

# Chapter 2 Political Science: The History of the Discipline

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## I Introduction

If we were to model the history of political science in the form of a curve of scientific progress in the study of politics over the ages, it would properly begin in Greek political science, make some modest gains in the Roman centuries, not make much progress in the Middle Ages, rise a bit in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, make some substantial gains in the 19th century, and then take off in solid growth in the 20th century as political science acquires genuine professional characteristics. What would be measured by this curve is the growth and qualitative improvement in knowledge concerned with the two fundamental questions of political science: the properties of political institutions, and the criteria we use in evaluating them.

We would record three rising blips in the 20th-century growth curve. There was the Chicago blip in the interwar decades (1920–1940), introducing organized empirical research programs, emphasizing psychological and sociological interpretations of politics, and demonstrating the value of quantification. A second much larger blip in the decades after World War II would measure the spread of “behavioral” political science throughout the world, improvements in the more traditional subdisciplines, and professionalization (in the sense of the establishment of multi-membered, meritocratically recruited, relatively non-hierarchical, departments; the establishment of associations and specialist societies, refereed journals; and so on). A third blip would register the entry of deductive and mathematical methods, and economic models in the “rational choice/methodological individualist” approach.

We might call this view of disciplinary history, the “progressive-eclectic” view. It would be shared by those who accept as the criterion of political science scholarship the search for objectivity based on rules of evidence and inference. This criterion would be applicable not only to studies we call “behavioral” but also to political philosophy (both historical and normative), empirical case studies (both historical and contemporary), systematic comparative studies, statistical studies involving survey and aggregate quantitative data, as well as research involving formal mathematical modelling and experiments (both real and simulated). In this sense it is an eclectic and non-hierarchical, rather than an integral, standard.

It is “progressive” in the sense that it imputes the notion of improvement to the history of political studies, in the quantity of knowledge, and its quality in terms of both insight and rigor. With respect to insight, most colleagues would agree that Michael Walzer (1983), has a better grasp of the concept of justice than does Plato, and with respect to rigor (and insight as well) Robert Dahl (1989) gives us a better theory of democracy than did Aristotle.<sup>37</sup>

There are four opposing views of the history of political science. Two of them would challenge its scientific character. There is an “anti-science” position as well as a “post-science” position. Two more of them—Marxists and the “rational choice” theorists—would challenge its eclecticism in favor of a purist, hierarchical monism. The Straussians express the “anti-science” view, that the introduction of scientific methodology is a harmful illusion, that it trivializes and clouds understanding and that the basic truths about politics are to be uncovered through direct colloquy with the classics and old texts. The “post-empirical,” “post-behavioral” approach to disciplinary history takes a deconstructive view; there is no privileged history of the discipline. There is a pluralism of disciplinary identities, each with its own view of disciplinary history.

The Marxist, neo-Marxist and “critical theory” approaches challenge our eclecticism, arguing that political science or rather social science (since there can be no separable political science) consists of the unfalsifiable truths discovered and stated in the works of Marx and elaborated by his associates and followers. This view rejects the notion of a political science separable from a science of society. The science of society reveals itself in the course of its own dialectical development. Rational choice theory rejects our eclecticism in favor of a hierarchic model of political science as moving toward a parsimonious set of formal, mathematical theories applicable to the whole of social reality, including politics.

<sup>37</sup> See, on a more modest scale, Riker 1982.

This chapter also assumes that political science has both scientific and humanistic components, both governed by the same imperatives of scholarly inquiry—the rules of evidence and inference. Contributions to knowledge may come from great insight or great virtuosity. We also assume that, within the ontology of the families of sciences, it is on the “cloud” side of Karl Popper's (1972) “clouds and clocks” continuum. That is to say, the regularities it discovers are probabilistic rather than lawlike, and many of them may have relatively short half-lives.

## II Themes of a Progressive-Eclectic History

The essential object of political science, which it shares with all of scholarship, is the creation of knowledge, defined as inferences or generalizations about politics drawn from evidence. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 7) put it in their recent book, “Scientific research is designed to make . . . inferences on the basis of empirical information about the world.” This criterion is evident even in such explicitly “anti-scientific” work as that of the Straussians. That is, they consider evidence, analyze it and draw inferences from it. It is impossible to conceive of a scholarly enterprise that does not rely on this evidence-inference methodological core. It would include Marxist and neo-Marxist studies, even though these studies are based on assumptions about social processes that are unfalsifiable and hence not fully subject to the rules of evidence or logical inference. It would include Clifford Geertz's (1973) “thick description” style of political science, exemplified by Womack's (1968) study of the Mexican peasant leader Zapata, at the simple display-of-evidence extreme; and it would include the work of Downs (1957) Riker (1962), and Olson (1965) at the inferential-deductive extreme. In Zapata we seem to have only evidence without inference and in the *Economic Theory of Democracy*, inference without evidence. But Hirschman (1970) tells us that the biography of the peasant leader is teeming with explanatory and policy implications; and the axioms and theorems of Downs generate a whole family of propositions testable by evidence. Both are falsifiable, through contrary evidence or logical flaws.

## III A Historical Overview

### A The Greeks and Romans

Though heroic efforts have been made to include writings of the ancient Near East in the political science chronicle, they are more properly viewed as precursors. Love for the Bible cannot convert the advice given to Moses by his father-in-law as to how he might more efficiently adjudicate the conflicts among the children of Israel, or the Deuteronomic doctrine of kingship, into serious political science.<sup>38</sup> But when we reach the Greece of Herodotus (c. 484–425 BCE) we are in a world in which analysis of political ideas and ideals, and speculation about the properties of different kinds of polities and the nature of statesmanship and citizenship, have become part of conventional wisdom. Informed Greeks of the 5th century BCE—living in the many independent Greek city states, in which the same language is spoken and the same or similar gods are worshipped, sharing common historical and mythological memories, engaged in inter-city trade and diplomacy, forming alliances and carrying on warfare—provided an interested audience for information and speculation about varieties of governmental and political arrangements, economic, defense and foreign policies.

The history of political science properly begins with Plato (428–348 BCE) whose *Republic*, *Statesman* and *Laws* are the first classics of political science.<sup>39</sup> In these three studies, Plato sets out propositions about justice, political virtue, the varieties of polity and their transformation which have survived as political theories well into the 19th century and even until the present day. His theories of political stability and of performance optimization, modified and elaborated in the work of Aristotle and Polybius, anticipate contemporary speculation about democratic transition and consolidation. In his first political typology, in the *Republic*, Plato presents his ideal regime based on knowledge and possession of the truth, and hence exemplifying the rule of virtue, and he then presents four other developmentally related regimes in descending order of virtue—Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and Tyranny. Timocracy is a corruption of the ideal state in which honor and military glory supplant knowledge and virtue; oligarchy is a corruption of Timocracy, replacing honor with wealth as the principle of recruitment; democracy arises out of the corruption of oligarchy, and in turn is corrupted into tyranny.

In *The Statesman*, written much later than *The Republic*, and in *The Laws*, written in his old age (after the sobering experiences of the

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Wildavsky 1984; 1989.

<sup>39</sup> See further: Sabine and Thorson 1973: chaps. 4, 5; Strauss and Cropsey 1987: 33 ff.

Peloponnesian War and the failure of his mission to Syracuse), Plato distinguishes between the ideal republic and the realistically possible varieties of polity. To classify real regimes, he introduces the famous three-by-two table, marrying quantity and quality: the rule of the one, the few, the many; each in its pure and impure versions. That generated the six-fold classification of regimes—monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, ochlocracy—which Aristotle perfected and elaborated in his *Politics*, and which has served as a basic taxonomy through the ages and into the 19th century.

In *The Laws* Plato presented the first version of the “Mixed Constitution” as the realistically best and most stable regime, designed to halt the cycle of development and degeneration implicit in the six-fold scheme. The Mixed Constitution, as formulated by Plato, attains stability by combining principles which might otherwise be in conflict—the monarchic principle of wisdom and virtue, with the democratic principle of freedom. This scheme was adopted and improved upon by Aristotle. It is the first explanatory theory in the history of political science, in which institutions, attitudes, and ideas, are related to process and performance. It is the ancestor of separation of powers theory.

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) spent 20 years as a member of Plato's Academy. Then after a period of tutoring of Alexander of Macedon, Aristotle returned to Athens and formed his own Lyceum, a teaching institution cum library-museum and research institute. The method of the Lyceum was inductive, empirical and historical, in contrast to the predominantly idealist and deductive approach stressed in Plato's Academy. The Lyceum is said to have collected 158 constitutions of Greek city-states, only one of which—that of Athens—has survived. The lectures which make up Aristotle's *Politics* were apparently drawn from the analyses and the interpretations of these data.

While Plato's metaphysics led him to depreciate the real world and the human capacity to perceive and understand it, and to posit a world of ideal forms of which reality was a pale approximation, Aristotle, in contrast, was more of a hands-on empiricist viewing political reality as a physician might view illness and health. Sir Ernest Barker points out,

It is perhaps not fanciful to detect a special medical bias in a number of passages of the *Politics*. This is not merely a matter of the accumulation of “case records,” or of the use of the writings of the school of Hippocrates such as the treatise of “Airs, waters, and places.” It is a matter of recurring comparison between the art of the statesman and the art of the good physician; it is a matter of the deep study of the pathology of constitutions, and of their liability to the fever of sedition, which we find in Book V of the *Politics*;

it is a matter of the preoccupation with therapeutics which we also find in the same book—a preoccupation singularly evident in the passage (at the end of chapter XI) which suggests a regimen and cure for the fever of tyranny (Barker, introduction to Aristotle 1958 edn.: xxx).

While in his theory of the polity Aristotle begins from Plato's six-fold classification of states, from a realistic point of view he argues that there are really four important types: oligarchy and democracy, the two types into which most of the Greek city states might be classified; “polity” or constitutional or “mixed” government, which is a combination of oligarchy and democracy, and which (because it reconciles virtue with stability) is the best attainable form of government; and tyranny, which is the worst. To back up his argument he points out that, while the social structures of cities vary according to the economies, occupations, professions and statuses contained in them, these differences are reducible into different distributions of rich and poor citizens. Where the rich dominate, we have oligarchy; where the poor dominate, we have democracy. Where the middle class dominates, we may have “mixed” or constitutional government, tending to be stable since extreme interests are out-weighted by moderate ones. Political structures and patterns of recruitment are classified according to the arrangements of the deliberative, magistrative and judicial organs, and according to the access of different classes to them.

