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Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO

Gregory L. Schulte

As Yugoslavia collapsed into conflict at the beginning of this decade, NATO was emerging from its Cold War posture and beginning to define its role on the new European scene. NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted in November 1991, acknowledged the new types of risks facing the allies. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was still seen as 'out of area' for NATO and peripheral to its traditional core functions. Moreover, the conflict was distant from the borders and concerns of one major ally, the United States, which was preoccupied with the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and the break-up of the Soviet Union.

For many observers in both Europe and the US, Yugoslavia was a European problem, to be solved by the institutions of Europe, not by NATO. Many saw this as 'the hour of Europe'. The EU's diplomatic machinery was harnessed to the UN's peacekeeping experience in a concerted attempt to alleviate the suffering and restore the peace. NATO sat on the sidelines, its relevance increasingly questioned on both sides of the Atlantic.

Extensive political efforts and brave humanitarian intervention could not, however, stop the internecine conflict. It became increasingly clear that diplomacy would not succeed in Bosnia unless backed by military force and the political will to use it if necessary. As diplomacy failed and the new Clinton administration began to play a more active role, NATO was increasingly called upon to provide the military clout. From 1993 to 1995, the mixture of UN humanitarian and traditional peacekeeping operations on the ground, intermittent peace negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere and NATO peace-enforcement in the air was not, however, an easy one. Tensions mounted within NATO and the situation on the ground deteriorated. The final outcome was far from clear until late 1995 when renewed negotiations in Dayton, Ohio – boosted by a three-week NATO air campaign that September, reinforced UN capabilities on the ground and a shift in the region's political and military balance – produced a peace agreement that ended the fighting.

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NATO's role in helping to create the conditions for the peace agreement and in implementing its military aspects vividly illustrates how the Alliance has adapted to the new security environment since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, it was this very involvement that gave impetus and reality to many aspects of NATO's transformation. The purpose of this article is, first, to review NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia through maritime, air and ground operations; second, to analyse the impact of these operations on the Alliance itself; and, finally, to consider some of the lessons for future NATO operations.

NATO's Involvement in Former Yugoslavia

NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia developed piecemeal, starting in 1992 with maritime and then air operations and culminating in 1996 with the deployment of a NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). All of NATO's operations are undertaken under the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC).¹ However, NATO has shifted from the role of a 'subcontractor' responding to UN requirements to a more active participant in seeking to stop the fighting and in defining its own mission and mandates.

Maritime Operations

In July 1992, at a meeting in Helsinki, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to mount a NATO operation to monitor the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions on the Adriatic Sea. *Operation Maritime Monitor*, activated for this purpose, took advantage of NATO's recently established Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). In November 1992, *Operation Maritime Monitor* became *Operation Maritime Guard* as UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 787 changed 'monitoring' to 'enforcement'. Rather than merely registering and reporting ships possibly violating the UN embargoes, NATO maritime forces began to stop, inspect and divert them as required. *Operation Maritime Monitor* was NATO's first out-of-area operation, and *Operation Maritime Guard* was the first in which the use of force was authorised to enforce a Security Council Resolution.

To step up enforcement of the UN embargoes under UNSCR 820, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) combined their separate maritime enforcement operations in June 1993. This operation, called *Sharp Guard*, was intended to catch violators not only in the international waters of the Adriatic, but also in the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to prevent coastal smuggling.² UNSCRs 1021 and 1022 phased out the UN embargoes in conjunction with implementing the December 1995 peace agreement. As a result, *Operation Sharp Guard* was suspended in June 1996 and terminated four months later.

In the course of enforcement operations, approximately 74,000 ships had been challenged, nearly 6,000 inspected at sea and over 1,400 diverted and inspected in Italian ports. Six ships were caught attempting to break the embargo, but none was reported to have succeeded. NATO and the WEU helped to contain the conflict and ultimately to bring pressure to bear on Serbia to support a negotiated

settlement. In addition, the phased termination of *Operation Sharp Guard* gave added incentive for Bosnian Serb compliance with transferring territory and conducting elections required by the General Framework Agreement on Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina.³

Air Operations

NATO air operations began three months after the start of its maritime operations. *Operation Sky Monitor* was activated in October 1992 to monitor the no-fly zone established over Bosnia by UNSCR 781. In March 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 816 authorising enforcement of the no-fly zone. Two weeks later, in April, NATO began enforcement by activating *Operation Deny Flight*. The rapid deployment of fighter and other aircraft for this operation was testament to the flexibility of allied air-power as well as to the substantial host-nation support provided by Italy, where most of the aircraft were based.

Operation Deny Flight neutralised the Bosnian Serbs' advantage in fixed-wing air-power. One of the few tests for the operation came in February 1994, when the Bosnian Serb air force attempted to evade NATO's enforcement by flying six *Galeb* aircraft at low altitudes to attack Bosnian Croat targets. Four of the six aircraft were promptly shot down by two US F-16s in NATO's first combat action in its 45-year history. NATO was less successful, however, in preventing the warring factions from using helicopters in violation of the no-fly zone. Helicopters were more difficult to detect and could land quickly if sighted; most importantly, however, those being used to carry civilians or for medical evacuation were difficult to distinguish from those undertaking military purposes.

No-fly-zone enforcement was further complicated by Bosnian Serb air defences, particularly after the shooting down of a US F-16 in June 1995. This incident, like several before it, demonstrated the vulnerability of NATO aircraft required to maintain continuous combat air patrols in Bosnian airspace despite the presence below of Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missiles. UNSCR 816 did not provide authority for NATO to attack systems on the ground, unless they demonstrated a direct threat to NATO aircraft. As a result, following the F-16 shoot-down, the presence of NATO aircraft in Bosnian airspace was limited, thus reducing the potential effectiveness of no-fly-zone enforcement except for the most egregious violations.

Resolution 816 authorised the use of force only in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 836 in June 1993 gave the authority for Alliance air-power to be brought to bear more directly on the situation on the ground. This Resolution authorised 'all necessary measures, through the use of air-power' to support the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in deterring attacks on the six 'safe areas' designated by the UN in April and May. NATO's first step under UNSCR 836 was to offer close air support, beginning in July 1993, to assist UNPROFOR in its own self-defence throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴ UNPROFOR soon began to exploit this offer

through frequent requests for 'air presence' to impress the warring factions with the availability of NATO air-power.

UNPROFOR's first actual request for close air support came in March 1994 as Bosnian Serb forces closing on Bihac attacked French UN forces located there. NATO aircraft were unable to engage effectively because of the time-consuming UN procedures for securing political authorisation from the UN Secretary-General. Thanks to the intervention of then NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner, UN procedures were streamlined and authority to approve requests for close air support was delegated to the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the theatre, Yasushi Akashi. This change was an improvement, but still did not assure UN forces with an effective source of immediate self-defence.

