

Kako mjeriti klijentelizam?

Kontekst: Kako bi stvari trebalo da izgledaju i kako zapravo izgledaju

- Opis demokratije – obaveza izabranih predstavnika vlasti da sprovode obećane programe i da jednako distribuiraju troškove i koristi svim građanima, bez obzira na to da li su građani glasali za njihov program
 - Politička agregacija – elite predlažu niz programskih mjera i nude ih biračkom tijelu.
 - Birači razumiju vezu između izbora koji naprave i onoga što će uslijediti kao ishod redistribucije (Kitchelt, 2000)
- **Međutim**, u slabim i nekonsolidovanim demokratijama programska veza između birača i partija je rijetka.

Kontekst: Kako bi stvari trebalo da izgledaju i kako zapravo izgledaju

- Demokratska odgovornost se mijenja klijentelističkom odgovornošću,
 - Kao zamjena za “frequently non-credible, uninformative, or non-existing” programmatic packages - payoffs
- **Klijentelizam kao transakcija**= direktna razmjena glasa birača za “for direct payment or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2).
- Elementi:
 - Zavisnost od direktne razmjene,
 - manipulation of public resources,
 - patronage,
 - **vote buying**,
 - turnout buying,
 - abstention buying, etc. (Stokes et al., 2013)
 - prediktabilnost,
 - Monitoring.
- Akteri razmjene:
 - Patrons-patroni
 - Brokers-brokeri
 - Clients-klijenti
- Oblici:
 - Kupovina glasova: nuđenje novca biračima u zamjenu za određeni glas (glasanje ili apstinenciju)
- Vidovi:
 - Pozitivna
 - Negativna stimulacija
- **Klijentelizam nije krađa glasova**



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Vrste klijentelizma

Type of broker	Type of inducement	
	Positive	Negative
Partisan brokers	Money, goods, or favors	Violence
State employees	Administrative favors	Administrative obstruction and punishment
Civil society and religious organizations	Social benefits, goods and services	Social exclusion, exclusion from benefits
Private actors (employers)	Monetary transfers and selective benefits, loans	Layoffs and exclusion from benefits
Ethnic leaders	Communitarian ethos (“deference patterns” in Lemarchand 1972), access to social insurance	Social exclusion, violence
Gangs and militias	Money	Violence

An Expensive Loyalty: The Role of Ethnicity in Vote-Buying

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What does it have to do with ethnicity?

- “Ethnicity seems to be about how politicians define their constituencies, and clientelism is about how they service and maintain those constituencies” Corstange (2016)
- Why is clientelism often tied to ethno-politics?
 - Sharply defined patterns of ethno-cultural separation facilitate contracting, monitoring, and enforcing of direct clientelistic exchange between politicians and citizens as it incentivizes politicians and parties to compete only for support within their groups, rather than across groups.
 - Establishment of clientelistic exchange obstructs potential cross-cutting cleavages in their ethnic constituency (e.g. class, gender) (Kitschelt, 2000, Horowitz’s, 1985)
 - Ethnicity reduces transactional costs (Cornstange, 2016)
 - information flows are much cheaper and faster within ethnic groups
 - patrons can monitor and target clients at much lower cost

So, where is the problem?

- The basic model of ethnic favoritism in which politicians reward their own and not bother to extend resources to their non-coethnics is **too simplistic**
- Scarcity of resources - patrons have to prioritize distribution of goods based on certain criteria.
 - The rules of ethnic neglect?
 - Distributive targeting
 - Not all coethnics will equally serve the purpose
 - Sometimes other ethnicities can be more beneficial clients
 - Ethnic monopsonies (Cornstange, 2016)

Hypotheses

- Assuming that vote buying is a function of three ethnicity-related variables:
 - Ethnic composition of the locality an individual voter inhabits (**heterogeneous vs. homogeneous**)
 - The relative size of an ethnic group on the national level (**titular, rival or minority ethnicity**)
 - Relationship between voter's ethnic group and dominant group on the level of locality (**hostile or potential coalition partner**)
- H1: The incidences of vote buying are more frequent in ethnically homogeneous localities compared to heterogeneous localities
- H2: Vote buying is more prevalent among members of minority groups compared to members of rival ethnicity
- H3: Ethnic minorities (Albanians/Bosniaks/Muslims) living in “hostile” localities with dominant population of rival ethnicity (Serbs) are targeted more frequently compared to their co-ethnics in non-hostile communities and vice versa.

Why Montenegro?

- Size in terms of population and geography and closeness between national, local and locality level, enables looking closely into phenomenon
- Density of social networks and importance of informal institutions,
- Predominant party system based monopolistic control of public resources that fosters spoils distribution
- ethnic diversity that sets the playfield for the practice
 - Montenegrins (44.9%), Serbs (28.7%), Bosniaks (8.6%), Muslims (3.3%) and Albanians (4.9%)
 - Independence referendum in 2006, the role of minorities
- Lack of belief in voter secrecy:
 - 31.7% voters don't believe that whom they voted remains a secret,
 - 39.6% said that they believed that politicians and their job supervisors could have found out whom they voted for,
 - 39.8% reported being personally contacted during campaign




Figure 1. Ethnic Composition of the Localities




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Methodology

- **List experiment**
 - Vote buying (money)

- **Multilevel model**
 - Individual nested in localities
 - Varying intercepts

- **Data**
 - 7 out of 12 municipalities where local elections were
 - 1456 individuals in 97 localities (approx. 15 each)
 - Survey experiment + census data



