

# Šta je klijentelizam i kako ga mjeriti

# Kontekst: Kako bi stvari trebalo da izgledaju i kako zapravo izgledaju

- Opis demokratije – obaveza izabranih predstavnika vlasti da sprovode obećane programe i da jednako distribuiraju troškove i koristi svim građanima, bez obzira na to da li su građani glasali za njihov program
  - Politička agregacija – elite predlažu niz programskih mjera i nude ih biračkom tijelu.
  - Birači razumiju vezu između izbora koji naprave i onoga što će uslijediti kao ishod redistribucije (Kitchelt, 2000)
- **Međutim**, u slabim i nekonsolidovanim demokratijama programska veza između birača i partija je rijetka.

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- Demokratska odgovornost se mijenja klijentelističkom odgovornošću,
  - Kao zamjena za “frequently non-credible, uninformative, or non-existing” programmatic packages - payoffs
- **Klijentelizam kao transakcija**= direktna razmjena glasa birača za “for direct payment or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2).
- Elementi:
  - Zavisnost od direktne razmjene,
    - manipulation of public resources,
    - patronage,
    - **vote buying**,
    - turnout buying,
    - abstention buying, etc. (Stokes et al., 2013)
  - prediktabilnost,
  - Monitoring.
- Akteri razmjene:
  - Patrons-patroni
  - Brokers-brokeri
  - Clients-klijenti
- Oblici:
  - Kupovina glasova: nuđenje novca biračima u zamjenu za određeni glas (glasanje ili apstinenciju)
- Vidovi:
  - Pozitivna
  - Negativna stimulacija
- **Klijentelizam nije krađa glasova**



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# Vrste klijentelizma

Tip brokera	Tip podsticaja	
	Pozitivni	Negativni
partijski	Novac, dobra i usluge	Nasilje
Državni	Administrativne usluge	Administrativne opstrukcije i kazne
Civilne i religijske organizacije	Socijalni benefiti, dobra i usluge	Društveno isključenje, isključenje od benefita
Poslodavci	Novčana davanja, selektivni benefiti, pozajmice	Otpuštanja i isključenje od benefita
Etnički lideri	Pristup društvenim dobrima, članstvo grup	Društveno isključenje, nasilje
Bande i kriminalne grupe	Novac	Nasilje

# Uslovi

- Sve partije distribuiraju sredstva
- Nije klijentelizam ako je korist „univerzalna“ i nije uslovljena glasanjem

Po Vašem mišljenju, da li zvanični rezultati  
Parlamentarnih izbora iz oktobra 2016. odgovaraju  
realnosti ili su pristrasni u korist nekog kandidata?

	N	%
U potpunosti odgovaraju	247	20.4
Djelimično odgovaraju realnosti	307	25.3
Ne odgovaraju realnosti	528	43.6
Odbija/ne zna	130	10.6

## Koliko često se po Vašem mišljenju dešavaju sljedeće stvari tokom izbora

	Stalno	Često	Ponekad	Uglavnom ne	Nikad	Ne zna
Glasovi se pošteno broje	21.6	15	12.4	24.7	15.6	10.8
Opozicioni kandidati su spriječeni da se slobodno kandiduju	9.1	13.9	18.2	22.8	21	14.9
Birači bivaju plaćeni da glasaju za nekog	24.7	29	21.4	7.4	7.2	10.3
Izborna administracija je pristrasna	13	17.2	24.2	19.6	8.7	17.3

## Jeste li imali sljedeće iskustvo tokom izbora

	Jeste	Nije
Neko Vam je ponudio novac za glasanje	13.3	83.5
Neko Vam je nudio neku administrativnu uslugu ili pomoć za glasanje	7.2	89.2
Neko je nudio Vama ili članu Vaše porodice posao za glasanje	7.3	87.7
Neko je pokušao da Vas ucijeni nečim (npr. gubitkom posla) u zamjenu za glasanje	5.4	89.9



## Da li se desilo ljudima u Vašem okruženju

	Jeste	Nije
Neko im je ponudio novac za glasanje	29.9	47.5
Neko im je nudio neku administrativnu uslugu ili pomoć za glasanje	19.9	56.5
Neko im je nudio ili članu njihove porodice posao za glasanje	22.8	52.8
Neko je pokušao da ih ucijeni nečim (npr. gubitkom posla) u zamjenu za glasanje	21.4	54.9

# An Expensive Loyalty: The Role of Ethnicity in Vote-Buying

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# Kakve veze ima klijentelizam sa glasanjem?