The availability of NATO close air support from July 1993 did little to change the immediate situation on the ground. In August 1993, with Bosnian Serb artillery pounding Sarajevo from the hills above, the US pressed the Alliance to threaten air-strikes 'at times and places of NATO's choosing' if the siege continued. Whereas close air support targeted forces attacking UNPROFOR, air-strikes were meant to play a larger deterrent role in protecting 'safe areas' by targeting a broader range of military assets. Several allies were reluctant to expand the role of NATO's air-power this way, fearing that it would undermine UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission and put their own soldiers in UNPROFOR at risk.

High-level political consultations and two all-night meetings of the NAC ultimately produced a compromise, and three 'operational options' for air-strikes were developed and presented to the UN in August 1993. These options ranged from a very limited use of air-strikes to more general strikes against military targets in and around the 'safe areas.' Instead of conducting air-strikes 'at times and places of NATO's choosing', though, the NAC agreed to obtain UN approval first. So-called 'dual-key' arrangements were agreed between the UN and NATO by which the UN Commander and the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) were to decide jointly on targeting and execution, once they had received the necessary political authorisation from their respective organisations.⁵

At the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, Alliance leaders reaffirmed their readiness to carry out air-strikes in order to prevent the 'strangulation' of Sarajevo, the 'safe areas' and other threatened areas in Bosnia. One month later, a mortar shell killed some 65 civilians in a crowded Sarajevo market-place. The UN Secretary-General asked NATO to be ready to attack from the air by heavy weapons firing on Sarajevo. From a military perspective, finding and attacking a specific 'smoking gun' was extremely difficult and risky for the aircraft involved. Therefore, NATO agreed to establish a 20km 'exclusion zone' around Sarajevo in February and around Gorazde two months later. It publicly announced that warring factions with uncontrolled heavy weapons in the exclusion zones, or attacking any of the 'safe areas' with heavy weapons, were subject to air-strikes on both the heavy weapons involved and associated military

targets. To demonstrate NATO's resolve, the NAC delegated authority to launch air-strikes – NATO's 'key' – to CINCSOUTH, Admiral Leighton Smith.⁶

A number of NATO's senior military advisers were concerned that air-power alone, without an effective capability on the ground, could not effectively protect the 'safe areas.' Nevertheless, the threat of air-strikes initially produced the intended outcome. NATO's expectations were clear and its military capability was unquestioned. Moreover, help came from another quarter in February 1994 as Russian Special Envoy Vitaly Churkin intervened and Russian UN peacekeepers were quickly repositioned to convince the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the 'exclusion zone' around Sarajevo. In May, NATO's Deputy Secretary-General Sergio Balanzino and General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), flew into Sarajevo and witnessed the relative calm induced by NATO's intervention.

The deterrent effect of NATO air-power soon eroded as the warring factions realised that the 'dual-key' arrangements prevented an immediate and effective response to violations of the exclusion zones and that heavy weapons left in the zone around Sarajevo were not subject to effective control. The threat of air-strikes was effectively neutralised as a result of UNPROFOR's vulnerability and natural reluctance to compromise its own mission, which depended on the factions' goodwill and cooperation. The mismatch of mission and capabilities between the UN on the ground and NATO in the air made it difficult to pursue a concerted approach to protecting the 'safe areas'. The exclusion zones remained, but their effectiveness diminished. This, in turn, jeopardised the security of the 'safe areas', particularly as the Bosnian Muslims used them as sanctuaries from which to mount military operations. A major NATO air-strike on the Udbina airfield in Serb-held Croatia in November 1994, after it was used to launch attacks on the Bihac 'safe area', did not restore the deterrent effect of NATO's air-power.⁷

A turning-point came when Bosnian Serb military forces took large numbers of UN hostages in May 1995 following a NATO air-strike near Pale and overran the Srebrenica and Zepa 'safe areas' in July. At the initiative of several NATO heads of state, including the new French President, Jacques Chirac, steps were taken to reinforce UNPROFOR with a rapid-reaction capability and to reduce its vulnerability by removing peacekeepers from isolated locations. But the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa demonstrated that strengthening UNPROFOR could not alone change the situation on the ground. After a July 1995 ministerial meeting in London, NATO initiated military planning to ensure that its air-power would be used in a timely and effective way in the event of threats or attacks against the remaining 'safe areas'. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali delegated authority to launch air-strikes – the UN 'key' – to the UN force commander, General Bernard Janvier.

In late August, following a mortar attack on Sarajevo from Bosnian Serb positions, NATO initiated a three-week graduated campaign of air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets. The operation, *Deliberate Force*, was carried out under the authority of UNSCR 836 and in full agreement with the

UN commander. Then NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes stated the operation's objective in clear terms: to reduce the threat to Sarajevo and to deter further attacks on the 'safe areas'.

Operation Deliberate Force achieved its objective when, after three weeks of air attacks, the Bosnia Serb leadership agreed to cease offensive operations and remove all heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone; to allow unimpeded access to the city by road and by air; and to formalise a cessation of hostilities. The operation also helped to re-launch the peace process, now led by US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, by showing that the international community was prepared to back diplomacy with the effective use of military force. This message was reinforced near the end of the operation by the use of *Tomahawk* cruise missiles launched from US naval forces.

Ground Operations

Prior to *Operation Deliberate Force* and the Dayton peace negotiations, a number of allied countries and Boutros-Ghali had voiced concerns about the continued viability and safety of UNPROFOR as the situation in former Yugoslavia deteriorated. In close collaboration with the UN, NATO had finalised provisional planning for *Operation Determined Effort* to withdraw UN forces from Bosnia and/or Croatia if requested by the UN Secretary-General. Forces were identified for the operation, command-and-control arrangements were agreed, provisions to transfer authority from UNPROFOR were discussed with the UN and arrangements were made with Croatia for the use of various facilities. Within the Alliance, consensus could not be reached on many of the arrangements for political oversight and command and control until the United States made clear that it was prepared to commit substantial ground forces to a 'NATO-led' operation.⁸

Full execution of *Operation Determined Effort* would have helped to extract the UN forces from a hostile environment, but this would have left the region in turmoil, with no clear means of restoring the peace. Fortunately, the operation never needed to be executed. Instead, NATO's preparations served to reinforce UN forces by bolstering the confidence of the contributing countries. In late September, following *Operation Deliberate Force*, NATO rapidly shifted its planning to implement the military aspects of a peace agreement.

From 1993 onwards, the NAC had tasked military planners at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons and NATO's Southern Command in Naples to consider how NATO could help to implement a succession of possible peace agreements. Preliminary planning was undertaken in close coordination with UNPROFOR and the results, once reviewed by the North Atlantic Council with the advice of the Military Committee, were shared with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.⁹

Thanks to these planning efforts, as well as the planning for *Operation Determined Effort*, NATO was in a good position to develop rapidly and agree a plan for *Operation Joint Endeavour* to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement that was initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995. Command-and-

control arrangements, rules of engagement and other aspects of the plan were based on those already provisionally approved for *Operation Determined Effort*, even though the missions of the two operations were fundamentally different.

