely tuned instruments and harmonious melody; the king will, however, produce only a cacophony of sound. In the light of Gaunt’s revelation, it appears that peace was not the reason

Richard stopped the fight; it was because he could not take the chance of Henry's victory, which would validate his accusations in the eyes of God (and therefore in the people as well) and prove that there was a major conspiracy at the highest levels in his kingdom. After banishing Henry, the king is reconsidering ever allowing him back into England since he had spies observe how popular he is with the people: "As were our England in reversion his, / And he our subjects' next degree in hope" (1.4.35–36).

Richard's attention soon turns to the war with Ireland for which the financial means are lacking; he has a quick but unpopular measure to procure the necessary funds by taxation and appropriation. This reckless stratagem will incite rebellious ideas soon enough. He is basically sacrificing the peace and stability of his kingdom for an immediate, short term goal. This rashness is further spurred by the news that Gaunt is deathly ill; Richard instantly sees an opportunity to seize his wealth, but lacks or ignores the foresight about the disastrous precedent this disinheritance will set in the eyes of other noblemen. Bacon warns of the same in *Of Sedition and Troubles*: "Also the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head, whereunto discontented persons may resort, and under whom they may join, is a known, but an excellent point of caution" (Bacon). Henry proves to be that perfect "fit head." Richard in his midst has capable advisors whose value Shakespeare developed according to practical Elizabethan didacticism. Their role is more down to earth since they are no longer concerned with the metaphysical issues of salvation. Roston calls it "political expediency" and says that "the focus has shifted from the next world to this, from redemption in the kingdom of heaven to the security of a kingdom on earth" (90). Gaunt expresses the value of good advice: "O, but they say the tongues of dying men / Enforce attention like deep harmony" (2.1.5–6) and also comments on Richard: "His rash fierce blaze of riot cannot last, / For violent fires soon burn out themselves; / Small showers last long, but sudden storms are short" (2.1.33–35). This is a classic example of inability to recognize the difference between short and long term goals and their consequences, with Richard persisting in his rashness and folly, like Lear. He impetuously refuses advice, but Gaunt is undaunted and mentions his father Edward: "That blood already, like the pelican, / Hast thou tapp'd out and drunkenly caroused" (2.1.126–27). As with the inversion of the royal symbol of harmony, to Richard is attributed the inversion of the royal symbol of the self-sacrificing pelican, with the implication that he ruined his father's achievements with his selfishness. York warns the king that this seizure will sour his reputation: "You pluck a thousand dangers on your head, / You lose a thousand well-disposed hearts" (2.1.205–06), but to no avail. Richard falls prey to the obvious causes of rebellion, as Bacon remarks: "The causes and motives of seditions are, innovation in religion; taxes; alteration of laws and customs" (Bacon). Naturally, other nobles immediately see a threat to their own titles and holdings, and the

commoners are suffering as well; Bacon again: "The matter of seditions is of two kinds: much poverty, and much discontentment" (Bacon). A grave error indeed is creating antagonism on both of these fronts. Richard's profligacy is also rampant, as Northumberland says: "More hath he spent in peace than they in wars" (2.1.255). It is no wonder that noblemen are conspiring to join Henry. Richard's campaign in Ireland proves to be a disastrous one, since his troops are dispersing for lack of payment. Natural signs, just like with Lear, do not bode well for the king as they signal the disturbances in the previously ordered realm; the captain reiterates the general opinion: "The pale-faced moon looks bloody on the earth / And lean-look'd prophets whisper fearful change" (2.4.9–10).

The king's inability to make hard, pragmatic decisions and to project a calm composure is best seen in the tragicomic scene of him quickly alternating between the extremes of self-confidence and despair: first he hears the bad news that his twenty thousand soldiers defected to Henry, but then boasts: "Is not the king's name twenty thousand names?" (3.2.85). Then he hears that the common folk are also taking up arms against him and worse, that his flatterers have been executed, so he reverts to musings on mortality and on the stress of being a king; he is simply unable to comprehend this world collision and the rebels who "throw away respect, / Tradition, form and ceremonious duty" (3.2.172–73). Just as he again summons his confidence, more bad news makes him completely distraught. These wild mood swings are emblematic of his inability of being practical and resolute during critical moments. When Henry arrives at the one remaining Richard's castle, he describes the king's appearance "As doth the blushing discontented sun / From out the fiery portal of the east" (3.3.63–64), with the sun representing another common royal symbol. The ensuing argument between the two again represents the conflict of two mind-sets, as Richard says: "If we be not, show us the hand of God / That hath dismissed us from our stewardship" (3.3.76–77) and again unrealistically threatens, similar to Lear, to unleash the celestial powers against his enemies: "Yet know, my master, God omnipotent, / Is mustering in his clouds on our behalf / Armies of pestilence; and they shall strike" (3.3.84–86). There is a sad moment of self-awareness when the king realizes the merits of diplomacy in resolving this conflict, but the royal burden he was born and brought up with does not allow any leeway with his conduct: "O that I were as great / As is my grief, or lesser than my name! / Or that I could forget what I have been, / Or not remember what I must be now!" (3.3.135–38). This is the crux of tragedy in the play: he cannot develop beyond this narrow understanding of royalty. Richard eventually grudgingly surrenders, while still trying to maintain his dignity amidst a lot of melodrama and petulance, just as Lear did when he went into exile. The king's incompetence is reflected in the famous symbol of the garden, when the court gardener speaks of "The noisome weeds, which without profit suck / The soil's fertility from wholesome flowers" (3.4.38–39), alluding to the flatterers in

royal court. He clearly criticizes Richard's poor management: "O, what pity is it / That he had not so trimm'd and dress'd his land / As we this garden!" (3.4.55–57). Here we can also view the garden simile of cutting down caterpillars as a quick and violent solution to problems, which can be tempting, but in the long run violence usually returns with a vengeance.

Again, Richard, just like Lear, did not listen to capable and honest advisors and the inevitable price had to be paid. A great part of Richard's identity goes with the relinquishment of the crown and eventually he gives it away in grand and sentimental manner, so congruent with his personality: "With mine own hands I give away my crown, / With mine own tongue deny my sacred state, / With mine own breath release all duteous oaths" (4.1.208–10). The melodrama continues with Richard asking for a mirror and bitterly commenting on the reflection: "O flatt'ring glass, / Like to my followers in prosperity, / Thou dost beguile me!" (4.1.279–81) As he starts to understand the difference between appearances and reality, he breaks the glass on the floor in desperation and wrath. His musical observation is very ironic; he could detect dissonance in a melody, but could not see a glaring array of mistakes he committed in his faulty reign: "And here have I the daintiness of ear / To check time broke in a disordered string; / But for the concord of my state and time / Had not an ear to hear my true time broke" (5.5.45–48). Bacon's remark of Nero's style of ruling in the essay *Of Empire* is very appropriate in this context:

Nero could touch and tune the harp well; but in government, sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. And certain it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much. (Bacon)

Richard had basically given Henry free reign by banishment, he should have kept him closer if he considered him a threat; conversely, he pressed his power 'too far' when he so brazenly appropriated Gaunt's wealth. The tuneless lute that is the former king finally breaks in the new king's pragmatic scheme, just as the new world of Henry supplants the old one of Richard.

Richard's hubris is also quite prominent, with self-descriptions like "The unstooping firmness of my upright soul" (1.1.121). When Richard plans to confiscate Gaunt's wealth, he could just be reckless, or perhaps in his haughtiness does not believe anyone would dare to consider this a provocation leading to rebellion, with him being so secure in his divine role and right. The king's vanity and penchant for flattery also dooms him, given that he keeps company with people like Baget, Bushy and Green, as the noblemen complain: "The king is not himself, but basely led / By flatterers" (2.1.240–41). Bacon notes in *Of Counsel*: "for the greatest errors are committed, and the most

judgment is shown, in the choice of individuals" (Bacon). These sycophants prove themselves to be of no grit and flee at the first sign of trouble. The greatest example of Richard's arrogance is when he identifies completely with England. Upon coming back from Ireland, he expresses this union in a very poetic and romantic way, as was his wont: "So, weeping, smiling, greet I thee, my earth, / And do thee favours with my royal hands" (3.2.10–11). Richard considers the English soil to be an extension of his divine self and what he feels, the earth feels the same. It will offer resistance to the usurpers just as good as real troops: "This earth shall have a feeling and these stones / Prove armed soldiers, ere her native king / Shall falter under foul rebellion's arms" (3.2.24–26). In time of crisis, Richard does not offer a cunning plan or bold action, but still harps on the power of heaven behind him that will surely smite the offenders with its righteous light and finishes this passionate address with an evocation of an angelic army, no less: "God for his Richard hath in heavenly pay / A glorious angel: then, if angels fight, / Weak men must fall, for heaven still guards the right" (3.2.60–62), while the reality is that he has no troops, imagined or otherwise. He cannot stand being deposed and compares this treason to the betrayal of Jesus: "So Judas did to Christ: but he, in twelve, / Found truth in all but one: I, in twelve thousand, none" (4.1.171–72). He still has enough pride and dignity to refuse reading the charges against him and detests being reduced in stature in front of everybody, especially Henry: "Standing before the sun of Bolingbroke, / To melt myself away in water-drops!" (4.1.261–62). When he is deposed and meets with the queen who is bound for France, Richard is characteristically concerned primarily with self-mythologizing and martyrdom and charges her to "Tell thou the lamentable tale of me / And send the hearers weeping to their beds" (5.1.44–5); such is the potency of Richard's melodramatic nature.

Henry as "a practical man of affairs" (Roston 193) is the representative of ambitious usurpation in the play which, although not as deplorable as that in *King Lear*, is still powerful enough to clash with and eventually surpass the old world order. Mowbray provides an ominous foreshadowing of Henry's character just before his exile: "But what thou art, God, thou, and I do know; / And all too soon, I fear, the king shall rue" (1.3.204–05). Henry definitely picks the right moment to return to England during Richard's absence and capitalizes on the general displeasure of noblemen and commoners alike. He gathers more and more followers on his way and justifies his actions with a legal argument of restoring his birthright: "I am a subject, / And I challenge law: attorneys are denied me; / And therefore, personally I lay my claim" (2.3.132–34). However, as said before, Henry also assumes the royal power of execution which he applies on Bushy and Green. York warns him not to usurp what is not his: "Take not, good cousin, further than you should. / Lest you mistake the heavens are o'er our heads" (3.3.16–17) but Henry relentlessly marches on. He issues

messengers with an ultimatum of humbly asking for a restoration of his title and land, knowing that Richard's pride would never allow him to admit that he was wrong and to have the legality of his decision, and therefore the authority itself, questioned. Henry's move was shrewd indeed, enabling him to mount a rebellion whilst at the same time distancing himself from it since the ostensible reason is legitimate restoration of his inheritance. The strategy works flawlessly since the melodramatic king eventually relinquishes the crown. When York informs everybody that Richard "willingly" declared him heir, Henry does not waver for a moment: "In God's name, I'll ascend the regal throne" (4.1.114). But the real masterstroke of Henry's plan is the apparently off handed remark in court, as heard by Exton: "'Have I no friend will rid me of this living fear?'" (5.4.2). Living and breathing Richard would always be a threat to his regency, since any future opposition would readily rally around the former king. However, there will always be opportunistic and unscrupulous people eager to get into the current king's good graces, and that is exactly what Exton does by murdering Richard (who, perhaps in a surprising display of physical power and courage does not go down lightly and even kills two of his attackers before dying) and arriving victoriously before Henry with his body, referring to it as "Thy buried fear" (5.6.31). Henry is seemingly not pleased with the deed and further paradoxically elaborates: "They love not poison that do poison need, / Nor do I thee: though I did wish him dead, / I hate the murderer, love him murdered" (5.6.38–40) but if the crime was so great, he would have executed Exton instead of merely banishing him. He basically kills two birds with one stone by simultaneously ridding himself of Richard and not taking full responsibility for the murder, much of it resting on an apparent misunderstanding of a rogue courtier. Perhaps due to genuine grief, but perhaps only for show, or both, he decides to undertake a holy pilgrimage to cleanse his soul, not to mention his public image. Henry seized the momentum and took by force what he wanted, but such revolutions will occur again. In fact, Henry had to deal with numerous rebellions himself during his reign and his guilty conscience is described in *2 Henry V*.

Richard II had an interesting contemporary impact in 1601 when followers of Earl Essex commissioned its performance (it is generally assumed that it was Shakespeare's version), and the day after tried to mount a sort of mutiny to reinstate the Earl back into Elizabeth's favour (a favour apparently soured by the queen's flatterers). The rebellion was quickly quenched and the Earl soon executed for treason. In the aftermath Elizabeth, upon perusing the report of the failed rebellion, was alleged to have said: "I am Richard II know ye not that?" and also: "He that will forget God, will also forget his benefactors; this tragedy was played forty times in open streets and houses" (Dawson, Yachnin 4). She certainly understood some of her parallels with Richard's situation and the play's power to cause unrest, although the actors involved

were questioned but later acquitted of all charges. In any case, the value of the play for contemporary politics did not escape Essex's followers, the problem being Elizabeth surrounded by unsavoury flatterers. The Earl's concern was the deterioration of social power and influence of himself and his peers, as he was "personally and ideologically troubled by what he saw as the loss, under Elizabeth, of traditional aristocratic privilege and independence from the monarchy" (5). We could say that the problem of the absolute of divine rule caused friction in Elizabeth's court and that the play served as a catalyst for these daring ideas of Essex and his supporters. As for Elizabeth herself, the fact that she remained in power for almost fifty years in an incredibly turbulent period of English history testifies to her ability of not alienating the most important members of her nobility, so she would have been well acquainted with Richard's crucial flaw in that regard. Curiously, the play was not considered to be inflammatory enough to provoke an outright ban upon its publication (scholars cannot be sure to what extent it has been censored, if at all), but this brief and odd rebellious episode in a way indicated the smouldering problems of power sharing between the two sides in Elizabethan and later Jacobean period. These problems would eventually explode in the English Civil War and King Charles' execution. As said before, one extreme behaviour provokes another and the violent conflict is practically inevitable; reader's contemplation of this conflict, rather than immediate taking of sides (which is usually in favour of the oppressed), is Shakespeare's intent. It was also already mentioned that he avoids portraying either sides favourably; so do the Holinshed's *Chronicles* which note the repeated failings of all involved (although Shakespeare further simplifies the conflict for dramatic purposes by barely mentioning the role of the commoners in the struggle). Basically, both sides are wrong and the effects of the "hideous rashness" (to use a phrase from *King Lear*) will continue to be a sword over the head of the volatile English society in the subsequent centuries. The play's power in instigating discussion is evident because it was at times interpreted as both advocating the divine right and a king as a servant to the commonwealth (17). Dawson and Yachnin frame the primary question well, a question about power itself: "what is the nature and source of political authority and under what circumstances is it legitimate to resist or even to overthrow that authority?" (21) and Shakespeare provides no easy answers.

He continued to explore these issues in a different, mythical setting of *King Lear*. As with many of his plays, the exact date of composition is uncertain, the likeliest years being between 1603 and 1606. Primary sources include Monmouth's *History of the Kings of Britain*, Holinshed's *Chronicles* and anonymous play *King Leir*, registered in 1594 and published in 1605. All of these sources have Lear giving away his rule to his two flattering daughters and their husbands, as well as banishing Cordelia for her honesty. There is a very ironic sentence in Monmouth's account concerning Lear's relinquishment: "And

without further delay, after consultation with his nobility,” (9) whilst in Shakespeare’s play we know that the primary cause for his downfall is exactly the rashness of division (Lear even calls it his “fast intent”). In all previous versions he gets his retinue decreased to eventually only one man and basically becomes a beggar in his own kingdom. The sources also have a happy ending where Lear with the help of Cordelia gets his kingdom back and rules it again for a couple of years before his death. Cordelia is only much later ousted by her nephews and commits suicide in prison. Shakespeare diverges the most from these sources with the well-known tragic ending, which resonated so powerfully with audiences that the play was produced with a happy ending for a long time after the Restoration in 1660, the original ending only being restored in the nineteenth century.

