Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Today

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Introduction

The late Eric Hobsbawm[1] termed the twentieth century the "Age of Extremes," because of how it was dominated, and scarred, by the extreme right of fascism and the extreme left of communism. Nowhere is this more relevant than in Europe, which was torn apart by both political extremes for most of the twentieth century. It has only been since the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, that the continent could reintegrate within a liberal democratic context. Today, almost all European countries are democratic and most of these are members of the European Union (EU).

But while truly anti-democratic forces are marginal, reduced to (sometimes violent) sects on both sides of the political spectrum, liberal democracy is not without its political challenges in contemporary Europe. The most significant challenge comes from the populist radical right, which constitutes the third wave[2] of postwar far right politics, by far the most successful so far. While it doesn't attack the system in an all-out fashion like the political extremes of the early twentieth century, it presents a significant challenge to some of the core values of the European political system, i.e. liberal democracy.

This chapter will provide a comprehensive but inevitably concise overview of the populist radical right challenge to European liberal democracy. In particular, I would like to answer four separate but related questions. First, *what* is the populist radical right? Second, *who* are their main representatives? Third, *why* are they electorally successful? And, fourth, *what* is their political relevance in contemporary Europe? It should be clear that, despite the ongoing economic crisis, Europe is not reliving the 1930s. While European democracies are being challenged, they are strong and vigilant.

What is the populist radical right?

What is termed "populist radical right" in this chapter, is more generally termed "extreme right," "radical right," or "right-wing populist" in most academic and media accounts. This is in part a consequence of the fact that, unlike other party families (such as Greens and socialists), populist radical right parties do not self-identify as

populist or even (radical) right. Many reject the left-right distinction as obsolete, arguing that they are, in the terms of the French National Front (FN), "neither left, nor right, but French."

It is not surprising that a phenomenon that goes under many different names is defined in many different ways. But while there are widely different definitions out there, most authors define the essence of the "populist radical right" in fairly similar ways. This is in part a consequence of the professionalization of the study of the populist radical right, or perhaps better: the increasing dominance of social scientific studies over mainly historic or pseudo-scientific studies.[3] For example, today few scholars still use terms like "neofascist" and "extreme right," or argue that the parties in question are anti-democratic, racist, or violent.

Today, populist radical right parties share a core ideology that combines (at least) three features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.[4] While individual parties might have additional core features, such as anti-Semitism or welfare chauvinism, all members of the party family share these three features and in the case of all parties these three features constitute (part of) their ideological core. This is not to say that different parties will not express their ideology in different ways, for example by attacking different elites and minorities or holding dissimilar opinions on the death penalty.

Simply stated, nativism entails a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. It is an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative (or "alien") elements, whether persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation state.[5] Nativism is mostly directed at "immigrants" (i.e. guest workers and refugees) in Western Europe and "indigenous minorities" (e.g. Hungarians or Roma) in Eastern Europe. In the late 1980s nativism was primarily framed in ethno-national terms with economic concerns, but particularly since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 West European populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have shifted to an ethno-religious discourse with strong liberal-democratic and security concerns. Concretely, whereas previously "Turkish immigrants" were opposed because of their different culture and alleged drain on the economy and welfare state, today "Muslim immigrants" are rejected because of their purported anti-democratic beliefs and violent culture.

Authoritarianism refers to the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely.[6] This translates into strict law and order policies, which call for more police with greater competencies and less political involvement in the judiciary. The parties criminalize social "problems" (such as abortion, drugs, prostitution), call for higher sentences, less rights for criminals, and more discipline in schools. Often crime and immigration are directly connected; such as, for example, in the slogan "more safety, less immigration" of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV).

Populism, finally, is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.[7] Populist radical right politicians claim to be "the voice of the people" and accuse the established parties of being in cahoots with each other. For

example, the FN would refer to the four mainstream parties (of left and right) as "the Gang of Four," while the main slogan of the Flemish Bloc (now Flemish Interest, VB) was "One Against All, All Against One."

The three different ideological features are often interconnected in the propaganda of the parties.[8] All PRRPs devote disproportionate attention to crimes by "aliens," be they Roma in the East or immigrants in the West. Similarly, populism and nativism are often connected, as mainstream political parties are accused of ignoring immigrant crime (and suppressing any critique with political correctness) and of favoring immigrants at the expense of the native people. This has led some scholars to conflate the two, i.e. arguing that populism and nativism lead to the same exclusions. This is incorrect, however, as the nativist distinction is between natives and aliens, while the populist division between "the people" and "the elite" is *within* the native group!