On 1 December, with the UN Secretary-General's concurrence, the NAC authorised the deployment to Bosnia and Croatia of a theatre-enabling force of 2,600 personnel. On 16 December, two days after the peace agreement was signed and one day after the UNSC adopted the necessary Resolution, the NAC gave its final approval to the plan for *Joint Endeavour* and activated the operation. IFOR, commanded by Admiral Smith, assumed command of operations in Bosnia four days later, on 20 December.

IFOR's primary mission was to implement Annex 1A of the peace agreement. The tasks were demanding, but achievable: to maintain the cessation of hostilities in place since mid-October; to separate the armed forces of the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska by mid-January 1996; to transfer territory between the two entities by mid-March; to move their forces and heavy weapons into approved sites by mid-April; and to create a secure environment for the UN High Representative and other organisations responsible for implementing the civil aspects of the peace agreement. These tasks required patrolling a separation zone along the 1,400km-long inter-entity boundary line and establishing and monitoring over 800 sites containing heavy weapons and other forces. In carrying out these tasks, IFOR opened 2,500km of roads, repaired or replaced over 60 bridges, and freed up Sarajevo airport and the railway system.

The Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale were extremely suspicious of IFOR at the outset. This was not surprising, considering that they had participated in the Dayton negotiations only as part of President Slobodan Milosevic's delegation and subjected to three weeks of bombing by allied aircraft. Moncilo Krajišnik, the influential leader of the Bosnian Serb parliament, made his suspicions clear at the outset of the operation. The words of IFOR's commanders and the actions of its troops soon demonstrated that the force would implement the peace agreement even-handedly.

The 'even-handedness' of IFOR was different from the 'impartiality' of UNPROFOR. The UN Force was reluctant to single out one faction, for fear of compromising its mandate and imperilling the safety of its lightly armed troops. IFOR treated all factions equally, but had the capability and authority to take enforcement action against any party violating the terms of the peace agreement. Thus, for example, IFOR was prepared to take firm military action when it was denied access to Bosnian Serb military command-and-control facilities at Han Pijesak. It was equally prepared to employ military force against the Bosnian Muslim 'Black Swan' paramilitary forces operating in Sarajevo's separation zone. From June to December, over 2,700 unauthorised weapons were confiscated from all three former warring factions and destroyed. In repeated meetings with the parties, the NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana made clear that IFOR, and now the follow-on Stabilisation Force (SFOR), would carry out its responsibilities 'fairly, but firmly'.

At the outset of *Operation Joint Endeavour*, IFOR's main effort was focused on completing its own deployment and enforcing the early deadlines in Annex 1A of the peace agreement. In carrying out these tasks, IFOR helped to create a secure environment for the many other organisations involved in implementing the peace agreement's civil aspects. IFOR was not, however, able to meet all of their requests for support in such areas as logistics, accommodation, transportation and communications. Various NATO countries and headquarters became concerned that, in trying to meet all these requests, IFOR would find itself gradually assuming responsibilities for civil tasks, thus clouding its mission, confusing lines of authority and creating a 'dependency culture' among the other international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These concerns about 'mission creep' subsided once IFOR was established and had accomplished its major military tasks.

Over the course of its operation, IFOR provided substantial support to civil implementation across a broad range of areas. Much of the assistance was provided locally by national contingents at their own initiative. This included, for example, working with national funds and development agencies to organise community assistance projects such as the rehabilitation of schools and local infrastructure. Other assistance was directed by the NAC following written requests from the High Representative, Carl Bildt. This action started with transportation and communications support for the Office of the High Representative and culminated in the priority support devoted to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in preparing and conducting the September 1996 elections.

With the elections peacefully concluded, it was clear that IFOR would successfully complete its mission during its one-year mandate. It was equally clear, however, that much would remain to be accomplished on the civil side and that the environment would continue to be potentially unstable and insecure. Just after the Bosnian elections, at an informal meeting in Bergen, Norway, NATO Defence Ministers concluded that the Alliance needed to reassess how it might continue to support a secure environment after the end of IFOR's mandate in December. One month later, the NAC approved detailed political guidance for a study by the NATO Military Authorities of post-IFOR security options. In November and December 1996, a two-year civilian consolidation plan was established in Paris and elaborated in London under the auspices of the Peace Implementation Council. On the basis of this plan and the Alliance's own study of security options, NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence was needed to provide the stability necessary for the consolidation of the peace. They therefore agreed that NATO should organise SFOR, which was subsequently activated on 20 December 1996.

The mission of the NATO-led SFOR is to deter renewed hostilities and to stabilise the peace. While SFOR is roughly half IFOR's size, it retains the same unity of command, robust rules of engagement, enforcement authority and consent of the parties that made IFOR successful.¹⁰ The NAC intends to review SFOR's force levels at six and 12 months with a view to shifting the focus from stabilisation to deterrence and completing the mission by June 1998.

Bosnia's Impact on the Alliance

NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia has had a dramatic impact on the Alliance. As previously mentioned, NATO's new November 1991 Strategic Concept acknowledged the need to adapt the Alliance to the new security environment including risks emerging from outside NATO territory and other challenges to security short of outright military threats. But it was operations in former Yugoslavia that gave the immediate impetus for NATO's increased emphasis on peacekeeping and 'out-of-area' operations, as well as for many other aspects of its transformation. Change has occurred in many areas, including NATO's relationship with the UN and other organisations; its relations with Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries, including Russia; and its own internal adaptation.

Relations with the UN and Other Organisations

During the Cold War, NATO operated as a collective security organisation under Article 51 of the UN Charter. There was little need for contact between the UN and NATO, and East–West tensions kept the two institutions at arm's length. In former Yugoslavia, NATO began to operate under the authority of the UNSC and in conjunction with UN forces on the ground. Suddenly the two organisations needed to interact.

UNSCR 816, adopted in March 1993, required that enforcement of the no-fly zone be subject to close coordination with the UN Secretary-General and UNPROFOR. To meet this requirement, the military planners at NATO's Southern Command developed the plan and associated rules of engagement in close coordination with UNPROFOR. Once approved by the NAC, they were presented to the UN Secretariat in New York by a NATO team. To ensure effective communication between the UN and NATO headquarters, a liaison officer was established at the UN headquarters, thereby initiating a presence that has been maintained ever since. A liaison officer from NATO's Southern Command was also established at UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb and UNPROFOR headquarters exchanged liaison teams with NATO's Combined Air Operations Centre in Vicenza, Italy. No-fly-zone enforcement was relatively autonomous, however, and there was little interaction between NATO operations in the air and UN operations on the ground. Once enforcement began, NATO directed the operation and kept the UN informed.

The adoption of UNSCR 836 in June 1993 set the stage for more intensified interaction between NATO and the UN. Planning for close air support was conducted in close coordination with UNPROFOR, and NATO helped to train and equip the UN tactical air-control parties responsible for calling in and controlling close air support. The 'dual-key' procedures, agreed in August 1993 to allow for joint decisions on NATO air-strikes, were initially seen as a symbol of NATO–UN cooperation. Soon, however, they became a source of controversy because of the differing views of the two organisations on the purposes of air-power in a peacekeeping operation.