Lear’s improvidence manifests throughout the play but its biggest instance is right in the beginning, namely in his unrealistic desire to relinquish the responsibilities and stress of governing but simultaneously keeping the privileges and respect a royal state involves, not realizing that one does not come without the other. His intent of dividing the kingdom among his daughters and their respective husbands is supposed “To shake all cares and business from our age; / Conferring them on younger strengths, while we / Unburdened crawl toward death” (1.1.34–36). This also has the purpose of preventing a power struggle and maintaining peace and stability in the kingdom after his retirement, as he naively believes “that future strife / May be prevented now” (1.1.39–40). He makes the unwise decision of awarding the parts of kingdom based on flattery, not merit. Goneril and Regan clearly exaggerate their affection but Lear in his vanity is oblivious to this. Instead of flattery, Cordelia explains that it is unrealistic to reserve her entire love for her father, and not leave anything for a future husband. Incensed Lear shows his ineptitude by immediately disinheriting her and the folly is compounded by banishment of loyal Kent as well. By handing out his influence, he basically loses control over his daughters, thus enabling them to pursue their ambition unimpeded. Bacon observes in his essay *On Council* that “[t]he motions of factions under kings ought to be, like the motions (as the astronomers speak) of the inferior orbs, which may have their proper motions, but yet still are quietly carried, by the higher motion of primum mobile” (Bacon). Like Richard, he makes a classic mistake of losing control over his subjects. Lear’s lack of insight about his inevitably deteriorating position is ironically expressed when the servants at Cornwall’s castle do not attend to him immediately like he was accustomed to, so he utters: “I think the world’s asleep” (1.4.42). Lear’s fool is not only a foil to the former king’s foolishness, but also represents an example of a Renaissance paradox where the fool is wiser than a king. He instructs Lear through quips, songs and colourful expressions such as: “e’er since thou mad’st thy daughters / thy mothers; for when thou gav’st them the rod, and put’st down / thine own breeches” (1.4.133–135) but

Lear finds this merely amusing and never penetrates the true meaning. The more Lear pushes for the restoration of his privileges, the more extreme reactions he elicits from his increasingly emboldened former subjects.

After a big confrontation with Goneril and Regan over his entourage, Lear becomes so upset and mentally unstable that he wanders like a beggar in the wilderness, bemoaning his cruel fate to Nature, i.e. to the old, established world of royal supremacy. It is ironic that Lear appears wise while mad, with insightful musings on power corruption, hypocrisy and deceitful appearances; Edgar, who only pretends to be mad, cannot help but observe: "O, matter and impertinency mixed, / Reason in madness!" (4.5.166–67), which represents another example of a Renaissance paradox. When Cordelia arrives to England with an army, he feels such burning shame that he does not want to see her, being unable to confront the consequences of his disastrous choices. Eventually though, Lear meets up with her and slowly comes to his senses by the restorative powers of music (another well-known Renaissance notion) but both are defeated and captured by Edmond. Lear does not seem to mind the prospect of imprisonment as long as he is with Cordelia. He finally understands that the value of a child's love is not in flattery, but in truthfulness and respect. The most poignant moment in the play is when Lear appears carrying dead Cordelia in his arms. He is now tragically aware that the real loss is not obedience and privileges, but the love of a child that he has now lost: "Howl, howl, howl, howl! O, you are men of stones. / Had I your tongues and eyes, I'd use them so / That heaven's vault should crack. She's gone for ever!" (5.3.231–33). However, just before he dies Lear imagines that Cordelia is breathing again, symbolizing perhaps the hope that love, honesty and loyalty will not die with her.

Along with improvidence, Lear's hubris plays a great role in this tragedy and it comes from the traditional haughtiness of a king's indisputable authority, like when he reacts to perceived insolence: "Peace, Kent, / Come not between the dragon and his wrath," (1.1.115–16) but it is also evident in a fatal susceptibility to flattery. Kent criticizes it in the context of unfair division, feeling an obligation to speak candidly of things even if they pertain to Lear's folly, or especially then: "Think'st thou that duty shall have dread to speak, / When power to flattery bows?" (1.1.141–42). Bacon comments on the value of a good advisor: "The true composition of a counsellor, is rather to be skilful in their master's business than in his nature; for then he is like to advise him, and not feed his humor" (Bacon). This inability of listening to honest, honourable and reliable people who would stabilize, encourage and develop his own ability of critical opinion contributes a lot to Lear's demise. Bacon elaborates: "The wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness or derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel" (Bacon). Lear exhibits an aloof attitude toward the severity of this division, thinking that his judgement cannot be wrong and that things will sort themselves out; he simply puts too much faith in

cosmological order and fate and does not critically question his decisions, something which Bacon strongly warns against: "Things will have their first, or second agitation: if they be not tossed upon the arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of fortune; and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunken man" (Bacon). Kent's wrath at Oswald represents a general statement against opportunistic flatterers. Of course, reality is not so simple, a good king must not blindly trust even his honest advisors but there is a lesser chance of a king being corrupted by honesty than by flattery. This is precisely where a king's ability of critical thinking should come into action. Kent expresses Lear's great flaw very clearly: "And, in thy best consideration, check / This hideous rashness" (1.1.144–45). Fittingly, Lear is enraged by Kent's questioning of his actions, even putting a hand on his sword. He expects unquestionable obedience and will suffer no criticism; it is simply unthinkable that anyone would dare to presume otherwise, as he scolds Kent: "and with strain'd pride / To come betwixt our sentence and our power, / Which nor our nature nor our place can bear" (1.1.163–64). Lear's short temper is evident in the treatment of Goneril's servant, where he hits him for being rude to his fool; his irascibility is causing chaos and tension throughout Albany's castle, as Goneril says: "His knights grow riotous, and himself upbraids us / On every trifle" (1.3.7–8). She is also annoyed by the fact that Lear is not fully aware of what he handed over in his retirement (lines in the first quarto): "Idle old man, / That still would manage those authorities / That he hath given away!" (1.3.16–18). Lear in his hubris is oblivious to the reason of Oswald's disrespect, who, for example, purposely identifies him merely as his lady's father, not a king. One of his knights calls this change of atmosphere "a great abatement of kindness" (1.4.52) but Lear is still characteristically incredulous: "Ha! sayest thus so?" (1.4.54). After Goneril joins this general attitude, he becomes infuriated and evokes Nature to his aid: "Hear, nature, hear; dear goddess, hear!" (1.4.230) and curses her with infertility. Nature here is supposed to restore the rightful order of things, namely the obligatory respect of children towards the parent, as well as subjects towards the king. The event that pushes Lear to the edge is the confrontation with both daughters at Cornwall's castle, instigated by seeing his follower Kent in stocks (Lear does not later recognize Kent in disguise, which symbolically illustrates his inability to recognize the importance of honesty and fidelity). At first, Lear typically cannot believe that he would be insulted in this way: "They durst not do 't; / They could not, would not do 't; 'tis worse than murder, / To do upon respect such violent outrage" (2.4.19–21). He displays a complete lack of royal composure, discussion and rationality, only melodramatic and passionate cries to the gods because of injured pride. Lear refuses to consider Regan's practical argument: "How, in one house / Should many people, under two commands, / Hold amity? 'Tis hard; almost impossible" (2.4.233–35) and continues with more uproar against ingratitude and finally

goes into exile. Fittingly, a great storm begins, it being a symbol of the irreconcilable differences between these worlds. Lear, like Richard, almost gleefully assumes this tragic fate, with his hubris unabated: "I am a man / More sinn'd against than sinning" (3.2.57–58). He frequently repeats the word 'ingratitude', and derides the cruelty of his daughters who have cast him out into the wilderness, forgetting that he left of his own volition. He later mentions them in the context of an inverted pelican symbol; they do not sacrifice for him in order to return with gratitude his parental love: "'twas this flesh begot / Those pelican daughters" (3.4.69–70). Lear's madness is cured near the end of the play, but the harm was irreversible.

Pragmatism and ambition is embodied in Goneril, Regan and Edmond. Despite some reasonable criticisms over Lear's behaviour, the other side is presented as truly sinister, as Roston notes: "Shakespeare remained disturbed by the threat of the Machiavels: the vicious Regans, Gonerils and Edmunds of this world, challenging the traditional virtues of hierarchical order" (211). The two sisters recognize Lear's capriciousness and rashness towards Cordelia, as Goneril says that "he always loved / our sister most; and with what poor judgment he hath now cast / her off appears too grossly" (1.1.281–83). Regan immediately identifies the problem: "'Tis the infirmity of his age: yet he hath ever but slenderly / known himself" (1.1.284–85). They wonder how Lear will treat them with this unstable behaviour, so they decide to go on the offensive first. Goneril and Regan know how to handle their elderly father, and their respect for Lear and his status will disappear as the play progresses. Goneril describes how to interact with him when he is about to return from hunting; it is basically the carrot and stick approach, like one would use to deal with a petulant child (lines in first quarto): "Old fools are babes again; and must be used / With checks as flatteries" (1.3.20–21). Basically, Lear's pride and improvidence are fanning the flames of their Machiavellian pragmatism, since they know how to profit from his conduct. Lear's belief that at least Regan supports him is grounded in notions of traditional bond between parent and children: "thou better know'st / The offices of nature, bond of childhood, / Effects of courtesy, dues of gratitude," (2.4.170–72) but they descend into cruelty and treachery (the scenes of blinding Gloucester and turning on each other because of Edmond come to mind). When Cordelia returns to England, both of them assume that she seeks power through restoration, but her intent is markedly different from the sisters' vileness: "No blown ambition doth our arms incite, / But love, dear love, and our aged father's right" (4.3.27–28).

Edmond provides an even better example of this ruthless go-getter attitude. Gloucester's bastard is unhappy with his position in society and aims to change it by resorting to treachery and manipulation. Bacon notes in *Of Ambition*: "Ambition is like choler; which is an humor that maketh men active, earnest, full of alacrity, and stirring, if it be not stopped. But if it be stopped, and

cannot have his way, it becometh a dust, and thereby malign and venomous" (Bacon). Edmond's first soliloquy establishes this Marlowian over-reaching aspiration by arguing that bastards are in fact better, since they were conceived in passion and determination, rather than duty and custom. It is precisely this traditional social order that he rails against. The conflict is expressed in Edmond's beliefs disguised as Edgar's: "This policy and reverence of age makes the / world bitter to the best of our times; keeps our fortunes from us / till our oldness cannot relish them" (1.2.45–47) and then continues: "I begin to find an idle and / fond bondage in the oppression of aged tyranny" (1.2.47–48). Edmond is effectively a proponent of social Darwinism, as seen when he again falsely uses Edgar as his mouthpiece: "maintain it to / be fit that, sons at perfect age, and fathers declined, the father / should be as ward to the son, and the son manage his revenue" (1.2.65–67). The argument is that rulers are not supposed to reign until death, but should in old age yield their place to younger lions, so to speak, who possess the necessary energy and stamina to rule. This shocking attack on the social order, on Nature itself, as it were, is expressed in Gloucester's wrathful reply: "Abhorred villain, unnatural, detested, brutish villain – worse / than brutish!" (1.2.69–70), who also later comments on Lear's madness and reversal: "O ruined piece of nature! This great world / Shall so wear out to nought" (4.5.130–31), where he specifically identifies the former king with Nature. Edmond calls this fatalism "the excellent foppery of the world" (1.2.104). His personality is his choice, not fate: "I should have been that I am had the maidenliest / star in the firmament twinkled on my bastardizing" (1.2.115–16). He embraces this immorality and is perfectly aware that it thrives at the expense of his father and brother "on whose foolish honesty / My practices ride easy!" (1.3.153–54). Edmond continues to pursue this ruthless ambition in framing his own father for treason and later turns Regan and Goneril's affection for him against each other. Mortally wounded by Edgar, he seems to repent and at least partly recognizes that his malice turned against him: "Th'hast spoken right; 'tis true. / The wheel is come full circle; I am here" (5.3.163–64). Instead of social Darwinism and this absolute of ambition meant to cement his new social position, he appears to return to the cyclical, cosmological order and dies as a bastard. He warns about the imminent execution of both Lear and Cordelia and dies with this one good deed to his name. In this particular case at least, Edmond is more redeemable than the sisters, who remain corrupted to the end.

Just as *Richard II* is connected to Elizabeth's reign, so is *King Lear* to her successor, James I. In fact, the first record of the play's performance was on December 26th 1606 at the court of the king himself. St. Stephen's holiday was also significant as it advocated the virtue of patience, with Lear's rashness providing a perfect contrast. The play was important for the current political situation regarding the structuring of monarchy. The obvious example was

Lear's division of the kingdom, a folly that was opposite to James' intention to unify the kingdoms of England and Scotland. The underlying issue, however, is again Lear's unwavering belief in the inviolability of a monarch, even after he basically removes himself from governing. The reaction from the other side is seething discontent which soon becomes uncompromisingly cruel and forceful. Just like Elizabeth, James I was a firm believer in the divine right to rule and he published two works propagating it: *The True Law of Free Monarchies* and *Basilikon Doron* in 1598 and 1599 respectively. In the first work James justifies the absolute sovereignty of a monarch by referring to the Bible: "Kings are called gods by the prophetic King David because they sit upon God his throne in the earth and have the count of their administration to give unto him" (James I). He uses a conventional simile when it comes to the relationship of a king and his subjects, something that is very pertinent to Lear and his children:

And now, first for the father's part (whose natural love to his children I described in the first part of this my discourse, speaking of the duty that kings owe to their subjects), consider, I pray you, what duty his children owe to him and whether upon any pretext whatsoever it will not be thought monstrous and unnatural to his sons to rise up against him, to control him at their appetite, and, when they think good, to slay him or to cut him off and adopt to themselves any other they please in his room. (James I)

James is also very clear when it comes to usurping a monarchy; even when the king is unjust and harmful to its subjects, they are forbidden to act against him in any way since they would be interfering with an order provided and sanctioned by God. The only course of action would be patience, endurance and leaving matters in God's hands:

I grant, indeed, that a wicked king is sent by God for a curse to his people and a plague for their sins; but that it is lawful to them to shake off that curse at their own hand, which God hath laid on them, that I deny and may do so justly. [...] It is certain, then (as I have already by the law of God sufficiently proved), that patience, earnest prayers to God, and amendment of their lives are the only lawful means to move God to relieve them of their heavy curse. (James I)

James's reign was characterized by an uncommon peace, but the seed of discord and devastation would be planted in his son Charles I, whose royal absolutism, inflexibility and disdain for the parliament would become infamous. His understanding of the divine rule was even more extreme than his father's and would eventually outdo even Richard II in alienating the powerful people

around him. Consequently, England was soon dragged into a Civil War and Charles was executed in 1649 (Milton at that time published *Eikonoklastes*, a work defending regicide based precisely on the argument that people have the right and duty to overthrow a tyrannical king). The Commonwealth which came to power through violence collapsed, and his son Charles II regained the throne in 1660. Chaos would be the perfect word to describe these turbulent times of the Reformation, as England became a bewildering conglomeration of religious sects and volatile political alliances and feuds. Again, the extreme behaviours resulting from the absolutes is presented in *King Lear*, with Nature itself through severe storms seemingly reflecting the resulting anarchy; the world basically becomes chaos from order, but not because of the higher agency of God, like King James I would have said, but because of ourselves: "Truth and rationality are violated ad libitum, and the result is a world turned upside down; but it is a world formed and determined by the people who inhabit it" (Halio 15). The ending in *King Lear* is a perfect symbol of all of this, since many readers found Cordelia's death too disturbing and unjust, with Samuel Johnson being a good example of this general sentiment; Halio again: "The reason for his reaction [Johnson's] is that he found her death not only disappointed expectation but violated our 'natural ideas of justice'. Cordelia's death is a violation of that kind, and being so, it is the final crushing experience in the play" (25). Indeed, our ordered expectations of the villain's comeuppance and the prevailing of the virtuous are specifically the things Shakespeare criticizes as wishful thinking; with this ending he injects a hard dose of reality, something that, as mentioned before, proved to be hard to accept even when it comes to a play, let alone real life. When the inevitable tragedy happens, the sense of injustice of Cordelia's death is best expressed by Lear: "No, no, no life? / Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life, / And thou no breath at all? (5.3.279–81). Halio quotes Kermode on the effectiveness of this reversal, where we can see an attack on the people's general reflex of reluctance in accepting the terrible consequences of violent reactions to extreme situations:

The more daring the peripeteia, the more we may feel that the work respects our sense of reality; and the more certainly we shall feel that the fiction under consideration is one of those which, by upsetting the ordinary balance of our naive expectations, is finding something out for us, something real. The falsification of an expectation can be terrible, as in the death of Cordelia; it is a way of finding something out that we should, on our more conventional way to the end, have closed our eyes to. (31)

However, with all the doom and gloom in *King Lear*, there is a beacon of light at the end, albeit it came too late. It could be argued that if there is one

absolute Shakespeare believed in, it would be love, like it is expressed in Lear's love for his daughter in a situation where he is practically glad to be thrown in prison as long as he is with her: "so we'll live, / And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh / At gilded butterflies" (5.3.11-13). Halio emphasizes this contrasting situation: "This lyric moment, like the earlier scene of reconciliation, conveys a beauty and harmony that are appropriate to the conclusion of a fairytale" (29). Greenblatt seems to think that absolutes, including love, are effectively extinguished by the play's conclusion: "The dream of the absolute with which the play opens, whether absolute power or absolute love, has been destroyed forever," (94) but we need to consider what resonates in the readers: it is not only the poignant ending, it is also the sadness of the love recognized and gained, and lost so soon. The fact that it was lost does not mean that it is obliterated and forgotten completely. Love could be considered one of the strongest points of Shakespeare's implicit didacticism, since it has the power to completely override (even when it is temporary) the difficulties the characters may feel in their lives, as expressed in his many plays and poems. There is a place for certain ideals in Shakespeare's work, as Roston explains: "although little concerned with the formalities of the Christian religion, he remained a firm upholder of its basic tenets, its insistence upon charity, love, and mercy, epitomised in his heroines Cordelia and Desdemona" (179). Upon further contemplation, we could say that there is another absolute that remains in Shakespeare's plays, and that is the inevitable consequences of our misdeeds; if the world is often chaotic, if we cannot rely on justice and honesty, we can certainly count on arrogance and violence coming back to haunt us sooner or later: "Shakespeare did not think that one's good actions are necessarily or even usually rewarded, but he seems to have been convinced that one's wicked actions inevitably return, with interest" (Greenblatt 85).