- “Ethnicity seems to be about how politicians define their constituencies, and clientelism is about how they service and maintain those constituencies” Corstange (2016)
- Why is clientelism often tied to ethno-politics?
  - Sharply defined patterns of ethno-cultural separation facilitate contracting, monitoring, and enforcing of direct clientelistic exchange between politicians and citizens as it incentivizes politicians and parties to compete only for support within their groups, rather than across groups.
  - Establishment of clientelistic exchange obstructs potential cross-cutting cleavages in their ethnic constituency (e.g. class, gender) (Kitschelt, 2000, Horowitz’s, 1985)
  - Ethnicity reduces transactional costs (Cornstange, 2016)
    - information flows are much cheaper and faster within ethnic groups
    - patrons can monitor and target clients at much lower cost

# U čemu je onda?

- The basic model of ethnic favoritism in which politicians reward their own and not bother to extend resources to their non-coethnics is **too simplistic**
- Scarcity of resources - patrons have to prioritize distribution of goods based on certain criteria.
  - The rules of ethnic neglect?
  - Distributive targeting
  - Not all coethnics will equally serve the purpose
  - Sometimes other ethnicities can be more beneficial clients
  - Ethnic monopsonies (Cornstange, 2016)

# Hipoteze

- H1: The incidences of vote buying are more frequent in ethnically homogeneous localities compared to heterogeneous localities
- H2: Vote buying is more prevalent among members of minority groups compared to members of rival ethnicity
- H3: Ethnic minorities (Albanians/Bosniaks/Muslims) living in “hostile” localities with dominant population of rival ethnicity (Serbs) are targeted more frequently compared to their co-ethnics in non-hostile communities and vice versa.



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# Zašto Crna Gora?

- Size in terms of population and geography and closeness between national, local and locality level, enables looking closely into phenomenon
- Density of social networks and importance of informal institutions,
- Predominant party system based monopolistic control of public resources that fosters spoils distribution
- ethnic diversity that sets the playfield for the practice
  - Montenegrins (44.9%), Serbs (28.7%), Bosniaks (8.6%), Muslims (3.3%) and Albanians (4.9%)
  - Independence referendum in 2006, the role of minorities
- Lack of belief in voter secrecy:
  - 31.7% voters don't believe that whom they voted remains a secret,
  - 39.6% said that they believed that politicians and their job supervisors could have found out whom they voted for,
  - 39.8% reported being personally contacted during campaign





Figure 1. Ethnic Composition of the Localities



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# Methodology

- **List experiment**
  - Vote buying (money)
- **Multilevel model**
  - Individual nested in localities
  - Varying intercepts
- **Data**
  - 7 out of 12 municipalities where local elections were
  - 1456 individuals in 97 localities (approx. 15 each)
  - Survey experiment + census data



Description of the Municipalities Included in the Study

Municipality	No. of citizens	No. of localities	Ethnic heter.	Compet.	Election winner	Turnover
Bar	42029	77	High	Low	Governmental	No
Bijelo Polje	46047	137	High	Medium	Governmental	No
Kolašin	8367	68	Medium	Low	Governmental	Yes
Pljevlja	30772	154	Low	Medium	Governmental	No
Plužine	3235	42	Low	Low	Opposition	No
Podgorica	185915	141	Medium	Medium	Governmental	No
Rožaje	22964	26	Low	Low	Ethnic minority	No

Figure 1. Ethnic Composition of the Localities

# Dizajn

## Senzitivni ajtem – indirektna razlika

### *Prva grupa*

*Ljudi u Crnoj Gori iz različitih razloga odlučuju za koju partiju će glasati. Sada ću Vam pročitati neke od razloga koje su ljudi naveli kao važne prilikom odabira za koga će glasati na lokalnim izborima održanim u maju 2018. godine. Pročitacu Vam cijelu listu i želim da mi kažete koliko navedenih razloga je uticalo na Vašu odluku za koga da glasate*

- Lično sam upoznao sve partijske kandidate kako bih sa njima raspravljao o kampanji
- Čitao-la sam novine svakog dana kako bih se informisala o izbornim kampanjama
- **Ponuđen mi je novac od strane članova političkih partija**
- Partije su postavile postere i bilborde u neposrednoj blizini mog mjesta stanovanja

**Koliko** od navedenih razloga se desilo Vama:

\_\_\_\_\_.