At an informal September 1994 meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Seville, then US Secretary of Defense William Perry called for the Alliance to

ensure that its air-power was used in a more timely and effective manner. Subsequently Perry flew to Split for a meeting with Akashi and senior UNPROFOR commanders to press them on this issue. A NATO team was dispatched to New York to pursue the matter with the UN Secretariat. The discussions in New York underscored the different institutional approaches of NATO and the UN, with NATO stressing the effective application of military power, even when used in a limited fashion, and the UN seeking to protect the traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality, consent and the use of force only in self-defence. The difference in philosophy was not bridged, although a set of practical understandings was ultimately agreed concerning such issues as timing, tactical warning and the number of targets to be involved in an air-strike. As a result, the November air-strike on Udbina airfield, while limited in scope, was more militarily effective than previous NATO air-strikes.

Some tension between the UN and NATO was perhaps inevitable in light of the two institutions' different approaches to conflict resolution. Furthermore, there was a clear divergence between the humanitarian mission assigned to the UN forces on the ground and the peace-enforcement mission assigned to NATO forces in the air. Nevertheless, the overall relationship between the UN and NATO, both in the region and between the headquarters in New York and Brussels, was excellent and characterised by a desire for mutual understanding and common solutions. Close personal relationships, such as the frequent contacts between their two Secretary-Generals, played an important role in keeping the two organisations on a common course.

The good relations between NATO and the UN paid important dividends in planning and carrying out the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in December 1995. This transition was carried out under the personal supervision of Kofi Annan, now UN Secretary-General. Since then, IFOR and now SFOR have continued to work closely with the UN in Bosnia, including with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF). IFOR has worked closely with the UNHCR in developing and implementing procedures for the return of refugees and displaced persons to the IFOR-supervised zone of separation between the Federation and Republika Srpska. IFOR has worked closely with the IPTF in its efforts to restructure and retrain the police forces of the two entities. There has also been regular joint patrolling of areas where tension exists or incidents are expected. A significant element of the IPTF's authority derives from its capability to call upon IFOR, and now SFOR, to remove checkpoints, disarm police or inspect police stations for unauthorised arms.

Support has also been extended to the UN International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by SACEUR and the ICTY in May 1996, IFOR has provided ICTY investigative teams with local area security and logistical support and has monitored suspected mass grave sites to prevent tampering. The MOU also contains arrangements to transfer to the ICTY any indicted war criminals

encountered by IFOR in the performance of its duties. IFOR's mission did not include the pursuit of indicted war criminals, which caused significant criticism, including from the ICTY's presiding judge. Nevertheless, IFOR's widespread presence limited the free movement of indicted war criminals and has ultimately helped to reduce their influence over the peace process. While neither of the two most prominent indictees – former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic – have been transferred to the Hague, both no longer occupy their previous positions of power.

Implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia has also brought NATO into closer contact with the OSCE. In June 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Oslo declared NATO's readiness to support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping activities under OSCE authority. While NATO and the OSCE soon developed closer contacts, it was the establishment of IFOR that provided NATO's first opportunity to give the OSCE practical support.

IFOR's most notable contribution to the OSCE in Bosnia was the significant planning, administrative and logistical support in preparing and conducting the September 1996 national and entity elections. This operation included providing planners to the OSCE Mission headquarters in Sarajevo, printing ballot papers and other election material, and transporting over 17,000 ballot boxes to and from 4,600 polling stations. In all, IFOR delivered some 650 tonnes of election material over 250,000km. SFOR is now preparing to provide the security framework for the 1997 municipal elections as well as other appropriate support, taking into account the reduced size of SFOR relative to IFOR.

IFOR and now SFOR are also assisting the OSCE in undertaking its responsibilities with respect to the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and arms reductions associated with Annex 1B of the peace agreement. They include supporting inspection teams and providing data on the number of heavy weapons stored by the parties in the authorised cantonment sites. SFOR has also been asked to take into account the parties' progress in arms-control implementation when deciding whether to grant permission to withdraw equipment from cantonments or to hold exercises.

Much of the assistance provided to the UN, OSCE and other organisations implementing the Dayton Accords has been provided or organised by some 350 civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) specialists deployed with IFOR and now SFOR. Largely reservists, these individuals have backgrounds in fields such as law enforcement, justice, education, public transportation, engineering, agriculture, public health and communications. They work in close cooperation with civilian organisations in Bosnia and many have been assigned by IFOR/SFOR to these organisations full-time as liaison officers, planners or staff support.

NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia has also provided the opportunity for practical cooperation with the WEU. When NATO activated *Operation Maritime Guard* in November 1992, the WEU also began maritime enforcement operations in the Adriatic. Running two separate operations in parallel, while unjustified militarily, was important politically at a time when each institution was seeking to demonstrate its relevance.

These arrangements could not be sustained when enforcement was stepped up under UNSCR 820. The need to move operations into the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia heightened the risk of military action, necessitated a single chain-of-command and more reliance on US naval assets to provide protection from attack. As a result, the combined NATO–WEU *Operation Sharp Guard* was activated in June 1993. The NATO and WEU Councils jointly directed the operation, and a NATO–WEU ‘Military Committee (Adriatic)’ was established to provide common military advice to the two Councils. However, the operation was executed through the NATO military chain of command, with operational control delegated to NATO’s Commander of Allied Naval Forces in Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) in Naples.

The arrangements for combined oversight by the NATO and the WEU Councils were never really tested. While allied forces challenged tens of thousands of ships, only a few incidents required political attention. Had more direction been required, the need to achieve consensus within and between the two Councils might have complicated decision-making while increasing opportunities for disagreement. For this reason, *Operation Sharp Guard* is probably not the best model for future NATO–WEU cooperation. Nevertheless, involving both NATO and the WEU in one combined operation met the political requirements of the time and has provided a good starting point from which the two organisations have explored other means of cooperation.

Relations with Partner Countries

NATO’s PFP programme was launched at its January 1994 summit, but practical cooperation with future PFP members had already begun as a result of NATO’s involvement in former Yugoslavia. One of the best examples is NATO’s cooperation with Hungary.

In October 1992, as NATO prepared to activate *Operation Sky Monitor*, computer analysis by the SHAPE Technical Centre had shown that radar coverage of Bosnian airspace could best be provided by positioning NATO airborne early-warning (NAEW) aircraft in two orbits – one over the Adriatic and another over Hungary. On 22 October, then NATO Deputy Secretary-General Amedeo de Franchis asked the Hungarian ambassador whether his government would permit Hungarian airspace to be used for this purpose. Nine days later, thanks to the prompt cooperation of Hungarian political and military authorities, NAEW aircraft began flying over western Hungary.

This NAEW orbit was accompanied by increased consultations between NATO and the Hungarian government on the situation in former Yugoslavia, as well as the exchange of early-warning information between NAEW aircraft and the Hungarian air-defence command. It also started an important pattern of cooperation that continued when NATO’s air operations expanded to no-fly-zone enforcement and then air-strikes, and when NATO approached the Hungarian government for access to various facilities in the event of a NATO operation to implement a peace plan in Bosnia or to extract UN forces in an emergency.