A modern political scientist—a Dahl, Rokkan, Lipset, Huntington, Verba, or Putnam—would be on quite familiar ground with Aristotle's analysis, in *The Politics and Ethics*, of the relation of status, occupation, profession and class to varieties of political institutions, on the one hand, and of the relation between political socialization and recruitment to political structure and process, on the other. The metaphysics and ontology would be shared. But had these chapters, or something like them, been submitted by contemporary graduate students in search of dissertation topics, one can visualize marginal comments of a Dahl or Verba: “What cases are you generalizing about?”; “What about using a scale here?”; “How would you test the strength of this association?”; and the like. Aristotle presents a whole set of propositions and hypotheses—on what makes for political stability and what makes for breakdown, on developmental sequences, on educational patterns and political performance—that cry out for research designs and careful quantitative analysis. The Aristotelian method consists essentially of a clinical sorting out of specimens, with hypotheses about causes and sequences, but without systematic tests of relationships.

The Greek political theory of Plato and Aristotle was a combination of universalistic and parochial ideas. The world about which they generalized was the world of the Greek city-states. They were generalizing about Greeks

and not about humankind. Citizens were differentiated from slaves, alien residents and foreigner barbarians. With Alexander's conquests, and the intermingling of Greek and oriental cultures, two notions generated by the Stoical philosophical school gained in authority. These were the idea of a universal humanity and of an order in the world based on natural law. These ideas were first advanced by the Stoic philosopher, Chrysippus, in the last third of the 3rd century BCE. Their clearest formulation was in the work of Panaetius (185–109 BCE) and Polybius (203–120 BCE), two Stoic philosophers of the second century who in turn transmitted these ideas to the Roman intellectual élite of the late republic. While Panaetius developed the philosophical and ethical aspects of late Stoicism, Polybius adapted Platonic and Aristotelian ideas to the history of Rome and to the interpretation of Roman institutions.

Polybius attributes the remarkable growth and power of Rome to its political institutions. He makes more explicit the developmental ideas of Plato and Aristotle, offering simple social psychological explanations for the decay of the pure forms of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy and for their degeneration into the impure forms of tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy. According to Polybius, the Roman state builders had, through a process of trial and error, rediscovered the virtues of the mixed constitution—the combination of the monarchic, aristocratic and democratic principles implemented in the Consulate, the Senate and the Assembly. It was these institutions which made possible the conquest of the world in the course of half a century, and which according to Polybius guaranteed a future of stable and just world rule under Roman law.<sup>40</sup>

Three-quarters of a century later, the Roman lawyer Cicero (106–43 BCE), applied “mixed constitution” theory to Roman history at a time when the institutions of the Roman Republic were already in deep decay. This part of his work was an appeal for a return to the structure and culture of the earlier Roman Republic prior to the populist and civil war decades of the Gracchi, Marius and Sulla. More significant and lasting was his development of the Stoic doctrine of natural law. This was the belief that there is a universal natural law resulting from the divine order of the cosmos and the rational and social nature of humanity. It was his formulation of this natural law idea which was taken up in the Roman law, and passed from it into Catholic church doctrine and ultimately into its Enlightenment and modern manifestations.<sup>41</sup>

Thus we find formulated in Greek thought by the end of the third century BCE, and in Roman thought in the following centuries, the two great

<sup>40</sup> See further Sabine and Thorson 1973: chaps. 4–9.

<sup>41</sup> See further Sabine and Thorson 1973: chaps. 9, 10.

themes of political theory, themes that carry through the history of political science into the present day. These are: “What are the institutional forms of polity?” and “What are the standards we use to evaluate them?” The answer to the first was the Platonic and Aristotelian six-fold classification of pure and impure organizational forms, and the mixed constitution as the solution to the problem of degeneracy and cyclicalism. The answer to the question of evaluation—legitimacy, justice—was the doctrine of natural law. These ideas were transmitted to Rome by the late Stoics (particularly Panaetius and Polybius) and from the work of Romans (such as Cicero and Seneca) into Catholic political theory.

## B Mixed Constitutions and Natural Law Theory in History

Mixed constitution theory and the theory of law receive their fullest medieval codification in the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who relates the mixed constitution to justice and stability through its conformity to divine and natural law. His exemplars of the mixed constitution are the divinely ordained political order of the Israel of Moses, Joshua and the judges, balanced by elders and tribal leaders, and the Roman Republic in its prime, with its mix of Assembly, Senate and Consulate. He follows the arguments of Aristotle on the weaknesses and susceptibility to tyranny of the pure forms of monarchic, aristocratic and democratic rule. Combining the pure forms is the antidote to human weakness and corruption.<sup>42</sup>

In the late middle ages and in the Renaissance, mixed government and natural law provide the theoretical coinage according to which governments were valued. Just as Israel of the pre-monarchic period and Rome of the Republican age were viewed by Thomas Aquinas and those whom he influenced as approximating the ideal of mixed government in the past, for the Italian political theorists of the late middle ages and Renaissance the exemplar was Venice, with its monarchic Doge, its aristocratic Senate and democratic Great Council. The stability, wealth and power of Venice were taken as proof of the superiority of the mixed system.

The variety of principalities and republics in northern Italy in these centuries, the overarching and rival claims of Church and Empire, the warfare, conquest, revolution, diplomatic negotiation and institutional innovation in which they were constantly engaged, stimulated several generations of political theorists who reflected and wrote on this political experience.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> See further Blythe 1992: chap. 3.

<sup>43</sup> See further Blythe 1992; Pocock 1975; Skinner 1978.



Central to their discussions were the ideas of the mixed constitution as expressed in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. With the translation of his *History of Rome* in the 16th century, Polybius became influential particularly in Florence and on the work of Machiavelli (1469–1527). In the Florentine crises of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Machiavelli engaged in a polemic with the historian Guicciardini in which the principal authorities cited were Aristotle, Polybius and Thomas Aquinas, and the issues turned on which countries were the best exemplars of the mixed constitution. Guicciardini favored an Aristotelian, Venetian-Spartan aristocratic bias; Machiavelli favored a somewhat greater role for the popular element, relying more on Polybius for support.<sup>44</sup>

The breakthrough of Renaissance political theory lay in Machiavelli's treatment of the legitimacy of regimes and political leaders. Prior to *The Prince* and the *Discourses*, writers treated political regimes dichotomously as pure and corrupt, normative or non-normative, in the original Platonic and Aristotelian senses.<sup>45</sup> Machiavelli, viewing politics as practised in Italy in the 15th and 16th centuries, legitimized non-normative politics as unavoidable, as survival-related, as part of reality. A Prince who failed to employ problematic means when necessary to survival would be unable to do good when that was possible. Machiavelli touched the nerve of political science with this “value-free” orientation, and his name became a synonym for moral indifference and political cynicism. The issues raised by this venture into realism are still fluttering the dovecotes of political philosophy.

The theory of sovereignty, so important a theme in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and the Enlightenment, receives its first full formulation in the work of Jean Bodin (1529–1596). His doctrine of absolutism as a solution to the problem of instability and disorder is formulated in polemic with the theory of the mixed constitution. Employing a realistic, historical method he makes the argument that the classic cases of mixed government, Rome and Venice, were actually concentrated and centralized regimes: indeed, every important and long-lasting regime concentrated the legislative and executive powers under a central authority. His appreciation of the influence of environmental and social structural conditions on the characteristics of states anticipates Montesquieu in its anthropological sensitivity.<sup>46</sup>

While there was substantial progress in the development of political science in the Enlightenment, such writers as Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Madison and Hamilton were pursuing the same themes that concerned

<sup>44</sup> See further Blythe 1992: 292 ff.

<sup>45</sup> See further Skinner 1978: 131 ff.

<sup>46</sup> See further Sabine and Thorson 1973: chap. 21.

Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, Aquinas, Machiavelli and Bodin—the forms and varieties of rule, and the standards by which one judged them. In considering the progress made by the Enlightenment philosophers we look for improvements in the gathering and evaluation of evidence and in the structure of inference.

The first scholarly project completed by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was a translation of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars, a history of a disorderly and tragic epoch, just as England of the 17th century was disturbed by civil war, regicide, dictatorship and exile. Hobbes’s view of the state of nature, of the reasons for humankind’s consent to be governed, the nature of political obligation, and the legitimacy of different forms of government, was influenced by reflections on the fall of Athens and the violence and moral confusion of 17th-century England. In his later books *De Cive* and especially *Leviathan*, Hobbes concluded that sovereign authority in a society is required if the deliverance of its members out of a disorderly and violent state of nature is to be secured. In exchange for obligation and obedience, the subject gets safety and security. The best form of government—logically derived from these premises, because it is rational and unambiguous—is monarchic absolutism, limited by the ruler’s obligation to provide for the security and welfare of the members of the society. Hobbes’s achievement was his logical derivation of conclusions about the best form of government from what he viewed as material conditions and human needs. He advanced the argument by restricting assumptions to what he viewed, and what he thought history confirmed, as “material” evidence of the human condition. He drew uncompromising logical inferences from these assumptions.<sup>47</sup>

John Locke’s conclusions about the origins and legitimacy of government, in his *Second Treatise of Government*, are derived from a different set of contractual assumptions than those of Hobbes. People consent to government to assure their welfare and liberty. The Lockean state of nature is not so abysmal as that of Hobbes. There are inconveniences and costs, and the consent to government is a conditional one, measured by the extent to which government performs these limited functions. In moving from the state of nature people cede to the community their right of enforcing the law of reason so as better to preserve life, liberty and property. There are the beginnings of “separation of powers” theory in John Locke. The power granted to the community is divisible into three components—the legislative, the executive, and the federative, the last a relatively unspecified power pertaining to foreign relations. In Locke as well as in Hobbes, the progress

<sup>47</sup> See further Sabine and Thorson 1973: chap. 24; Strauss and Cropsey 1987: 396–420.

in political science scholarship lies in the logical derivation of the nature and forms of government, and of the bases of authority, liberty and obligation, from sociological and psychological assumptions. Their strength lies in their logical rationalism, rather than in the gathering of evidence.