Importantly, it is the combination of *all* three ideological features that makes a party populist radical right. Unlike the extreme right of the 1930s, the populist radical right is democratic, in that it accepts popular sovereignty and majority rule. It also tends to accept the rules of parliamentary democracy; in most cases it prefers a stronger executive, though few parties support a toothless legislature.[9] Tensions exist between the populist radical right and liberal democracy, in particular arising from the constitutional protection of minorities (ethnic, political, religious). The populist radical right is in essence monist, seeing the people as ethnically and morally homogeneous, and considering pluralism as undermining the (homogeneous) "will of the people" and protecting "special interests" (i.e. minority rights).

Who are the populist radical right?

In contemporary Europe the populist radical right mobilizes primarily in political parties, given that European politics *is* party politics. In fact, most street activists are *extreme* right, i.e. rejecting democracy *per se* (such as neo-Nazis); one of the few exceptions is the English Defence League (EDL). Given that no party self-defines as populist radical right, classification is up to scholars, and they tend to disagree almost as much as agree. While there are many parties that virtually all scholars agree on, such as the German Republicans (REP) or the FN, fierce debate exists on some others.[10] These debates are mainly related to the different definitions used, but are also the result of a continuing lack of detailed academic studies of several parties in smaller European countries.

Table 1 lists the highest and most recent electoral results of the sixteen main PRRPs in contemporary Europe.[11] What directly stands out, are the huge differences within both the highest results, ranging from 5.6 to 29.5 percent of the vote, and the most recent results, from 1.5 to 26.6 percent. The average *high* result of these successful parties is 14.7 percent, while their average most recent result is 9.5 percent.

It is important to note that Table 1 includes less than half of the roughly 40 European countries. In the other half of the continent PRRPs are electorally unsuccessful, consistently gaining less than 5 percent of the national vote (e.g. Estonia, Germany, Portugal), or do not contest national elections at all (e.g. Iceland, Ireland). In addition,

Table 1 Electoral results of main populist radical right parties, 1980–2014

Country	Party	Highest result (%)	Last result (%)
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	26.9	20.5
Belgium	Flemish Interest (VB)	12.0	3.7
Bulgaria	Attack	9.4	4.5
Croatia	Croatian Rights Party (HSP)	7.1	3.0
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DFP)	13.8	12.2
France	National Front (FN)	15.3	13.6
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	20.5	20.5
Italy	Northern League (LN)	10.1	4.1
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15.5	10.1
Poland	League of Polish Families (LPR)	8.0	—
Romania	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	19.5	1.5
Russia	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	22.9	11.7
Serbia	Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	29.5	2.0
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	11.6	4.6
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	12.9	12.9
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	28.9	26.6

the electoral successes of European PRRPs do not coincide in time; hence, the often-used metaphor of a populist radical right "wave" is only accurate if one uses fairly long time frames (of several decades). Only two of the 16 PRRPs in Table 1 gained their highest result in the last election (Jobbik and SD), while four are no longer represented in their national parliament (LPR, PRM, SNS, SRS).

In short, while PRRPs contest elections in the vast majority of European countries, they have been more or less successful in only half. Moreover, in many cases their electoral success was only short-lived. Today, PRRPs are relevant political actors in about one-third of all European countries, even if many seem to be beyond their electoral peak. This notwithstanding, the populist radical right is by far the most successful new party family in postwar Europe. In average electoral support only the Greens rival them, but they are only successful in Western Europe.

Why are they electorally successful?