Another good example of early cooperation with a future PFP country was the arrangement with Albania for NATO ships to use its territorial waters in enforcing UN embargoes on the Adriatic Sea. As with Hungary, the government of Albania was more than willing to provide various forms of support for NATO operations.

Establishing PFP facilitated the creation of IFOR, but IFOR in turn dramatically increased the scope and content of cooperation with the PFP countries involved. In initiating planning for *Operation Joint Endeavour*, the NAC directed that it allow for the incorporation of non-NATO countries. Unlike the UN, which sought broad diversity in force contributions, the NAC established a specific group of countries from which to solicit non-NATO contributions: Russia and other PFP countries, and other countries then contributing to the UN forces in Bosnia or Croatia.

NATO's motivation in inviting external participation was partly practical. It made good military sense to build upon existing forces and infrastructure in theatre, rather than trying to establish a force from scratch. Access to Partner facilities in the region was also essential to the force's rapid deployment. But NATO's motivation was also political. The Alliance wished to engage its Partners in an actual peace-support operation. It also wanted to demonstrate that not just NATO, but a broad segment of Europe and the international community was committed to implementing a peace agreement.

On 5 December, nine days before the Dayton Accords were signed, NATO formally invited 14 non-NATO countries to contribute forces to IFOR. These countries were invited to sign Participation and Financial Agreements that were drafted for the IFOR operation. By the end of its mission, IFOR had contributions from 18 non-NATO countries, 14 of which were participating in PFP.¹¹ Some 20% of IFOR's personnel came from non-NATO countries. All Partners and other non-NATO countries contributing to IFOR also intend to participate in SFOR. Indeed, with SFOR half the size of IFOR, military planners at SHAPE have had to cope with an oversupply of outside contributions.

The Partners involved in IFOR and SFOR are gaining experience of cooperating with NATO in daily operations and are increasing force interoperability with the Alliance. At the same time, NATO has benefited from the extensive peacekeeping experience of Partners such as Finland and Poland. Indeed, without the transfer of Swedish forces from UNPROFOR, IFOR would have faced major difficulties in establishing the separation zone in the northern sector within the 30 days stipulated in the peace agreement.

An excellent example of multinational PFP cooperation was IFOR's NORDPOL brigade, in which forces from all of the Nordic countries, the Baltics, Poland and the United States patrolled side-by-side in northern Bosnia. Partners have also now been incorporated into SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, which is staffed by personnel from 25 countries.

Cooperation in IFOR and SFOR has brought closer contact with PFP countries not only in the field, but also at NATO headquarters and SHAPE. Contributing Partners have been involved at SHAPE in planning operations and

generating the necessary forces through the IFOR Coordination Centre, which was established in October 1995. At NATO headquarters, contributing Partners receive the same daily situation reports transmitted to NATO countries, and their representatives sit alongside those from NATO countries at regular briefings on current operations. Contributing Partners are also consulted at key junctures and given the opportunity to express their views or associate themselves with NAC decisions. The main mechanism for political consultation has been the so-called 'NAC + N' – the North Atlantic Council meeting with non-NATO contributors. The NAC + N has met nine times since December 1995 to consult on such issues as operational planning, rules of engagement, support to civil implementation, post-IFOR security options and activating SFOR.

NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia has also brought the Alliance into closer contact with Russia. In view of Russia's permanent membership on the UNSC, Russian officials were briefed in December 1992 on NATO plans to enforce the UN no-fly zone. Since then, Russian officials have been regularly briefed on NATO planning for air and other operations and were also kept closely informed during NATO air operations.¹² Close contact did not, however, guarantee agreement. On a number of occasions, the Russian government expressed its concern that NATO air-strikes favoured one party to the conflict. *Operation Deliberate Force* raised particularly strong reservations that needed to be overcome in bringing Russian forces into IFOR.

The participation of a Russian airborne brigade in IFOR and now SFOR represents a major step forward in Russian–NATO cooperation. But developing the basis for Russian participation was not easy. At an informal October 1995 meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Williamsburg, Virginia, US Secretary of Defense Perry negotiated the military command arrangements for Russian participation with then Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. These discussions were facilitated by inviting a senior representative from the Russian General Staff, General Leontii Shevstov, to come to SHAPE to familiarise himself with NATO command arrangements and terminology. In November, following a series of meetings between Perry and Grachev, arrangements were finally agreed whereby the Russian contingent was placed under the operational control of SACEUR through General Shevstov serving as SACEUR's deputy for Russian forces and under the tactical control of the US commander of the Multi-National Division (North).

The military command arrangements for Russian forces in IFOR have given Russian military authorities better access to SACEUR through his Russian deputy and thus more influence over the planning and conduct of operations involving Russian forces. Moscow has also been able to emphasise cooperation with the 'US military' rather than with 'NATO', which is important in Russia given the stigma still associated with the latter. Russian satisfaction with the military arrangements was evident when the current Minister of Defence, Igor Rodionov, asked his NATO counterparts, in a '16 + 1' meeting in Bergen, in September 1996, that the arrangements be extended for SFOR.

Whereas Perry negotiated the military arrangements for Russian participation, the task of negotiating the political arrangements was given to NATO's

International Staff. Negotiations ultimately resulted in agreement on a special consultative mechanism whereby Russia could introduce its views on matters affecting the Russian contingent prior to NAC decisions. This mechanism was spelled out in the Participation Agreement with Russia which was signed in March 1996, two months after the Russian brigade had arrived in Bosnia. Regular political consultations between NATO and Russia during the IFOR operation and preparations for SFOR have been marked by considerable commonality of views about the purpose and conduct of the two operations.

Cooperation on the ground between Russian and allied forces has also gone well. US and Russian forces have conducted regular joint patrols on both sides of the separation zone around the town of Brcko in north-eastern Bosnia. Russian forces have been involved in a number of sensitive operations, including providing local area security for ICTY investigations and intervening to prevent civil disturbances in the separation zone. There is a clear desire to demonstrate that the Russian military, despite domestic problems, is capable of operating effectively alongside the professional and well-trained armies of the West.

Russian participation in IFOR and SFOR has helped to maintain military stability in the sensitive area around Brcko and to mitigate Bosnian Serb concerns about NATO's balance in helping to implement the peace agreement. At the same time, Russia's participation has been one of the most positive elements in the overall NATO–Russian relationship and one of the few examples of close military cooperation despite Russia's entry into PFP in June 1994.

NATO's Internal Adaptation

NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia has further helped to propel certain aspects of the Alliance's internal adaptation. Two prominent changes involve the political oversight of military operations and French participation in NATO peace-support operations.

In dealing with Bosnia, NATO's political authorities have set aside procedures for managing traditional Article 5 operations. These procedures, derived from NATO's Cold War alert system, were oriented towards the rapid authorisation of various military measures to defend the Alliance against direct attack. The focus was on providing for immediate and collective self-defence, rather than on setting political objectives, operating under a UN or OSCE mandate and integrating operations with those of other organisations.