Though it is an exaggeration to describe Montesquieu's evidence as rigorously gathered and accumulated, surely he takes this step beyond Hobbes and Locke. While he recognizes laws of nature, and derives the formation of government from these laws, he emphasizes above all the variety of human political experience and the pluralism of causation. Montesquieu goes to "Persia," and back in time to Rome, so to speak, to Venice, to many other European countries, and especially to England, to compare their institutions with those of France. He is a comparativist and causal pluralist. To explain varieties of polity and public policy he considers climate, religion, customs, economy, history and the like. He finds the best form of government in his notion of separation of powers, and a kind of Newtonian balance among these powers, which he views as most likely to preserve liberty, and promote welfare. And, in Book XI of his *Spirit of Laws*, he finds his best exemplification of separation of powers in post-Petition of Right England.

Montesquieu's classification of governments includes republics, monarchies and despotisms, with the republican category being further divisible into aristocracies and democracies. He finds exemplified in the government of England the ideal of mixed government combining democratic, aristocratic and monarchic institutions in a dialectic-harmonic balance. His political theory is an explanatory, system-functional, conditions–process–policy theory.

It had great influence on the framers of the American Constitution. And it may have been in Hamilton's mind when he wrote in *Federalist* 9, "The science of politics . . . has received great improvement. The efficacy of the various principles is well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients" and, in *Federalist* 31, "Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than . . . we should be disposed to allow them" (Hamilton 1937 edn.: 48, 189). What led Madison and Hamilton to view themselves as such good political scientists was through having tested the theories of Montesquieu, Locke and other European philosophers against the experience of the thirteen colonies and of the United States under the Articles of Confederation. They had the confidence of engineers in applying laws of politics, derived from empirical and laboratory-like examinations of individual cases. Separating executive,

legislative and judicial power (which they had learned from Montesquieu) and mixing powers through checks and balances (which they had learned from practical experience with the thirteen colonies) enabled them to treat politics in equation-like form: “Separation + checks and balances = liberty.”

## C The 19th Century

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the philosophers of the Enlightenment forecast the improvement in the material, political and moral condition of humanity as a consequence of the growth of knowledge. In the 19th and 20th centuries, scholars and intellectuals elaborated this theme of progress and improvement, predicting different trajectories, and causal sequences. In the first part of the 19th century there were the great historicists (or historical determinists)—Hegel (1770–1831), Comte (1798–1857) and Marx (1818–1883)—who, in the Enlightenment tradition, saw history as unilinear development in the direction of freedom and rational rule. In Hegel, reason and freedom are exemplified in the Prussian bureaucratic monarchy. In Comte, the constraints of theology and metaphysics are broken by science as it enables humanity to exercise rational control over nature and social institutions. In Marx, capitalism supplants feudalism, and is supplanted in turn, first by proletarian socialism and then by the truly free, egalitarian society.

Hegel departs from Enlightenment notions by his dialectical view of history as the clash of opposites and the emergence of syntheses. The Prussian bureaucratic monarchy as rationalized and modernized in the post-Napoleonic decades was viewed by Hegel as the exemplification of an ultimate synthesis.<sup>48</sup> In Marx, the Hegelian dialectic became the principle of class struggle leading to the ultimate transformation of human society. According to Marx, the nature of the historical process was such that the only social science that is possible is one that is discovered in, and employed in, political action. In Marxism, this science of society became a fully validated, economy-ideology-polity driven scheme. Armed with this powerful theory an informed vanguard would usher in a world of order, justice and plenty.<sup>49</sup>

Auguste Comte, the originator with Saint-Simon (1760–1825) of philosophical positivism, inaugurated the new science of “sociology” in his

<sup>48</sup> See further Sabine and Thorson 1973: chap. 17; Strauss and Cropsey 1987: 732 ff.

<sup>49</sup> See further Sabine and Thorson 1973: chap. 34; Strauss and Cropsey 1987: 802 ff.

six-volume *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (Koenig 1968). He made the argument that all the sciences went through two stages—first, the theological; second, the metaphysical—before becoming, in the third stage, scientific or positive. Thus, argued Comte, astronomy first passed through these three stages, then physics, then chemistry, then physiology. Finally, social physics (the social sciences inclusive of psychology) was in process of maturing as a science. Comte saw this new scientific sociology as furnishing a blueprint for the reform of society.

There was a wave of empiricism in reaction to these sweeping, abstract, monistic theories. This reaction produced a large number of descriptive, formal-legal studies of political institutions and several monumental, pedestrian, descriptive political ethnographies, such as Theodore Woolsey's *Political Science; Or the State Theoretically and Practically Considered* (1878); Wilhelm Roscher's *Politik: Geschichtliche Naturlehre der Monarchie, Aristokratie, und Demokratie* (1892); and Woodrow Wilson's *The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics* (1889/1918). These were essentially ponderous classificatory exercises, employing some variation of the Platonic-Aristotelian system of classification.

Similar to the historicists, but more empirical in approach and more pluralistic in explanation, were a group of writers in the second half of the 19th century who might be characterized as “evolutionists,” and who influenced modern sociology in a variety of ways. These included Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822–1888) and Ferdinand Töennies (1855–1936). Spencer (1874/1965), an early post-Darwinian social evolutionist, avoids a simple unilinearism. He is concerned with accounting for cultural and political variation, as well as generic improvement. He explains political decentralization and centralization by physical features of the environment, such as mountainous versus open prairie terrain. He also makes the argument, backed up by historical example, that democratization is the consequence of socioeconomic changes resulting in urban concentration, and the proliferation of interests due to the growth of manufactures and the spread of commerce.

There was a common dualistic pattern among the later 19th-century writers on the historical process. Maine (1861/1963) distinguishes ancient from modern law in terms of the shift from status relationships of a diffuse character to specific contractual ones. Tönnies (1887/1957) introduces the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* und *Gesellschaft* (Community and Society). At the turn of the century Weber (1864–1920) and Durkheim (1858–1917) contrast modern rationality with traditionality (Weber 1922/1978: vol. i, pp. 24 ff.), organic with mechanical solidarity

(Durkheim 1893/1960). This theme of “development,” of “modernization,” continues into the 20th century and to the present day, with efforts at defining, operationalizing, measuring, and interpreting socio-economic-political “modernization” discussed below.

It was common throughout the 19th century to speak of the study of politics and society as sciences, for knowledge about politics to be described as consisting of lawful propositions about political institutions and events based on evidence and inference. Collini, Winch and Burrow document this in great depth and detail in their book, *That Noble Science of Politics* (1983). As in earlier times, the historians and publicists of the 19th century looked for “lessons” from history, but with increasing sophistication. Recalling his “method” in writing *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville (1805–59) observed, “Although I very rarely spoke of France in my book I did not write one page of it without having her, so to speak, before my eyes”; and in appreciation of the comparative method more generally, he said, “Without comparisons to make, the mind does not know how to proceed” (Tocqueville 1985: 59, 191).

Collini, Winch, and Burrow point out that in the 19th century propositions about the nature and explanation of political phenomena increasingly came to be based on historical inductions rather than from assumptions about human nature. In part this was attributable to the simple growth of knowledge about contemporary and historical societies. Imperialism and colonialism brought vast and complex cultures such as India, as well as small-scale and primitive societies such as the American Indian and the African cultures, into the intellectual purview of European scholars and intellectuals. Exotic parts of the world became accessible and invited more cautious and controlled efforts at inferring cause and effect than was the case with Machiavelli and Montesquieu. At Oxford and Cambridge, at the very end of the 19th century, under the leadership of E. A. Freeman (1874), Frederick Pollock (1890) and John Seeley (1896) comparative history came to be viewed somewhat sanguinely as the basis for a genuinely scientific study of politics. It was introduced into the History Tripos at Cambridge in 1897 in the form of two papers—one on Comparative or Inductive Political Science, and a second on Analytical and Deductive Politics (Collini et al.: 341 ff.). As early as 1843, John Stuart Mill (1806–73) had recognized in his *System of Logic* (1843/1961) that the comparative method in the human sciences was in some sense equivalent to the experimental method in the natural sciences. A century and a half ago Mill had in effect anticipated the “most similar systems strategy of Przeworski and Teune. (1970).

For John Stuart Mill, Tocqueville, Ostrogorski, Wilson and Michels,

democracy as an alternative to other regimes is a major preoccupation. Each in his own way continues the debate about “mixed government.” Mill wants the educated, the informed, the civically responsible to play a preeminent role in democracy to avoid the corrupt and mass potentialities latent in it. Tocqueville found in the American legal profession an aristocratic admixture to moderate the “levelling” propensities of democracy. Ostrogorski (1964: vol. ii, Conclusion) and Michels (1949) both see fatal flaws in democracy, and inevitable oligarchy, resulting from the bureaucratization of mass political parties.

These 19th-century trends readily fall under our organizing concept of the advancing rigor and logical coherence of the study of political phenomena defined as the properties and legitimacy of rule.

Linking European political theory with American political science of the first decades of the 20th century was the concept of “pluralism,” a variation on the “mixed government” theme. The concept of state sovereignty, associated with the ideology of absolutist monarchy, was challenged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by “pluralists” of both the right and the left. Otto Gierke (1868) in Germany and Leon Duguit (1917) in France question the complete authority of the central state. Conservative political theorists such as Figgis (1896) asserted the autonomy of churches and communities; left-wing theorists such as Harold Laski (1919) made such claims for professional groups and trade unions.

With the seminal figures of Marx and Freud, and the great sociological theorists of the turn of the 19th century—Pareto, Durkheim, Weber—and with the polemic about sovereignty and pluralism, we are already in the immediate intellectual background of 20th-century political science.