Absolutism and overconfidence in the conventional order and disregard for the mutability of people and circumstances doom both kings. The abilities of adaptability and awareness in the context of one's world have always been the hallmarks of competent monarchs, but they escaped Richard and Lear because they were too lulled and comfortable in their regal positions. Improvidence prevented them from fully seeing the consequences of their choices, and hubris entrenched them even deeper into mind-set incapable of parrying their followers' growing practicality and ambition. In the universal game of power tide, both kings were caught in the ebb, taking their times with them. The purpose of Shakespeare's history plays and tragedies concerning power was to precisely bring these issues to the mind, from the celestial to the terrestrial sphere. Roston elaborates on the effectiveness of these dramatic genres:

although originating with the didactic tradition of "fortune's wheel" and the fall of kings, [he] was developing well beyond that theme. He was

aware that the English monarchy was more precariously poised than many were prepared to admit; for the throne rested on two contradictory principles. There was not only belief in an unalienable divine right conferred by hereditary succession as part of the hierarchal pattern of the universe, but also a more practical element often underplayed in criticism of these plays, the necessary consent of the people, expressed not by the direct vote but through the leaders of the shires. Where Greek tragedy had explored the conflict between a pre-ordained fate and man's determination of his own destiny, Shakespeare was fascinated by a similar paradox implicit in sovereignty; on the one hand the profound belief: "There's such divinity doth hedge a king / That reason can but peep to what it would", and on the other the knowledge, proved repeatedly by history, that a monarch must prove morally and politically worthy of governing his kingdom or risk forcible removal by his people. (191)

Regarding the other side, it is important to conclude that Shakespeare in these plays does not advocate overthrowing kings, nor does he automatically root for the oppressed. Many authors have dealt with the theme of tyrannical monarchs and their downfall, but Shakespeare also pays attention to the corruptibility from the other end and how quickly the oppressed can become the oppressor. Serious contemplation is needed to resolve these conflicts, instead of a knee-jerk violent reaction which perpetuates the cycle of destruction and instability. We can see this in countless revolutions from history; a good example is Cromwell's overthrow of tyrannical King Charles I and many people hailed him as a hero and a liberator, but he was also involved in the atrocities in the subsequent Irish campaign. The Commonwealth he left behind was rife with internal problems and it soon crumbled before the Restoration. This happened precisely because there was no long term strategy in dealing with serious problems other than the usually quick violent response; for the people who came to power like this, it can be a very tempting "solution" to many, if not all other problems. Other examples come to mind, like The Reign of Terror after the French Revolution or the Russian Civil War in the aftermath of the October Revolution. It is a general opinion that one of the greatest values of Shakespeare's plays is their relevance for all times and cultures. What is left after these two plays is the sense of realism and wealth of interpretation and discussion, but perhaps above all, the desire to keep looking for a better, long term, pacifist solution when it comes to proper ways of exercising power, a quest that continues to this day.

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WHEN EQUALITY IS JUST NOT ENOUGH: THE INTERPLAY OF LOVE AND POWER IN SHAKESPEARE'S *THE MERCHANT OF VENICE* AND BRONTË'S *JANE EYRE*

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Abstract: In both works the heroines are exquisite persons who are prepared to go against tradition and willing to accept it, but on their own terms. They do not stop when they achieve equality, as the concept is usually understood in feminist circles, because, as the philosopher John Rawls points out, equality is often very far from justice. They demand full self-realization and the sense of power which they can choose to exercise or not. In the end, both Jane and Portia are not carried away by their newly gained power but distribute it according to Rawlsian principles of fairness to those who, despite the initial equality of chances, have not been fortunate or able to overcome the personal, financial or societal obstacles in their path. The article tries to explore various visions of power and equality and the ways in which the acquisition thereof, or failure to do so, influences the lives of people both on a personal and societal level. The heroines, Portia and Jane, having achieved and sensed the desired level of power and self-realization have no difficulty in accepting their traditional place in society, fully aware, as all the people around them are, that it is because they have chosen to do so and not because they are forced to. That feeling of latent power, which does not strive to turn into predominance, as well as the achieved level of self-realization seem to ensure the long term happiness of both marriages. Moreover, the behaviour of the two heroines, if replicated on a larger scale, provides a good recipe for the mutually advantageous coexistence of classes and a means of repairing many societal wrongs arising within every society even if the utilitarian initial equality of chances has been achieved.

Key Words: William Shakespeare, Charlotte Brontë, John Rawls, love, power, equality, justice, self-realization, utilitarianism.

Although there is a great time difference between *The Merchant of Venice* and *Jane Eyre*, they seem to share one common trait: they both try to go a little beyond appearance or mere legality where women's rights and attitudes toward equality and power are concerned. At certain points in both works the situation for female characters seems to be satisfactory, especially if the historical frame into which the plots are set is borne in mind, but both Portia and Jane, the two main female protagonists, want more. They are not satisfied with the roles of seemingly happily married women who appear to have a bright future and who will most probably be treated well by their husbands. The

heroines refuse to be at the mercy of their husbands even if their husbands appear to be well-bred, loving, and generous people. They do not want just to be treated well; they want an active role in the relationship, demanding free will and full responsibility in making decisions. The mere appearance of equality is just not good enough because, as the works of the political philosopher John Rawls suggest, nominal equality is often very far from fairness and justice. Consequently, Portia and Jane require power just for the sake of it, but what makes the two heroines remarkable is the fact that they are neither corrupted nor changed by the power they have won. Such a turn of events is exceptionally rare because there are not so many people, even among literary characters, who are not corrupted by the awareness of unlimited power, and who redistribute and use the achieved power for the benefit of *the least advantaged*, as Rawls phrases it. The two heroines both acquire and handle power in a noteworthy way proving thereby *in practice* that Rawlsian precepts of justice as fairness can be a viable way of correcting many wrongs in the societal structure, especially in our time of rampant capitalism which seems to breed blatant inequalities despite the nominal equality of chances. This article will investigate the interrelations between the two literary works in question and then analyze them in the light of the philosophical views of John Rawls, attempting to identify his philosophical precepts in the actions of the two heroines, who seem to embody many of them.

Similarities between the two heroines are revealed by the way they fight obstacles which society and tradition put in front of them. Their unenviable position is succinctly summed up by Portia, who describes the awkwardness of her situation by saying that “the will of a living daughter” is “curbed by the will of a dead father” (*Measure for Measure*, 1.2.6). Her father’s dying wish represents social conventions and ways of conduct which do not allow much freedom where young women and their marriages are concerned. Portia does not have much choice in selecting her future husband. Whoever picks the right box will win her hand and she is forced to accept that arrangement. She has a hard time bearing the decree issued by her father who most certainly was a good man and who loved her very much. Portia suffers because she obeys her late father but Jane Eyre, quite to the contrary, suffers because her father’s wishes are not respected after his death. What is important here is the fact that the destinies of both heroines are shaped by someone else’s decrees. Jane’s life is a much sadder story than Portia’s but, as it is evidently presented in Shakespeare’s play, even a happy turn of events, as in Portia’s case, cannot result in a happy marital life if one is not appreciated enough and seriously counted on when problematic situations in life arise.

Namely, before her destiny is settled by the lottery arranged by his father, Portia secretly wishes that Bassanio, the young nobleman from Venice, may become her husband. The problem is that he is the third in the line of

contenders and she has little or no way of influencing their choices. Eventually, things turn out more than well. The first two suitors make wrong choices and Bassanio chooses the lead casket which entitles him to marry Portia. Now Portia seems to have everything: she is young, beautiful, rich, respected and has a good and noble husband. She seems to have it all, but then the letter from Antonio, Bassanio's friend, comes. By means of that letter Antonio informs his friend that Shylock, the Jew, wants a pound of his flesh as repayment for the unreturned loan that Bassanio has taken in Antonio's name. Bassanio makes urgent preparations to leave for Venice to help his friend and Portia gives him enough money to repay the debt three times over. This brings the reader to the key issue of the play as far as Portia's position is concerned. When the news arrives it never occurs to Bassanio that his wife, Portia, could be of any help in solving that problem, except for the money she possesses, and that money is basically her father's money. Apparently, when the situation becomes serious all the people involved seem to think that Portia does not have in her anything that could contribute to the solution of the problem. The idea that his wife could be of invaluable help while solving the incident in question never crosses her husband's mind. He unhesitatingly leaves her out of all plans and basically instructs her to sit at home and pray while the situation is resolved. She is just to be informed about the outcome of the trial. Bassanio forgets the statement he made after reading the note contained in the lead casket, in which he said that he came by her leave "to give and to receive" (*Measure for Measure*, 3.2.138).

However, Portia is not prepared to sit and wait. She decides to take an active role in the matter and prove to her husband that she is not to be underestimated. She immediately replies to him, without disclosing her intentions, that she demands at least half of the burden, if not more. She says, "I am half yourself / and I must freely have the half of anything / that this same paper brings you" (*Measure for Measure*, 3.2.247-9). And she manages to put her plan through in a stupendous way so that everyone is stunned when the truth is finally revealed. She feels underappreciated and that sense of being considered incompetent and undervalued is beautifully illustrated by the episode with the *lost* ring. Portia expresses her disappointment by saying, "If you had known the virtue of the ring / or half her worthiness that gave the ring / or your own honour to contain the ring / you would not then have parted with the ring" (*Measure for Measure*, 5.1.199-202). A more direct reproach and demand for full appreciation and recognition is hard to imagine. She seems to be cleverer than most of the men present at the trial and more merciful, so that during the trial no one equals her in cunning, foresight and Christian virtues. After the trial there is no way back. She has proved her value and it is impossible to imagine a future in which Bassanio would leave her out of important matters

just because she is a woman. She rejects all popular notions of the expected female behavior and imagined male supremacy in important matters.

Jane Eyre has to fight a similar battle, although her starting position is, it must be admitted, considerably tougher than Portia's. While Portia has always had a good life, limited in some aspects but luxurious in others, Jane has always been forced to be self-reliant and to fight for everything. She seems to have been born under an unlucky star. She has no protection, no love, no money, and no friends, which forces her to struggle and to develop her personality to the full extent. While she fights her own personal defects and the obstacles unmerciful destiny has placed in front of her she receives no gifts. She has to fight for everything, which she does. She wins some true friends (Helen Burns and the Rivers sisters), she completes her education, she acquires employment and eventually, she wins the love of her life. When she has become capable of controlling her own destiny that very destiny shows a kinder side and even provides a few presents for the poor girl.

Her life story seems to be an allegory of the whole female rights movement. In her youth she is completely in the power of others. She is young and insecure. She feels that she deserves more but she is not confident that she will ever achieve it and therefore she often has outbursts of desperate emotions and displays of unacceptable behavior. As the novel progresses she becomes stronger, better educated and gains self-confidence, which results in better manners and better self control. She seems to be able to find the golden middle between Christian humility, self consciousness and stoicism, which forces all her future acquaintances to respect her. Her development starts when she enters Lowood school and is introduced to the girl Helen Burns and their teacher Miss Temple. Her new acquaintances are open-minded and independent spirits who try to make the most out of all life situations and who do not allow anyone to control their thoughts. Jane tries to *steal* as many personal qualities as she can from her new friends and thereby patch up evident flaws in her own character. She transforms her personality from a radical revolutionary who was proudly standing at the edge of the society to someone who rebels within the system but does not try to destroy the existing world in order to build a supposedly better and a more just one. As she implements more and more personal characteristics of her two friends she changes from a person always prepared to oppose and destroy into a person ready to build and to improve, knowing that radical revolutions rarely result in fruitful improvements. She integrates herself into society but always remains critical of it and aware of the possibilities for improvement. Her social aptness rises so that she skillfully manages to walk the thin line which enables her to change and improve without detrimentally influencing and radically changing her surroundings. The zealous St. John, her friend and cousin, recognizes traces of radicalism and fanaticism in her, which are very similar to the traits of his own personality, and, consequently, he tries

to use such parallels as arguments for taking her as his wife to his missionary expedition. However, Jane has managed to develop another side of her personality which enables her to bend and to conform to social norms in a measure that is beneficial both to her and others. She sums up the end of her maturation and the gaining of complete self assertion and independency in the following paragraph:

I broke from St. John, who had followed, and would have detained me. It was my time to assume ascendancy. My powers were in play and in force. I told him to forbear question or remark; I desired him to leave me: I must and would be alone. He obeyed at once. Where there is energy to command well enough, obedience never fails. (Brontë 358)

Portia's and Jane's struggles for full recognition, acceptance and empowerment exhibit two uncommon and rarely encountered traits. The first of them is the way they conduct it and the second one is their subsequent behavior. While endeavoring to prove their competence and worth they do not approach society and the system *as common revolutionaries do*, i.e. from the outside, trying to overthrow the system and empower new masters. On the contrary, they work *within the system*, as if following Marie Lu's precept, "If you want to rebel, you should rebel from inside the system. That's much more powerful than rebelling outside the system" (192). The two of them balance so delicately between tradition and the need for change and innovation, and this eternal interplay between stability and constant flux, both of which are necessary for the development and sustenance of humanity, is poignantly depicted by Hannah Arendt, who says,

Man's urge for change and his need for stability have always balanced and checked each other, and our current vocabulary, which distinguishes between two factions, the progressives and the conservatives, indicates a state of affairs in which this balance has been thrown out of order. No civilization – the man-made artefact to house successive generations – would ever have been possible without a framework of stability, to provide the wherein for the flux of change. (79)

The two heroines and the philosopher John Rawls function within their respective *worlds* in a very similar way. All of them are revolutionaries in their individual ways but their revolutions and their immediate influence are deliberately restricted to the small worlds they inhabit. Jane and Portia share an undeniably feminist background but their feminism is not militant and aggressive. They do not try to change the whole world and to convince all the people that women are underappreciated and denied some basic rights freely

offered to their male counterparts just because they were *lucky* to be born male. On the contrary, the two of them try to set the matters straight in their *small worlds* and improve the lives of the people they live among, leaving *cosmic* battles aside. John Rawls chose to act in the same manner. His philosophical views are in almost complete opposition to the prevailing views propagated by utilitarianism and modern capitalism, and conversely, one would expect a bitter public fight against *the greedy profiteers* using all the media at the disposal to a 20th century philosopher who has important things to say. Ben Rogers describes the peculiar nature and characteristic magnitude of Rawls's success and influence in the following passage:

Since the appearance of Rawls's epoch-making *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, he has been acknowledged as America's – perhaps the world's – leading political philosopher. On a conservative estimate, there are now about 5,000 books or articles that deal with it, at least in part. Where once the foundations of western civilisation went from Plato to Freud, nowadays it is from Plato to Rawls. (n.p.)

Yet, Rawls has remained a relatively unknown figure outside academic circles. Nevertheless, among the experts in the field of political philosophy, i.e. *in his – world*, Rawls is an unavoidable figure and his views clearly define the terms of discussion, whether one agrees with them or not. The two heroines, Jane and Portia follow the same pattern of behavior. They set things indubitably straight in their respective *small worlds*, among the people willing and capable of understanding their subtle but evidently revolutionary efforts. Both of them are perfectly aware that if they made a public fuss about feminist issues their personal happiness would be ruined – they would experience humiliation and disgrace and their destinies would turn into a version of *The Taming of the Shrew* because, as Upton Sinclair writes, “it is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it” (109). Consequently, being aware that their surroundings are not ripe for change at that point of time, both Rawls and the two heroines do the only thing possible – they try to irrevocably change their respective *small worlds* and hope that the *positive ripples*, possibly coming from other directions as well, will eventually do the rest. As Max Planck has observed “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it” (33-34). John Rawls and the two heroines are determined to do everything they possibly can within their society circles and hope that the *ripples* influencing both contemporary and future generations will do the rest.