For Bosnia, NATO's political authorities had to grapple with means for providing closer political oversight over non-Article 5 operations for peace support. Close political oversight has not meant that the 16 allied governments have collectively managed complex operations on a daily basis. In the case of IFOR and SFOR, the NAC provided comprehensive political guidance at the outset of the operation, with substantial authority delegated to the theatre commander. The Policy Coordination Group, established in May 1996, has assisted the Council in linking policy and military aspects of SFOR by developing the policy guidance for studying and planning the operation.

While the military authorities have been granted significant authority, they in turn are expected to ensure an adequate and timely flow of information and

assessments, so that the NAC, in consultation with the non-NATO contributors, can provide additional political guidance if necessary.¹³ During the course of *Operation Joint Endeavour*, additional guidance was provided on topics including guarding suspected mass graves, support for the elections and the development of common institutions. General Joulwan, the SACEUR, has himself served as an important part of the politico-military interface between NATO's political authorities and the theatre commander, alerting the NAC to impending problems and ensuring that the Council's political guidance and concerns are understood in theatre.

The politico-military interface has operated satisfactorily during the course of the IFOR and SFOR operations. This smooth running has been facilitated by the absence of major military confrontations and the underlying political consensus among the 16 allies about the purpose and conduct of NATO's involvement. The modalities developed for political oversight now need to be refined and exercised as part of NATO's standing procedures.

A second significant contribution to NATO's internal adaptation has been France's decision to commit forces to Alliance military operations associated with former Yugoslavia. This began with the commitment of French fighter aircraft to *Operation Deny Flight* in April 1993. In the planning phase for this operation, the NAC debated how best to structure the command and control of the forces involved. Central to the debate was the question of whether the operation should be executed using NATO's military structure, in which France did not participate, or using *ad hoc* arrangements. Ultimately the Council agreed to use existing command arrangements, but to delegate the operational control of the fighter aircraft involved from the US admiral serving as CINCSOUTH in Naples to the Italian general commanding the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force in Vincenza.

France also joined in the mechanisms for political oversight. Prior to *Operation Deny Flight*, the 16-member NAC took the basic decisions about NATO's role in former Yugoslavia while the 15-member Defence Planning Committee, in which France did not participate, issued the implementing directives to NATO's military structure. In May 1993, once French fighter aircraft were committed to *Deny Flight*, the allies agreed that the NAC would begin to take the decisions previously reserved for the Defence Planning Committee. Also that year, France began taking part in the deliberations of NATO's Military Committee as it developed military advice for the Council concerning operations in former Yugoslavia.

Over time, French officers have joined various staffs at NATO headquarters, SHAPE and AFSOUTH responsible for planning and overseeing operations in former Yugoslavia. IFOR and SFOR have a French officer as the deputy commander and one of the three multinational divisions is headed by a French general. The enhanced military cooperation between France and the other allies has worked to everyone's benefit by strengthening NATO's political and military cohesion. It has also eased progress towards a future NATO command structure in which all allies will be able to participate fully.

Lessons for Future Operations

NATO has had major advantages in implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia. The Alliance had been preparing to implement a peace settlement in the region since 1993. Annex 1A of the agreement that was eventually signed contained clear, enforceable tasks that reflected NATO's own planning. The parties granted IFOR full authority and the necessary status of forces to carry out its mission. UNPROFOR – composed largely of forces from allied countries – was already in place, which greatly facilitated IFOR's deployment and its accomplishment of the initial military tasks. During the operation itself, compliance and cooperation by the parties was good, and IFOR only needed to take limited military action. Finally, and perhaps most important, there was a strong political consensus behind the operation that encompassed all the allies and also extended to Russia and the other countries involved.

All of these favourable conditions might not pertain for future peace-support operations undertaken by NATO. There may be less time for planning these operations or for assembling and integrating the necessary forces. NATO may not have ready access to the developed base structure and host-nation support of the kind provided by Italy. The risks may be higher, particularly if allied forces are operating in the presence of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Nonetheless, there are some useful lessons that can be drawn from NATO's experience with IFOR and SFOR about planning, civil–military cooperation and incorporating Partners.

Planning Future Operations

In conceiving both IFOR and SFOR, NATO tried to learn from the experience of UNPROFOR. The UN Security Council gave UNPROFOR a series of mandates that were both ambitious and ambiguous. These mandates could not be readily translated into a clear mission, and the force lacked the capabilities required.

In planning IFOR, the NAC carefully defined the mission, taking full account of advice from the Military Committee and SACEUR, and ensuring that the tasks assigned were clear and achievable. These tasks were written into the peace agreement by the negotiators in Dayton. The mandate for NATO's involvement was provided by the UNSC on the basis of the peace agreement, which embodied the consent of the parties and their agreement that IFOR could act as necessary to fulfil its mission. Finally, NATO exploited its existing military structures to assemble the required forces, using military effectiveness as the primary criterion for assessing national contributions. The result was a tight link between three elements: mission, mandate and capabilities. This tight link, which was missing for UNPROFOR, helped IFOR to succeed.

In preparing for SFOR, NATO sought to maintain a similarly tight link between its mission, mandate and capabilities. The allies ensured that NATO received a mandate from the UN and the parties comparable to that given to IFOR. The challenge has been in balancing the mission with a reduced force size. To prevent the force's mission from overreaching its capabilities, NATO

has had to prioritise both the military tasks and support to civil implementation. As a result, SFOR will not be able to maintain a presence throughout the separation zone, but will concentrate on areas where tensions are most likely. Similarly, SFOR will be unable to conduct regular inspections of all 800 authorised sites for heavy weapons and other forces, but only of those with significant combat potential. And, finally, SFOR's support to civil implementation will need to be selective, with military and civil planning carefully harmonised to make maximum use of SFOR's more limited assets.

Keeping a tight linkage between mission, mandate and capabilities is a key lesson for planning future operations. Another lesson for planning is the importance – but also the difficulty – of defining a realistic exit strategy. For IFOR, NATO adopted the clearest exit strategy possible: it declared that the mission would end after 12 months. While the specific tasks assigned to IFOR could be accomplished in that timescale – and they were – the need for a military presence nevertheless persisted because of difficulties in civil implementation and a continuing risk of local incidents escalating to military confrontation. What is needed for future operations is not a simple exit strategy for the military forces, but a strategy for overall success. This strategy should have clear objectives, set milestones, adequate resources and the backing of all the countries and organisations involved. Such a strategy was absent in December 1995, but is closer to being in place now thanks to the civilian consolidation plan developed in Paris and London in November and December 1996 under the auspices of the Peace Implementation Council.

Civil–Military Cooperation

Implementing the peace in Bosnia has reconfirmed that military success alone cannot guarantee overall success in a peace-support operation. Military stability is a prerequisite to peace, but a peace that endures ultimately depends on political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. Armed forces can separate warring factions, but they cannot force people to live together peacefully.