The question why PRRPs are electorally successfully has dominated the field, largely driven by the idea that the populist radical right is a "normal pathology" in postwar Europe, a remnant of a pre-modern past, which should be limited to a tiny part of the population.[12] In line with the normal pathology thesis, the explanation is found in crisis: globalization has divided societies into winners and losers, and it is the latter that disproportionately support PRRPs.[13]

The globalization theory is the latest incarnation of the classic modernization theory, which has been dominating the field of nationalism studies.[14] Simply stated, the (underdeveloped) theory holds that globalization has interconnected the world economically, which has created insecurity for large parts of the population (the

"losers"), which look for salvation in the populist radical right. Globalization finds its most concrete expressions in mass immigration, post-industrialization, and European integration—in Eastern Europe this comes on top of the multifaceted transition from a socialist dictatorship to a capitalist democracy at the end of the last century.[15]

At first sight, the losers-of-globalization thesis seems to be confirmed by the socio-demographic profile of the typical populist radical right supporter: a white, lowly educated, blue-collar male. We also know that populist radical right voters tend to consider immigration more important than the average voter, believe there are more immigrants than there really are, and want to limit immigration.[16] But more comprehensive research points at the limits of the loser-of-globalization thesis.[17] First of all, white blue-collar males constitute only a small part of the electorate of successful PRRPs. Second, the majority of voters in most European countries share most of the populist radical right electorate's positions on immigration (crime, corruption, or European integration), so the difference is not so much in terms of attitude towards these issues, but in the *salience* of the issue to the individual.[18]

This is not to say that globalization is irrelevant to the electoral success of PRRPs. Rather, it explains both too much and too little. Defined in absolute or relative terms, there are many more losers of globalization than voters of PRRPs. Moreover, as Table 1 has shown, the electoral success of PRRPs differs greatly between countries, yet globalization affects European democracies in fairly similar ways. In short, globalization theory is too rough an instrument to explain the electoral successes of PRRPs. The reason is that it only focuses on the demand-side of populist radical right politics, i.e. it tries to explain why people would support PRRPs. It completely ignores the supply-side of politics, i.e. what established and populist radical right parties *offer* the voters and the political context in which they operate.[19]

While the electoral system might have an effect on the success of PRRPs,[20] most European countries have some form of proportional system, which is believed to favor the rise of new parties. Within multi-party systems, the behavior of established parties seems crucial, particularly in the breakthrough phase of PRRPs. If the established parties, most notably of the right, ignore populist radical right issues like crime, corruption, European integration, and immigration—or take centrist positions on it—PRRPs have an opportunity to exploit the existing frustration of parts of the population. At the stage of electoral breakthrough, i.e. the first electoral success and entry into parliament, the actions of the PRRP are probably less important than the inactions of the established parties—in part because they will not be well known to the broader electorate yet, in part as a consequence of the unofficial boycott by the mainstream media.[21]

Once a PRRP makes it into parliament, however, it will attract broader media and public scrutiny, and its actions will be vital for its future. There are many examples of PRRPs that have lost their electoral support as a consequence of incompetence and infighting, rather than a decrease in demand among the electorate. But while it is relatively straightforward to explain why some PRRPs fail to establish themselves in the political system, it is much harder to pinpoint the reasons for enduring success. There is no doubt that truly successful PRRPs, i.e. those that are able to maintain their electoral success over several elections, have an attractive leader, a well-run organization,

and professional propaganda.[22] Moreover, they often have particular *Hochburge*, (significant) local or regional strongholds, from which they have developed their national success and where they can recover from electoral defeat—examples include Antwerp for the VB, the Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur (PACA) for the FN, Žilina for the SNS, and Zurich for the SVP.

What is their political relevance?

While for long the literature was focused almost exclusively on debating the correct terms and theories to understand the rise of the populist right, only recently have scholars started to address the key "so what?" question. Are populist radical right parties relevant to contemporary European politics? And, if so, in what way and under which conditions are they relevant?

In both the academic and public debate about the populist radical right the answer to the so-what question was assumed to be clear and above debate: yes! This was based on a broad consensus that PRRPs constitute the main challenge to contemporary European democracies, even if there was a fierce debate about what that challenge exactly entailed—most notably, whether PRRPs are anti-democratic or anti-*liberal* democratic. With the mainstream media and politicians similarly obsessed with "the rise" of the populist radical right, leading to disproportionate attention after each individual electoral success of a PRRP, scholars in the field would seldom be challenged on the relevance of their topic. It was relevant *because of its ideological threat*!

Even well before PRRPs entered national governments, scholars would write about their important effects on mainstream parties and politics. Using rather vague terms like *Rechtsruck* ("pull to the right"), virtually every change in politics in the (assumed) direction of the populist radical right agenda was interpreted as a direct effect of PRRPs—even in countries where PRRPs were not present or relevant. Once different parties started to enter national government coalition, from 2000 onward, scholars finally turned their attention to the empirical study of their effects and influence.[23] Not surprisingly, the conclusions were much more modest and less straightforward.