## D The Professionalization of Political Science in the 20th Century

In the latter half of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th, the rapid growth and concentration of industry and the proliferation of large cities in the United States, populated in considerable part by immigrants from the countryside or from foreign countries, created a situation prone to corruption on a major scale. It took political entrepreneurs with resources to organize and discipline the largely ignorant electorates that swarmed into such urban centers as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City and the like. The “boss” and the “machine” and intermittent reform movements were the most visible American political phenomena of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Reform movements

inspired by an ideology of efficiency and integrity, and supported by urban business and professional élites, drew on the talents of journalists of the quality media and academic communities. The corruption of politics by business corporations seeking contracts, franchises and protection from governmental regulation became the subject of a journalistic “muck-raking” literature, which brought to public view a political infrastructure and process—“pressure groups” and the “lobby,” deeply penetrative and corrupting of local, state and national political processes.

In the interwar years American political scientists were challenged by this political infrastructure, and by the muckraking literature which exposed it, and began to produce serious monographic studies of pressure groups and lobbying activities. Peter Odegard (1928) wrote on the American Anti-Saloon League, Pendleton Herring (1929) on pressure groups and the Congress, Elmer Schattschneider (1935) on politics and the tariff, Louise Rutherford (1937) on the American Bar Association, Oliver Garceau (1941) on the American Medical Association, and there were many others. They put their stamp on the political science of the interwar years. The realism and empiricism of these early students of what some called “invisible” or “informal” government drew on the ideas of an earlier generation of American political theorists including Frank Goodnow (1900) and Woodrow Wilson (1887).

## 1 The Chicago School

Thus in the first decades of the 20th century the notion of a “scientific” study of politics had put on substantial flesh. Europeans such as Comte, Mill, Tocqueville, Marx, Spencer, Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, Michels, Mosca, Ostrogorski, Bryce and others had pioneered, or were pioneering, the development of a political sociology, anthropology and psychology, in which they moved the study of politics into a self-consciously explanatory mode. Empirical studies of governmental and political processes had made some headway in American universities. But in major part the study of politics in American universities in these decades was still essentially legal, philosophical and historical in its methodology. The significance of the University of Chicago school of political science (c. 1920–40) lay in its demonstration through concrete, empirical studies that a genuine enhancement of political knowledge was possible through an interdisciplinary research strategy, the introduction of quantitative methodologies and through organized research support. Other writers spoke a language similar to Merriam's (1931b) in “The Present State of the Study of Politics” (for example, Catlin 1964). But the school which Merriam founded in the 1920s, and staffed in part with his own students, made a quantum leap in



empirical investigative rigor, inferential power in the study of things political, and in institutional innovation.

What led him to become the great political science entrepreneur of his generation was the dynamic setting of the city of Chicago, booming with wealth and aspiring toward culture in the early 20th-century decades, and the interplay of his academic life and his political career. His hopes for high political office had been dashed by his defeat in the Chicago mayoralty campaign in 1919. It was no longer possible for him to aspire to become the “Woodrow Wilson of the Middle West” (Karl 1974: chap. 4). At the same time he was unable to settle for a quiet academic career. His years in municipal politics, and his wartime experience with foreign affairs and propaganda, sensitized him to “new aspects” in the study of politics. Not long after returning to the University of Chicago from his “public information” post in Italy, he issued his *New Aspects* (1931b) declaration and began his build-up of the Chicago department and the various research programs which identified it as a distinctive “school.” He was an institutional innovator: first creating the Social Science Research Committee at the University of Chicago to dispense financial support for promising research initiatives among the Chicago social science faculty; and then pioneering the formation of the Social Science Research Council to provide similar opportunities on the national scale.

The first major research program to be initiated at Chicago was built around Harold Gosnell, who received his doctorate under Merriam in 1921 and was appointed to an assistant professorship in 1923. He and Merriam collaborated in a study of the attitudes toward voting of a selection of some six thousand Chicagoans in the mayoral election of 1923 (Merriam and Gosnell 1924). The selection was made prior to the introduction of “probability sampling” and was carried out through “quota control” which sought to match the demographic characteristics of the Chicago population by quotas of the principal demographic groups. Quota control, discredited in the Truman–Dewey election of 1948, was then the “state of the art” approach to the sampling of large populations. The interviewers were University of Chicago graduate students trained by Merriam and Gosnell. Gosnell followed up this study with the first experiment ever to be undertaken in political science. This was a survey of the effects on voting of a non-partisan mail canvass in Chicago that was intended to get out the vote in the national and local elections of 1924 and 1925. The experimental technique Gosnell (1927) devised was quite rigorous: there were carefully matched experimental and control groups, different stimuli were employed, and the results were analyzed according to the most sophisticated statistical techniques then available. Follow-up research was done by

Gosnell in Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. Nothing like this had been done by political scientists before.

Harold Lasswell (1902–78), a young prodigy from small-town Illinois, brilliantly implemented Merriam's interest in political psychology. His accomplishments when he was in his 20s and 30s were extraordinary. Between 1927 and 1939 he produced six books, each one innovative, exploring new dimensions and aspects of politics. The first, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927), introduced the study of political communication (to be followed in 1935 by a book-length annotated bibliography called *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*), identifying the new literature of communications, propaganda and public relations. The second book, *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) explored the “depth psychology of politics” through the analysis of the case histories of politicians, some of them mentally disturbed. The third book, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935), speculated about the psychological bases and aspects of individual political behavior, different kinds of political regimes, and political processes. The fourth book, the celebrated *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How* (1936), was a succinct exposition of Lasswell's general political theory, emphasizing the interaction of élites, competing for such values as “income, deference and safety.” In 1939 he published *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study*, in which he and Blumenstock examined the impact of the world depression on political movements among the Chicago unemployed, exemplifying the interaction of macro and micro factors in politics at the local, national and international levels. Lasswell also published some twenty articles during these years in such periodicals as *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, *Scientific Monographs*, *The American Journal of Sociology*, *The Psychoanalytical Review* and the like. He was the first investigator of the interaction of physiological and mental-emotional processes to use laboratory methods. He published several articles during these years reporting the results of his experiments in relating attitudes, emotional states, verbal content and physiological conditions as they were reported or reflected in interview records, pulse rates, blood pressure, skin tension and the like.

While Gosnell and Lasswell were the full-time makers of the Chicago revolution in the study of political science, the senior scholars in the department—including Merriam himself, and his colleagues Quincy Wright in international relations and L. D. White in public administration—were also involved in major ways in the making of the reputation of the Chicago School. Merriam (1931a) sponsored and edited a series of books on civic education in the US and Europe, a forerunner of contemporary studies of political socialization and culture. During these same years

Quincy Wright (1942) carried on his major study of the causes of war, which involved the testing of sociological and psychological hypotheses by quantitative methods. Leonard White took on Lord Bryce's (1888) problem of why in America the "best men do not go into politics." His book *The Prestige Value of Public Employment*, based on survey research, appeared in 1929.

## 2World War II and the Post-War Behavioral Revolution

The Chicago School continued its productivity up to the late 1930s, when the University administration under Hutchins attacked the value of empirical research in the social sciences. Several of the leading professors in the Department of Philosophy, including George Herbert Mead and others of its leading "pragmatists" resigned and went to other universities. In political science, Lasswell and Gosnell resigned, and Merriam's retirement brought the productivity of the Chicago Department of Political Science almost to a halt. However, the Chicago School had reached a mass which assured its future in the country at large. Herman Pritchett continued his innovative work in public law at the University of Chicago; Lasswell continued his work at Yale, inspiring Dahl, Lindblom and Lane in their transformation of the Yale department. V. O. Key, Jr., at Harvard, produced several generations of students with empirical and quantitative research interests in political parties, elections and public opinion. David Truman and Avery Leiserson brought the study of interest groups to theoretical fruition. William T. R. Fox, Klaus Knorr and Bernard Brodie and the present author and their students brought University of Chicago international relations and comparative politics to Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Stanford, MIT and the Rand Corporation.

World War II turned out to be a laboratory and an important training experience for many of the scholars who would seed the "behavioral revolution." The problems of how to insure the high rate of agricultural and industrial production on the part of a reduced labor force, how to recruit and train soldiers, sailors and airmen, and later how to discharge and return them to civilian life, how to sell war bonds, how to control consumption and inflation, how to monitor internal morale and the attitudes of allies and enemies, created demand for social science personnel in all the branches of the military and civilian services. The war effort created pools of social science expertise which, on the conclusion of the war, were fed back into the growing academic institutions of the post-war decades.

Working for the Department of Justice, Lasswell developed systematic quantitative content analysis for the monitoring of the foreign language press, and the study of allied and enemy propaganda in the United States.

He also participated with social scientists such as Hans Speier, Goodwin Watson, Nathan Leites and Edward Shils in the work of an analysis division in the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission, which among other things analyzed the content of Nazi communications for information on internal political and morale conditions in Germany and occupied Europe. Survey research techniques, other kinds of interviewing methods, statistical techniques, especially sampling theory, were brought to bear on the war-related problems of the various military services, the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury and Justice and such agencies as the Office of Price Administration and the Office of War Information. Anthropology, then in its psychiatric-psychoanalytic phase, was similarly drawn into the war effort. The causes of Fascism and Nazism, the reasons for the French political breakdown, the cultural vulnerabilities of Russia, Britain and the United States, were sought in family structure, childhood socialization and cultural patterns. The Office of War Information and the War Department drew on the anthropological and psychological expertise of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Cora Dubois, Clyde Kluckhohn, Ernest Hilgard, Geoffrey Gorer and others. Social psychologists and sociologists specializing in survey research and experimental social psychology—including Rensis Likert, Angus Campbell, Paul Lazarsfeld, Herbert Hyman, Samuel Stouffer and Carl Hovland—were employed by the Army, Navy and Air Force in dealing with their personnel problems, by the Department of Agriculture in its effort to increase food production, by the Treasury in its effort to market bonds, and by the various intelligence services, including the OSS. A younger generation of political scientists working in these various agencies during the war years experienced something like post-doctoral internships under the supervision of leading scholars in the social science disciplines.