The negotiators at Dayton recognised the importance of the civil aspects of a peace settlement. The peace agreement's annexes addressed elections, constitutional matters, refugees and displaced persons, human rights and police monitoring. But, whereas NATO had spent several years planning for its role in a peace agreement, planning for civil implementation was significantly less advanced when the agreement was signed.

Organisations such as the UNHCR had years of experience in Bosnia and had already done some advance planning for implementing their responsibilities under a peace agreement. The OSCE, in contrast, had no experience in Bosnia and little opportunity to prepare for its role in overseeing the elections and the arms-control regime. Recruiting personnel for the UN IPTF took time and, as a result, the Force did not approach its required strength of 1,700 monitors until July. Carl Bildt was not nominated as the High Representative until December 1995 and did not have a full staff and budget until several months later. Even then, his ability to coordinate the planning and activities of the various civil

organisations was limited. The net result was that establishing civil structures and planning followed some way behind the deployment of IFOR. In consequence, NATO planners – focused on IFOR’s primary mission – completed military planning and preparations in relative isolation.

In preparing for future peace-support operations, NATO has in theory two options to ensure that planning for military and civil implementation are harmonised and mutually supportive: either the Alliance can develop its own organic capabilities for civil implementation – for example, running elections or deploying police monitors – or it can again rely on others’ capabilities. The first approach can probably be ruled out. The UNHCR has expertise that would be difficult to match in handling refugees and humanitarian relief. The UN and now the OSCE have experience in running elections, although neither has a standing capability to do so. It would make little sense for NATO to seek to replicate functions that should be the responsibility of other organisations.

The better approach is to ensure that NATO is in a good position to cooperate with these civil agencies in the future in order to maximise the collective prospects for success. NATO is not the only institution with a role to play in peacekeeping and crisis management; rather, the concept of ‘interlocking institutions’ means that each organisation needs to develop its own specialised capabilities while promoting close ties with the others. For NATO, this means improving the cooperative relations that it has established in Bosnia with the UN, OSCE and others. This can be done by continuing or even increasing the involvement of UN agencies, the OSCE and NGOs in the various peacekeeping and civil emergency seminars and exercises sponsored by NATO.

NATO must also develop doctrine and concepts for civil–military cooperation that allow military and civil planning to be effectively harmonised and to ensure effective military support to civil implementation. ‘CIMIC’ was a term relatively unfamiliar at NATO before IFOR; now both SHAPE and NATO headquarters are assigning staff to work specifically on CIMIC policy and operations. More NATO countries, as well as Partner countries, need to develop the type of CIMIC capabilities that have proved so useful in IFOR and SFOR, but that have been provided primarily from US reserve forces.

An area deserving special attention is the military’s role in helping to promote civil law and order in a society where the local police are incapable or unwilling to do so. Most allied military forces are neither trained nor equipped to act as civil police, nor are they anxious to assume this responsibility. In Bosnia, however, IFOR and SFOR have often found themselves trying to fill a gap between their own heavily armed presence and the unarmed IPTF police monitors. This gap has slowed implementation of the peace agreement in areas such as freedom of movement and return of refugees, and it has been exploited by the parties for their own purposes.¹⁴

Much has been done to close the gap between IFOR/SFOR and the IPTF through close cooperation, political measures and programmes to retrain and re-equip the local police. But a better solution needs to be found for future peace-support operations. Part of the solution will probably entail improved doctrine

and capabilities for promoting civil law and order during the peace-building process. This needs to be pursued outside NATO in the UN and perhaps elsewhere. Within NATO, more needs to be done to prepare allies' and Partners' armed forces to train and back up local police or to support international police monitors. This enhancement may entail the training of more military forces in crowd control, increased emphasis on the potential role of military police or other paramilitary units and further investigation into the potential of non-lethal weapons. It may also require increasing police advisory capabilities deployable with national military forces, perhaps in the form of reserve CIMIC units drawn from national law-enforcement bodies.

Regardless of the best solution, one lesson from Bosnia is clear: more thinking and resources need to be devoted to filling the conceptual and capabilities gap between military forces and civil police advisers in peace-support operations. Otherwise, future peace-building efforts will falter in the absence of local law and order, and military forces will be required to remain in theatre well after their military tasks are completed.

Incorporating Partner Countries

As with IFOR and SFOR, it is likely that NATO will want to involve Partner countries in future peace-support operations. Contributions can take many forms, from military forces to transit rights and host-nation support, and the reasons for seeking them are likely to be both political and practical. Political considerations could entail the desire to demonstrate widespread support for an operation. Practical considerations could involve the need for access to neighbouring territory or for additional forces, particularly in the case of a protracted operation.

None of the arrangements used to bring Partner countries into IFOR existed before the operation. They were invented for IFOR and updated as necessary for SFOR. NATO will want to develop standing procedures for incorporating Partner forces into future peace-support operations. These should involve generic Participation and Financial Agreements, derived from those drafted for IFOR, but available for use in any future operation; and a standing structure like the IFOR Coordination Centre at SHAPE to link Partners into NATO structures for planning operations and for generating and balancing the necessary forces. Regular PFP exercises across the full spectrum of peace-support operations would also facilitate the integration of Partner forces into future operations.

Attention must similarly be paid to the mechanisms for political consultations with PFP countries. One senior Partner official warned that they might lose interest in contributing to future operations if they are not more involved in the process of 'making' decisions, as opposed to the final act of 'taking' decisions. This view underscores the importance of ongoing work in NATO aimed at increasing opportunities for political consultations with PFP countries and allowing those who join future NATO-led operations to contribute to providing political guidance, drawing on the experience of both IFOR and SFOR.

Special arrangements will be necessary for incorporating Russia into the planning and conduct of future peace-support operations. NATO has proposed

to build upon the positive experience of the Russian military mission developed at SHAPE for IFOR through creating permanent Russian military liaison missions at major NATO military headquarters. Such a permanent presence would facilitate planning for Russian participation in future NATO-led operations. Enhanced arrangements at the political level are being considered as one element of the charter or other agreement that the Alliance aims to conclude with Russia by the time of the NATO summit in July 1997.

Finally, the PFP Planning and Review Process should be used to encourage development in Partner countries of military capabilities where IFOR and SFOR have shown that overall shortfalls exist, in areas like engineering, logistics and military police. As with IFOR and SFOR, it may be easier for Partner countries to contribute combat support or combat-service support to future operations, rather than actual combat forces. And it may be in these areas where contributions are most needed.

Conclusions

The challenge for NATO over the 18 months of SFOR is to create conditions for peace to become self-sustaining without the further need for a NATO military presence. This goal will require the close cooperation of Alliance countries and SFOR with the High Representative and other organisations to achieve significant progress in consolidating the peace.

New governmental institutions must be made to function; municipal elections must take place and their results be implemented; and the local police must be retrained and re-equipped. Progress must be made in returning refugees and displaced persons, rebuilding vital infrastructure and establishing effective, market-based economic policies and institutions. Arms reductions must be completed and the results of the international arbitration for Brcko must be implemented peacefully. Perhaps most crucially, the newly elected authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina must assume their responsibilities and promote reconciliation among the three ethnic groups. SFOR will play an important role, to one degree or another, in each of these areas.