In terms of direct power, i.e. government participation, PRRPs play at best a secondary role in European politics. Table 2 lists all government participation of PRRPs in European states since 1980. All in all, a mere twenty-one of well over three hundred European governments have included a PRRP since 1980.[24] The cases are fairly equally spread over the eastern and western parts of the continent, but most East European governments with radical right participation are of the 1990s, while most West European governments are of the twenty-first century. Still, at the end of 2014, only one European country, Switzerland, had a government that included a PRRP, while no European country had a minority government that was supported by a PRRP.

Given that most legislation in western democracies is initiated and passed by governmental parties, the fact that almost 95 percent of all European governments do *not* include a PRRP should be a caution to expecting too much influence. That said, non-governmental parties could influence the behavior of governmental parties

Table 2 Participation in government by populist radical right parties, 1980–2014

Country	Party	Period(s)	Coalition partner(s)
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	2000–2	ÖVP
		2002–5	ÖVP
	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	2005–6	ÖVP
Croatia	Croatia Democratic Union (HDZ)	1990–2000	
Denmark[1]	Danish People's Party (DFP)	2001–5	V & KF
		2005–7	V & KF
		2007–11	V & KF
Estonia	Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP)	1992–5	Isamaa
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	2011–12	ND & PASOK
Italy	Northern League (LN)	1994	AN & FI
		2001–5	AN & FI & MDC
		2008–11	PdL & MpA
Netherlands[1]	Party for Freedom (PVV)	2010–12	CDA & VVD
Poland	League of Polish Families (LPR)	2005–6	PiS & Samoobrona
Romania	Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR)	1994–6	PDSR & PSM
	Greater Romania Party (PRM)	1995	PDSR & PSM
Serbia	Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	1998–2000	SPS & JUL
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS)	1994–8	HZDS & ZRS
		2006–10	HZDS & Smer
Switzerland[2]	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	2000–	SPS & FDP & CVP

[1] Minority governments in which PRRPs function as the official support party.

[2] Swiss governments are longstanding, voluntary governments based on a "magic formula," rather than the outcome of the parliamentary elections.

through a variety of different mechanisms. I will here shortly assess the impact of PRRPs on four aspects of European politics: people, parties, policies, and polities.[25]

There is a lot of debate about whether the rise of PRRPs is the cause or the consequence of the rise of certain values. As Ronald Inglehart has shown, Europe has gone through a "silent revolution" since the 1960s, which has seen a sharp increase in the importance of socio-cultural over socio-economic issues.[26] While Inglehart and others used this theoretical framework to explain the rise of new social movements in the 1970s, and Green parties in the 1980s, various scholars have argued that PRRPs are the illegitimate children of the silent revolution.[27] According to some, they have even caused a "silent counter-revolution."[28]

Logically, PRRPs should have the strongest impact on issues and values that are directly connected to their ideological core; in the case of nativism this would be immigration and European integration, for authoritarianism it would be crime, and for populism the issue of corruption and dissatisfaction with democracy/the political system. Many scholars argue that PRRPs, through their agenda-setting power, have indeed impacted the issue positions (and salience) of the European people.[29] Backing this popular view up with some survey evidence, Charles Westin[30] concludes that: "When protest parties such as the VB and FN receive a considerable share of the vote, the gravitational centre of public opinion is shifted significantly to the right."

However, other studies show very different results, and all of them suffer from limited or problematic data. For example, with regard to mass attitudes toward immigration and integration, some studies find a significant effect,[31] while others find a more limited effect,[32] or no significant effect at all.[33] The picture is not much clearer on issues such as Euroscepticism, crime, and political dissatisfaction.[34] In fact, it looks like PRRPs have not needed to change the issue positions of large parts of the European public, because they were already largely in line with the core program of the parties.[35]

One of the most widespread ideas is that PRRPs have pushed the other parties to the right, most notably the mainstream right-wing parties. Jean-Yves Camus[36] voices this opinion on the basis of the French case: "the FN's ideas . . . have had an influence on the political agenda of the right on issues such as immigration, law and order, multiculturalism and the definition of national identity." It is particularly with regard to immigration policies that scholars have claimed the impact.[37] However, the picture is quite complex; the impact should be qualified in both strength and scope. In those cases that PRRPs have been able to influence other parties on the broader immigration issues, it has been across the political spectrum on immigration control (mostly political asylum), yet only on the right side of the spectrum on integration.[38] With regard to other issues, such as crime and Euroscepticism, the influence of PRRPs seems even more modest. In most cases mainstream (right-wing) parties needed little external stimulus to move to the right.