The rapidly growing academic enterprise in the postwar and Cold War world drew on these war-time interdisciplinary experiences. The curriculum of political science and departmental faculties expanded rapidly in response to this broadened conception of the discipline and the spread of higher education. The study of international relations, stimulated by the important American role in the postwar and Cold War world, was fostered in mostly new research institutes at Yale, Princeton, Columbia, MIT, Harvard, spreading into the middle western and western universities in the 1950s and 1960s. New subspecialties such as security studies, international political economy, public opinion and political culture studies joined with the older subspecialties of international law, organization and diplomatic history in the staffing of these research institutes and political science departments. The new and developing nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle

East and Latin America, now seen as threatened by an aggressive Soviet Union, required area specialists and specialists in economic and political development processes and problems. Departments of political science expanded rapidly to accommodate these new area specialties and international relations programs.

The survey research specialists of World War II found themselves to be in great demand. Business wanted to know how best to market and merchandize its products; and politicians wanted to know the susceptibilities and intentions of their constituents. From small beginnings in the 1930s and 1940s, the field of survey and market research exploded in the post-war decades (Converse 1987). It had both commercial and academic components. The main academic institutions involved in this development were: the University of Michigan, with its Institute of Social Research and its Survey Research Center founded by the psychologists Rensis Likert, Angus Campbell and Dorwin Cartwright; the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, founded by sociologists Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton; and the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, headed in its early years by sociologist Clyde Hart. These three organizations in the postwar decades produced a literature and a professoriate that contributed substantially to the "behavioral revolution."

Among these three university centers, the University of Michigan turned out to be the most important in the recruitment and training of political scientists. Its Institute of Social Research established a Summer Training Institute in the use of survey methods open to young political and other social scientists as early as 1947. Over the years this program has trained hundreds of American and foreign political scientists in survey and electoral research techniques. In 1961 it established an Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), supported by subscribing universities and maintaining in machine-readable form a rapidly growing archive of survey and other quantitative data. This archive has served as the database for a large number of doctoral dissertations, articles in learned journals and important books illuminating various aspects of the democratic process. It has administered its own summer training program in quantitative methods.

In 1977 the University of Michigan, Survey Research Center Election Studies became the American National Election Studies supported by a major grant from the National Science Foundation, with an independent national Board of Overseers drawn from American universities. This organization—based at the Center of Political Studies of the Institute of Social Research of the University of Michigan, directed by Warren Miller, and with its Board of Overseers chaired by Heinz Eulau of Stanford

University—has regularly conducted national election studies, with input from the larger national political and social science community, and whose findings are available to the scholarly community as a whole (Miller 1994; below: chap. 11).

If we can speak of the University of Chicago school of political science as the agency which sparked the scientific revolution in the study of politics in the inter-war decades, surely the University of Michigan Institute of Social Research deserves a major credit for the spread of this scientific culture in the post-World War II decades into most of the major academic centers in the United States and abroad. Several hundreds of young scholars have been trained in survey and statistical methods in its Summer Training Institutes; scores of articles and dozens of books have been produced by scholars using its archival materials; the Michigan election studies have served as models for sophisticated election research in all the rest of the world.

The spread and improvement in empirical political theory involved more than election research technique and theory. Such fields as international relations and comparative politics grew as rapidly as did the field of American politics, and their newer growth involved quantification and interdisciplinary approaches. The major university centers of graduate training during the post-war decades—Yale, the University of California at Berkeley, Harvard, the Universities of Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Stanford, Princeton, MIT and others—turned out hundreds of political science PhDs to staff the proliferating and growing political science departments in American and in many foreign colleges and universities. Most of these centers of graduate training provided instruction in quantitative methods in the decades after World War II (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Crick 1959; Eulau 1976).

Under the leadership of Pendleton Herring, the Social Science Research Council in the 1940s to 1960s facilitated and enriched these developments through its graduate and post-doctoral fellowship and research support programs. Two of its political science research committees—the Committee on Political Behavior, and its spin-off Committee on Comparative Politics, were particularly active in spreading these ideas and practices. The Committee on Political Behavior provided direction and support in American election and legislative studies. The Committee on Comparative Politics led in the development and sophistication of area and comparative studies.<sup>50</sup> While most of the participants in these programs were American political and social scientists, around one-fifth of the

<sup>50</sup> For details, see especially its 1972 report.

participants in the conferences of the Committee on Comparative Politics during the years 1954–1972 were foreign scholars. Some of these—Stein Rokkan, Hans Daalder, Samuel Finer, Richard Rose, Giovanni Sartori, among others—were in turn leaders in movements in Europe and in their particular countries to expand and improve the quality of the work in political and social science.

The discipline of political science was becoming a modern “profession” over these years. Departments of Political Science, Government and Politics had first come into existence at the turn of the 19th century, when they began to be formed by an alliance of historians, lawyers and philosophers. By the first decades of the 20th century, there were free-standing departments in many American universities. The American Political Science Association was formed in 1903 with a little more than 200 members. It reached around 3,000 members at the end of World War II, exceeded 10,000 in the mid-1960s, and now includes more than 13,000 individual members. Most of these members are instructors in institutions of higher education, organized in a large number of subspecialties. Most political science teachers and researchers have obtained degrees as Doctors of Philosophy in political science in one of the major centers of graduate training. Qualifications for the degree normally involve passing a set of field and methodological examinations, and the completion of a major research project. Scholarly reputations are based on the publication of books and articles screened for publication by “peer review.” Advancement in scholarly rank normally requires evaluation by external reviewers specialized in the field of the candidate. There are dozens of political science journals, specialized by field and governed by the processes of peer review.

The half-century of political science training and research since the end of World War II has created a major academic profession, with many sub-specialties, and has made many substantive contributions to our knowledge and understanding of politics in all its manifestations. Area-studies research on Western and Eastern Europe, East, Southeast and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, carried on by literally thousands of trained scholars organized in “area study” centers in scores of universities and colleges, with their own professional organizations and journals—has produced libraries of informative and often sophisticated monographs.

A quick and selective review of substantive research programs may help us appreciate this growth of political knowledge. We have already described the spread and sophistication of election research. Its forecasting record may be compared with that of meteorology and of seismology. We have

made major progress in our understanding of political culture as it affects political institutions and their performance, as well as the cultures of important élite and other social groups. Examples from survey research include the work of Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, Alex Inkeles, Ronald Inglehart, Samuel Barnes and Robert Putnam.<sup>51</sup> More descriptive-analytical studies of political culture are exemplified in the work of Lucian Pye (1962; 1985; 1988; Pye and Verba 1965). Our understanding of political participation has been brought to a high level through a series of studies carried on over the last decades by Verba and his associates.<sup>52</sup>

In the early decades of the postwar period Talcott Parsons and others developed “system” frameworks for the comparison of different types of societies and institutions, building on the work of such European sociological theorists as Weber and Durkheim.<sup>53</sup> Drawing on these and other sources David Easton pioneered the introduction of the “system” concept into political science (Easton 1953; 1965; 1990; Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond and Powell 1966).

Through aggregate statistical methods, we now have vastly improved understanding of the processes of modernization and democratization<sup>54</sup> and of governmental performance.<sup>55</sup> Significant progress has been made in our understanding of interest groups and of “corporatist” phenomena,<sup>56</sup> and in our appreciation of the key importance of political parties in the democratic process.<sup>57</sup>

Theories of representation and of legislative behavior and process have been explored and codified in studies by Eulau, Wahlke, Pitkin and Prewitt.<sup>58</sup> Herbert Simon, James March and others, beginning from studies of governmental organizations, have created a new interdisciplinary field of organization theory generally applicable to all large-scale organizations including business corporations.<sup>59</sup> Public policy research, pioneered jointly in Europe and the United States, has taken off in recent decades and promises the development of a new political economy.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Almond and Verba 1963. Verba 1987. Inkeles and others 1950; 1959; 1974. Inglehart 1977; 1990. Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979. Putnam 1973; 1993.

<sup>52</sup> Verba and Ahmed 1973. Verba and Nie 1972. Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978. Schlozman and Verba 1979. Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1995.

<sup>53</sup> Parsons 1951. Parsons and Shils 1951. Parsons and Smelser 1956.

<sup>54</sup> Lerner 1958; Deutsch 1961; Lipset 1959; 1960; 1994; Diamond and Plattner 1993.

<sup>55</sup> Hibbs 1978; Cameron 1978; Alt and Chrystal 1983.

<sup>56</sup> Goldthorpe 1978; Schmitter and Lehbruch 1979; Berger 1981.

<sup>57</sup> Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976; Lijphart 1968; 1984; Powell 1982.

<sup>58</sup> Wahlke and Eulau 1962; 1978. Eulau and Prewitt 1973. Eulau 1993. Pitkin 1967.

<sup>59</sup> Simon 1950; 1953; 1957. March and Simon 1958. March 1965; 1988.

<sup>60</sup> Wildavsky 1986. Flora and Heidenheimer 1981. Heidenheimer, Hecló and Adams 1990. Castles 1989.



The theory of democracy has been significantly advanced by the work of Robert Dahl, Arend Lijphart and Giovanni Sartori.<sup>61</sup> That of democratization has been developed by Juan Linz, Larry Diamond, Phillippe Schmitter, Guillermo O'Donnell, Samuel Huntington and others.<sup>62</sup> The life-long dedication of Robert Dahl to the study of democracy is an example of how normative and empirical political theory may mutually enrich each other (Dahl 1989).

While we have stressed the growth and spread of empirical, explanatory and quantitative political science in this chapter, there has been “progress” in the older branches of the discipline as well. The propositions and speculations of the political historians, political philosophers and legal scholars have been increasingly based on improvements in scholarly methodology—rigorous accumulation of information, and refinements in the logic of analysis and inference. Comparative political history has made important contributions to the theory of the state, political institutions and public policy (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; 1984). Refinements in case study methodology have been made by Harry Eckstein and Alexander George, and these have increased the rigor of historical studies in comparative politics and foreign policy.<sup>63</sup> The methodology of comparison has been refined and improved through the work of Almond and his collaborators, Adam Przeworski and James Teune, Arend Syphart, Neil Smelser, Mattei Dogan, David Collier, and Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba.<sup>64</sup>

With the work of Rawls, Nozick, Barry, Walzer, Fishkin and others, normative political philosophy has made substantial progress, and not entirely without influence from empirical studies.<sup>65</sup> William Galston (1993), in the recent edition of *Political Science: The State of The Discipline II*, points out that political philosophy and theory are moving in the direction of increasing reliance on empirical evidence, much of it drawn from the research of political science and the other social science disciplines. Galston urges political theorists to take on the task of codifying the findings of empirical research as they may bear on political philosophy, as

<sup>61</sup> Dahl 1956; 1961; 1966; 1970; 1971; 1973; 1982; 1985. Lijphart 1968; 1984; 1994. Sartori 1987.