Ultimately, an enduring peace will also require Bosnia and its neighbours to be integrated into Europe. The High Representative has asked the EU to take the lead in developing a regional strategy to bring Bosnia closer to the rest of Europe in the political and economic fields. An effective regional strategy will also need a security dimension to which NATO will have to contribute. Both Croatia and the previous Bosnian Muslim government have expressed interest in PFP. Once SFOR withdraws, PFP or a similar programme could be used to demonstrate NATO's long-term interest in regional stability. It could allow for an occasional NATO presence through exercises, promote democratisation and encourage the armed forces within Bosnia to cooperate with each other and to respect the CSBMs measures agreed under Annex 1B of the Dayton Accords.¹⁵

The most fundamental lesson to come from NATO's involvement in Bosnia is the continuing need for the Alliance. As described above, NATO is needed to help consolidate the peace in Bosnia and it will be required to promote stability

in the region over the longer term. NATO will also be necessary to project stability in other regions in and around Europe and to deal with new and possibly unforeseen risks, including those emerging from future ethnic strife or the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The instruments available to the Alliance for dealing with these challenges include its political and military structures, PFP, its relationship with Russia and its cooperation with other international organisations. All of these have been strengthened as a result of NATO's experience in former Yugoslavia, and can be enhanced further based on the lessons learned, thus better preparing the Alliance for its role in providing stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

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Notes

¹ Of over 100 UN Security Council Resolutions pertaining to former Yugoslavia, 22 have been directly relevant to NATO and eight have provided a specific mandate. No resolution has referenced NATO by name. Most refer to 'Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements'. Resolutions 1031 and 1088 (authorising the Peace Implementation Force and the Stabilisation Force, respectively) mention 'the organization [NATO] referred to in Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement'.

² Execution of *Operation Sharp Guard* was complicated by US legislation in October 1994 prohibiting US forces from participating in enforcing the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian government. Adjustments were made by the NATO and WEU military authorities to allow for continued participation of US forces without jeopardising effective enforcement of the UN embargoes. Nevertheless, the legislation exacerbated existing strains in the Alliance over the UN arms embargo.

³ UNSCR 1022 linked suspension of the

economic embargo on the Bosnian Serbs to the withdrawal of their forces behind the zones of separation established by the peace agreement. The Resolution linked the complete termination of the sanctions to the conduct of the elections. ⁴ NATO agreed in November 1994, under the authority of UNSCR 908, to extend close air support to UNPROFOR units in the UN Protected Areas in Croatia. Close air support remains available to the current UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES).

⁵ The term 'dual-key' had its origins in NATO's nuclear posture, since some nuclear weapons could only be employed with authorisation from both the nuclear power and the host country. For Bosnia, the 'dual-key' procedures at the operational level were invented by a Royal Air Force officer who had been taken from a nuclear unit to become the NATO liaison officer in Zagreb.

⁶ NATO's concept of an 'exclusion zone' was fundamentally different from the UN concept of 'safe areas' around which the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones were established. The UN drew the 'safe area' boundaries at the outer limits of the six designated towns while seeking the concurrence of the local warring factions. Attacks on the 'safe areas' were to be deterred through the mere presence

of UNPROFOR units authorised to use force or request NATO air-power only in self-defence. In contrast, the 'exclusion zones' established by NATO extended a non-negotiable 20km from the town centre, thus forcing Bosnian Serb heavy weapons out of range of the 'safe area' or into UNPROFOR's control. The NATO military commander was given the authority to attack any heavy weapons left uncontrolled in the exclusion zone from the air, together with other related military targets, following the expiry of a fixed deadline. The 'safe-area' concept was based on deterrence, but without any real sanction; the 'exclusion-zone' concept combined both compellence and deterrence, with a more serious means of enforcement.

⁷ This air-strike was conducted at the request of the UN force commander under UNSCR 958 which was quickly adopted by the Security Council to provide the necessary authority.

⁸ The North Atlantic Council and subordinate committees spent considerable time debating the role of the US general serving as SACEUR. Was he merely to transmit instructions from the NAC to the theatre commander, or was he to have a broader role in organising and overseeing the operation and providing military advice to NATO's political authorities? These discussions were as much about the future of NATO's peacetime command structure as about the command arrangements for this particular operation. Ultimately, in view of the complexities of mounting such a large-scale operation, the NAC agreed that SACEUR would have 'overall authority', a responsibility that was retained for IFOR then SFOR. SACEUR's ability to call rapidly on unique US assets in such fields as strategic communications, intelligence and heavy lift helped demonstrate the advantage of having a US officer in this position.

⁹ NATO's planning focused on the military aspects of the various peace plans; only limited planning took place on the civil side, despite Wörner meeting with Boutros-Ghali in October 1993 to urge the UN to develop a comprehensive plan for civil implementation.

¹⁰ Prior to adopting UNSCR 1033 authorising SFOR, the Bosnian Presidency and Foreign Ministers of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia exchanged letters with the NATO Secretary-General granting SFOR the same legal status as IFOR under Annex 1A to the peace agreement. This means that SFOR, like IFOR, can take whatever action it deems necessary to ensure compliance with Annex 1A, to provide for its own self-defence and freedom of movement, and to remove any threats to the peace. This also means that the status of forces and transit agreements negotiated in late 1995 with Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remain in place for SFOR.

¹¹ The 14 PFP countries that contributed to IFOR are Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. The remaining four contributors were Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia and Morocco, all which, bar Malaysia, participate in NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. Eight of the 14 PFP countries and all four of the others had participated alongside allied forces in UNPROFOR.

¹² After one air operation, an allied official complained that the Russian government was receiving information more promptly than NATO governments!

¹³ To help to ensure that IFOR would be sensitive to its likely concerns, the NAC agreed that the IFOR commander should appoint a political adviser familiar with NATO politics. This position has been retained for SFOR. The adviser works directly for the commander, but ensures

that the NAC receives adequate reporting on political developments.

¹⁴In Bosnia, the factions recognised that they could not challenge IFOR militarily, but that they could seek to obstruct or circumvent it through organised civil disturbances, a tactic previously used with UNPROFOR. A number of civil disturbances also developed when orchestrated crowds of Bosnian Muslim refugees, sometimes armed or accompanied by soldiers in civilian clothing, returned to sensitive parts of the separation zone and were confronted by Bosnian Serb police. Serious incidents occurred in Mahalla, Jusici and Gajevi in eastern Bosnia. On several

occasions, the situation could have easily deteriorated and resulted in civilian casualties, but IFOR forces on the scene responded calmly and professionally.

¹⁵Under the Bosnian Constitution contained in the peace agreement, the members of the collective Presidency exercise civilian command authority over the armed forces. An institution called the Standing Committee on Military Matters assists the Presidency in exercising this collective responsibility. NATO has offered SFOR's assistance in establishing this Committee, which could eventually help to provide the basis for NATO to establish a PFP or PFP-style programme with Bosnia as a whole.