As can be easily perceived from their respective life stories, the two heroines share very similar patterns of behavior, a similar vision of feminism and

female rights, and, furthermore, their attitude toward power exhibits numerous common points. However, the similarities between *The Merchant of Venice* and *Jane Eyre* are not exhausted with Jane and Portia. If Shylock's famous speech about the common nature of all people is compared with the statement uttered by the offended Jane when she thought that Mr Rochester was mocking her with his marriage offer, the underlying common background is conspicuously present. Shylock asks both himself and the others,

I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not
a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed
with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the
same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by
the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do
we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us,
do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we
are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that. (*The Merchant of Venice*, 3.1.46-53)

Jane's speech bears a striking resemblance. She asks Mr Rochester,

Do you think I am an automaton? – a machine without feelings? and can
bear to have my morsel of bread snatched from my lips, and my drop of
living water dashed from my cup? Do you think, because I am poor,
obscure, plain, and little, I am soulless and heartless? You think wrong!
– I have as much soul as you – and full as much heart! And if God had
gifted me with some beauty and much wealth, I should have made it as
hard for you to leave me, as it is now for me to leave you. I am not
talking to you now through the medium of custom, conventionalities,
nor even of mortal flesh: it is my spirit that addresses your spirit; just as
if both had passed through the grave, and we stood at God's feet, equal
– as we are! (Brontë 215-6)

The first part of Shylock's speech is very righteous, truthful and convincing, but his subsequent behavior, ensuing after those undeniably true words, creates a clear distinction between him and the two heroines. While he is not in power, he clearly and convincingly differentiates between the right and wrong but when he has become empowered, when he thinks that he has unquestionable control over Antonio's destiny, he becomes even worse than his *masters*, i.e. those who he has been accusing of their misuse of authority and power. Not only has he become like them but he has outclassed their ruthlessness by far. His authority would be much harder to bear than the authority of those whom he had been complaining of. Unlike Shylock, who

unfortunately represents the highest percentage of people, the two heroines exhibit a rarely encountered trait – they thirst for power, but they are not detrimentally influenced by it. Although Lord Acton perspicaciously notes, “power tends to corrupt; and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” (xi) the two heroines are not detrimentally affected by the freshly gained sense of power. Once they have proved their worth and unquestionably positioned themselves as forces never to be underestimated within their social circles, their true worthiness is revealed because it is the moment when most people fail, when they betray their earlier propagated ideals and become just like those they were fighting against. Hannah Arendt explains this phenomenon by explicating the original meaning of the word *revolution*.

In the seventeenth century, where we find the word for the first time as a political term, the metaphoric content was even closer to the original meaning of the word, for it was used for a movement of revolving back to some pre-established point and, by implication, of swinging back into a preordained order. Thus, the word was first used not when what we call a revolution broke out in England and Cromwell rose to the first revolutionary dictatorship, but on the contrary, in 1660, after the overthrow of the Rump Parliament and at the occasion of the restoration of the monarchy. (42-43)

This phenomenon has been repeated on a daily basis around the globe both in everyday personal situations and in historical events of global magnitude. Revolutionaries most usually end up either as failed rebels or as new masters, as Albert Camus vividly depicts in his *The Rebel*. Camus says that “the slave begins by demanding justice and ends by wanting to wear a crown. He must dominate in his turn” (24). Neither Jane nor Portia fall into this trap. They want power for the sake of feeling good, because they want to be appreciated and, in almost equal measure, which is extraordinarily rare, they want power for the benefit of others. The two heroines sincerely want, as Portia says to Bassanio, “to give and to receive” (*The Merchant of Venice*, 3.2.138). They do not forget their past, the time when they were among the *least advantaged* ones, to use Rawls’s terminology, and they redistribute the newly gained power in such a way that the small world they inhabit, the circle of their friends and acquaintances does not experience any new masters, but a redistribution of power according to Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness.

The mentioned idea of justice as fairness, which will be explained in more detail in the next paragraphs, seems to be so intuitive and close to everyone but, up to the present point, despite being logical and intuitive, it has not taken hold in any society since the rise of civilization. It is possible to imagine society organized on such principles at pre-civilizational times but not

afterwards. Justice as fairness and civilization seem to have been mutually exclusive. The divine right of kings to rule, based on various religious concepts and analogies, Hobbes's theory of society, based on the greed inherent in every human being or Locke's property related political theory have been present since the first civilized societies despite being far more illogical than Rawls's vision of justice, but the two heroines undeniably show that a spark of such thinking has always been present. At the point when they have achieved unquestionable power the two heroines stand out and show extraordinary wisdom and strength of character, unhesitatingly and, of course, inadvertently, putting into practice Rawls's most fundamental principles no matter how they contradict the prevailing contemporary logic.

When Jane receives her inheritance she does not doubt for a second that the sum in question should be equally divided among her and her three cousins. This behavior and way of thinking is in direct opposition both with the prevailing custom and the common logic. Namely, people tended to keep their property in one piece, so that only one person, usually the eldest son, could inherit the property. Adam Smith succinctly explains the land inheritance law that was still in power at the time in which the plot of *Jane Eyre* is set.

[W]hen land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one. In those disorderly times, every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace and their leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. (n.p.)

Although Jane has not inherited land, this passage nicely sums up the prevailing logic of the time. What Jane does is in complete opposition to it. She immediately divides the inheritance in four equal shares giving both St. John and his sisters equal chances of pursuing their desires as independent people. In other words, she uses her power to empower them. She justifies her opinion when she says,

I stopped, half suffocated with the thoughts that rose faster than I could receive, comprehend, settle them – thoughts of what might, could, would, and should be, and that ere long. I looked at the blank wall: it seemed a sky thick with ascending stars, – everyone lit me to a purpose

or delight. Those who had saved my life, whom, till this hour, I had loved barrenly, I could now benefit. They were under a yoke, – I could free them: they were scattered, – I could reunite them: the independence, the affluence which was mine, might be theirs too. Were we not four? Twenty thousand pounds shared equally would be five thousand each, justice – enough and to spare: justice would be done, – mutual happiness secured. (Brontë 328-9)

In the same way as she had not deserved former ordeals and losses fortune put in her way earlier, Jane clearly sees that she has not deserved this positive twist of fate, and, unlike most people, she does her best to level things out and distribute the unearned blessings evenly, as she had been wishing to share her earlier sufferings, which she also had not *earned*, with someone else. She acts in the same way when she is blessed by fortune as she would have acted when she was *cursed* by it. Rawls provides a theoretical background for such reasoning when he says that

the initial distribution of assets for any period of time is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies. The existing distribution of income and wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural assets – that is, natural talents and abilities – as these have been developed or left unrealized, and their use favored or disfavored over time by social circumstances and such contingencies as accident and good fortune. Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view. (72)

It is very interesting to note that Rawls's life is marked by such contingencies of fortune, some of which could be interpreted as blessings and others as terrible incidents. Rawls's brother, for example died, due to an illness he contracted from John. Another incident which placed additional burden on his sensitive conscience happened while he was fighting in World War II. Rawls was assigned to fight in a battle in Japan where he would have almost certainly been killed because all the odds were against his regiment but, *fortunately*, Truman's government decided to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Rawls's life had been saved in such a horrifying way that it irrevocably marked his worldview and philosophy. Being born into a wealthy and educated family, excellent possibilities of education and improvement offered by the positive environment around him and his life being saved many times without *being earned* on his part in any way convinced Rawls that the primary role of all state and social institutions is and always should be to level such contingencies out and provide a fair equality of chances to everyone disregarding origins,

inheritance, connections, environment and other factors which detrimentally distort the nominal equality of chances propagated by utilitarianism and capitalism.

Jane Eyre's life is marked by numerous contingencies outside her power but when her destiny takes a turn for the better she is wise enough not to forget how things were while fortune did not favor her, so, now, when circumstances have changed, she acts as if deciding behind what Rawls calls a *veil of ignorance*. The veil of ignorance is Rawls's version of the *original position* present in all contractarian social theories like Hobbes's or Locke's. Unlike Hobbes, Rawls does not claim that his original state existed at any point of time but immediately states that it is a thought experiment which is supposed to prove the inherent morality in every human being provided that people are made unaware or ignorant of their origins, status, gender, social or religious values etc. Rawls claims that people tend to be egalitarian if they are not aware of their own interests and ends. The rules of conduct decreed under the veil of ignorance would nullify most of the inequalities arising from the undeserved contingencies like inherited wealth, influential connections, good health, natural talents etc. A slave owner will have a completely different logic of thinking from his slaves for example but, if the rules of conduct were defined under the veil of ignorance, one would not know whether he/she would end up as a slave or as a slave owner so everyone would make sure that the worst option is not so bad in case it proves it to be their destiny. While putting it in practice, this precept requires a person to clearly differentiate between the *rational* and the *reasonable*. In his book on Rawls, Paul Graham says that

His [Rawls's] method presupposes a distinction between the rational and the reasonable. Pure "rationality" involves simply assessing a particular political system from one's own standpoint: what do I get out of this system compared with any alternative? Reasonableness requires viewing a political system from the standpoint of each person who will be affected by it. I have to put myself in the shoes of another person and ask myself whether, if I were that person, I would agree to this system rather than some alternative. Rawls works this idea up into a thought-experiment: we are to assess alternative conceptions of justice from the "original position." The most important feature of the original position is the denial of knowledge of your identity – you choose principles of justice without knowing what position you occupy in society. Indeed, you do not know even your particular society. (20)

Jane does not forget the past and acts as if she had been asked to make the same decision ten years earlier when she was what Rawls calls the least advantaged person. She is not carried away by her newly gained power and

ability to influence someone else's destiny for the better or for worse. She *walks in the shoes of her cousins* and reaches a decision which is a far cry from the legally advisable option. She is legally entitled to inherit all the money in question and *justice*, i.e. every court, would be supportive of her decision. It seems like the right thing to do – a rational thing to do, and such behaviour, as everyone *normal* would say, would be more than just considering what she had experienced before receiving the inheritance, but that is not what Rawls calls *justice as fairness* or *distributive justice*. After years of suffering and poverty Jane is offered a chance to secure her future for the rest of her life and have no financial worries ever again by taking only what is hers in the eyes of the law, church and in the eyes of the whole world. However, it never occurs to her to act in that manner. Once when she has acquired the power to change the destiny of her cousins, she immediately seizes the opportunity and empowers them by reducing her own amount of that very *power*. In a similar way, when she returns to the blind and partly impoverished Mr Rochester as a rich heiress and an independent woman in every sense of the word she unhesitatingly approaches him by saying,

I will be your neighbour, your nurse, your housekeeper. I find you lonely: I will be your companion – to read to you, to walk with you, to sit with you, to wait on you, to be eyes and hands to you. Cease to look so melancholy, my dear master; you shall not be left desolate, so long as I live. (Brontë 370)

She provides a perfect example of what Rawls calls *reasonable behaviour*, examples of which can be found in *The Merchant of Venice* as well.

This way of thinking, conducted under the *veil of ignorance* ensures excluding one's own present interests, demands a complete disregard of one's social status, class, political party, ancestry etc. and acting in a way one would act if he/she was the least advantaged person in the situation in question. Rawls convincingly claims that such a way of thinking is the only path toward a just and fair society because only such behaviour, unburdened and unbiased by one's present interests, reveals the egalitarian morality inherent in all people. Shakespeare's famous Jew can never escape the yoke of selfish rationality in Rawls's sense of the word. He constantly seeks to satisfy his own prospective ends, but Portia, or the young judge, repeatedly tries to induce Shylock to start thinking *reasonably*, in Rawls's terms. Shylock's behaviour serves as a powerful contrast to Jane Eyre's handling of power. The overwhelmingly poisoning influence of power does not allow the unfortunate Jew to imagine a potential situation in which the roles and the possession of power could be reversed.

Throughout the whole trial, Shakespeare confronts the reader/the audience with the dichotomies between the *reasonable* and the *rational* and

with the potential opposition between legality and justice. As Shylock repeatedly says, law certainly is on his side, but it is plain that in that case justice does not reside where the law does. Since Shylock is incapable of thinking in Rawlsian terms, it is the job of Antonio and the young judge to teach him. The young judge teaches the rigid Jew the ambivalent nature of justice and proves to him that he is “most ignorant of the things he is most assured” of (*Measure for Measure*, 2.2.123). Eventually, he perceives that what Rawls calls *justice as fairness*, although not perfect in itself, is much closer to the ideal of justice than his stiff legality. As if desiring to prove that Rawls’s philosophy is not only exceptionally humane but that it is *doable in practice* as well, Antonio, after the trial, when he controls a half of Shylock’s property, forces the Jew to bestow it upon his daughter and son-in-law because they appeared to be the least well-off or the least advantaged ones at that point of time. His act resembles Jane’s because he, just like she does, completely disregards legality and acts according to Rawls’s concept of distributive justice. That concept is often referred to as *maximin principle* which is supposed to ensure that every just law or regulation should benefit the least advantaged. If a concept, a law or a practice increases efficiency, ensures profit, provides comfort or other benefits even to the majority of people, as *regular* utilitarianism advocates, but it exacerbates the position of those who are worst-off, even if they are in the minority, Rawls would proclaim it unjust and unfair, and so do Antonio and Portia in *The Merchant of Venice* and Jane in *Jane Eyre*. Jane deliberately worsens her financial situation in order to redistribute the fortune more justly among those who are temporarily the worst-off and Antonio does the same. Even in his unenviable financial situation, aware that his ships have sunk and are therefore lost to him, he rejects the Jew’s fortune in favour of those who should have got it, had the issue been decided upon under the *veil of ignorance*. If no one knew their own identities, positions and the final outcome they would most certainly agree that the fairest thing would be for the daughter and the son-in-law to inherit the fortune left by a man who had no other relatives. Even Shylock would agree to this without any reproach, were he stripped of his identity and origins and forced to investigate the issue from an objective, unbiased point of view. However, his rationality, his rigid embeddedness in his origins, business and tradition control his behaviour and thinking completely and do not allow him to analyse issues from the perspective of others, not even through the eyes of his own child.

It is easy to notice that some of the statements or actions of the two heroines may be interchanged without ruining the sense and the plausibility of the text around them. Both of them have gained a decent status in the society but they want more. They want the missing part which is noticeable only to them, in the quietness of their homes, in the depths of their souls. Being equal in everything and being recognized and appreciated as equal by their partners is

the most important issue for both of them. The feeling and their husband's constant awareness of their latent power is more than enough for them. They are willing to serve, to call their husbands masters or kings provided that their partners sense and appreciate their inherent power. Inadvertently, both of the heroines follow Rawls's precepts concerning power and justice. When feeling empowered Portia and Jane feel extremely good but, what is extraordinary is the fact that the increase in their power is immediately followed by the increase in the average amount of happiness and justice in their respective *small worlds*, which is an astoundingly rare phenomenon. Without following Rawls's precepts an increase in someone's power or wealth is usually followed or made possible by a simultaneous increase in unhappiness, injustice and misery in other people. The two heroines use their power in such a way that it makes happier not only them but most of the people around them. Neither of them is concerned about the appearance of things. They do not demand that the whole society necessarily sees public signs of their worth, independence and esteem. Just as Rawls, fully aware that they cannot change the whole world at once, they take care of matters within their small worlds and enable thereby both themselves and their partners and friends to live happier and more fulfilled lives. The sense that they are needed, the awareness of their partners that they must be counted on and relied upon in the most extraordinary situations is what they desperately need. Once this condition has been fulfilled they do not hesitate to surrender themselves to their husbands always knowing that they do things of their own free will and not because it is required by the commanding personalities of their husbands or by outdated social conventions.

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KADA JEDNAKOST NIJE DOVOLJNA – UZAJAMNI UTJECAJ LJUBAVI I MOĆI U SHAKESPEAREOVOM MLETAČKOM TRGOVCU I JANE EYRE CHARLOTTE BRONTË

U oba djela glavne junakinje su predstavljene kao izuzetne osobe spremne boriti se protiv tradicije, ali ju i prihvatiti pod svojim uvjetima. Kada postignu jednakost, kako se ona obično shvaća u feminističkim krugovima, one se ne zaustavljaju na tome jer, kao što ističe filozof John Rawls, jednakost je vrlo često jako daleko od pravednosti. One zahtijevaju potpunu samoaktualizaciju i osjećaj moći kojega će one po svojoj volji iskoristiti u praksi ili ne. Nakon što je konačnici dosegnu, ni Jane ni Portia ne podliježu njenom negativnom utjecaju, nego stečenu moć redistribuiraju prema Rawlsovim principima pravde zasnovane na moralnom poštenju. U praksi to znači njenu raspodjelu među onima koji nisu bili dovoljno sretni ili sposobni izboriti se sa osobnim, financijskim i društvenim poteškoćama koje je život stavio pred njih. Članak pokušava istražiti različite vizije moći i jednakosti, i na osobnoj i na društvenoj razini, te različite načine na koje se one mogu dostići, izgubiti i, kao možda najvažnije, pravedno raspodijeliti. Kako Jane tako i Portia, nakon što dosegnu željenu razinu moći, bez problema prihvaćaju svoje tradicionalno mjesto u društvu, u potpunosti svjesne, kao i ljudi oko njih, da to čine po vlastitom izboru, a ne zbog utjecaja ili prisile okoline. Taj osjećaj latentne moći, koji nikada ne teži prijeći u izrazitu dominaciju, kao i zadovoljavajući stupanj samoaktualizacije osiguravaju trajnost i sreću u oba braka. K tome, ponašanje glavnih junakinja, ukoliko bi se repliciralo na široj društvenoj razini, moglo bi poslužiti kao pouzdan recept za uspješno koegzistiranje različitih klasa i kao sredstvo ispravljanja brojnih društvenih nepravdi prisutnih u svakome društvu, čak i ako je postignuta nominalna početna jednakost među ljudima na kojoj inzistira utilitarizam.