<sup>62</sup> Linz and Stepan 1978. Diamond and Plattner 1993. Schmitter, O'Donnell and Whitehead 1986. Huntington 1991.

<sup>63</sup> On the methodology, see Eckstein 1975 and George and McKeown 1982. For applications, see: George and Smoke 1974; George 1980; George et al. 1983; George and Simons 1994.

<sup>64</sup> Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond, Flanagan and Mundt 1973. Przeworski and Teune 1970. Syphart 1971. Smelser 1976. Dogan and Pelassy 1990. Collier 1993. King, Keohane and Verba 1994.

<sup>65</sup> Rawls 1971. Nozick 1974. Barry 1970. Walzer 1983. Fishkin 1992.

Robert Dahl (1956), Dennis Thompson (1970) and James Q. Wilson (1993) have done.

Martin Shapiro's (1993) evaluation of the contemporary study of the courts and public law similarly urges a closer integration of legal studies with institutional and processual political science. Political science without legal analysis is seriously lacking in explanatory power; and legal analysis without the political institutional and processual context is formalistic and sterile. The work of Shapiro and that of a growing band of students of the courts and public law demonstrates the validity of this proposition (see Drewry below: chap. 6).

Thus, our account of the history of political science is inclusive of progress made by the earlier traditional subdisciplines, measured by the same criteria. As the scientific revolution of the last century has impinged on the study of politics the response of the discipline of political science has been multivocal and ambivalent. Some parts of the discipline responded earlier to these challenges; and some parts saw the face of science as lacking in all compassion and empathy, and as a threat to humane scholarship. One ought not overlook the fear of obsolescence generated by the introduction of statistics, mathematics and diagrammatic virtuosity. But the newer generations cultivating the study of political history, philosophy and law have overcome these anxieties, discovered the vulnerabilities and shortcomings of the behavioral approach, developed their own arsenal of mystifications, and have proven to be quite as competent in the employment of smoke and mirrors as their behavioral brethren.

### 3 Political Science in Europe

While political science had its origins and first growth in the Mediterranean world of antiquity, in medieval Catholic, Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and 19th-century Europe,<sup>66</sup> this was a matter of individual scholarship—whether in institutional settings, as the Greek academies, or the European universities of the Middle Ages and later. Many early political philosophers and theorists operated as part-time scholars within the framework of the Church, its bureaucracy and orders, supported by kingly and aristocratic patrons, or were themselves aristocrats or persons of wealth. In the 19th century with the growth of European universities, scholarship on the state, administration, politics and public policy was increasingly based in universities. Until recently the typical unit of European universities consisted of a single professorial chair held by a single scholar surrounded by lesser docents and assistants. In the postwar

<sup>66</sup> And indeed in Indian antiquity (Rangavajan 1987) and in medieval Islam (Rabi 1967).

decades some of these university chairs have been broadened into departments with a number of professorial billets assigned to different teaching and research specialties.

A recent issue of the *European Journal of Political Research* (Vallès and Newton 1991) is devoted to the post-war history of West European political science. An introductory essay by the editors argues that the progress of political science in Europe has been associated with democratization, for obvious reasons, and with the emergence of the welfare state, because an activist, open, penetrative state requires large amounts of information about political processes and political performance. While recognizing that the impact of American political science on Europe has been very substantial, they point to the fact that there already was a “behavioral” election study tradition in Europe prior to World War II (Siegfried 1930), with Duverger (1951/1976) in France and Tingsten (1937/1963) in Sweden. The great 19th- and early 20th-century figures in the social sciences who inspired the creative developments in America were European, as we have suggested. Richard Rose (1990) points out that, while the major development of modern political science took place in the United States after World War II, the founders of American political science—the Woodrow Wilsons, the Frank Goodnows, the Charles Merriams—took their degrees or spent postgraduate years at European universities, principally the German ones. Learning, culture and professional skill were concentrated in the Old World, and it thinned out as one went west. In the period prior to World War I, American scholars still viewed themselves as provincials. In the interwar years, and in such an innovating center as the University of Chicago, Merriam still urged his most promising students to spend a postgraduate year in Europe and provided the financial support to do so.

The conquests of Nazism and Fascism and the devastation of World War II disrupted university life in continental Europe for almost a decade. Much of German social science scholarship was effectively transplanted to the United States, where it contributed to the American war effort and enriched American sociological, psychological and political science teaching and research. There was an entire “exiled” Graduate Faculty in the New School for Social Research in New York; and hardly a major university was without one or more exiled professors in its social science faculties. Scholars such as Paul Lazarsfeld, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Kohler, Hans Speier, Karl Deutsch, Hans Morgenthau, Leo Lowenthal, Leo Strauss, Franz Neumann, Henry Ehrmann, Otto Kirchheimer, Herbert Marcuse made important contributions to the behavioral revolution in the United States, as well as to the various trends which attacked it. Hence, the political science which was planted in Europe after World War II was in part the

product of a political science root-stock that had originally come from Europe.

In the first decades after World War II, as the physical plant of Europe was renewed and its institutions put back in place and staffed, what was new in the social sciences was mostly American in origin. The break from legalism and the historical approach in the study of governmental institutions, political parties and elections, interest groups, public opinion and communications had been accomplished in American universities and research centers. Along with the Marshall Plan for the shattered European economy, American scholars backed up by American philanthropic foundations were missionaries for the renewal of European scholarship and for the assimilation of the American empirical and quantitative approaches. Young European scholars supported by Rockefeller and other foundation fellowships visited and attended American universities by the dozens. America-based research programs—the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, the University of Michigan election studies, the Inglehart studies of political values—sought out European collaborators, trained them and often funded them.

This one-sided dependency only lasted for a short period of time. Social science scholarship and traditions were too deeply rooted in European national cultures to have been thoroughly destroyed in the Nazi period. By the 1960s, old universities had been reconstituted and many new ones established. European voices were increasingly contributing to the significant research output in the social sciences. The Committee on Political Sociology of the International Sociological Association, though joining American with European efforts, was predominantly European in participation. Its impact in Europe was much like that of the American Committee on Comparative Politics before it. Comparative European studies, such as the Smaller European Democracies project led by Dahl, Lorwin, Daalder and Rokkan, helped contribute to the development of a European political science professionalism. The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan began its active role in the development of sophisticated election research in Europe with a study in England in the early 1960s, followed by other European countries. Each such national election study left a cadre of trained professionals to carry on future work in election research.

A European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) was founded in 1970 with funds from the Ford Foundation (Rose 1990), with an agenda similar to that of the political science committees of the American Social Science Research Council. It provided funds for the establishment of a summer school training program in social science methodology (located at

the University of Essex), workshops held in different national centers concerned with particular research themes, actual joint research projects. Among the activities which it has fostered are a Data Archive and a professional journal, The European Journal for Political Research. Membership in the ECPR is by department and institution. By 1989 the ECPR had 140 member departments. By 1985 the Directory of European Political Scientists listed just under 2,500 members. The strength of political science in individual European countries is suggested by the number of national departments affiliated with the ECPR. Of the 140 members as of 1989, 40 were in the United Kingdom, 21 in Germany, 13 in the Netherlands, 11 in Italy, and 5 in France (Rose 1990: 593). The influence of American political science on European and international political science is reflected to some extent by the number of foreign members of the American Political Science Association, and hence subscribers to the American Political Science Review: the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan each have well over a hundred members; Israel, South Korea, and the Netherlands each have around fifty members; Norway, Sweden, and Taiwan have around thirty members; France has 27 (APSA 1994: 327 ff.).

By the 1990s, organized in the International Political Science Association, in various national and subnational organizations, as well as in many different functional specializations, the profession of political science along with a common conception of scholarship was well established globally.

## IV Opposing Perspectives on Disciplinary History

Those who would disagree with this progressive-eclectic account of the history of political science may be sorted out in four groups. There are those who reject the notion of a progressive political science—from an anti-science perspective (the Straussians); or from a post-science, deconstructive perspective. Then there are those who reject the eclecticism of our position. Among those are the Marxists and neo-Marxists, who argue that the basic laws of human society have been discovered by Marx and his associates and that these laws show that historic, economic, social and political processes, as well as the human action effecting these processes, are one inseparable unity; hence the Marxists would reject both the progressiveness and eclecticism of our approach. The second group rejecting the methodological eclecticism of our approach are the maximalists among the “rational

choice” political scientists, whose view of disciplinary history is one which culminates in a parsimonious, reductive, formal-mathematical stage.

## A Anti-Science

The Straussian version of the history of political science harks back to the German intellectual polemics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As a young German PhD in the immediate post-World War I years, Leo Strauss shared in the general admiration of Max Weber for “his intransigent devotion to intellectual honesty . . . his passionate devotion to the idea of science . . . ” (Strauss 1989: 27). On his way north from Freiburg where he had heard the lectures of Heidegger in 1922, Strauss describes himself as having experienced a Damascan disillusionment with Weber and a conversion to Heideggerian existentialism. Strauss's mode of coping with the pessimism of the Heidegger view of the nature of “being” was through an affirmative political philosophy, seeking the just society and polity through the recovery of the great exemplars of the canon of political philosophy, through dialogue and deliberation, and through the education of a civic élite.

According to Strauss, Weber was the problematic intellectual figure who legitimated modern positivistic social science, its separation of fact and value, its “ethical neutrality,” its effort to become “value free.” Strauss attributes to Max Weber the belief that all value conflicts are unsolvable. “The belief that value judgments are not subject, in the last analysis to rational control, encourages the inclination to make irresponsible assertions regarding right and wrong or good and bad. One evades serious discussion of serious issues by the simple device of passing them off as value problems.” This search for objectivity produces an

emancipation from moral judgments . . . a moral obtuseness . . . The habit of looking at social or human phenomena without making value judgments has a corroding influence on any preferences. The more serious we are as social scientists, the more completely we develop within ourselves a state of indifference to any goal, or of aimlessness and drifting, a state which can be called nihilism.