There is little doubt that most European countries have developed more authoritarian policies on issues related to immigration and integration as well as crime and national security since the rise of PRRPs started in the late 1980s. However, this rise is just a minor factor in the process. Hence, neither the electoral success of PRRPs nor their government participation seems to be highly related to the adoption of authoritarian policies.[39] In fact, almost all studies of governments with PRRP participation note the limited impact of the populist radical right;[40] even in the Berlusconi governments[41] and even on their key issue of immigration.[42]

In light of the limited influence on the people, parties, and policies of Europe, it should come as little surprise that PRRPs have not had much impact on the polities of Europe. Even when in government, PRRPs have not substantially changed the political system in which they operate. In line with their contentious ideological relationship with liberal democracy, several PRRPs have tried to undermine the liberal aspects of their democratic system; at times helped by other illiberal democratic parties—like the Italian *Forza Italia*[43] or the Slovak Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS).[44] In all cases they were fought back by a remarkably resilient coalition of opposition parties, civil society and, most importantly, courts.

Conclusion

Populist radical right parties are experiencing their biggest electoral and political success in postwar Europe history, but remain relatively secondary political actors at the same time. Just as the Great Depression did not lead to a Europe-wide rise in electoral support for fascist parties,[45] the Great Recession has not led to a Europe-wide

rise in electoral support for PRRPs. Both Adolf Hitler and Marine Le Pen are more the exception than the rule.

At the same time, warnings for a new Weimar era grossly overestimate today's challengers, while at the same time underestimating the contemporary democracies of (particularly Western) Europe.[46] The extreme right of the early twentieth century was fundamentally anti-democratic, rejecting both popular sovereignty and majority rule, yet the populist radical right of the early twenty-first century is anti-*liberal* democratic, rejecting minority protections and pluralism, but supporting popular sovereignty and majority rule. Even more importantly, while most European democracies were relatively new and lacking support in the 1930s, they are mature and broadly supported today.

At the same time, PRRPs are the most successful new party family of postwar Europe and are increasingly part of national governments—for the moment, without much success. There are at least five reasons for their governmental impotence. First, PRRPs focus on only a few issues, most notably immigration and integration. Second, political parties are just one of the major actors in the policy-making process and PRRPs tend to lack allies among the other major actors (such as bureaucrats and NGOs). Third, PRRPs are always junior partners in coalition governments, much less experienced than their coalition partners. Fourth, coalition agreements are the outcomes of the processes of policy convergence predating the government cooperation.[47] Fifth, PRRPs prefer to keep "one foot in and one foot out" of government.[48]

There is no reason this will continue forever, however. While the thesis that populist parties are destined for success in opposition but failure in government is popular in the academic literature,[49] it is factually incorrect. Like social democratic parties before the Second World War, and Green parties in the 1990s, populist parties can make the transformation from successful opposition party to effective governing party.[50] And as the (after)effects of the economic crisis will impact elections for many more years to come, and mainstream parties continue to converge with the populist radical right on socio-cultural policies, PRRPs will continue to challenge Europe's liberal democracies. But even in case of unprecedented success, the changes will not lead to a fundamental transformation of the political system, as the populist radical right is not a pathological normalcy of European democracy, unrelated to its basic values, but rather a pathological normalcy, which strives for the radicalization of mainstream values.

Notes

1 See his *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York: Pantheon, 1995).

2 Klaus von Beyme, "Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe," *West European Politics* 11:2 (1988), 1–18.

3 Tim Bale, "Supplying the Insatiable Demand: Europe's Populist Radical Right," *Government & Opposition* 47:2 (2012), 256–74.