Ključne riječi: William Shakespeare, Charlotte Brontë, John Rawls, ljubav, moć, jednakost, pravda, samoaktualizacija, utilitarizam.

THE DISCOURSE OF POWER IN POPULAR FICTION: A CASE STUDY OF CHARLAINE HARRIS' *DEAD UNTIL DARK*

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Abstract: This paper examines how the terms *power as domination* and *power as capacity* can be applied to reading popular fiction, in particular to cross-genre hybrids such as Charlaine Harris' *Dead Until Dark* (2001). The term *power as domination* refers to coercive power or power over, which in popular fiction works through its form and fandom/readership. The principles of coercive power in Harris' novel are visible in its cross-genre hybridity (mystery-horror-romance), which attracts different types of fans/readers who, in its multi-generic definition, find their own type of empowerment. The term *power as capacity* connotes coactive power or power with as well as power to. This type of power is in popular fiction present in specific structural elements of popular fiction genres such as characters, narrative voice, resolution, irony, plot, setting, themes, motifs, symbols, etc. Harris' novel thus shows the female protagonist's power to question and subvert (1) racism, sexism, and homophobia in the American South, (2) Southern myths and stereotypes, and (3) the concept of otherness. Sookie Stackhouse's power is also coactive as it is occasionally exercised through either collaboration (mutual empowerment exemplified by her relationship with vampire Bill Compton) or assistance/education (assisted empowerment exemplified by her relation with other supernatural beings). The paper concludes by showing that the discourse of power in popular fiction operates through both its form (*power as domination*) and content (*power as capacity*).

Key Words: power, power as domination, power as capacity, popular fiction, cross-genre hybrid, romance, horror, mystery, Charlaine Harris, *Dead Until Dark*.

This paper is about the ways we tend to think and talk about *power* in literature, in particular popular fiction. To embark on this project, the prevailing academic discourses of power need to be clearly yet briefly articulated. As one of the fundamental concepts in Western social theory, the term power has been explained in relation to different forms it takes as well as resources allowing the exercise of power (Wartenberg 1990; Wrong 1997); some, like Foucault (1980), have focused on "the changing ways that power circulates throughout societies, constructing social institutions as well as individual subjectivities, as it imposes order and discipline in historically specific ways" (Karlberg 2). Foucault's contribution to the modern conception of power also includes the view of power as "productive" (119) rather than repressive – it "doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but [...] it traverses and produces things, it induces

pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse" (119); as "capillary" – it is "a productive network which runs through the whole social body" (119) and "operates at the lowest extremities of the social body in everyday social practices" (Fraser 18); as a phenomenon "anchored in the multiplicity of what he calls 'micropractices,' the social practices that constitute everyday life in modern societies" (Fraser 18) and "interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which [...] it plays at once a conditioning and a conditioned role" (Foucault 142). Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson further assert that power is "a basic force in social relationships" (265) and, it may be argued, the capacity to influence other people (Turner 2). Others have examined the term power from other theoretical points of view. However, a survey of such an extensive and diverse body of views is beyond the scope of this paper. What this paper will take as its theoretical starting point is thus a widespread and widely used distinction between two ways of thinking and talking about power, namely the opposite expressions of *power over* and *power to* (e.g., Connolly 1974; Coser 1976; Dowding 1996; Hartsock 1974 and 1983; Karlberg 2005; Lukes 1986; Macpherson 1973; Pitkin 1972; Wartenberg 1990).

These two models of power have also been known as *power as domination* and *power as capacity*. The first model – *power as domination* – can be traced back to the most important representatives of social and political thought such as Machiavelli, Weber, Bourdieu, Hobbes, Gramsci, Marx, and Engels. It usually denotes "a situation where an agent exercises relatively stable, ongoing control over the actions of other agents ('agents' taken broadly to mean anything from individual persons, to social groups, to organizations and institutions)" (Dowding 203) or, more generally, "causing behavior on the part of others" (Dowding 521). As such, *power as domination* is always seen as placed within social structures, constant, actual, potential, taken for granted since it refers to certain kinds of social and interpersonal relationships and processes of which the dominated are unconscious or only partially conscious. The concept of *power as domination* thus raises the issues of conflict, influence, male privilege, coercion, social control, of the idea that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Karlberg 3) thus preventing him/her from identifying his/her interests.

Often unacknowledged and ignored by social and political theorists, the second model of power – *power as capacity* – implies the existence of power as "transformative capacity" or "the capacity to achieve outcomes" (Giddens 257); as the "capacity to produce change," which includes activities such as "nurturing" and "empowering others" (Baker Miller 1-2); as

cooperation and reciprocity, friendship and collective identity, the growth of a sense of community, the ability to create and pursue constructive images of the future together, and the belief that one's

own welfare is increased through an increase in the welfare of others. (Karlberg 8)

As such, *power as capacity* refers to human power, a capability/ability/ableness consisting of internal powers brought into being by external conditions “to cause certain outcomes or states of affairs” (Dowding 521). It is thus dispositional – about “the capacity actors possess to bring about specific outcomes” (Dowding 521), individual – the property of persons or groups, and consensual.

When applied to literature, in our case popular fiction i.e. Charlaine Harris’ *Dead Until Dark* (2001), the term *power as domination/coercive power/power over* works through its form and readership/fandom. In Harris’ novel, the principles of coercive power are visible in its cross-genre hybridity (mystery-horror-romance), which attracts different types of fans/readers who are dominated by the power of particular popular fiction genres, as well as in its multi-generic definition through which fans/readers find their own type of empowerment. The term *power as capacity/coactive power/power to* is in popular fiction present in the specific structural elements of popular fiction genres such as characters, narrative voice, symbols, irony, plot, resolution, setting, themes, motifs, etc. Harris’ novel thus shows the female protagonist’s power to question and subvert (1) racism, sexism, and homophobia in the American South, (2) Southern myths and stereotypes, and (3) the concept of otherness. Let’s further advance our exploration of these concepts by articulating them through the analysis and interpretation of *Dead Until Dark*.

Dead Until Dark and the Concept of Power as Domination

As already argued, in popular fiction the concept of *power as domination* operates through the form/genre and the fandom/readership. Harris’ *Dead Until Dark* is a cross-genre hybrid as it incorporates the elements of mystery, romance, and horror. As mystery, *Dead Until Dark* mixes an element of crime (the murders of women sexually associated with vampires) with an element of detection (as “a crime-solving protagonist who has no official standing, either as an officer of the law or as a paid private detective,” Sookie Stackhouse is “drawn into the process of solving the crime” (Herald 168) as her brother Jason is the prime suspect) and invites readers to help solve the puzzle. Despite a considerable number of obstacles including the inability to access the murder scenes and the evidence as well as the lack of resources (e.g. the finances and scientific methodologies used in modern investigation), Sookie Stackhouse offers the answer to the question *whodunit?* by working as an “independent operator who answers only to” herself, by not being bound by “any restrictions, including the law” and by having time “to investigate a case,

and [...] focus all of her attention on it while ignoring the rest of the world” (Niebuhr 32).

Being also romance – “a work of prose fiction that tells the story of the courtship and betrothal of one or more heroines” (Regis 14), Harris’ novel depicts the development of the love relationship between one woman – Sookie Stackhouse and one *man* – Bill Compton, the vampire. Pamela Regis claims that all romance fiction contains eight essential elements which are typical for the genre: the society which heroine and hero must confront when courting; the meeting between heroine and hero; the barrier to the union of heroine and hero; their mutual attraction; the declaration of love between heroine and hero; the point of ritual death (the moment in the novel when it seems impossible for heroine and hero to reconcile); the recognition by heroine and hero of the means to overcome the barrier; and the betrothal (30-38). In addition to those eight elements, Regis lists three accidental elements that may or may not appear in romance novels: wedding, dance or fete; the exile of a scapegoat character, and the conversion of a bad or evil character (38-39). Harris uses many, if not all, of these key and/or additional romance elements¹⁶ in the construction of the compelling courtship story between Sookie Stackhouse and Bill Compton thus complementing and furthering the novel’s corresponding elements of mystery and horror. It is interesting to note that Harris also employs the narrative structure of the ideal romance (Radway 134):

1. The heroine’s social identity is destroyed.
2. The heroine reacts antagonistically to an aristocratic male.
3. The aristocratic male responds ambiguously to the heroine.
4. The heroine interprets the hero’s behavior as evidence of a purely sexual interest in her.

¹⁶ The society that Sookie and Bill must confront while courting is the Bon Temps society; this society is in many ways flawed and tries to separate the heroine and hero. Sookie and Bill first meet at Merlotte’s, a bar where Sookie works. The bar patrons reflect the views of the Bon Temps society on vampires and human-vampire relationships thus imposing the barrier to Sookie and Bill’s union. At the same time, the barrier is also introduced through a number of prejudices the vampire society has about humans and vampire-human relationships. Occasionally, Sookie and Bill act as the barrier to their union as they have different ideas about courtship, sex, and gender roles. Sookie and Bill are immediately attracted to one another mostly because they can sense their mutual otherness (Sookie cannot read Bill’s mind and Bill cannot glamour her) and because Sookie saves Bill’s life when he is attacked by the Rattrays. Sookie and Bill declare their love separately. The point of ritual death involves both Sookie’s dealings with the intricacies of the vampire society and her near-death when she confronts Rene Lenier, a mad fang-banger murderer. Sookie literally removes the barrier by almost killing Rene single-handedly and by confronting the Bon Temps society and their prejudices. At the end of the novel, there is a promise of a stable relationship between Sookie and Bill. In addition to the eight key elements, Harris uses the two additional romance elements: (1) wedding, dance or fete: there are several episodes depicting Sookie and Bill going out to dinners, bars, historical society meeting, etc., and (2) the scapegoat exiled: Rene Lenier, who opposes any kind of human-vampire relationship, is arrested at the end of the novel.

5. The heroine responds to the hero's behavior with anger or coldness.
6. The hero retaliates by punishing the heroine.
7. The heroine and hero are physically and/or emotionally separated.
8. The hero treats the heroine tenderly.
9. The heroine responds warmly to the hero's act of tenderness.
10. The heroine reinterprets the hero's ambiguous behavior as the product of previous hurt.
11. The hero proposes/openly declares his love for/demonstrates his unwavering commitment to the heroine with a supreme act of tenderness.
12. The heroine responds sexually and emotionally.
13. The heroine's identity is restored.¹⁷

As horror – the genre that “seeks to inspire a unique emotional state in its reader – fear” and is “more properly seen in light of what it *does* than what it *is*” (Herald 420), but can also be defined in terms of content as stories about “monsters and the supernatural – tales of vampires, werewolves, haunting, and demonic possession,” (Herald 420) *Dead Until Dark*, through its plot about vampires that just “came out of the coffin” (Harris 1) uses typical horror elements such as the supernatural, vampires, shape-shifting, and telepathy thus evoking, at least in those weak-hearted, (faint) feelings of terror, a purely psychological type of fear, and horror, which includes a physical dimension. Not only are these feelings brought into being by the plot of *Dead Until Dark* but also through its use of conventional horror elements: (1) physical and/or

¹⁷ Sookie and Bill's courtship story thus develops following the afore-mentioned pattern:

1. Sookie is considered mentally impaired, or crazy, by the citizens of Bon Temps because of her telepathic abilities.
2. Despite the attraction and the inability to read Bill's mind, Sookie cannot accept his overprotective behavior.
3. Despite the attraction and the inability to glamour her, Bill cannot accept the fact that Sookie saved his life and does not need his protection.
4. Sookie interprets Bill's interest in her as sexual as well as nutritional.
5. Sookie reacts angrily to Bill's overprotective behavior and his treatment of her as a vampire pet.
6. Bill keeps his views, attitudes, and behavior unchanged.
7. The differences in their expectations of each other keep Sookie and Bill emotionally and physically separated.
8. After her grandmother's murder, Bill treats Sookie tenderly.
9. Sookie responds warmly to Bill's support.
10. Sookie interprets Bill's former behavior as a part of his vampire nature as well as a part of his old-fashioned ideas about women since he was turned into vampire immediately after the Civil War.
11. Bill expresses his feelings for Sookie.
12. Sookie responds emotionally and sexually: Sookie admits that she loves Bill and loses her virginity to him.
13. Sookie embraces her otherness and learns how to take the best of it.

emotional violence (brutal murders of women sexually or otherwise associated with vampires); (2) suspense in plotting (readers cannot part with the novel as its story is urgent and the characters are believable); (3) the use of ruined or isolated settings (as an overall setting, Bon Temps is an isolated little town in Louisiana; as a specific setting, Bill's home is a ruined plantation mansion); (4) the atmosphere of moral gloom and physical decay (this is achieved by the society's attitude to vampire-human relationships as morally corrupt because of the view of vampires as unnatural); (5) the vision of a world divided between powers of darkness and light (the vision of (1) vampires as literal and metaphorical representatives of darkness and decay: they are alive only during the night and are usually seen as evil as they feed on humans and (2) humans as representatives of light and vitality).

Being a cross-genre hybrid, Harris' novel attracts different kinds of readers. According to Victoria Nelson, there is a huge difference between readers of Literature and readers of popular fiction:

After reading *Moby-Dick* a reader does not feel compelled, in a week or two, to seek out another adventure story with whales in it. Reading Henry James's *Turn of the Screw* or a tale by [Isaac Bashevis] Singer, [Bruno] Schulz, or [Franz] Kafka does not trigger an insatiable hunger for more stories about demons real and possible or men turning into insects. These works are self-fulfilling in some mysterious way; they are inherently satisfying in themselves and can, in time, be re-read with even deeper appreciation for their levels of meaning [...] Reading a murder mystery, in contrast, or a ghost story or a romance – all the genres whose readers are accurately described as “addicts” – is in essence [...] to embark on an endless cycle in which the true catharsis seems oddly displaced, moved forever forward into the future as the reader “devours” story after story. (qtd. in Gelder 41)

Those *addicted* and *devouring* readers are what makes popular fiction coercive, controlling, and, I would like to argue, more powerful than Literature, at least in terms of books sold, downloaded or adapted to movies/TV series. Harris' *Dead Until Dark* is no exception to the rule. Reprinted multiple times after 2001¹⁸ and

¹⁸ On August 19, 2015, Barnes & Noble listed the following reprints of *Dead Until Dark*: Hardcover: San Val, Incorporated 2008; Penguin Group USA 2008; Demco Media 2003; Audio book: Recorded Books 2007; Nook book: Penguin Publishing Group 2001; Paperback: Penguin Publishing Group 2010, 2009, 2008, 2001; Penguin Random House LLC 2010; Gale Group 2004; Gollancz, Victor Limited 2011; Orion 2012; Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 2009, 2008, 2003. All in all, 16 reprints. The list of reprints found on Amazon.com on the same day is more modest: Paperback: Ace 2008, 2010; Kindle edition: Ace 2001; Audio CD: Orion 2009; Audible Audio edition: Orion 2009. All in all, 5 reprints.

having earned at least 20 million dollars as a part of the Southern Vampire series, this novel draws its power by appealing to, or having influence over, different kinds of readers, namely the readers of romance, horror, and mystery.

So, how does *Dead Until Dark* as mystery exercise its power over readers/fans? Mainly through its (1) structure which is based on the following elements: the intriguing crime, the search laced with clues and involving more than one suspect, and the resolution as well as through (2) the main character, Sookie Stackhouse, whose traits make readers/fans fall in love with her, (3) the first person point of view which reveals the intricacies of the plot to readers/fans, (4) tone which ranges from cozy to hard-boiled, (5) pace ranging from slow to fast, (6) different levels of violence, (7) the occasional use of sexually explicit scenes, (8) use of Southern dialect, (9) setting in the contemporary American South, and (10) theme. Some, if not all, of these elements make mystery a kind of fiction that “currently constitutes a third of the fiction published in English worldwide” (Herald 137). As the study “‘Both a Woman and a Complete Professional’: Women Readers and Women’s Hard-boiled Detective Fiction” by Erin A. Smith reveals, this kind of reading mostly appeals to “well educated, middle- and upper-middle-class professionals, with slightly more women readers than men” (Herald 143).

Having put its spell on mystery readers, *Dead Until Dark* continues to work its magic on/exercise its power over romance readers not only through the conventional romance plot but also by choosing the female first person narrator thus enabling the reader, who is a woman, to identify with the narrator-protagonist. The power of *Dead Until Dark* as romance thus lies in the following traits: the woman, Sookie Stackhouse, is the lead character who has power to reject and hurt her hero, vampire Bill Compton; Sookie Stackhouse is the strong character; Bill surrenders to Sookie thus making *Dead Until Dark* a novel of female empowerment; the romantic content of *Dead Until Dark* validates readers’ beliefs and offers them a space of their own.

The last group of readers that Harris’ novel draws are horror readers, i.e. the readers of vampire fiction. Definitely a publishing category in itself, vampire fiction, whose surge has been linked to the 1980s “cultural anxiety about the AIDS epidemic” (Herald 422), finds its readership in *addicts* whose fascination with this subgenre of horror stems from both fear and (sexual) excitement. Needless to say, the TV adaptation of *Dead Until Dark* – the first season of the TV series *True Blood* – has created a vast body of fans and additionally confirmed the idea of coercive pull of popular fiction, its power over cultural trends and tendencies.