A bit later he qualifies this statement, “Social science positivism fosters not so much nihilism, as conformism and philistinism” (Strauss 1959: 21 ff.).

This attack on Weber has been extended by Strauss and his followers to the contemporary social sciences, and in particular to the “behavioral” trends in political science which Weber is said to have inspired. In contrast

to this “positivistic,” Weberian social science, Strauss presents a model of a “humanistic social science” in which scholarship is intimately and passionately engaged in dialogue with the great political philosophers over the meaning of the central ideas and ideals of politics—justice, freedom, obligation and the like. The history of political science timeline, which the Straussians offer in the place of the one presented here, characterizes contemporary “behavioral” political science as the product of a heresy which assumed palpable form in the 19th century and was fully formulated in the work of Max Weber at the turn of the century.<sup>67</sup>

Its characterization of Weber as the arch-positivist and separator of fact and value, and of “behavioral” political science as pursuing this erroneous course of “ethical neutrality,” is mistaken both with respect to Max Weber and with respect to most of the contemporary practitioners of so-called behavioral political science. Weber's views of the relation between “fact and value” are much more complex, and involve a deeper concern for value issues, than the caricature contained in the writings of Strauss and his students. We draw attention to two contexts in which Weber deals with these questions: in his lecture “Politics as a Vocation” (1949), and in his essay on “Objectivity in Social Science” (1958). In the lecture on “Politics as a Vocation” he refers to two kinds of ethically oriented political action—the ethics of absolute ends, and the ethics of responsibility (*Gesinnungsethik und Verantwortungsethik*). Science would have little to contribute to the ethics of absolute ends, other than examining the adequacy of the relation of means to ends. Since the chosen end is sacred or absolute, there can be no opportunity-cost analysis of the consequences of pursuing this end for other ends. But if one takes a rationally responsible view of the effect of means on ends, scientific analysis makes possible an “opportunity-cost” analysis of political action, that is, how a given choice of policy or action may, on the one hand, transform the end one is seeking, and on the other preclude the choice of other options. “We can in this way,” says Weber (1949: 152), “estimate the chances of attaining a certain end by certain available means . . . we can criticise the setting of the end itself as practically meaningful. . .or as meaningless in view of existing conditions.” Elaborating his argument about the ways in which means may effect ends in “unintended ways,” Weber (1958: 152) says,

we can answer the question: what will the attainment of the desired end “cost” in terms of the predictable loss of other values. Since in the vast majority of cases, every goal that is striven for does “cost” . . . something in

<sup>67</sup> For the full flavor of the Straussian challenge, see the essays in Storing 1962 and the debate they aroused in the *American Political Science Review* (Schaar and Wolin 1963; Storing et al. 1963).

this sense, the weighing of the goal in terms of unintended consequences cannot be omitted from the deliberation of persons who act with a sense of responsibility. . . . [Science can make one] realize that all action and naturally . . . inaction, imply in their consequences the espousal of certain values, and . . . what is so frequently overlooked, the rejection of certain others.

But in addition to this twofold means-end analysis, Weber (1958: 152) points out that science can enable us to clarify our goals, and comprehend their meaning. “We do this through making explicit and developing in a logically consistent manner the ‘ideas’ which . . . underlie the concrete end. It is self evident that one of the most important tasks of every science of cultural life is to arrive at a rational understanding of these ‘ideas’ for which men . . . struggle.”

“But,” Weber (1958: 152) goes on, “the scientific treatment of value judgments may not only understand and empathically analyze the desired ends and the ideals which underlie them; it also can judge them critically . . . ” according to their internal consistency. “The elevation of these ultimate standards . . . to the level of explicitness is the utmost that the scientific treatment of value judgments can do without entering into the realm of speculation . . . An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do but rather what he can do—and under certain circumstances—what he wishes to do.”

The reality of the Weberian fact-value formulation is as far from the Straussian caricature, as is its depiction of the state of contemporary empirical political science. We therefore reject the view of the history of the discipline implied in the Straussian perspective. On the other hand, we would include much of the substantive work done by these political theorists—and that of Strauss himself, in the work which we include in the progressive-eclectic account which we give here, to the extent that it has increased the body of logically drawn inferences about politics, from reliable accumulations of evidence.

## B Post-Science, Post-Behavioralism

Among contemporary political scientists, there is a prevailing, perhaps predominant view of the history of the discipline, that we are now, in a “post-positivist, post-scientific, post-behavioral” stage. Saxonhouse (1993: 9) speaks of the

demise of positivism and the demands for verification as the only philosophic stance for the human sciences, with the rejuvenation of normative



discourse in a society concerned with the dangers of an unleashed science . . . [P]olitical scientists in general and political theorists in particular are no longer willing to adopt uncritically the distinction of fact and value that controlled the social sciences for several generations . . .

A small subdiscipline in political science specializing in the “history of political science” pursues this theme. David Ricci, in a 1984 book called *The Tragedy of Political Science*, argues that the naïve belief in political “science” that had emerged in American political science in the 1920s to the 1960s had been thoroughly discredited in the disorders of the 1960s and 1970s. He concludes that political science as empirical science without the systematic inclusion of moral and ethical values and alternatives, and a commitment to political action, is doomed to disillusion. Political science has to choose sides or become a “precious” and irrelevant field of study. Even more sharply, Raymond Seidelman (1985) rejects political science professionalism, saying that modern political science must bridge this separation of knowledge and action “if [these professional] delusions are to be transformed into new democratic realities.”

There has been a substantial exchange of ideas about the “identity” and history of political science in the decade bounded by the two editions of Ada Finifter's, *Political Science: State of the Discipline* (1983; 1993). In the first, John Gunnell (1983, p.12 ff.) presents a picture of the history of political science marked by a “scientific” revolution in the half-century, from the 1920s until the 1970s, followed by a “post-empiricist” period continuing into the present. In the second edition, Arlene Saxonhouse (1993) makes the comments about the “demise of behavioralism,” quoted above. In the interval between these two volumes there has been a further exchange of views in the *American Political Science Review* among a number of historians of political science. In an article appearing in the December 1988 issue, “History and Discipline in Political Science,” John Dryzek and Stephen Leonard (1988: 1256)

conclude that there is no neutral stance for evaluating, accepting, or rejecting disciplinary identities. Rather, standards can only emerge in the conflicts and debates within and between traditions of inquiry. It is in this conflict and debate that the relationship between disciplinary history and identity crystallizes . . . [P]lurality is going to be the essence of, rather than an obstacle to, the progress of political science.

The view expressed here is that there will be as many disciplinary histories as there are “disciplinary identities” and that there is no “neutral” way of choosing among them.

A flurry of responses to this pluralist approach to the history of political

science appeared under the general title “Can Political Science History be Neutral?” (Dryzek et al. 1990). Contributions came from James Farr, John Gunnell and Raymond Seidelman, with a reply by Dryzek and Leonard. All three of the respondents support the “pluralist” view of disciplinary history expressed by Dryzek and Leonard, with some qualifications. In two recent collections of articles and papers treating the history of political science, James Farr and his associates (Farr and Seidelman 1993; Dryzek, Farr and Leonard 1995) codify this pluralist perspective.

We have to conclude from these exchanges that, at least among this group of contemporary writers on the history of political science, there is a “deconstructionist, postmodernist” consensus arguing that there is no privileged canon of political science. While each one of the major competing schools of political science history—the so-called “behavioral” or political “science” perspective, the anti- and post-science perspectives, and the Marxist and rational choice ones—makes claim to being the valid approach to disciplinary history, this consensus argues that no one of them has a valid claim. Our account of the growth of political knowledge defined as the capacity to draw sound logical inferences from an increasing body of reliable evidence, which these “historians” of political science refer to as “neopositivism,” would only be one of several accounts no one of which would have any special claim to validity.

Our treatment in this chapter advances and demonstrates in its historical account that there is indeed a “privileged” version of our disciplinary history and that this is a progressive one, measured by the increase of knowledge based on evidence and inference. It would include the work of the opposing schools, insofar as it meets these standards. It would exclude those claims and propositions not founded on evidence, or not falsifiable through evidence and logical analysis. Objective, rigorous scholarship is indeed the privileged thread in our disciplinary history.

## C Integralism and Maximalism: Anti-Pluralism

### 1 Theory and Praxis

There are several schools which would challenge the approach to the history of political science as the progress of “objective” scholarship, on the grounds that objectivity is both impossible to achieve and, if sought, leads to “scientism” and the embrace of the status quo. From this point of view even the search for professional objectivity is to be eschewed. One has to choose political sides and self-consciously employ scholarship in the

service of good political goals. For the various neo-Marxist schools this meant hooking scholarship up to socialism.

In the history of Marxist scholarship there was a point at which one branch of this tradition rejected this dialectical view of scholarship. Karl Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia*, concluded that objectivity in political science was possible. “The question, whether a science of politics is possible and whether it can be taught, must if we summarize all that we have said thus far, be answered in the affirmative.” He attributes to Max Weber the demonstration that objective social science scholarship is possible (Mannheim 1949: 146). But while objectivity becomes possible for Mannheim, this capacity is only likely to be developed “by a relatively classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the social order . . . This unanchored, relatively classless stratum is, to use Alfred Weber's terminology, the ‘socially unattached intelligentsia’ ” (1949: 171). For contemporary political science scholarship, “professionalism” has taken the place of Mannheim's “unattached intelligentsia” as the guarantor of the obligation of the search for objectivity—professionalism in the sense of affiliation to professional associations, peer accreditation and reviewing of recruitment and scholarship and the like. At the time that Weber and Mannheim were presenting these ideas, professional associations in the social sciences and particularly in political science and sociology were in their infancy. And it is of interest that it is precisely this notion of the search for objectivity through professionalism that continues to be the target of both contemporary neo-Marxist and of other “left” critics.