4 For an elaborate discussion of the definition and ideology, see the first chapter of Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

 5 Ibid., 18–20.

 6 Ibid., 22–3.

 7 Cas Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," *Government & Opposition* 39:4 (2004), 543–63.

 8 On the ideology of PRRPs, see, among others, Sarah Harrison and Michael Bruter, *Mapping Extreme Right Ideology: An Empirical Geography of the European Extreme Right* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Cas Mudde, *The Ideology of the Extreme Right* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Marc Swyngedouw and Gilles Ivaldi, "The Extreme Right Utopia in Belgium and France: The Ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National," *West European Politics* 24:3 (2001), 1–22.

 9 See Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 138ff.

10 It would lead too far to discuss all categorizations in detail here (see ibid., 32ff). The most important parties that are excluded from this analysis, but that some other authors include, are the Dutch *List Pim Fortuyn* (LPF), the Finns Party (PS), the Greek Golden Dawn (XA), the Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ), the Italian *Forza Italia* (FI) and National Alliance (AN), the Latvian National Alliance (NA), the Norwegian Progress Party (FP), the Swedish New Democracy (ND), the Turkish Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). All share some but not all of the features of the populist radical right. In most cases the debate is over the question whether nativism (most often anti-immigrant sentiments) is ideological or opportunistic, i.e. only used strategically in election campaigns. The Greek Golden Dawn is excluded because it is an extreme right party, i.e. it is anti-democratic, rejecting popular sovereignty and majority rule.

11 I have included only PRRPs that have won more than 5 percent of the vote in at least *two* consecutive national parliamentary elections since 1980 and only one PRRP per country. The most important PRRPs that have been excluded are the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), which was always second to the FPÖ (from which it split), and the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), which only once gained more than 5 percent of the vote in national elections. Both parties have lost representation in their national parliament in recent elections.

12 Erwin K. Scheuch and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften," *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik* 12 (1967), 11–19.

13 See, among many others, Mabel Berezin, *Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and Populism in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Michael Minkenberg, "The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-Modernity," *Government & Opposition* 35:2 (2000), 170–88.

14 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

15 See, for example, Michael Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative Observations and Interpretations," *East European Politics and Societies* 16:2 (2002), 335–62; Sabrina Ramet (ed.), *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

16 See Cas Mudde, "The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue," *West European Politics* 22:3 (1999), 182–97.

17 See, most comprehensively, Tim Spier, *Modernisierungsverlierer? Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistischer Parteien in Westeuropa* (Wiesbaden: VS, 2010).

18 Cas Mudde, "The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy," *West European Politics* 33:6 (2010), 1167–86.

19　For one of the first comprehensive analyses of the supply-side, see Elisabeth Carter, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

20　See, among others, Kai Arzheimer and Elisabeth Carter, "Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success," *European Journal of Political Research* 45:3 (2006), 419–43; Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

21　See Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Part III. On the role of the media, see more elaborately David Art, *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David Art, "Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria," *Party Politics* 13:3 (2007), 331–49; Antonis A. Ellinas, *The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

22　Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, chapter 11. For a comprehensive study of radical right organizations, see David Art, *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

23　See Stefanie Frölich-Steffen and Lars Rensmann (eds.), *Populisten an der Macht: Populistische Regierungsparteien in West- und Osteuropa* (Vienna: Braumüller, 2005); Reinhard Heinisch, "Success in Opposition—Failure in Government: Explaining the Performance of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Public Office," *West European Politics* 26:3 (2003), 91–130.

24　I count the Swiss government as one, as it doesn't fundamentally change composition as a consequence of parliamentary elections. Obviously, even if I were to count them by parliamentary period, the overall percentage of European governments with PRRP participation would still be hovering around 5 percent.

25　Cas Mudde, "The 2012 Stein Rokkan Lecture. Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?," *European Journal of Political Research* 52:1 (2013), 1–19. Unfortunately, the issue of impact has so far been hardly studied within Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, much of this section focuses predominantly, if not always exclusively, on Western Europe.

26　Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

27　See, most notably, Herbert Kitschelt (in collaboration with Anthony McGann), *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); Paul Taggart, "New Populist Parties in Western Europe," *West European Politics* 18:1 (1995), 34–51.

28　Piero Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 22:1–2 (1992), 3–34.

29　Michael Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy Effects," *West European Politics* 24:4 (2001), 1–21.

30　Charles Westin, "Racism and the Political Right: European Perspectives," in Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 97–125 [123].

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