Dead Until Dark and the Concept of Power as Capacity

As mentioned in the introductory part of the paper, in popular fiction the concept of *power as capacity* is brought into being through the particular structural elements of popular fiction such as plot, characters, setting, narrative voice, theme, symbols, irony, motifs, etc. Combined together, they helped Charlaine Harris to create the novel whose protagonist Sookie Stackhouse clearly demonstrates her power, or as she calls it – her “gift,” (Harris 7) her “curse” (Harris 7) or her “disability,” (Harris 2) to question and subvert the issues the contemporary South has been struggling with thus challenging the stability of gender, sex, race, and human roles in conservative and patriarchal societies. Her power is coactive as it is occasionally exercised through either collaboration (mutual empowerment exemplified by her relationship with vampire Bill Compton) or assistance/education (assisted empowerment exemplified by her relation with other supernatural beings: shape-shifters, werewolves, werepanthers, demons, witches, other vampires, fairies, etc.).

The first articulation of the *power as capacity* concept occurs when readers are presented with Sookie’s views/reactions on Southern contemporary and past social and cultural issues. Through a vast number of incidents, events, and people she encounters, Sookie links the contemporary “human prejudice against vampires to the history of slavery, racism, sexism, and homophobia in the American South” (Miller). Throughout the novel, the prejudices vampire face mirror those African Americans had to endure during slavery, Reconstruction, and the Jim Crow era. To mention just a few: (1) the taboo against interspecies dating or marriage: “Though most police forces loved having vampires join them on the job, there was a lot of prejudice against vampires on the street, especially as part of a mixed couple” (Harris 127); (2) the limited right to vote: “Bill was going to try to register to vote, absentee ballot” (Harris 177); (3) the insulting and offensive naming practices: “Just then one of the firemen started to laugh, and his companion, too. ‘Southern fried vampires!’ the shorter one hooted to the man who was questioning me. ‘We got us some Southern fried vampires here!’” (Harris 197); (4) the view of vampires as a valuable commodity:

Since vampire blood was supposed to temporarily relieve symptoms of illness and increase sexual potency, kind of like prednisone and Viagra rolled into one, there was a huge black market for genuine, undiluted vampire blood. Where there’s a market there are suppliers; in this case, I’d just learned, the scummy Rat Couple. They’d formerly trapped vampires and drained them, selling the little vials of blood for as much as \$200 apiece. It had been the drug of choice for at least two years now. Some buyers went crazy after drinking pure vampire blood, but that

didn't slow the market any. The drained vampire didn't last long, as a rule. The drainers left the vampires staked or simply dumped them out in the open. When the sun came up, that was all she wrote. (Harris 6-7)

and (5) the Ku Klux Klan-ish treatment of vampires (lynch and arson):

"Can you call this murder, Sam?" He shook his head. "I just don't know, Sookie. Legally, killing the vampires is murder. But you'd have to prove arson first, though I don't think that'd be very hard." We could both smell gasoline. There were men buzzing around the house, climbing here and there, yelling to each other. It didn't appear to me that these men were conducting any serious crime-scene investigation. (Harris 196)

Furthermore, the novel establishes a connection between vampires and homosexuals in terms of marriage and civil rights thus hinting at Southern homophobia. This is best exemplified by the opening credits of *True Blood*, a TV adaptation of the novel, which includes an image of a noticeboard outside a church reading *God Hates Fangs*. By relying on the similarity between the words *fangs* and *fags*, the sign points out the actual prejudice as it echoes the slogan *God Hates Fags* coined by Fred Phelps of Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka. The sign/slogan thus indicates that the church condemns vampires as it does homosexuality and as it once did racial equality. Another prejudice Sookie questions is the "theory" (Harris 2) that vampires are the victims of "a virus that left [...] them apparently dead for a couple of days and thereafter allergic to sunlight, silver, and garlic" (Harris 2) thus linking this *theory* to the *theory* that homosexuality is an illness. Relatedly, the beginning of *Dead Until Dark* mocks the assumption that a vampire, or for that matter a homosexual, can be spotted just from his/her behavior or physical appearance: "And he sat at one of my tables – the vampire. I knew immediately what he was. It amazed me when no one else turned around to stare. They couldn't tell!" (Harris 2). Sookie's last point of reference to the link between vampirism and homosexuality occurs in relation to vampire-human marriages. She often wonders what the marriage between Bill and her would be like despite the fact that vampire-human marriages are not allowed (in *True Blood*, Sookie and Bill plan to get married in Vermont, which is one of the states that allows vampire-human as well as same-sex unions), which reflects the society's view on homosexual unions.

The next cultural and social issue Sookie Stackhouse exercises her power to question is the subversion of Southern myths and stereotypes such as the Southern Gentleman, the Southern Belle, the Southern domestic metaphor, the glory of the Civil War, and the notion of the South as the land of moonlight and magnolias, white columned mansions and planter aristocracy. She shows us that they are *gone with the wind*, the relic of the (not so glorious) past, present

just in the memories of the Descendants of the Glorious Dead, a society at whose meeting Bill, the vampire, shares his, not so glorious, memories of the Civil War:

"Did you fight in the War?"

"Yes."

"I have the feeling you're gonna get mad. But it would make her and her club so happy if you'd tell them a little bit about the War, about what it was really like."

"Club?"

"She belongs to Descendants of the Glorious Dead."

"Glorious dead." The vampire's voice was unreadable, but I could tell, sure enough, he wasn't happy. [...]

"We were in rags and starving." [...]

"[...] we didn't have any blankets and very little food," Bill was saying calmly. "There were many deserters." That was not a favorite fact of the Descendants, but a few of them were nodding in agreement. This account must match what they'd learned in their studies. (Harris 38, 63, 139)

Similarly, Sookie's dates with vampire Bill, who was turned at the end of the Civil War and literally lived the life of a Southern planter and gentleman, demonstrate the obsolescence and outdatedness of the antebellum values and rules of behavior in the contemporary South: Bill can hardly get "used to young ladies with so few clothes on" (Harris 62) and when he eventually dates them, he behaves according to a code of conduct "that performed by anyone else would have seemed phony as hell" (Harris 168). He is also overprotective: "'I'm protecting you,' he said, his voice not quite as neutral as usual. 'Had it occurred to you that I –' [...] 'You – don't need protection' he guessed softly" (Harris 124) thus "citing older ideas about gender roles" (Culver 25) that correspond perfectly with the stereotypical notions of Southern chivalry and Southern domestic metaphor.

The object of a Southern Cavalier's veneration was a Southern Belle. She was lively, little bit vain, rather naïve and "had few tasks other than to be obedient, to ride, to sew, and perhaps to learn reading and writing" (Seidel 6). Her energies and skills were mainly directed to finding and marrying a real Southern gentlemen and "if she was pretty and charming and thus could participate in the process of husband-getting, so much the better" (Seidel 6). Sookie may be just a barmaid¹⁹ but she is also a belle, and proper behavior is

¹⁹ Because of her telepathy Sookie could not concentrate in school, which ruined her chances for higher education. She is thus forced to work as a barmaid in order to be financially independent.

important to her. She goes to church on Sundays, says her grace, berates herself when she calls God's name in vain, prays to God before going to bed,²⁰ and always pays attention to etiquette. Furthermore, Sookie is virginally pure. Not because she did not have the opportunity or enough gentlemen callers (as her grandmother would phrase it), but mainly because her telepathic ability prevented her from dating: "sex, for me, is a disaster. Can you imagine knowing everything your sex partner is thinking? [...] It's chilling to the emotions, believe me. And during sex, there is simply no way to keep a mental guard up" (Harris 28). As soon as she meets Bill, a vampire gentleman who immediately senses her otherness and expresses it by saying: "You're different [...] What are you?" (Harris 15) and whose mind she cannot read, she starts a relationship that excludes the possibility of a husband-hunt (for the simple fact that Bill is a vampire) thus challenging the Southern Belle stereotype.

Lastly, the image of the South as the land of moonlight and magnolias, white columned mansions and planter aristocracy is in Sookie's discourse rendered powerless as the novel is set in Bon Temps (ironically meaning *good times*), a typical Southern rural town, and the only Bon Temps' planter family – the Bellefleurs who "had been around Bon Temps as long as there'd been a Bon Temps" (Harris 95-96) – lives in a dilapidated and crumbling mansion and earns their living as public servants (Andy is a police officer, his sister Portia is a lawyer, and their cousin Terry is a Vietnam war veteran working as a bartender in Sam Merlotte's bar). The only remnant of the aristocratic past are the memories in which Andy and Portia's grandmother lives. In the narrative space of *Dead Until Dark*, the plantation is decayed and ruined, "vampire Bill Compton and Sookie Stackhouse are a twisted and at times subversive version of the Southern Belle and her gentleman. Sookie oscillates between being a 'Buffyesque' character with a lot of courage and strength, saving her vampire and supernatural friends while at the same time seeking constant male protection and companionship" (Kindinger 10).

In addition to the power to question and subvert myths, stereotypes and burning, past and present, social and cultural issues in the South, *Dead Until Dark* depicts one more facet of the *power as capacity* concept: Sookie Stackhouse has the power to recognize and understand the otherness in other, human and supernatural, beings. Sookie's power to understand otherness stems from being a *monster*, a social outcast in Southern society: "by her powers and presence, [Sookie] disrupts that order, rendering her an outsider, since she speaks her mind, associates with vampires, and is able literally to read minds. To them, she is something other than what they are familiar with, and in fact, she is

²⁰ Sookie's comprehension of God (and religion in general) is based on the idea of inclusiveness/inclusivism: "I don't think Jesus would mind if someone was a vampire" (*True Blood*, episode 102, "The First Taste").

strange" (Boyer 32). Being the product of a repressive society, "a society in which powerful groups impose or project identities upon subordinate groups in a manner that underlines the 'superiority' and 'normality' of the powerful" (Hutchings 96), otherness in *Dead Until Dark* is thus epitomized in both Sookie Stackhouse, *a crazy girl* i.e. a telepath and *a fang-banger* i.e. a woman who dates vampires, and its vampire characters (Bill Compton, Eric Northman, Pam, Long Shadow, etc.) – creatures who live within, or perhaps outside, the border of life and death, normal and abnormal, and thus embody our fear of difference. Historically and universally different, the vampire

offers a way of inhabiting difference with pride, for embracing defiantly an identity that the world at large sees as "other." But to embrace the vampire is also to embrace pain; a painful awareness of outsiderdom, a recognition of inhabiting an unwelcome self, a life at least partly lived at the edges. Richard Dyer elegantly captures this ambiguity in the vampire when he writes "if the vampire is an Other, he or she was always a figure in whom one could find one's self – the despicable as well as the defiant, the shameful as well as the unashamed, the loathing of oddness as well as pride in it." (Boyer 23-24)

Sookie and Bill thus represent a border between us and them, between human and inhuman, between normal and supernatural, and between good and evil. In the narrative space of *Dead Until Dark*, they are the perfect others, the perfect monsters who embrace their otherness as normalcy.

Conclusion

If "power travels in the bloodlines, handed out before birth" (469), as Louise Erdrich asserts in "Fleur," Sookie Stackhouse is, as this paper attempted to prove, the right person to demonstrate this as she is born with a powerful *disability* that has enabled her to point out, question, and subvert various issues the contemporary South has been struggling with. Sookie's first demonstration of *power to* is related to the disclosure of the ties between the fate of African Americans and homosexuals and that of vampires as all the mentioned "minorities" (Harris 1) are the victims of racial, religious, and sexual discrimination and segregation expressed through the denial of basic civil rights such as the right to vote, the right to marry, the right to own property, and the right to the fair and just treatment. The next instance of Sookie's exhibition of *power to* is her deconstruction of deeply rooted cultural myths and stereotypes connected to the American South such as the Southern Belle, the Southern Cavalier, the glory of the Civil War, and the Southern plantation. Finally, Sookie

possesses the power to sense the otherness in others and herself, embrace it, and impose it as normalcy.

Sookie's power comes to her through her creator – Charlaine Harris who, by constructing *Dead Until Dark* as a cross-genre hybrid, empowers as well as gets power over different groups of readers/fans: readers/fans of mystery, romance, and horror fiction. Each of these groups is dominated by different genre expectations which are brought into being through the specific definition, traits, and structure of a mystery/romance/horror novel. Taken all together, all those elements form a coercive pull that is hard to resist thus transforming *Dead Until Dark*, as well as its TV adaptation *True Blood*, into one of the most powerful cultural trends and tendencies of the decade.

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DISKURS MOĆI U POPULARNOJ KNJIŽEVNOSTI: ANALIZA ROMANA *MRTVI DO MRACA* CHARLAINE HARRIS

Ovaj članak pokazuje kako se pojmovi *moć kao dominacija* i *moć kao sposobnost* mogu primijeniti pri analizi popularne književnosti, osobito žanrovskih hibrida poput romana *Mrtvi do mraka* (2001) Charlaïne Harris. Pojam *moć kao dominacija* implicira moć nad nekim/nečim te se u popularnoj književnosti realizira kroz njezin oblik i čitateljstvo. Principi moći kao prisile su u

romanu *Mrtvi do mraka* vidljivi u njegovoj žanrovskoj hibridnosti (kriminalistički roman-roman strave i užasa-ljubavni roman). U multižanrovskoj definiciji romana čitatelji kriminalističkog romana/romana strave i užasa/ljubavnog romana pronalaze izvore svoje osobne moći. Pojam *moć kao sposobnost* odnosi se na moć propitivanja i/ili subverzije, na moć koja se dijeli s drugima. Ova je vrsta moći u popularnoj književnosti prisutna u određenim strukturalnim elementima ove književnosti poput likova, pripovjedača, mjesta i vremena radnje, fabule, ironije, teme, motiva, simbola, itd. *Mrtvi do mraka* pokazuje moć protagonistice romana da propita i subverzira (1) rasizam, seksizam i homofobiju na američkom Jugu, (2) južnjačke mitove i stereotipe te (3) koncept drugosti. Moć Sookie Stackhouse je i koaktivna jer se povremeno realizira ili kroz suradnju (obostrana moć oprimjerena njezinim odnosom s vampirom Billom Comptonom) ili kroz pomoć (dijeljena moć oprimjerena njezinim odnosom s drugim natprirodnim bićima). Iz svega navedenog očito je da diskurs moći u popularnoj književnosti funkcionira i kroz njezin oblik (*moć kao dominacija*) i kroz njezin sadržaj (*moć kao sposobnost*).

Ključne riječi: moć, moć kao dominacija, moć kao sposobnost, popularna književnost, žanrovski hibridi, ljubavni roman, roman strave i užasa, kriminalistički roman, Charlaine Harris, *Mrtvi do mraka*.

NAME AS A POWERFUL MEANS OF FORMING IDENTITY IN JHUMPA LAHIRI'S *THE NAMESAKE*

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Abstract: As an outstanding writer of short stories, Lahiri has explored various issues concerning immigrants of an Indian background and their lives in America, highlighting their sense of isolation and alienation living far away from their homeland. In the same respect, Lahiri's first novel *The Namesake* deals with the similar themes and examines what being a stranger in a foreign land means. The central character of the novel is Gogol, a young man from a Bengali family born in America, who was named after a famous writer by his father. Growing up, Gogol gradually realizes how different he is from his peers, not only in respect of a culture, but in respect of a name. In the first part of the novel, Gogol's name functions as a symbol of cultural displacement and identity confusion of the cross-cultural protagonist, which results in his changing it. On the other hand, after the death of Gogol's father, his name is a means of reinstating and re-evaluating his Indian heritage and identity. Moreover, it helps him finally understand his father and cherish the memory of him. With respect to all mentioned above, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which the name of the main protagonist empowers him to find the key answer to the question of his identity.

Key Words: Jhumpa Lahiri, *The Namesake*, name, identity, otherness, culture, cultural alienation.

Due to a rapid demographic change of population, resulting in a constant meeting of cultures, multiculturalism is a concept widely spread all over the world. Multiculturalism includes many features, among which are the recognition and acknowledgement of racial, ethnic and cultural diversity within a society (Brenman 1506). It means the acceptance of a group's right within a nation to preserve its culture and identity, provided they respect and do not conflict the society's laws (1506). Ideally, in a multicultural society, many different groups of people coexist in a certain area where they cherish their own cultures, but at the same time, they show understanding and respect towards others without resorting to violence to resolve the differences, which is seen as one of the biggest advantages of multiculturalism. However, both in theory and praxis, there is a certain tension between multiculturalism and the concept of acculturation, since multiculturalism is sometimes seen as a tendency which results in social fragmentation and separates ethnic ghettos, rather than in assimilation (Harris 1211). Moreover, it is often a case that these irrational fears

of multiculturalism seem to overlook the fact that multiculturalism provides the space for a diversity of cultural identities and the survival of different cultures within a society (Brenman 1507).