### *Druga grupa*

*Ljudi u Crnoj Gori iz različitih razloga odlučuju za koju partiju će glasati. Sada ću Vam pročitati neke od razloga koje su ljudi naveli kao važne prilikom odabira za koga će glasati na lokalnim izborima održanim u maju 2018. godine. Pročitacu Vam cijelu listu i želim da mi kažete koliko navedenih razloga je uticalo na Vašu odluku za koga da glasate*

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**Koliko** od navedenih razloga se desilo Vama:

\_\_\_\_\_.





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# Mjere

## Individualne nezavisne varijable (nivo 1):

- Ethnic background (nationality)
  - Serbs
  - Minority
  - (Montenegrin as reference category)
- Net household income
- Employment
- Education
- Type of settlement
  - Rural
  - Urban
  - suburban
- Age
- Sex
- Reciprocity scale (Perugini, 2003)

## Nezavisne varible na nivou lokaliteta (nivo 2):


- Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003)
- Dominant ethnic group in particular locality
  - Montenegrin dominated
  - Serb dominated
  - Minority dominated
- Competitiveness
- Access to resources
  - Municipal government,
  - Coalition partner in national government
  - Predominant party
- Unemployment

# Rezultati

- No design effect (Blair and Imai test 202)
- No "ceiling" and "floor" effect
- Successful randomization

Table 2. Randomization check

Variable	Control group	Treatment group	p-value
Education	3.78	3.83	0.52
Male	0.6	0.61	0.77
Age	54.8	54.21	0.7
Unemployed	0.22	0.21	0.59
Income	5.59	5.83	0.12
Minority	0.27	0.28	0.81
Serb	0.33	0.32	0.84
Rural	0.79	0.82	0.19
Reciprocity	3.22	3.19	0.35



Graph 1.

# Rezultati: *Kupovina glasova kao zavisna varijabla*

## Multilevel Regression Models for Vote Buying

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	1.34**	1.40**	1.38**
Competitiveness	0.12	0.09	0.08
Predominant Party	0.27**	0.27**	0.35**
National Coalition	-0.30	-0.35*	-0.36*
Municipality Government	-0.02	0.02	0.02
Unemployment	0.11	0.10	0.10
Ethnic Heterogeneity	-0.28*	-0.21*	-0.27*
Montenegrin Dominated	-0.12	-0.06	-0.09
Serb Dominated	-0.27	-0.17	-0.23
Minority Dominated	-0.33*	-0.50**	0.60**
Minority x Serb Dominated			1.18**
Serb x Minority Dominated			0.45
Minority		0.36**	0.33**
Serb		-0.13	-0.11
Income (H)		-0.07	-0.07
Education		-0.06	-0.06
Rural		0.17	0.15
Urban		0.30	0.26
Age		0.02	-0.02
Male		0.18**	0.19**
Pensioner/Student		-0.23**	0.12
Unemployment		0.07	0.11
Reciprocity		-0.12	-0.14
N	1062	1062	1062
J	97	97	97
AIC	2135	2127	2124
df (p-value)	/	22 (0.0001)	4 (0.020)



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# Osnovni nalazi

- List experiment proved to be very successful, as 20% of respondents have additionally “admitted” being offered money for their vote compared to typical self-reported measure
- Locality level:
  - Political competitiveness is not an important predictor of level of vote buying
  - Ethnic heterogeneity is negatively correlated with vote buying
  - Minority dominated localities more vote buying
  - The level of ethnic fractionalization significantly affects the level of vote buying
    - in Serb-dominated localities a member of national minority is more likely to be offered money than their counterparts not living in Serb-dominated community
  - Pre-dominant party in the locality increases chances to be offered money
- Individual level:
  - no evidence of socio-economic variables having direct impact on susceptibility to vote buying
  - gender effect