Description of the Municipalities Included in the Study

Municipality	No. of citizens	No. of localities	Ethnic heter.	Compet.	Election winner	Turnover
Bar	42029	77	High	Low	Governmental	No
Bijelo Polje	46047	137	High	Medium	Governmental	No
Kolašin	8367	68	Medium	Low	Governmental	Yes
Pljevlja	30772	154	Low	Medium	Governmental	No
Plužine	3235	42	Low	Low	Opposition	No
Podgorica	185915	141	Medium	Medium	Governmental	No
Rožaje	22964	26	Low	Low	Ethnic minority	No

Figure 1. Ethnic Composition of the Localities



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Design

Sensitive issue – indirectly measured as mean difference between control and treatment group

Group 1

During the election campaign, people in Montenegro are exposed to a large number of events. Pull out the card which contains number of events that people listed as frequent during the local election held in May 2018. Read the whole list and tell me how many of these things apply to you. Please, do not tell me which events, just how many of them.

- I watched TV almost every day to learn about the campaign.
- The voting place where I was registered to vote remained the same as during previous election.
- **I was offered money by a party member.**
- I personally met all party candidates and discussed campaign with them.

How many of these happened during the last local election: _____.

Group 2

During the election campaign, people in Montenegro are exposed to a large number of events. Pull out the card which contains number of events that people listed as frequent during the local election held in May 2018. Read the whole list and tell me how many of these things apply to you. Please, do not tell me which events, just how many of them.

- I watched TV almost every day to learn about the campaign.
- The voting place where I was registered to vote remained the same as during previous election.
- I personally met all party candidates and discussed campaign with them.

How many of these happened during the last local election: _____.



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Measures

Individual level variables (level 1):

- Ethnic background (nationality)
 - Serbs
 - Minority
 - (Montenegrin as reference category)
- Net household income
- Employment
- Education
- Type of settlement
 - Rural
 - Urban
 - suburban
- Age
- Sex
- Reciprocity scale (Perugini, 2003)

Locality level variables (level 2):


- Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003)
- Dominant ethnic group in particular locality
 - Montenegrin dominated
 - Serb dominated
 - Minority dominated
- Competitiveness
- Access to resources
 - Municipal government,
 - Coalition partner in national government
 - Predominant party
- Unemployment

Assumptions

- No design effect (Blair and Imai test 202)
- No "ceiling" and "floor" effect
- Successful randomization

Table 2. Randomization check


Variable	Control group	Treatment group	p-value
Education	3.78	3.83	0.52
Male	0.6	0.61	0.77
Age	54.8	54.21	0.7
Unemployed	0.22	0.21	0.59
Income	5.59	5.83	0.12
Minority	0.27	0.28	0.81
Serb	0.33	0.32	0.84
Rural	0.79	0.82	0.19
Reciprocity	3.22	3.19	0.35



Graph 1.

First look...

Vote Buying Across Levels of Heterogeneity



Graph 2.

Multivariate analysis

- Multilevel model
 - Data: 1456 individuals in 97 localities
 - Variation: 15% of variation at the level of locality
 - Dependent variable: **reported number of items on the list**
 - Interaction with experimental group (control vs. treatment) to obtain individual level estimates (Blair & Imai, 2012)
 - Models
 - Model 1: Locality level independent variables
 - Model 2: Model 1 + Individual level independent variables
 - Model 3: Model 2 + interactions

Results:

Vote buying

Multilevel Regression Models for Vote Buying

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	1.34**	1.40**	1.38**
Competitiveness	0.12	0.09	0.08
Predominant Party	0.27**	0.27**	0.35**
National Coalition	-0.30	-0.35*	-0.36*
Municipality Government	-0.02	0.02	0.02
Unemployment	0.11	0.10	0.10
Ethnic Heterogeneity	-0.28*	-0.21*	-0.27*
Montenegrin Dominated	-0.12	-0.06	-0.09
Serb Dominated	-0.27	-0.17	-0.23
Minority Dominated	-0.33*	-0.50**	0.60**
Minority x Serb Dominated			1.18**
Serb x Minority Dominated			0.45
Minority		0.36**	0.33**
Serb		-0.13	-0.11
Income (H)		-0.07	-0.07
Education		-0.06	-0.06
Rural		0.17	0.15
Urban		0.30	0.26
Age		0.02	-0.02
Male		0.18**	0.19**
Pensioner/Student		-0.23**	0.12
Unemployment		0.07	0.11
Reciprocity		-0.12	-0.14
N	1062	1062	1062
J	97	97	97
AIC	2135	2127	2124
df (p-value)	/	22 (0.0001)	4 (0.020)



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Summary of findings

- List experiment proved to be very successful, as 20% of respondents have additionally “admitted” being offered money for their vote compared to typical self-reported measure
- Locality level:
 - Political competitiveness is not an important predictor of level of vote buying
 - Ethnic heterogeneity is negatively correlated with vote buying
 - Minority dominated localities more vote buying
 - The level of ethnic fractionalization significantly affects the level of vote buying
 - in Serb-dominated localities a member of national minority is more likely to be offered money than their counterparts not living in Serb-dominated community
 - Pre-dominant party in the locality increases chances to be offered money
- Individual level:
 - no evidence of socio-economic variables having direct impact on susceptibility to vote buying
 - gender effect

Way forward...

- Go beyond vote buying – social welfare
- Disbelief in vote secrecy - negative inducements
- Political competitiveness?
- Including new cases