One of the results of multiculturalism is multicultural literature. It has developed and become popular as cross-cultural writers and individuals reflect on their experiences as a *minority* in the dominant culture they live in. According to Desenbrock, multicultural literature explores multicultural societies explicitly as well as implicitly, as it involves the readership from different cultures. This kind of literature has originated as a result of globalization and post colonialism, the possibility of its transmission thanks to the mass media, the mobility of people and the exchange of their experience (Desenbrock 10). Multicultural literature deals with both the clash of a dominant and minority culture and the possibility of writing in a non-native language (Izgarjan 7). In multicultural literature, the friction between a dominant and minority culture happen very often, due to a vague feeling of cultural affiliation of an author. In this respect, it can be said that Jhumpa Lahiri is a multicultural writer. Lahiri explores various issues regarding immigrants of an Indian background and their lives in America. In particular, she highlights their sense of isolation and alienation living far away from their homeland. Since Lahiri had similar issues concerning dual identity, as a descendant of Bengali parents, who was born in England and spent most of her life in America, she was able to identify with her protagonists and their ordeal and tell the stories close to all first and second generation immigrants around the world. In the same respect, Lahiri's first novel *The Namesake* deals with the similar themes, showing what being a stranger in a foreign land means.

The central character of the novel is Gogol, a young man from a Bengali family born in America. His parents Ashoke and Ashima Ganguli are Bengali immigrants. The themes of name and identity, that are going to be central to this paper, are in co-relation, and introduced in the very beginning of the novel. The book opens with Ashima who is about to give birth. Her husband takes her to the hospital, and unlike other American husbands, he leaves Ashima alone with the words "I'll be back" (Lahiri 7) said in Bengali. Bengali functions as a cultural barrier between the Gangulis and the rest of the people, because the two of them are the only ones who understand the language in the room. On the other hand, it is a signal of their cultural distinction, and their desire to preserve and sustain their culture in the USA. Ashima stays alone and afraid in the hospital room, just like she feels alone in America. Having left their families and friends back in Calcutta, both Ashok and Ashima find all their values challenged by a new culture where they have to adapt, which is the reason why they feel disorientated and experience culture shock (Bannet 684).

As the first generation immigrants, the Gangulis are trapped in their mother tongue and everything it symbolizes, concerning their past and culture.

This does not come as a surprise as language is one of the most significant marks of a culture and identity. Although it is a difficult task to define identity, there are certain elements of identity that the majority of theorists agree upon. Calhoun, for instance, states that identity formation is a process of development of a person in a certain phase of their life, in which individual features they possess differentiate them from others and make them distinct. This process defines a person in the eyes of others and themselves. The components of individual identity include physical, psychological, and sociological attributes that can be influenced by an individual's attitudes, habits, beliefs and ideas. Besides the physical, there is also cultural identity, which is in relation to one's cultural affiliation within a group or culture, as well as national identity, the concept by which all human beings are divided into groups called nations (Calhoun 48). Culture is the system of institutions, customs, ideology and values within a particular society, which is transmitted from generation to generation (Landau 55). All these parameters influence personality development and shape one's mindset, because there is a relation of conditionality between an individual and culture, since they are interdependent. Growing up and living in a certain culture, a person will adopt the majority of its values and respect its institutions. The customs and values imposed on a person by a culture will certainly shape their behavior. In accordance with that, identity is also influenced by a culture, its socio-historical categories such as tradition or religion. This is the reason why people who live in another culture face difficulties when it comes to understanding its principles and living by them. New environment sometimes means maladjustment and life in a state of exile. The problem of fitting in another culture is prominent among immigrants who bring their own cultural patterns when they leave their country. In another country a person becomes aware of instability and changeability of their identity because they are isolated from their culture and forced to perceive themselves, their origin and language from another perspective (Landau 55).

With respect to all said above, Ashok and Ashima keep preserving their tradition in America. Their son is born in the morning, and they want to wait for the letter from Ashima's grandmother from Calcutta. It is the Bengali tradition to have a respected elder choose the name of a child. In this way, the parents will make sure that their child is introduced to and accepted within Bengali culture (Siber and Riche 275). It is also a part of tradition to give a baby two names, a formal one and a pet name. In Bengali culture, the word for pet name is *darknam* which literally means "the name by which one is called by friends, family, and other intimates, at home and in other private, unguarded moments" (Lahiri 28). A good name is *bhaloram*, and it is used for "identification in the outside world" (Lahiri 28). However, it is time to leave the hospital and the letter has not arrived, so the Gangulis decide to make up a pet name that will be used until they can officially name their baby based on his great-grandmother's

wishes. Since the distinction between pet names and good names is an important one in Bengali culture, given the fact that only members of the family and really close relatives are entitled to call a person by a pet name, Ashoke decides to give his son the name which will have an important meaning for him. He chooses Gogol, the name of the Russian author. The reason why Ashok picks this name is because he was reading the collection of stories named *The Overcoat* by Gogol years ago, when he almost died in a train accident on the way to visit his grandfather.

A page of Gogol's book saved his life, as he sustained severe injuries and was too weak to say anything. When the rescue team came many hours after the accident, he crumpled a page from the book whose stories he was reading, after which the rescuers spotted him and saved him. Thanks to that book he was reborn:

He was born twice in India, and then a third time, in America. Three lives by thirty. For this he thanks his parents, and their parents, and the parents of their parents [...] But there is one more dead soul he has to thank. He cannot thank the book; the book has perished, as he nearly did, in scattered pieces, in the earliest hour of an October day, in a field 209 kilometers from Calcutta. Instead of thanking God he thanks Gogol, the Russian writer who had saved his life. (Lahiri 21)

The name Gogol is supposed to be a pet name, just a temporary substitute for the good name of the baby, until the letter from Ashima's grandmother finally arrives. However, the letter from Calcutta does not arrive at all and the Gangulis are devastated. In the meantime, they find out that Ashima's grandmother has had a stroke and that she will never be able to speak again. The secret about Gogol's good name will stay with her forever. The Ganguli's anxiety over their son's name is not a surprise, since

[p]ersonal names are important devices for self-definition in all cultures. It is through naming that a social group acknowledges a child's birthright and establishes its social identity. Among the many cultural rules that exist in each society, those having to do with naming are unique because they individualize a person and at the same time identify one as a group member. (Prins 134)

As the time goes by, and the Gangulis are aware of the fact that Gogol's good name will be forever lost in an envelope somewhere between Bangladesh and America, they want to give an official name to their son and they chose Nikhil. The name is powerful and very important in Bengali culture: "The name, Nikhil, is artfully connected to the old. Not only is it a perfectly respectable

Bengali good name, meaning ‘he who is entire, encompassing all,’ but it also bears a satisfying resemblance to Nikolai, the first name of the Russian Gogol” (Lahiri 56). However, Gogol starts school, and he is not happy with his new name and that is the reason why he hates the thought of going there. He wants to stay Gogol, because changing the name for him at that point would mean changing identity.

“Why do I have to have a new name?” he asks his parents, tears springing to his eyes. It would be one thing if his parents were to call him Nikhil too, but they tell him that the new name will be used only by the teachers and children at school. He is afraid to be Nikhil, someone he does not know. Who doesn’t know him. His parents tell him that they each have two names, too, as do all their Bengali friends in America, and all their relatives in Calcutta. “It is a part of growing up, they tell him, part of being a Bengali.” (Lahiri 57)

When his father takes him to school, Gogol is very sad, and he says to his headmistress that he does not want to be called Nikhil. Ashok tries to explain the difference between good names and pet names in his culture, but this explanation seems even more confusing to Mrs. Lapidus. When Ashok leaves, the headmistress decides to respect the will of the child instead of his parents and she writes down Gogol in the form. This reflects the difference between the two cultures, because in American culture individuality is something desirable and respected very early in life. On the other hand, Ashok’s explanations of the two names for his son confuse the teacher, since that is not something typical of American culture.

Although Gogol’s parents gradually accept the unusual fact that their son will have only one name, Gogol begins to question it during a class trip to the cemetery with his class. He becomes aware that not even one name at gravestones is like his. He begins to feel like an alien, completely secluded from the rest of the world by the uniqueness of his name. The problem is that his father Ashok has never told him the reason why he named him Gogol. He always thought that the moment is not right and that Gogol is too young to understand. Moreover, the memory of the accident where many people had died and of his close encounter with death is still very painful for him. To connect with his son and provide him with some meaningful explanations, Ashok gives him a book *The Short Stories by Nikolai Gogol* for his fourteenth birthday, but he never tells his son about the train accident because Gogol does not seem interested to listen. Gogol stashes the book away when his father leaves, and the book remains forgotten for a very long time.

In time, Gogol’s attitude towards his name deteriorates. In his junior year at high school, his English teacher informs the class about Russian writers.

Among all the classics, they dedicate a lesson to Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol. Gogol is devastated and in fear that his friends would tease him about his name, but it seems that nobody notices. His disappointment grows further after finding out that Gogol was a strange, depressive man who died in poverty all alone. Moreover, he realizes that Gogol is not even the writer's first name, but his surname, and he becomes aware of the fact that "no one he knows in the world, in Russia or India or America or anywhere, shares his name. Not even the source of his namesake" (Lahiri 78). Gogol's confusion and dissatisfaction with his name is rooted not only in his father's silence about its origin and the meaning behind it, but also in the fact that one's name can have a formative influence on one's identity. Consequently, Gogol's name starts having a bad influence on his self-confidence, since he does not like the name Gogol as he used to do when he was a child, and he identifies with the bizarreness which he ascribes to his name. He does not see the point in being named Gogol in the first place, since Gogol does not have any meaning for him. In many cultures there is a custom of giving a name with a strong and significant meaning. A name should reflect who the person is, and who the person will become (Csinos 276). Many Hindus give the names to their children to signify the character of the child (Gonda 5). As Csinos points out, at an individual level, names speak of the character of a child or the qualities of the child's personal identity. Thus, names can act as role models giving children messages about character traits with which they can identify. Even though they cannot always live into the meaning of their names, children can still reflect on them as they grow. This reflection should remind them that they have been called by a special name and have a special place and purpose within their family and community (Csinos 277). Gogol does not see the purpose of his name. That is the reason why he finally decides to legally change it. His parents protest his decision because they think that he is too old to do it now, but his father tells him: "In America anything is possible. Do as you wish" (Lahiri 105). The sentence with a cynical tone to it shows Ashok's dissatisfaction with his son's disobedience. At the same time, it shows Ashok feels disappointment but conveys it through detachment. Ashok is aware that his son is American, despite his desire to instill Bengali ways into him.

At first, the name change is confusing for Gogol, but when he goes to Yale, the new name, Nikhil, gives him freedom and power to separate himself from his old life, his parents and the culture that they embrace.

But now that he is Nikhil, it's easier to ignore his parents, to tune out their concerns and pleas [...] It is as Nikhil, that first semester that he grows a goatee, starts smoking Camel Lights at parties and while writing papers and before exams, discovers Brian Eno and Elvis Costello and Charlie Parker. It is as Nikhil that he takes Metro-North into Manhattan one week with Jonathan and gets himself a fake ID that allows him to be

served Liquor in New Haven bars. It is as Nikhil that he loses his virginity at a party at Ezra Stiles, with a girl wearing a plaid woolen skirt and combat boots and mustard tights. (Lahiri 105)

According to Goffman, the self is an effect of a performance. It is the way in which we present ourselves on a daily basis. Our life becomes a performance and an individual who performs requests his observers to take his impressions seriously. "They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess" (Goffman 28). If taken into account that identity is a dramatic effect, it can be noted that Gogol is able to play a different role from the one traditionally assigned to him only as Nikhil. Only as Nikhil does he date girls that are not of Bengali ancestry. When he starts living in New York, Gogol practically moves in to live with his girlfriend Maxine and her parents which results in his avoiding his parents and not returning their phone calls. The casual lifestyle that Maxine's parents choose have appeals to him so much that he feels safe and protected in their house. This gives him a chance to escape from himself and the notion of who he really is. As a performer, he is completely immersed in his own act and honestly believes that the version of reality he is projecting is correct (Clarke 511). The reality that he is Nikhil is completely different from the reality his parents would have desired. As he becomes so alienated from his cultural descent, he is almost ashamed to identify himself as a member of his family. Gogol's reality is now contained in his new name, and he is able to re-create himself and become whoever he wants, which he does.

Even when his father finally tells him the story behind his name, although Gogol feels sorry for him, he is still perplexed about the nature of his name, saying: "Is that what you think of when you think of me? Do I remind you of that night?" (Lahiri 142) His father eventually says: "Not at all, you remind me of everything that followed" (Lahiri 142). After this Gogol gradually starts seeing things from a different perspective and re-connecting with his father. However, it is on one occasion when Gogol is with Maxine, in her parents' house, that his family calls him to tell him that his father died. From that moment on, Gogol's attitude towards his family and Bengali tradition starts changing. Gogol finally realizes how his parents had felt when they had lost their parents in Calcutta. He starts declining Maxine's offers and suggestions to get away with her somewhere for a few days. He is determined that he does not want to get away. Even when Maxine offers to go with him after his father's death, he declines because "[h]e doesn't want to be with someone who barely knew his father, who's met him only once" (Lahiri 170). In the period after Ashok's death, Gogol is supportive of his mother and sister, spending most of the time with them in mourning typical of Bengali tradition. They wear traditional clothes, eat traditional food, go through all the rites and feel "they are alone, isolated, as a

family” (Lahiri 181). He misses his father very much and he pays more attention to his mother. He starts visiting her regularly at the weekends and he calls her often. All of a sudden, he feels completely different from Maxine, her parents and their way of life, which finally results in their break up. Sharma points out:

In the death of his father, he finds a beginning, and awareness and understanding of community and of the place of the individual within family in society. The hour of personal grief unites him to his family and makes him accept their ways. The ambivalence of his in-between state ceases to vex him anymore. Responding to the binary opposition as complementary rather than oppositional, he eventually discovers and resuscitates his Indian roots and familial ties. (Sharma 56)

The discovering and resuscitation of Gogol’s Indian roots looms in his openness to obey his mother’s proposal, something he would probably never have done before. A year after his father’s death Ashima insists on Gogol’s asking out Moushumi, a daughter of their Bengali family friends. Gogol remembers Moushumi from the time they were children and he does not like the idea. However, his mother is very persistent and Gogol finally yields. The very act of submission to his mother’s request shows his willingness to finally embrace a Bengali part of his identity, in the same way he embraced his American culture a long time ago. When the two meet, Gogol is very surprised because Moushumi has changed a lot. She is beautiful and interesting, and she is the only girl he has ever dated who knows him as Gogol. She is very surprised when he informs her about his name change.

The two of them bond over their Bengali origin. Besides sharing the same ancestry, Gogol and Moushumi share the frustration over their identity. Both of them have been a source of confusion for Americans who assumed them to be Greek, Mexican, or Egyptian. Although born in America, from time to time both of them felt alienated and strange in the society of dominant white Anglo-Saxon population where they were seen as *Other*. Douglas argues that the Other is a crucial symbol in the definition of our identity. The Otherness defines who we are, and it is about perception and fear of difference. The exaggeration of difference creates the “notion” of who we are, or better to say, who we are not, leading to the marginalization and intolerance of Others (Douglas 5). Moushumi admits that she was very frustrated by the fact that her name was mispronounced so often, and like Gogol, she has never dated any Bengali seriously. To escape her parents and culture, and try to find out who she is, Moushumi moves to Paris as a PhD scholar and she starts doing things she has never done before, dating many different men, changing partners very often. When she meets an American man named Graham, she falls in love and almost marries him, but their engagement is over after she hears Graham

talking disrespectfully towards her family and their culture and customs. Moushumi's contradictory behavior shows that she is caught in between two cultures and identities. On the one hand, she negates her cultural background by running away from it, on the other hand, she feels embittered by any offensive comment on account of Bengali customs. Just like Gogol, Moushumi goes through a kind of identity crisis.

Even Gogol and Moushumi's wedding is contradictory. Although it is traditional, it is organized by their families and none of the two participates in its planning very much. They still feel very different from their families in this respect, because their wedding is extravagant, nothing like an American intimate ceremony that the majority of their friends would have, and that would appeal to Moushumi very much. The problems in Gogol and Moushumi's marriage and their differences, in spite of their shared culture, start appearing soon after they are married. Moushumi insists on spending a lot of time with her friends who are all artists or writers or scholars, which leaves Gogol, an architect, excluded from their conversations. They talk a lot about their relationships from the past, and Gogol feels betrayed because they all knew Moushumi's ex boyfriend Graham. The gap between Gogol and Moushumi becomes obvious when during one of their dinners with friends, Moushumi announces that Nikhil used to be Gogol, and that he changed his name. Since Moushumi is the only girl who has ever known him as Gogol, he is shocked and offended by her sharing this personal detail about his past. Their relationship deteriorates further as Moushumi starts cheating on Gogol with a man she met a long time ago as a student. After a year of marriage they get divorced.