This polemic against “ethical neutrality” and the “search for objectivity” has been carried on from a number of perspectives. The Frankfurt School out of which “critical theory” emerged—inspired by the Marxist theorist Lukács and led by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and currently led by Jürgen Habermas—view the conduct of political inquiry as an aspect

of a total situation caught up in the process of social change. . . . Positivists fail to comprehend that the process of knowing cannot be severed from the historical struggle between humans and the world. Theory and theoretical labor are intertwined in social life processes. The theorist cannot remain detached, passively contemplating, reflecting and describing “society” or “nature” (Held 1980: 162 ff).

A recent formulation by Habermas (1992: 439 ff.) reaffirms this unity of theory and “praxis” perspective. The influence of this point of view was reflected in the deep penetration of views such as these into Latin American, African and other area studies, under the name of “dependency theory,” during the 1970s and 1980s (Packenham 1992).

How may we treat Marxist and neo-Marxist scholarship in this progressive-eclectic account of the history of political science? These literatures are very substantial indeed, running into the many hundreds of volumes and learned articles in very large numbers. Exemplary of the very important place some of this work must have in the history of political science are the important empirically based studies of class and politics which were largely the product of Marxist and neo-Marxist scholarship. Nevertheless, while Marxism directed attention to the explanatory power of economic development and social structure, it also diverted scholarly attention away from other important explanatory variables such as political institutions, religion, ethnicity, the international setting, individual leadership, contingency and chance. Its conception of economic development was oversimplified and primitive. As the modern economy produced an increasingly diversified labor force, and internationalized, the capacity of Marxist scholarship to perceive and properly weight economic, social, and political variables attenuated. Thus, while these various Marxist schools greatly increased the quantity and kind of evidence available to historical and social science scholarship, their inferential logic was seriously faulty and not properly open to falsification. Eric Hobsbawm (1962; 1987; 1994) and other Marxist historians (Hill 1982; Hilton 1990; Thompson 1963) make a great contribution to the historical scholarship on the 19th and earlier centuries, but have difficulties in their efforts to interpret and explain the 20th (Judt 1995).

## 2 Scientific Maximalism: The Rational Choice Approach

The rational choice approach—variously called “formal theory,” “positive theory,” “public choice theory” or “collective choice theory”—is predominantly a lateral entry into political science from economics. Economic metaphors had been used by political scientists such as Pendleton Herring, V. O. Key, Jr., and Elmer Schattschneider (Almond 1991: 32 ff.). But it was the economists—Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Downs, Duncan Black, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, and Mancur Olson—who first applied economic models and methods in the analysis of such political themes as elections, voting in committees and legislative bodies, interest group theory and the like.<sup>68</sup> In the 1993 edition of *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* the chapter dealing with “formal rational choice theory” describes this approach as promising “a cumulative science of politics.” Its co-authors claim that “rational choice theory has fundamentally changed how the discipline ought to proceed in studying politics and training students” (Lalman et al. 1993).

<sup>68</sup> Arrow 1951. Downs 1957. Black 1958. Buchanan and Tullock 1962. Olson 1965.

This approach holds out the prospect of a unified, cumulative political science theory—part of a unified, formal social science theory—based on common axioms or assumptions derived essentially from economics. These assumptions are that human beings are rational, primarily short-term, material self-interest maximizers. Its advocates argue that from such premises it is possible to derive hypotheses regarding any sphere of human activity—from decisions about what to buy and how much to pay for it, and whom to vote for, to decisions about whom to marry, how many children to have, how political parties should negotiate and form coalitions, how nations should negotiate and form alliances and the like. The theory is parsimonious, logically consistent, mathematical and prefers experimental methods to observational and inductive ones for the testing of hypotheses.

This is the maximal, aspirational version of the approach—encountered in the contribution to the *State of the Discipline II* volume cited above (Lalman et al. 1993), in Peter Ordeshook's "The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy" (1990), in William Riker's "Political Science and Rational Choice" (1990), in Mancur Olson's "Toward a Unified View of Economics and the Other Social Sciences" (1990), as well as in other writers in this genre. This approach argues a discontinuity in the history of political science, in which everything that went before had to be viewed as pre-scientific. Its vision of the future of the discipline is of a cumulating body of formal theory, internally logical and consistent, capable of explaining political reality with a relatively small number of axioms and propositions.

Some very eminent writers in this movement do not share in these maximal expectations. On such a question as the content of utility, some economists reject the model of Economic Man as the rational, material self-interest maximizer. Milton Friedman (1953) long ago took the position that it made no difference whether this assumption was correct or incorrect, just as long as it produced valid predictions. Just as long as it proved relevant at all, it could serve a heuristic function in testing the usefulness of different versions of utility. It is of interest that one of the pioneers of rational choice political theory, Anthony Downs, has long since moved his away from Political Man modelled on Economic Man; and he is now engaged in a major work on social values and democracy which assumes the importance of political institutions in shaping political choices, and the importance of the political socialization of élites and citizens in the utilization and improvement of political institutions (Downs 1991). Having lost contact with institutions through the reductionist strategy followed by this movement, now most of its practitioners are in search of institutions (Weingast below: chap. 5; Alt and Alesina below: chap. 28).

Robert Bates (1990), a pioneer in the application of rational choice theory in the study of developing countries, now favors an eclectic approach to political analysis. "Anyone working in other cultures knows that people's beliefs and values matter, so too do the distinctive characteristics of their institutions. . . ." He wants to combine the political economy approach with the study of cultures, social structures, and institutions. "A major attraction of the theories of choice and human interaction, which lie at the core of contemporary political economy, is that they offer the tools for causally linking values and structures to their social consequences."

This less heroic version of rational choice theory is quite continuous with so-called "behavioral" political science. And it is so viewed in this version of the history of political science. Its formal deductive approach to generating hypotheses has distinct uses, but it is not inherently superior to the process of deriving hypotheses from deep empirical knowledge, as some of its devotees claim. Green and Shapiro (1994: 10) argue that

formalism is no panacea for the ills of social science. Indeed, formal exposition does not even guarantee clear thinking. Formally rigorous theories can be inexact and ambiguous if their empirical referents are not well specified. Formalization, moreover, cannot be an end in itself; however analytically tight and parsimonious a theory might be, its scientific value depends on how well it explains the relevant data.

In a major critique of the empirical literature produced by the rational choice approach, Green and Shapiro (1994: 10) conclude:

exceedingly little has been learned. Part of the difficulty stems from the sheer paucity of empirical applications: proponents of rational choice seem to be most interested in theory elaboration, leaving for later, or others, the messy business of empirical testing. On our reading, empirical failure is also importantly rooted in the aspiration of rational choice theorists to come up with universal theories of politics. As a consequence of this aspiration, we contend, the bulk of rational-choice-inspired empirical work is marred by methodological defects.

To escape from this sterility Green and Shapiro advise rational choice theorists to

resist the theory-saving impulses that result in method driven research. More fruitful than asking "How might a rational choice theory explain X?" would be the problem driven question: "What explains X?" This will naturally lead to inquiries about the relative importance of a host of possible explanatory variables. No doubt strategic calculation will be one, but there will typically be many others, ranging from traditions of behavior, norms, and cultures to differences in peoples' capacities and the contingencies of

historical circumstance. The urge to run from this complexity rather than build explanatory models that take it into account should be resisted, even if this means scaling down the range of application. Our recommendation is not for empirical work instead of theory; it is for theorists to get closer to the data so as to theorize in empirically pertinent ways.

Responding to the Green and Shapiro critique, Ferejohn and Satz (1995: 83) tell us, “The aspiration to unity and the quest for universalistic explanations have spurred progress in every science. By ruling out universalism on philosophical grounds, Green and Shapiro surrender the explanatory aspirations of social science. Such a surrender is both premature and self-defeating.” On the other hand Morris Fiorina (1995: 87), a member of the more moderate, eclectic camp of the rational choice school, in answer to the Green–Shapiro critique minimizes the extent of universalism and reductionism in the rational choice community. He acknowledges, “Certainly, one can cite rational choice scholars who write ambitiously—if not grandiosely—about constructing unified theories of political behavior.” But these, according to Fiorina are a small minority. And in making extravagant claims, rational choicers are no different in their over-selling, from the functionalists, systems theorists and other innovators in the social sciences and other branches of scholarship. Thus two of the most important contributors to the rational choice approach adopt very different positions on the question of scientific maximalism—one defends it as an aspiration without which scientific progress would be compromised, the other offers a half-apology for its hubris, the other half of the apology being withheld since “everybody does it.”

The polemic regarding the larger aspirations of the rational choice approach leads us to subsume its accomplishments under our progressive-eclectic view of disciplinary progress, rejecting its maximal claims and view of political science and recognizing its positive contribution of a formal deductive approach to the arsenal of methodologies, hard and soft, which are available to us in our efforts to interpret and explain the world of politics. The movement to penetrate political science laterally, so to speak, without in many cases acquiring knowledge of the substantive fields that are proposed to be transformed, has led inevitably to a method-dominated strategy and an illustrative record of accomplishment, rather than a problem-focused strategy in which formal, deductive methods find their appropriate place.

## V Conclusion

The recent historians of political science, cited above, ask us to adopt a pluralist view of political science. The *methodenstreit*—the methodological war—of the 1970s and 1980s, they tell us, has ended in a stalemate. The idea of a continuous discipline oriented around a shared sense of identity has been rejected. There are as many histories of political science, they say, as many distinct senses of identity, as there are distinct approaches in the discipline. And the relations among these distinct approaches are isolative. There is no shared scholarly ground. We are now, and presumably into the indefinite future, according to these writers, in a post-behavioral, post-positivist age, a discipline divided, condemned to sit at separate tables.

What we propose in this chapter on the history of political science is a view based on a search of the literature from the ancients until the present day, demonstrating a unity of substance and method, and cumulative in the sense of an increasing knowledge base, and improvements in inferential rigor. There is a pluralism in method and approach, but it is eclectic and synergistic, rather than isolative. It acknowledges the substantive contributions of Marxist scholarship as exemplified in its history of social classes, the contribution of Straussians to the history of political ideas, the contribution of rational choice political science to analytical rigor, and the like. This pluralism is not “isolative,” it is eclectic and interactive, governed ultimately by its uncompromising commitment to rules of evidence and inference.

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