In the last part of the book, Gogol's failed marriage is contrasted to his sister Sonia's upcoming wedding. Sonia is about to get married to Ben, the man she has been dating for three years. Ashima feels guilty about making her son to meet Moushumi. She thinks about the difference between Bengali and American marriages. Her marriage was arranged, she never met Ashoke before he came to her father to propose to her, but she learned to love him in time and their relationship was full of love and respect. On the other hand, in America people get married for love, and they choose their partners, but the marriages usually do not last for a long time because neither of the partners wants to sacrifice their own happiness and comfort. These two different aspects of marriage, Bengali vs. American, show the gap between the two cultures. In Bengali culture marriages are arranged, and neither a bride nor a groom is asked for their opinion. They are destined to follow the hierarchy imposed by their tradition, while the members of their family choose their future spouses. On the other hand, the illusion of choice in American culture usually does not have a positive outcome, very often resulting in divorce.

After his failed marriage, Gogol comes from New York to join his family for Christmas and celebrate the news about his sister's wedding. He travels by a

train, tormented by the memories of his father and the trip that almost cost him his life. Once again, Gogol misses his father very much. He is pensive and thinks about his life a lot: about the fact that he is already divorced at the age of thirty-two. During the Christmas dinner, he goes to his old room to fetch the Nikon camera, and among the pile of books, one book “never read, long forgotten, catches his eye” (Lahiri 288). He opens the book *The Short Stories of Nikolai Gogol*, with a dedication: “For Gogol Ganguli” and he starts reading it.

He turns for the first story. “The Overcoat.” In a few minutes his mother will come upstairs to find him. “Gogol,” she will say, opening the door without knocking, “Where is the camera? What’s taking you so long? This is no time for books,” she will scold, hastily noting the volume open against the covers, unaware, as her son has been all these years, that her husband dwells discreetly, silently, patiently, within its pages.” (Lahiri 288)

The book by Gogol, forgotten about long time ago, finally finds its way to Gogol. By deciding to read it, Gogol shows respect and identifies with his father, realizing the reasons his father had for naming him after the writer. Functioning as a symbol of the final cultural recognition, “The Overcoat” offers Gogol many answers concerning his identity, helping him re-connect with his father. It seems that Gogol finally accepts the fact that in a multicultural society like American, identity is fluid and contingent in relation to historical and cultural circumstances (Clarke 528) and that it is possible to have multiple identities to choose from in a given context (Clarke 527). By decision to read the book that his father gave him, Gogol decisively reinstates his national identity and claims the right to appropriate Bengali, as well as American culture.

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IME KAO MOĆNO SREDSTVO FORMIRANJA IDENTITETA U ROMANU DŽAMPE LAHIRI *IMENJAK*

Kao izvanredna spisateljica kratkih priča, Lahiri istražuje različite probleme koji se tiču imigranata indijskog porekla i njihovog života u Americi, ističući osećaj izolovanosti i otuđenosti koji imaju zbog života daleko od domovine. Na isti način, Lahirin roman prenač, *Imenjak*, obrađuje slične teme i ispituje šta znači biti stranac u drugoj zemlji. Centralni lik romana je Gogolj, mladić iz Bengalske porodice rođen u Americi, kojem otac daje ime po poznatom piscu. Tokom odrastanja Gogolj postepeno uviđa koliko se razlikuje od svojih vršnjaka, ne samo po pitanju kulture već i po pitanju imena. U prvom delu romana Gogoljevo ime

funkcioniše kao simbol kulturnog izmeštanja i konfuzije identiteta kros-kulturnog junaka, što za rezultat ima promenu tog imena. Sa druge strane, nakon smrti oca, Gogoljevo ime funkcionise kao sredstvo preispitivanja i učvršćivanja indijskog nasleđa i sopstvenog identiteta. Iznad svega, ime mu konačno pomaže da shvati svog oca i sačuva uspomenu na njega. U skladu sa svim što je rečeno, svrha rada je da istraži načine na koje ime daje moć glavnom junaku da nađe odgovor na ključno pitanje o svom identitetu.

Ključne reči: Džampa Lahiri, Imenjak, ime, identitet, Drugost, kultura, kulturno otuđenje.

THE BALKAN HIGHER-EDUCATION EXPRESS

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Abstract: Balkan universities are in a hurry to beat Oxbridge and Ivy League universities. But, from their dire straits, can Balkan teachers afford the train ticket to compare and contrast? Therefore, in this paper we will talk about the situation in the higher education system in the Former Yugoslav countries which has lost its vigour and rigour with the reforms in the last ten years. Instead of adapting the system to the new political and economic situation, our university decision-makers literally implanted the existing western models thus creating a non-productive and mediocre situation. While requirements for tenure track position equal those at the most prestigious universities, funding for research (and teaching too) is desperate. Under this powerful discourse, humanities, especially, are judged useless and literary studies are marginalized as an ineffectual expression of subjectivity. While mapping the Balkan higher-education state of affairs in contrast to its vision, we especially want to highlight the unenviable “post-Theory” condition of literary studies.

Key Words: the Balkans, Former Yugoslav countries, higher-education, teaching, research.

What Is the Balkans?

The Balkans²¹ is the name introduced in scientific and political discourse by German scientist August Zeune in 1808 after the mountain range that stretches from east Serbia to East Bulgaria, to denote the Balkan Peninsula in South East Europe. It includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and the European part of Turkey. However, Greece and the Turkish part are normally placed elsewhere on the political map, often Slovenia is excluded from the region, while Moldavia and Hungary are sometimes added as former Ottoman colonies, although, historically speaking, crucial cultural and political connections were also made with Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. Because of this, diverse social, cultural, religious, and architectural structures characterize the region. Yet, its oldest name was the Peninsula of Haemus, given after the mythological Thracian king who was

²¹ For a detailed history of the Balkans see Sghevill 1991.

turned into a mountain by an angry Zeus. From the ancient pool of names, some etymologists derive that the name actually comes from the Greek word “haema” (αἷμα) which means blood and refers to the monster Typhon whose blood flowed down upon the mountains after Zeus struck him with lightning. However the Balkans retained the image of an unruly and warring zone, which exists between West and East, while belonging to both and to neither. But, where do Balkan people think they are?

What Have We Been Doing So Long?

After the Ottoman invasion of this area in the fourteenth century,

the Great Powers have considered Western control of these peripheries essential for the preservation of peace on the continent. In the nineteenth century, France, Britain, Austria and Russia all made incursions into the region, both to master Europe’s eastern border and to pursue the strategic and economic gains that proceed from conquest. (Hammond 7)

This pursuit provoked numerous international crises, including the Crimean War and World War I, and, eventually, the 1990s’ calamities, which are also called the Balkan Wars, although the real action took place in Yugoslavia. After communism collapsed most of the region suffered severe economic crisis because of which, as often generalized, communism was to be blamed. Parallel to this, English dictionaries were enriched with the word “balkanization,” “a pejorative geopolitical term [...] describ[ing] the process of fragmentation or division of a region or state into smaller regions or states that are often hostile or non-cooperative with one another” (Meštrović viii). The world interfered, of course, sent an abundance of military, financial, and humanitarian relief for the Balkans’ positive advancement. It did advance.

Approximately half of the Balkans is now part of the European Union, while the other half still fights its unmatched Herculean war against everything: against balkanism, against Balkan heritage, against nationalism, for the power of myth, against poverty, against aggressive capitalism, for competitive economy, against the transition, for Europe, against the West’s monopolizing, for democracy and against its true irony, for the rule of law and against the subservient position to European legal constrictions. Apart from this, the Balkans has entered a multigeneric war against itself by supporting a self-stigmatizing practice evident in all the spheres of its existence, in politics, in economy, society at large, and, indeed, at academia.

What Do We Want?

As the Balkans struggles to acquire a positive image, its economy strives to reach at least that level at which an average salary would meet an average consumer's needs, and so does, indeed, its higher education wrestle against its dire conditions and for global recognition. Ministries of education around the Balkans developed strategies that are almost the same in every country. Some of the standards, as the Albanian Public Accreditation Agency defined them, include dynamism in scientific research, research internationalization, and continuity in the scientific field.²² Therefore, in this part of the Balkans pertaining to go under the European umbrella, the universities have their vision: to be competitive teaching and research centers and the true agents of prosperity. This is a noble vision that becomes higher education and one should vote for enforcing as our models the most prestigious universities. Yes, we want to be the best and we want that the best students, researchers, and teachers in the world want to become members of our scientific community. Thus the University of Montenegro (the smallest of the countries) expressed its vision in its strategic document called "Evolunimont."

Do We Know What We Want?

We know that every theory is true within its own frame, and so is ours. However, the frame should have props substantial enough to sustain the hypothesis at least so long that it can be tested, proven or opposed, supported or dismantled, objectively or passionately. Yet, to accept our frame, one will have to be able to simultaneously stand on the two warring romantic sides of the story: to join this enthusiasm for the ideal together with this enthusiasm for self-stigmatization; to be the best and the worst at the same time; recognized and commensurable, while being also unrecognized and substandard. In other words, with our separate national strategies turning towards high-core research universities, we are denying each other's qualities, both individual and communal, and rejecting each other even as possible partners in the endeavor. This may be a very interesting moment for a historian of mentality, but it is a pronouncedly uncomfortable one for any individual decently striving to acquire knowledge and to pass it on. This is primarily an awkward position because it excludes a look back – the fact that our societies have already experienced express transitions (into communism, for example) and should have learned that substantial systems cannot be created "overnight" – and, logically, it blurs a look forth, into the future.

²² We want to thank Professor Armela Panajoti from the University of Vlore for a few useful tips in this regard.

More recently, due to the tendency to improve their education and to the fact that the European Union insisted on it, Former Yugoslav countries readily accepted the Bologna Education System. However, it was soon obvious that they were not ready to take over this new frame due to their poor infrastructure and lack of financial means. As numerous provided analyses agree, our regional universities do not have enough classrooms and offices for staff; our libraries' holdings are outdated, new books have not been purchased since the Civil War broke out in 1991. Research and teaching equipment is dated, while staff is not financed enough to attend conferences, workshops and seminars or to afford study visits to prestigious universities. This clearly shows that Western education norms and standards cannot be applied to our regional systems and are thus inappropriate – at least not appropriate yet.

To this inconvenience of ours, university decision makers have introduced still more rigorous rules. Ph.D. candidates at the (only state) University of Montenegro cannot even get approval to defend their theses without having at least two papers published in a journal on the referred Thompson & Reuters Journal Citation List. They can have papers published in journals that have international distribution and are present in other databases (Kobson, EBSCO, Google scholar), but these don't bring the desired sanction. It is not surplus to add that an average assistant teacher's monthly salary is around €450 and that this university does not provide its staff access to any of the relevant databases. Similarly, to be tenured, a teacher in Montenegro must have a book published by a renowned global publisher (needless to say that this action also involves the costs of translating, language editing, and often printing that highly surpass our salaries). In the Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, universities cannot establish doctoral studies on their own. They are obliged by regional regulations to have joint doctoral studies with two more regional universities. In addition, each lecturer in doctoral studies must have published papers in journals on the list mentioned. This drastically reduces the potential of the two largest state universities, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, as most colleges cannot meet these requirements. In Serbia, tenure demands even four such papers, in addition to other activities.

Apart from this, for example, the Government of the Republic of Srpska and the Ministry of Science and Technology in charge of higher education have an annual budget of €347,678 for co-financing research in 2015. This sum is divided into several sections: conferences attendance, study visits, inviting foreign lecturers, obtaining research equipment, co-financing research projects granted by the European Union, publishing, and co-financing doctoral studies. The situation is similar in the surrounding countries, whose academics complain that their ministries do promise money but are, regrettably, often incapable of fulfilling that promise.

In this blindness of ours, can we even consider if average universities in the U.S. – because we are not comparable to Harvard, to be honest – who do provide their staff with decent salaries (at least seven times higher than ours) and access to relevant databases (even teaching-oriented universities do so), put such demands in front of their staff? In some of the leading research universities, as is that of Liege, Belgium, for example, we are told that they never even heard of a Thomson & Reuters List.

What We Actually Do

To differentiate ratings of research papers and the editions in which they appear is a commendable activity in a competitive progressive society, even in ours. However, the drama of our progress runs parallel with a drama of our factual confusion, owing to the absence of instruments for introspection and a motivated auto-imagology of a progressive society, and a drama of our real delayed mobility.

“Mobility,” being one of the main concepts around which the idea of a united Europe is articulated, serves this discussion as a convenient metaphor. In the first place, the quoted facts show an obvious inaccessibility of relevant research material and research tools that significantly slows down our communication with peers elsewhere. This particularly applies to, insufficiently reasoned, marginalization of the humanities and pronunciation of the superiority of scientific (technological) literacy. Despite the fact that humanities are mandatory at numerous internationally recognized higher education institutions, frequently none or less than 1/5 of the available funds are devoted to these obsolete Renaissance scholars. The European Research Centre provides only 17% to the humanities. We are told that humanities do not guarantee detectable and immediate effects on the state of affairs and that, therefore, they are socially useless. Unlike natural sciences, which rely on definite data and thus are capable of explaining the truth of the natural world, humanities offer a pleasure in an eternal interpretation of texts, otherwise extremely displeasing in the world of efficiency and practical utility. Paradoxically, this runs parallel with scientific questioning of the category of human (cognitive science, genetics, bioengineering) and everyday understanding of humanity in its ontological extension through digitalization.

However, lacking a substantial frame into which to implement their research, our researchers are crucified between two brutal economies: one of them has to do with the banal question: “How much of my salary can I spend on my research?” The other concerns a rigorous reference system and targeted publishing. We hardly expect that such an unhealthy tension can bring forth a healthy will for science. Our scholars, therefore, start from an instability and head down a double path: that of a private life (insignificant to the employers)

and that of science (whose call they still hear regardless of the employers). This instability is doubled with another contradiction: mobility is both desired by the parent habitus (employer), but also internally limited by its axes. Taking into account literal mobility, not only do we see that given parameters are extremely unfavorable (salary should provide living and acknowledged research), but we are also aware that a number of mobility programs devised by the European Commission (Erasmus+, CEEPUS, Basileus) are highly competitive because there are always more persons who want to travel than what actual funds allow. Furthermore, many of the EU projects are not accessible to non-EU countries. Apart from that, many a Balkan scholar, especially those young striving assistants, Ph.D. candidates, would risk even this insecure employment if they attempt to behave in a “European” way.

When it comes to publishing research, apart from the financial Scylla, we are facing the Charybdis of the established rules of academic writing. A publishable paper must have an introduction, which concisely states our hypothesis and methodology, a body, in which we are expected to rely on the available theory to support our claims, to be elaborated through substantial findings, a confirmation of our hypothesis, and sometimes underlined contribution to the particular field of science. Even if we had easy access to the relevant recent references and we indeed made an important contribution, there is another frustrating question: how much this recycling of clever quotations in the journals truly satisfies a serious thinker and how much it really discourages genuine thinking. This frustration especially applies to the field of literature, which is faced with the crisis recognized as “post-Theory” that denies authorities and pushes studies towards multidisciplinary and postdisciplinary. In other words, if we approach a novel from the perspectives of sociology and cultural geography, do we publish our paper in a literary, sociological, or a geographical journal?

Staying in the Balkans

Everybody agrees that our *republica literaria* should not allow inundation of published rubbish. However, we must be realistic in judging our possibilities. Therefore, our argument against this shocking situation in which our universities offer nothing to their basic agents while demanding high achievements also understands a necessity of taking into account our immediate scientific surrounding by instituting a constructive comparative dialogue that relies on respect for each other’s decades-long efforts, their serious undertakings, which also include numerous peer-reviewed scientific journals. Apart from this, if we do overlook the state of affairs in a particular research field, as the case of literature shows, we risk coming to dangerous generalizations. Finally, even if we achieved gratifying communication with the

most referential scientific authorities in the papers published in the JCR journals, which are inaccessible to most of our Balkan colleagues, are we not utterly oblivious of what the region has to say in science, and, again, do we really know where we are talking from? Do we really behave scientifically?

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VISOKO OBRAZOVANJE – BALKAN EKSPRES

Ovaj rad bavi se situacijom u visokom obrazovanju na Balkanu, prije svega u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije, a čiji su energičnost i kritičnost značajno oslabili u posljednjih deset godina. Umjesto da prilagode sistem novoj političkoj i ekonomskoj situaciji, naši univerziteti najprije su bukvalno nakalemili na stare obrazovne sisteme modele sa Zapada i tako stvorili neproduktivnu i situaciju mediokriteta u obrazovanju. Zatim su se kriturijumi za izbore u viša zvanja izjednačili sa onima koje, pretpostavimo, traže najugledniji svjetski univerziteti a da je pri tom izgubljena iz vida neophodnost su/finansiranja istraživanja, pa čak i modernizacije neophodnih nastavnih sredstava. Humanističke nauke, pri tom, vide se kao nepotrebne, dok su studije književnosti marginalizovane kao neefikasan izraz subjektivnosti. Naš je cilj da mapiramo stanje stvari u visokom obrazovanju na Balkanu u kontrastu sa njegovom vizijom i da naglasimo nezavidne

uslove opstajanja studija književnosti u istom.

Ključne riječi: Balkan, bivša Jugoslavija, visoko obrazovanje, nastava, istraživanje.

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